Cephalus……………………………………………………….……126A

Zeno………………………………..….……………………….……127B

Parmenides…………………………………………………….……130B

1……………………………………………………………………137C
2……………………………………………………………………142B
3……………………………………………………………………155E
4……………………………………………………………………< 157B
5……………………………………………………………………159B
6……………………………………………………………………< 160B
7……………………………………………………………………< 163B
8……………………………………………………………………< 164B
9……………………………………………………………………165E

*Note from Brumbaugh on Theorem 1 first hypotheses: “Theorem I: Parts and Whole 1.2 (137c5)
So neither can it have a part, nor can it be a whole. Ar: How is that? This is marked as a theorem by the response, which is a question whenever a theorem or a subordinate proof within a theorem is introduced.
When we came from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the market-place. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said,

“Welcome, Cephalus if there is anything we can do for you here, let us know.”

“Why,” said I, “that is just why I am here, to ask a favour of you.”

“Tell us,” said he, “what it is.”
Cephalos: Immediately after we arrived at Athens from Clazomenae, the place of our abode, we happened to meet with Adeimantos and Glauccon at the place of assembly (the agora); and Adeimantos, taking me by the hand said …

Adeimantos: Welcome, O Cephalos, and if there is anything you need, of those things that we have here, of which we are able to provide, please ask.

Cephalos: Then on the one hand, I am certainly here indeed, for this very purpose, as being in need of your help.

Adeimantos: Please tell us, your need.

Cephalos: Then on the one hand, I am certainly here indeed, for this very purpose, as being in need of your help.
And I said, “What was your half-brother's name? I don't remember. He was only a boy when I came here from Clazomenae before and that is now a long time ago. His father's name, I believe, was Pyrilampes.”

“Yes,” said he.

“And what is his own name?”

“Antiphon. Why do you ask?”
Cephalos: What was your maternal brother’s name? For I do not remember.

For at that time he was just a child when I came here before to the assembly from Clazomenae; but since that time, a great length of time has already taken place.

But, his father’s name was, Pyrilampes, I believe.

Adeimantos: Quite so. (Πανυ γε.)

Cephalos: To be sure, but what was his name?

Adeimantos: Antiphon. But what is it that you need most to enquire after?

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὀμομητρίῳ τῷ ἤν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δὲ τοῦ ἤν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν: πολὺς δὲ ηδὲ χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρὶ, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα.

πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

αὐτῷ δὲ γε;

Ἀντιφῶν. ἄλλα τι μάλιστα πυνθάνη;
“These gentlemen,” I said, “are fellow-citizens of mine, who are very fond of philosophy. They have heard that this Antiphon had a good deal to do with a friend of Zeno’s named Pythodorus, that Pythodorus often repeated to him the conversation [126c] which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once had together, and that he remembers it.”

“That is true,” said he.

“Well,” I said, “we should like to hear it.”

“There is no difficulty about that,” said he “for when he was a youth he studied it with great care though now he devotes most of his time to horses, like his grandfather Antiphon. If that is what you want, let us go to him. He has just gone home from here, and he lives close by in Melite.”
Cephalos: You are aware, that these fellow-citizens of mine, are quite philosophical, 

Οἰδ᾽, τ᾽ πολίται εμοί, εἰσὶ μάλα φιλόσοφοι,

and have heard that this very Antiphon, was frequently present with one Pythodoros, 

τε ακηκόασι οτι ουτος ο Αντιφων πολλα εντετυχήκε τινι Πυθοδώρῳ

the companion of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory The Discourses/Logos which

126C εταιρω Ζηνωνος, και απομνημονευει τους λόγους ους

Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other at that time, having been often heard

Σωκράτης και Ζηνων και Παρμενιδῆς διελέχθησαν ποτε, πολλακις ακουσας

from Pythodoros.

του Πυθοδώρου.

Adeimantos: You speak the truth. (λεγεις Αληθη.)

Cephalos: Accordingly then, we are in need of hearing these discourses.

τοινυν δεομεθα διακουσαι, Τουτων .

Adeimantos: But this is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made Them

Αλλ᾽ ου χαλεπον , γαρ μειρακιον ων αυτους

the subject of quite focused attention; and indeed after that, he now applies himself very

ευ μαλα διεμελητησεν, γε επει νυν διατριβει πολλα

closely to equestrian affairs with his grandfather who also has the same name. Then if we must,

προς τα ιππικη κατα τον παππον τε και ομονυμον. αλλ᾽ ει δει,

let us go to him; for he just now went home from here; for he lives very near, in Melita.

ιωμεν παρ’ αυτον: γαρ αρτι οιχεται οικαδε ενθενδε, δε οικει εγγυς εν Μελιτη.
Thereupon we started, and we found Antiphon at home, giving a smith an order to make a bridle. When he had got rid of the smith and his brother told him what we were there for, he remembered me from my former visit and greeted me cordially, and when we asked him to repeat the conversation, he was at first unwilling—for he said it was a good deal of trouble—but afterwards he did so. Antiphon, then, said that Pythodorus told him
Cephalos: After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and we found him at home, handing a bridle to a coppersmith to be prepared in a certain way; but as soon as the smith was gone, and his brother had told him the reason for which we had arrived, he also recognized me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and he greeted us kindly; and upon our pleading with him to relate The Discourses/Logos, at first, he hesitated for he said it was a great deal of work— but afterwards, he most certainly set it out in detail.

Therefore, Antiphon said indeed, that Pythodoros spoke to say …
that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea; that Parmenides was already quite elderly, about sixty-five years old, very white-haired, and of handsome and noble countenance; Zeno was at that time about forty years of age; he was tall and good-looking, and there was a story that Parmenides had been in love with him.
**Antiphon:** At that time, Zeno and Parmenides arrived to celebrate The Great Panathenaea.

Thus, on the one hand, Parmenides was already quite well advanced in years, very gray-haired, but of a beautiful and good appearance, most nearly about sixty-five years of age; but that on the other hand, at that time, Zeno was nearly forty years old, but very tall and graceful to see; and he was said to have come to be the dear friend of Parmenides.

Zήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολῖον, καλὸν δὲ καγαθὸν τὴν οὐριν, μαλιστὰ περὶ ἐξηκόντα καὶ πεντε ἐτη, δὲ καὶ παρμενίδης τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολῖον, καλὸν δὲ καγαθὸν τὴν οὐριν, μαλιστὰ περὶ ἐξηκόντα καὶ πεντε ἐτη, καὶ εὐμήκη καὶ χαρίεντα ιδεῖν: καὶ αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι παϊδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου.
He said that they lodged with Pythodorus outside of the wall, in Cerameicus, and that Socrates and many others with him went there because they wanted to hear Zeno's writings, which had been brought to Athens for the first time by them. Socrates was then very young. So Zeno himself read aloud to them, and Parmenides was not in the house.
Then Pythodoros said that they lodged with him, in the Ceramicus, outside the walls; where indeed Socrates also arrived, and many certain others with him, who had set their heart upon hearing the written discourses of Zeno; for at that time, they first began to pay attention to his writings; since Socrates was very young at that time. Therefore, Zeno himself read to themselves, while Parmenides happened to be outside;
[127d] Pythodorus said the reading of the treatises was nearly finished when he came in himself with Parmenides and Aristoteles (the one who was afterwards one of the thirty), so they heard only a little that remained of the written works. He himself, however, had heard Zeno read them before.

Socrates listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said:
so that only a small part of the discourses still remained to be read,
καὶ εἶναι παντὸς βραχύ τῶν λόγων εἰτε λοιπῶν αναγιγνωσκομένων,
when Pythodoros himself, together with Parmenides came in from outside, and also
ηνίκα ο Πυθόδωρος αὐτῶς τε μετ’ τον Παρμενίδην επεισελθεῖν ἔξωθεν καὶ
Aristotle who he himself said became one of the thirty tyrants. So that they still had to hear
Ἐριστοτέλες αὐτοῦ εφὴ γενόμενον τον των τριακοντα, καὶ ετὶ επακουσὰν
some small part of the discourses; not however Pythodoros himself, since he had indeed heard
σμίκρ’ των γραμμάτων: οὐ μὴν αὐτῶς ἀλλὰ γε ακηκοέναι
the discourses of Zeno before.

Therefore, Socrates having listened, he then urged him to read again the first hypothesis
ουν Τὸν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα τε κελεύσαι αναγνώρισαι πάλιν τὴν πρῶτον ὑπόθεσιν
of the first Logos, and having been read; Socrates said …

τοῦ πρῶτου λόγου, καὶ αναγνωσθείσης: φαναι
[127e] “Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is not that your meaning?”

“Yes,” said Zeno.

“Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible. Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many? And you think each of your treatises is a proof of this very thing, and therefore you believe that the proofs you offer that existences are not many are as many as the treatises you have written? Is that your meaning, [128a] or have I misunderstood?”
Socrates: In what way do you mean this, O Zeno? If the Beings are Many, is it then necessary that they be both Like and Unlike? But this is certainly impossible.

For it is not possible for the Unlike to be Like nor for the Like to be Unlike?

You do not mean it in this way, do you?

(For Socrates thinks that the Ideas are Separate from Each Other and are not “Woven-together”)

Socrates: Is it not the case then, that if it is indeed impossible that both the Unlike be Like and the Like be Unlike, it is certainly impossible that many should also exist. For if many were to exist, then they would undergo impossibilities. Is this then, the intention of your Discourses, and no other one, than to struggle through all arguments, to show that many do not exist? And do you consider each of your Discourses to be a positive proof in support of your hypothesis; so that you are also led to think that you have produced as many positive proofs, as you have composed Discourses, to show that many do not exist? Do you mean it in this way, or do I not understand you correctly?
“No,” said Zeno, “you have grasped perfectly the general intent of the work.”

“I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here wishes to be very close to you not only in his friendship, but also in his writing. For he has written much the same thing as you, but by reversing the process he tries to cheat us into the belief that he is saying something new. For you, in your poems, say that the all is one, [128b] and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion;
Zeno: No other way. You have understood quite well the intent of the whole work.

Socrates: I understand, O Parmenides, that Zeno does not only wish to be situated in the other close bonds of friendship with you, but also to agree with you in the following writings. For he has written in the very same direction as you, although, by changing certain particulars, he endeavors to deceive us that he asserts something other. For on the one hand, you assert in your poems that The All is One, and you produce sound proofs in a beautiful and good way in support of these hypotheses:
and he, on the other hand, says it is not many, and he also furnishes very numerous and weighty proofs. That one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each of you expresses himself so that although you say much the same you seem not to have said the same things at all, appears to the rest of us a feat of expression quite beyond our power.”

“Yes, Socrates,” said Zeno, “but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings. You follow the arguments with a scent [128c] as keen as a Laconian hound’s,
but on the other hand, he says

in turn, the following: that many is not, and then he produced very-many and very-mighty positive proofs. Therefore, on the one hand, you affirm that The All is One, but on the other hand, he denies that The All is many; and in this way, almost saying the same thing, each one speaks, so as to appear not to have said the same things. Thus the latter discourses are revealed to us to be said in a way that is above and beyond our way of speaking/understanding.

Zeno: Yes, O Socrates. So it is, but you have not perfectly perceived The Truth of my words; although, just as Spartan hounds, you have indeed well pursued and tracked their intent.

128C καίτοι ωσπέρ αἱ Λάκαιαι σκυλάκες γεν σε μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἴχνευες τὰ λεχθέντα.
but you do not observe that my treatise is not by any means so pretentious that it could have been written with the intention you ascribe to it, of disguising itself as a great performance in the eyes of men. What you mentioned is a mere accident, but in truth these writings are meant to support the argument of Parmenides against those who attempt to jeer at him and assert that
But in the first place, this, remains unnoticed by you, that the written words are not
αλλα πρωτον μεν τουτο λανθανει σε, στι το γραμμα σε
in every respect so venerable, so that it was composed, as you say then, with the intention
πανταπασιν ουτω σεμνυνεται, οστε γραφηναι απερ συ λεγεις δε διανοηθεν
of concealing from men, as if I was doing something of great importance; but on the one hand,
επικρυπτομενον τους ανθρωπους, οω διαπραττομενον τι μεγα: αλλα μεν
you have spoken something of those things which happen to be the case, but on the other hand,
συ ειπες τι των συμβεβηκων, δε
The Truth of the matter is indeed that these writings were composed for the purpose of
το αληθες εστι γε ταυτα τα γραμματα
a certain assistance to The Logos of Parmenides, against those who try their hand at
τις βοηθεια τω λογω Παρμενιδου προς τους επιχειρουντας

αλλα πρωτον μεν σε τοιτο λανθανει, δτι ου πανταπασιν ουτω σεμνυνεται το γραμμα, ωστε απερ συ
λεγεις διανοηθεν γραφηναι, τοις ανθρωπους δε επικρυπτομενον οως τι μεγα διαπραττομενον: αλλα συ
μεν ειπες των συμβεβηκων τι, έστι δε το γε αληθες βοηθεια τις ταυτα τα γραμματα τω Παρμενιδου
λογω προς τους επιχειρουντας

Zeno
[128d] if the all is one many absurd results follow which contradict his theory. Now this treatise opposes the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one.
comically-representing **The Self**; by asserting that if **One Is**, many ridiculous and opposite κωμῳδεῖν αὐτόν ὡς εἰ ἐν ἐστί, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα καὶ εναντία συμβαίνει results happen to **The Self Logos**.
πασχεῖν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ.

Truly then, this writing, contradicts the advocates of the many, and δὴ οὖν τοιτο τὸ γράμμα αντιλέγει τους λέγοντας πρὸς τα πολλὰ, καὶ opposes this and many other such opinions; by being willing to make clear that the hypothesis ανταποδίδωσι τούτῳ καὶ πλεῖω ταύτα, βουλομένον δηλοῦν ὡς ἡ υποθέσις that asserts that many is, will undergo/suffer **even more** absurd consequences, than that εἰ πολλὰ εστίν, ἂν πασχοι ετὶ γελοιοτέρα η ἡ which asserts that **The One Is**; if anyone of them is sufficiently gone through in detail.
τοῦ εν εἶναι, εἰ τὶς αὐτῶν ἰκανῶς ἐπεξέρχετο (ἐπεξερχείτο).
It was in such a spirit of controversy that I wrote it when I was young, [128e] and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not. So, Socrates, you are not aware of this and you think that the cause of its composition was not the controversial spirit of a young man, but the ambition of an old one. In other respects, as I said, you guessed its meaning pretty well.”
Therefore, it has escaped your notice, O Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when I was a youth, through such a thing indeed as the love of contention, and the writing itself was stolen by someone, so that I was not able to consult whether Self should be brought out or Led into The Light or not. It has escaped your notice, I say, that it was not composed through that Love of Honor, which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile love of contention; although, just as I have said indeed, you do not conjecture amiss.

\[\text{διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἐκλεψε γραφέν, ὡςτε οὔδὲ βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἰς τὸ φῶς εἰτε μή. ὅπερ οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σωκρατέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ νέου φιλονικίας οἶει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας: ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ᾽ εἶπον, οὐ κακῷ ἀπήκασας.}\]
“I see,” said Socrates, “and I accept your explanation. But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, [129a] and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, and those which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation? And even if all things partake of both opposites,
Socrates: 3 I admit it then, and I am Led to believe that the case is just as you have stated it.

But explain to me about the following particulars: Do you not consider that there is a certain Idea/Species of Likeness, Self According to Self, and another one such as this but opposite, that is in turn, an Unlike Idea/Species. But that you and me, and all the other things which we surely call many, have a Share of These Two Beings? And that on the one hand, things that Share of Likeness become like, and according that the degree that such things may become like, the Self Idea/Species of the likeness gynæsthai omia, and kata oson tosoonton αν Share in This; but those that Share of Unlikeness become unlike; but that those that Share of Both become both? Therefore, if all things also Share of both opposite Beings, αμφοτερων αμφοτερα; ἀλλ᾽ αποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἠγούμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δὲ μοι εἴπε: οὐ νομίζεις εἰναι αὐτῷ καθ᾽ αὐτό εἰδος τῆς ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὐτῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ αὖτᾳ τῷ τοιούτῳ εναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν αὐτων o : δὲ σε καὶ εμε καὶ ταλλα which we surely call many, have a Share of These Two Beings? And that on the one hand, α δὴ καλουμεν πολλα μεταλαμβανειν τουτων δυοιν οντων; και μεν things that Share of Likeness become like, and according that the degree that such things may the degree that such things may τα μεταλαμβανοντα της ὁμοιότητος γιγνεσθαι omia, και κατα oson tosoonton αν Share in This; but those that Share of Unlikeness become unlike; but that those that Share αμφοτερων αμφοτερα; of Both become both? Therefore, if all things also Share of both opposite Beings, αμφοτερων αμφοτερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων οντων ἀμφοτερων μεταλαμβανει,
and are enabled by their participation to be both like and unlike themselves, [129b] what is there wonderful about that? For if anyone showed that the absolute like becomes unlike, or the unlike like, that would, in my opinion, be a wonder; but if he shows that things which partake of both become both like and unlike, that seems to me, Zeno, not at all strange, not even if he shows that all things are one by participation in unity and that the same are also many by participation in multitude; but if he shows that absolute unity is also many and the absolute many again are one, then I shall be amazed.
and are both like and unlike their Selves by Participating in both; then, what is wonderful?

For if, on the one hand, anyone brings to Light that The Like Selves become Unlike, or The Unlike Selves become Like, then I think, that it would be monstrously absurd; but if on the other hand, someone were to bring to Light that such things that Participate of Both of These Ideas, undergo both of these conditions, then as far as I’m concerned, O Zeno, it does not appear to be out of the ordinary; nor indeed, if anyone would show that all things are one, through their Participation of The One, and that these Same Selves are many, in turn, through their Participation of Plurality. But if someone were to show, that This Self which Is One, is many, and in turn that the many are indeed One: I shall immediately wonder at this.
[129c] The same applies to all other things. If he shows that the kinds and ideas in and by themselves possess these opposite qualities, it is marvellous but if he shows that I am both one and many, what marvel is there in that? He will say, when he wishes to show that I am many, that there are my right parts and my left parts, my front parts and my back parts, likewise upper and lower, all different; for I do, I suppose, partake of multitude;
And similarly in All the other cases; if on the one hand, someone could bring to Light an argument worthy of admiration; by showing that both the Generic and Ideal Selves undergo these opposite experiences Them Selves. But if on the other hand, someone demonstrates that I am both one and many, what would be wondrous about this? And demonstrate this assertion, by saying, on the one hand, that when he wishes to bring to Light that I am many, that the parts on the right side of me are other, from those parts on the left, and that the front parts are other, from the back parts, and in like manner, the upper from the lower parts; for I think that I participate of Plurality.
[129d] and when he wishes to show that I am one, he will say that we here are seven persons, of whom I am one, a man, partaking also of unity and so he shows that both assertions are true. If anyone then undertakes to show that the same things are both many and one—I mean such things as stones, sticks, and the like—we shall say that he shows that they are many and one, but not that the one is many or the many one; he says nothing wonderful, but only what we should all accept.
But on the other hand, when he brings to Light that I am one,
he should say that since there are Seven of us, I am one man and Participate of The One,
so that in this way he would bring to Light The Truth of both these assertions. Thus if anyone,
should try to bring to Light that stones and wood and such particulars, are both many and one,
we would say that he exhibits to our view such things as are many and one, but that he does not
show that The One is Many, nor The Many, One; nor speak of anything wonderful, but we
would agree to that which is affirmed by all.

Zeno
If, however, as I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should,” said he, “be filled with amazement, Zeno. Now I think this has been very manfully discussed by you; but I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects.”
But if on the one hand, anyone would first divide/separate The Ideas apart/separate, Those of which I have just now been speaking, The 129E διαιρήται τα ειδή χωρίς, ο εγώ δή νυν ελέγον, Selves according to Selves, such as In Likeness and Unlikeness and Plurality and The One, αυτα καθ’ αυτα, οιον ομοιοτητα τε και ανομοιοτητα και πληθος και το εν Rest and Motion and all such as These, then reveal himself as being able to Blend-together and και στασιν και κινησιν και παντα τα τοιαυτα, ειτα αποφαινη δυναμενα συγκεραννυσθαι και Separate-Apart Selves In Them Selves, then I will indeed be in wondrous admiration, O Zeno. διακρινεσθαι ταυτα εν εαυτοίς, εγω’ αν θαυμαστος ασημην, ω Ζηνων. Thus on the one hand, I am Led to think that we should strenuously labor in the investigation of these particulars; but yet on the other hand, it would be deserving of much more admiration, ταυτα: μεντ’ αν πολυ μαλλον, αγασθειν, if anyone could solve the following puzzle, as I said, about This (Ousia) Self that is woven-together ταις αν εχοι ωδε αποριαν, ως λεγω, την ταυτην αυτην πλεκο-together Into The Ideal Selves, in-a-manifold-way; just as you demonstrated in detail about 130Α –μενην εν τοις ειδεσι αυτοις παντωδαςως, ωσπερ επιδειξει διηλθητε objects we see by the faculty of sight, if you could also in the same way, demonstrate in detail τοις ορωμενοις [Republic 508Α–1], και ουτως εν about The Ideas which we grasp by The Activity of The Logos.

Ελαιν δε τις ων νευδη εγω ελεγον πρωτον μεν διαιρηται χωρις αυτα καθ’ αυτα τα ειδη, οιον ομοιοτητα τε και ανομοιοτητα και πληθος και το εν και στασιν και κινησιν και παντα τα τοιαυτα, ειτα εν εαυτοις ταις δυναμενα συγκεραννυσθαι και διαιρηθῃ και αποφαινη, αγαμην εν εγωγ’ εφη, θαυμαστος, ο ε Ζηνων, ταυτα δε ανδρειως μεν πανο ιηομαι πεπραγματευθαι πολυ μενην ωδε μαλλον, ως λεγω, αγασθειν ει τις εχοι την αυτην ταυτην αποριαν εν αυτοις τοις ειδεσι παντοδαπος πλεκομενην, ωσπερ εν τοις υφωμενοις διηλθητε, ουτως και εν τοις λογισμω λαμβανομενοις επιδειξαι.
Pythodorus said that he thought at every word, while Socrates was saying this, Parmenides and Zeno would be angry, but they paid close attention to him and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates, and when he stopped speaking Parmenides expressed their approval.
Antiphon: 4 Pythodorus said, that on the one hand, when Socrates had said these particulars, he believed that, both Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at each one of them, whereas on the other hand, They Themselves Offered-up Their Mind entirely to what he said, and frequently looked at each other, smiling, as if in admiration of Socrates. And that once Socrates ceased to speak, Parmenides then spoke, saying...
“Socrates,” [130b] he said, “what an admirable talent for argument you have! Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?”

“Yes, I do,” said Socrates.

“And also,” said Parmenides, “abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good, and all such conceptions?”

“Yes,” he replied. [130c]
Parmenides: O Socrates, how worthy of admiration is Your Impulse in Your Pursuit of

The Logos! And tell me, have You Your Self thus Separated certain Ideas apart from Selves, as you say, on the one hand, and in turn on the other hand, in the same way, Set apart

those that Participate of These? And does there appear to you, to be a certain likeness that is

Separate from Self Likeness, and indeed a certain One/Unity and Many/Plurality and all other such particulars, which we possess, and of which, you have just now heard of from Zeno?

Socrates: It does to me indeed. (Εμοίγε.)

Parmenides: And how about the following ones; is there a Certain Idea, like that of Justice, and also of Beauty and of Good and all such Ideas (by Them-

(Self by Self); and also of Beauty and of Good and all such Ideas (by Them-

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)

Parmenides
“And is there an abstract idea of man, apart from us and all others such as we are, or of fire or water?”

“I have often,” he replied, “been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not.”

“And are you undecided about certain other things, which you might think rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else particularly vile and worthless? Would you say that there is an idea of each of these distinct and different from the things [130d] with which we have to do, or not?”
Parmenides: What next then? Is there also an Idea of Man and of All the Elements such as

we are composed of; and a certain Ideal Human Self and One of Fire and One of Water

that is Separate from us? (χωρίς ἡμοιν;

Socrates: I have certainly often been in dire-straights/puzzled/at-a-loss, O Parmenides,

calling whether it is necessary to speak of Selves, just as we did about Those Ideas,

or in another way.

Parmenides: And are you also at-a-loss/puzzled, about the following particulars, O Socrates?

Whether it is necessary to affirm that there is a Separate Idea/Species of each one of these

which may also appear to be ridiculous, such as of hair and clay and dust, or of anything else

which may also appear to be quite without honor and most worthless, by Being Other in turn,

of those particulars with which we are familiar, or whether it is not necessary?

130D  ὅν ἡμεῖς μεταχειρίζομεθα, εἰτε καὶ μὴ ;

Parmenides
“By no means,” said Socrates. “No, I think these things are such as they appear to us, and it would be quite absurd to believe that there is an idea of them; and yet I am sometimes disturbed by the thought that perhaps what is true of one thing is true of all. Then when I have taken up this position, I run away for fear of falling into some abyss of nonsense and perishing; so when I come to those things which we were just saying do have ideas, I stay and busy myself with them.”
Socrates: On the one hand, I do not affirm that these exist in any other way from these which we do indeed also see; whereas on the other hand, is it not the height of absurdity, insofar as one imagines that there is a certain Idea of these selves? Nevertheless at times it also actually troubles me; in regards to whether or not the very same thing, can be affirmed of everything.

But thereafter, having been fixed in this opinion, I then run-away fleeing, in fear of falling at that time, into a certain abyss of nonsense, and utterly perish. But then, I reach up from those considerations, and again I seriously apply myself to those considerations, concerning which, we have just now asserted, whether such Ideas/Forms/Species have to exist.
“Yes, for you are still young,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not yet taken hold upon you, Socrates, as I think it will later. Then you will not despise them; but now you still consider people’s opinions, on account of your youth. Well, tell me do you think that, as you say, there are ideas, and that these other things which partake of them are named from them, [131a] as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”

“Certainly,” said Socrates.
Parmenides: That is because you are still a young man, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not as of yet, received you into Her Embraces. For in my opinion, when you are received by Her, you will not dishonor any of these selves; but now since you are still young, you give heed, to the opinions of men.

προς δοχας ανθρωπων.

ają Are The Ideas Related to Wholes/Parts and Genera/Species?

5 Tell me then, the following. Does it appear to you, as you say, that there exist certain Ideas/Forms/Species, of which the other things have a Share, thus retaining Their Names; such as, on the one hand, those that have a Share of Likeness are like; therefore, those that have a Share of Greatness/Magnanimity/Magnitude are great/generous/big, whereas on the other hand, those that Share of Righteousness and Beauty become just and beautiful?

Socrates: Entirely so indeed. (Πανυ γε.)

νεός γάρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὐπώ σου ἀντέιληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἐτὶ ἀντιλήφθητι κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις: νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. τόδε δ’ οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἰναι εἰθὴ ἀττα, ὅτε τά δ’ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἵσχειν, οἷον ὀροιοτήτος μὲν μεταλαμβόντα ὀμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαια τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι; πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?”

“How could there be?” said he.

“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?”

“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?” said Socrates.
Parmenides: Now surely, is it not the case then, that each thing which has a Share, either ητοι Ουκουν εκαστον το μεταλαμβανον

has a Share of The Whole (Genera) Idea or of only a Part (Species) of It? Or, can there be μεταλαμβανει του ολου ειδους η μερους; η αν γενοιτο

some other way of Participation/Transference/Succession apart from these Two ways? τις αλλη μεταληψις χωρις τουτων;

Socrates: And how could there be? (Και πως αν;)

Parmenides: Therefore, does it appear to you, that The Whole Idea, Being One, exists ουν ποτερον δοκει σοι το ολον ειδος ον εν ειναι

in each of the many, or in what way? εκαστω των πολλων, η πως;

Socrates: What is there to prevent The Whole Idea, O Parmenides, to exist in each of them? Τι γαρ κωλυει, ω Παρμενιδη, ενειναι ;

ουκον ητοι ολου τω ειδους η μερους έκαστον το μεταλαμβανον μεταλαμβανει; η άλλη τις άν μεταληψις χωρις τοις τοις γενοιτο;

και πως άν; ειπεν.

ποτερον ουν δοκει σοι ολον το ειδος εν έκαστω ειναι των πολλων εν άν, η πως;

ti γαρ κωλυει, φαναι τον Σωκρατη, ω Παρμενιδη, εν ειναι;
[131b] “Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.”

“No,” he replied, “for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.”

“That,” said he, “is very neat, Socrates you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over many. [131c] Is not that about what you mean?”

“Perhaps it is,” said Socrates.
Parmenides: Accordingly then, by Being One and The Same in many separate existents, then

The Whole is in each at the same time, and in this way Self will be separate from Self.

Socrates: It cannot be in this way; but if This Idea were indeed such as The Self is to Daytime,

by Being One, It is at-once present in many places and yet Self is in no way more separate

from Self; if then in this way, every Idea may also be At-Once One and The Same in all.

Parmenides: You have made, O Socrates, One and The Same aspect present at The Same time,

in many places, a very pleasant way; just as if you covered-over many humans with a sail.

Thus you say, that there is One Whole, over many.

Or is it not something such as this that you are Led to say?

Parmenides: You have made, O Socrates, One and The Same aspect present at The Same time,

in many places, a very pleasant way; just as if you covered-over many humans with a sail.

Socrates: Perhaps. (Ἰσως.)
“Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?”

“A part over each.”

“Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.”

“So it appears.”

“Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?”

“By no means,” he replied.
Parmenides: Then either, will the whole sail exist over each individual,

οὖν ἢ αὖν ὁ ὅλον ἑστίον εἴη εφ’ εκάστῳ

or will another part of the whole self exist over each individual?

ἡ ἀλλὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ επ’ ἀλλῶν;

Socrates: The part. (Μέρος.)

Parmenides: Accordingly then, O Socrates, “these ideal selves” are divisible,

ἀρα, ὦ Σωκράτες, τὰ εἰδη αὐτὰ εστίν Μεριστα

and those that participate can only participate of “parts of selves”; and hence there will

καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὖ μετέχοι μέρους αὐτῶν, καὶ αὖ

no longer be one whole in each individual, but only one part of each.

οὐκετὶ εἰὴ ὁλὸν εὖ εκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ μέρος εκαστοῦ.

Socrates: It has come to Light in this way indeed.

Φαίνεται οὕτω γε.

Parmenides: Or are you willing then, O Socrates, to affirm to us The Truth, that One “idea”

Ἡ εἴθελησεις οὖν, ὦ Σωκράτες, φανει ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ἐν εἶδος

is susceptible of being divided, and yet “it” will still be One?

μερίζεσθαι , καὶ ἐπὶ εἰσται ἐν;

Socrates: By no means. (Οὐδαμῶς.)

Parmenides
“No,” said Parmenides, “for if you divide absolute greatness, [131d] and each of the many great things is great by a part of greatness smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Or again, will anything by taking away a particular small part of equality possess something by means of which, when it is less than absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else?”

“That is impossible.”

“Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small will be greater than this, since this is a part of it, and therefore the absolute small will be greater; but that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller, [131e] not greater, than before.”

“That,” said he, “is impossible.”
Parmenides: For See, that if you attempt to divide The Great Self, then in that case

would it not be shown to be irrational, and that each of The Many that are Great, will then be great/big by a “part” (like The Day/sail) of “greatness” that is less than The Greatness of Self?

Socrates: Most irrational indeed. (Πανυ γ’.)

Parmenides: What then? Will each thing, by possessing some “small part” of “equality” which is less than The Equality of Self, be equal to another thing by having the part received?

Socrates: Impossible. (Αδυνατον.)

Parmenides: Then if one of us has a “part of the small”, then in that case The Small of Self will be “bigger” than this, since it is a part of Itself, and thus The Small Self will then be that which is “bigger”; but then on the other hand, this to which the part of The Small will be added and then subtracted, will be smaller, but not greater, than before.

Socrates: This most certainly cannot come to pass.

Parmenides

Parmenides: For See, that if you attempt to divide The Great Self, then in that case

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will be “bigger” than this, since it is a part of Itself, and thus The Small Self will then be

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Socrates: This most certainly cannot come to pass.

Parmenides
“How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?”

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“How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?”

“By Zeus,” he replied, “I think that is a very hard question to determine.”

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“Well, what do you think of this?”

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“Well, what do you think of this?”

“Of what?”

“Of what?”

“Of what?”

“Of what?”

Parmenides
Parmenides: To you then, O Socrates, in what way are the other existents able to have a Share
σοι οὖν, ὦ Σωκρατέω, Τίνα τρόπον τα αλλὰ δυνάμενα μεταλαμβάνειν
of The Ideas, since they are unable to do so according to Parts, nor according to Wholes?
tων εἰδῶν, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα;
Socrates: No by Zeus, it does not appear to me to be in any way an easy matter to define
Οὐ μα τὸν Δία, οὐ δοκεί μοι, εἶναι οὐδαμῶς εὐκολὸν διορίσασθαι
something such as this.
tο τούτον.
Parmenides: What next then? What do you say to this?
Τι δή δέ; πως εἴχεις πρὸς τὸδε;
Socrates: To what? (Το ποιον;)


tίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἴπειν, ὦ Σωκρατέω, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἀλλὰ μεταλήφεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκολὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.
tί δὲ δή; πρὸς τὸδε πῶς ἔχεις;
tὸ ποιον;

Parmenides
[132a] “I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this; when there is a number of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one.”

“That is true,” he said.

“But if with your mind's eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?”

“So it seems.”
Parmenides: I suspect that your reason for believing that each Idea is One arises from something such as this. When a multitude of particulars appear to you to be great, you may think, that by looking at all of them, One Certain (Common) Ideal Self is found to be Equally in their case, from whence you are Led to believe that The Great/Big is One. (Inferred concept, not Idea. PG)

Socrates: You speak The Truth.

λέγεις Ἀληθῆ.

Parmenides: What then if when you See with The Soul, The Great Self, and All the Other Ideas that are Great in a similar way. Then in turn, will not a Certain Great One, necessarily come to Light, through which, All These come to Light as Great/Big?

Socrates: It seems so. (Εοικεν.)

οἶμαι σὲ ἑκ τοὐ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἔκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι: ὅταν πολλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἵδεα ἡ αὕτη εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἱδόντι, οὖν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τάλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ φυσὶ ἐπὶ πάντα ἱδής, οὖχ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέγα φανεῖται, ὧν ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;

ἔοικεν.
“That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it; [132b] and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great; and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite.”

“But, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned.”

“But,” he said, “is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?”

“That is impossible,” he replied.

“But of something?”

“Yes.”
Parmenides: Accordingly then, another offspring idea of Greatness will appear, besides

\[
\text{αρα Άλλο γεγονος ειδος μεγεθους αναφανησεται, παρ’}
\]

The Great Self, and also of those that partake of The Self: and besides all these, yet another

to μεγεθος αυτω τε και τα μετεχοντα αυτου: και επι πασιν τουτοις ετερον

in turn, through which, all these will appear to be great/big. And surely then, each of

your “ideas”, will no longer be One, but an infinite multitude.

σοι των ειδων ουκετι εσται εν, αλλ’ το απειρα πληθος.

~~~Socrates the empiricist!?!~~~

Socrates: Then, O Parmenides, each one of these ideas is nothing more than a conception,

\[
\text{Αλλα, ω Παρμενιδη, εκαστον τουτων των ειδων μη η νοημα,}
\]

and will not subsist in any place other than in the proper Self in Souls; for in this way, each

και εγγιγνεθαι ουδαμου αλλοθι η εν προσηκη αυτω ψυχαις: γαρ ουτω εκαστον

will indeed be one; and that which was just now mentioned will not still happen.

αν γε ειη εν και α δη νυν ελεγετο αν ουκ ετι πασχωι.

Parmenides: What then? Is each of these conceptions One,

\[
\text{Τι ουν; εστι εκαστον των νοηματων εν}
\]

but on the other hand, a conception of nothing?

\[
\text{δε νοημα ουδενος;}
\]

Socrates: But this is impossible. (Αλλ’ αδυνατον.)

Parmenides: Hence, it is a conception of something? (Αλλα τινος;)

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)
[132c] “Of something that is, or that is not?”

“Of something that is.”

“A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?”

“Yes.”

“Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?”

“That, again, seems inevitable.”

“Well then,” said Parmenides, “does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?”
Parmenides: Of Being or of non-being?

Parmenides: Will it not be of One Certain Entity, which that conception Intelleccts

in the case of all things, as Being One Certain Idea?

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)

Parmenides: Then will not This Idea that is Being Intellected be One,

by Always Being The Self in every case?

Socrates: This again, has come to Light as Necessary.

Parmenides: But what then? Or does it not appear Necessary, for you to say that inasmuch as other things Participate of The Ideas/Species, that each one of Them must be composed of Thoughts/Intellections and that All of Them in turn, must be Able to Intellect/Think?

Or will you say that although by Being Intellections, yet They are without Intelligence/Mind?

Parmenides
“That is quite unreasonable, too,” he said, “but Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing else.”

“Then if anything,” he said, “resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?”

“No, there is none.”
Socrates: But this has to be *in no way* Rational. But, O Parmenides, it seems to me indeed, to be clearly seen especially, as follows: On the one hand, *These Ideas/Species* are *Set-Up* in *Their Very Nature*, just as *Paradigms/Models*, whereas on the other hand, the others are *Assimilated* to *These Models*, and are *Their likenesses*; and *The Self Participation*, by the *εοικεναι τουτοις και ειναι ομοιωματα*: και η αυτη μεθεξις τοις other things, is nothing else than to become *Assimilated* to *The Selves* of *The Ideas/Species*. *καθ’ αυτω; η εστι τις μηχανη το ομιοιον μη ειναι ομιοιον ομιοιο; Socrates: There is not.

Parmenides: Therefore, if *anything* becomes Like *The Idea/Species*, *can it be possible that* *ουν ει τι εοικε τω ειδει, οιον The Idea* not be Like *that* which becomes assimilated, and by as much as the assimilated *ειδος μη ειναι ομιοιον εκεινο τω εικασθεντι, τε οσον αφωμοιωθη nature* is rendered Like *The Self? Or* is *there any reason why, the like* not be like *The Like? καθ’ αυτω; η εστι τις μηχανη το ομιοιον μη ειναι ομιοιον ομιοιο; Socrates: There is not.

εστι Ουκ.
“And must not necessarily the like partake of [132e] the same idea as its like?”

“It must.”

“That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then it is impossible that anything be like the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they are alike, some further idea, in addition to the first, will always appear, and if that is like anything, still another, [133a] and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it.”

“Very true.”
Parmenides: Accordingly then, is there not a Great Necessity, that The Relationship of like to Like should Participate of One Idea/Species/Paradigm of The Self?

Socrates: Necessarily. (Αναγκη.)

Parmenides: But will not That, through The Participation of which, likes are like be The Ideal Self?

Socrates: Yes, entirely so.

Parmenides: Hence, neither can a (partible) thing Be Like The (Impartible) Idea, nor to eidos aito; 

The Species Be Like the thing. For if this were not the case, another species will always appear besides that species; and that species will again become like another; and so a new species would never cease to always come to be, as long as any species becomes like its participant. 

Socrates: You speak most truly. (λεγεις Αληθεσταται.)

Parmenides
“Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas we must seek some other method of participation.”

“So it seems.”

“Do you see, then, Socrates, how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“You may be sure,” he said, “that you do not yet, if I may say so, [133b] grasp the greatness of the difficulty involved in your assumption that each idea is one and is something distinct from concrete things.”

“How is that?” said he.
Parmenides: So if the other things do not have a Share of The Ideas through Likeness;

αρα τάλλα ουκ μεταλαμβανει των ειδων ομοιοτητι,

then it is necessary to seek after something else through which they may have a Share.

αλλα δει ζητειν τι αλλο ω μεταλαμβανει.

Socrates: So it seems. (Εοικεν.)

Parmenides: Do you see then, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises,

Ορας ουν, ομ Σωκρατες, οση η απορια

if any one defines/delimits/separates The Ideas, as Being Selves according to Selves?

εαν τις διοριζηται ειδη ως οντα αυτα καθ’ αυτα;

Socrates: I do, very much so. (Και μαλα.)

Parmenides: Accordingly then, know well that you do not yet grasp how great is the difficulty

tοινυν ισθι Ευ στι ουδεπω απτει οση η απορια

of Self, as the saying goes, if you should place Each One Idea of The Real Beings

αι τι αφοριζομενος.

Socrates: What do you mean then? (Πως δη;)
“There are many reasons,” he said, “but the greatest is this; if anyone should say that the ideas cannot even be known \textit{if} they are \textit{such} as we say they must be, no one could prove to him that he was wrong, unless he who argued that they could be known were a man of wide education and ability and were willing to follow the proof through many long and elaborate details; [133c] he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.”

“Why is that, Parmenides?” said \textit{Socrates}.
Parmenides: On the one hand, there are many other doubts indeed, but on the other hand, the following one, is the greatest. If anyone should say that The Ideal Selves cannot even be properly known, being Such as we have said They Must Be. It could not even be proven to anyone, that he is mistaken, if it were not the case, on the one hand, that he who argues that it could be proven, happened to be experienced/practiced in a multitude of particulars and who is not without natural talent, and on the other hand, he should also be willing to follow the through many long and elaborate details; but even then, he who contends that The Ideal Selves are unknowable, may still remain un-persuaded. 133C αυτα ειναι αγνωστα ειη απιθανος.

Socrates: In what way then, O Parmenides? (Πη δη, ω Παρμενιδη;)
“Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”

“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said Socrates.

“You are right,” he said. “Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses,
Parmenides: In a way that I think both you and any other person, O Socrates, who would

τινα ὁμιμαί καὶ σε καὶ ἄλλον, ὦ Σωκρατεῖς, οοτὶ αὐν

set-up The Ousia of each Idea as Subsisting Herself by Herself: you must agree
tιθεται ουσιαν εκαστου ειναι αυτην καθ’ αυτην, αν ομολογησαι

in the first place, that None of The Ideal Selves, Exist in us.

πρωτον μεν μηδεμιαν αυτων ειναι εν ημιν.

Socrates: For if They did, then how could Their Ousia still Subsist Herself by Herself?

γαρ Πως αν ετι ειη αυτη καθ’ αυτην;

Parmenides: You speak Well. Is it not also the case, that of The Ideas that exist in relation to

λεγεις Καλως. Ουκουν και των ιδεων εισιν προς

Each Other, however many They Are, They Maintain Their Own Ousia in relation to Their

αλληλας αι οσαι εισιν, εχουσιν αυται την ουσιαν προς

Selves, but not in relation to those existing among us; whether in relation to some likeness,

133D αυτας,
[133d] or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and, belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.”

“What do you mean?” said Socrates.
but not in relation to those existing among us; whether in relation to some likeness,

\[\text{αλλ᾽ ών πρὸς τα \ ημιν εἰτε ομοιωματα}\]

or in whatever way one may then set selves up; and we do Participate of each relationship, to eite oti tis dh auta tithetai, ημεις ειναι μετεχοντες εκαστα which we apply by some particular name; but on the other hand, that those relations that exist oiv επονομαξομεθα : δε τα οντα among us bear the same name as Those, and again our selves also exist in relation to our par’ ημιν ταυτα ομωνυμα αυ αυτα εστιν προς αυτα but not in relation to Those Ideas; and again selves exist in relation to them selves, but not αλλ’ ών προς εκεινοις τα ειδη, αυ εαυτων, αλλ’ ουκ in relation to Those with whom they thus only Share Their Name.

\[\text{εκεινων οσα ουτως ονομαξεται.}\]

Socrates: How do you mean this? (Πως λεγεις;)
“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is master or slave of
anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, [133c] nor is
the master the master of slave in the abstract; each is a man and is
master or slave of a man but mastership in the abstract is
mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the
abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract, but our slaves and
masters are not relative to them, nor they to us;
Parmenides: Such as, if one of us were The Lord or the servant of any one; then, the one who

\[\text{Parmenides: } \text{οἶον, } εἰ \text{ τίς ἡμῶν } εστιν } \text{δεσπότης } \text{ἡ } \text{δούλος } \text{του, } \text{o}

is a servant, is certainly not in any way, the servant of That Selfhood of The Lordship of The

\[\text{εστι δούλος, } \text{εστιν } \text{δὴ } \text{ουκ } \text{πω } \text{δούλος } \text{εκείνου } \text{αυτου } \text{δεσποτης}.

Lord, nor is The One who is Lord, The Lord of The Selfhood of the servant; whereas by
despotou oude o esti despotitis, o despotitis autou douloou, all’

being human, they Share in both these human relations. On the other hand, Self Mastership

\[\text{ων ανθρωπος } \text{εστιν } \text{αμφετερα } \text{ταυτα } \text{ανθρωπου}, \text{de } \text{αυτης } \text{δεσποτεια}

is That which It Is, from Its Relation to Self Stewardship; and Self Stewardship,

\[\text{εστιν } \text{o } \text{εστι}, \text{ αυτη } \text{δουλεις } \text{kai } \text{αυτη } \text{δουλεια}

in the same way, is Stewardship in Relation to Lordship. Thus the relationships in us

\[\text{ωσαυτως } \text{δουλεια } \text{δεσποτειας}, \text{all’ } \text{τα } \text{εν } \text{ημιν}

exercise none of Their Power in relation to Those Ideas nor Those in relation to us.

\[\text{134A } \text{εχει ου } \text{την } \text{δυναμιν} \text{ εκεινα } \text{ουδε } \text{εκεινα } \text{προς } \text{ημας,}

Parmenides
[134a] they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves. You understand what I mean, do you not?”

“Certainly,” said Socrates, “I understand.”

“Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth?”

“Certainly.”

“And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not?”

“Yes.”
Thus

αλλ’

I say that They both Subsist by Them Selves and also Selves in Relation to Selves; and in a

ο λεγω εκεινα τε εστι αυτων και αυτα προς αυτα, και

similar way, Those in us in relation to Them Selves. Or do you not understand what I say?

ωσαυτως τα παρ’ημιν προς εαυτα , η ου μανθανεις ο λεγω;

Socrates: I understand quite well indeed.

μανθανον Πανυ γ’.

Mastership: Stewardship:: Self Mastership: Self Stewardship

Parmenides: 7 On the one hand, is it not also the case, that if Self Knowledge is

μεν και Ουκουν αυτη επιστημη εστιν

The Knowledge of That which Is True, then Knowledge would be of That Self?

επιστημη ο εστιν αληθεια επιστημη αν ειη της εκεινης αυτης;

Socrates: Perfectly so. (Πανυ γε.)

Parmenides: But on the other hand, will every Knowledge, which Is, then in turn,

δε αν η Εκαστη των επιστημων, ο εστιν, αυ,

Be The Knowledge of Each-one of The Real Beings that Exist; or not?

ειη επιστημη εκαστου των οντων εστιν: η ου;

Socrates: Yes, it will. (Ναι.)

Parmenides
“And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the
knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and each kind of our
knowledge [134b] be the knowledge of each kind of truth that exists
among us?”

“Yes, that is inevitable.”

“But the ideas themselves, as you, agree, we have not, neither can they
be among us.”

“No, they cannot.”

“And the various classes of ideas are known by the absolute idea of
knowledge?”

“Yes.”

“Which we do not possess.”

“No, we do not.”

“Then none of the ideas is known by us, since we do not partake of
absolute knowledge.”

“Apparently not.”

Parmenides
Parmenides: But will not The Knowledge among us, be The Truth which exists among us?

Those Knowledge among us, be The Truth which exists among us?

Parmenides: But will not The Knowledge among us, be a Knowledge of Each of Those Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships that happen to exist among us?

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

nor can They exist As Such among us.

Socrates: Necessarily so. (Αναγκη.)

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

and in turn, would not Each Knowledge among us, be a Knowledge of Each of Those Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships that happen to exist among us?

Parmenides: But of course, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

Among us, be The Knowledge of Each of Those Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships that happen to exist among us?

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

Parmenides: Accordingly then, not a Single One of The Ideas are Recognized/Known by us,

Socrates: We do not. (Ου γαρ ουν.)

Parmenides: Which Ideal Real Being, we do not indeed possess.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, not a Single One of The Ideas are Recognized/Known by us,

Socrates: It does not seem likely. (Ουκ εοικεν.)

Parmenides: But of course, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

Parmenides: But of course, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,
“Then the absolute good and the beautiful and all [134c] which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.”

“I am afraid they are.”

“Now we come to a still more fearful consequence.”

“What is it?”

“You would say, no doubt, that if there is an absolute kind of knowledge, it is far more accurate than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and all the rest?”

“Yes.”

“And if anything partakes of absolute knowledge, you would say that there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge?”

“Of course.”
Parmenides: Therefore, The Beautiful Self, which is also The Good Self and All The Selves
which we have surely taken-up as Being Ideas, are also Un-Known by us?

134C α δή ὑπολαμβάνομεν ως οὕσας ἰδέας εστὶ καὶ Ἀγνωστὸν ἡμῖν.

Socrates: I am afraid they are. (Κινδυνεύει.)

Parmenides: Behold then, this even more fearful consequence.

Orα δή τουτου ετι δεινοτερον τοδε.

Socrates: What is it? (Το ποιον;)

Parmenides: You will say perhaps, that if indeed there is a Certain Class of Knowledge,
then It Is much more-Perfect than the knowledge which exists among us; and the same goes
for Beauty, and all the other Genera/Classes/Kinds/Wholes.

και καλλὸς καὶ παντα ταλλα.

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)

Parmenides: Is it not the case, that if indeed anyone else Partakes of Self Knowledge,
then you will not affirm that anyone Possesses That Most Perfect Knowledge more than God?

αν ουκ φαιης τινα εχειν την ακριβεστατην επιστημην μαλλον η θεον;

Socrates: Necessarily not. (Ἀναγκη.)
Then will it be possible for God to know human things, if
he has absolute knowledge?"

“Why not?”

“Because,” said Parmenides, “we have agreed that those ideas are
not relative to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to
themselves.”

“Yes, we have agreed to that.”
Parmenides: Take notice then; is it possible in turn, that God, can Know of our affairs,
by Possessing Self Knowledge? (εχων αυτην επιστημην;)
Socrates: Why not? (Τι γαρ ου;)
Parmenides: Since it has been agreed by us, O Socrates, that neither do Those Ideas Have
The Power which They Possess, in relation to those among us, nor those among us, in relation
to Those; but that Selves exist in relation to Selves in each realm.
Socrates: It was so agreed. (γαρ ομολογηται.)
“Then if this most perfect mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, his mastership can never rule us, [134e] nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs.”

“But surely this,” said he, “is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge.”

Parmenides
Parmenides: Is it not so, that if there is The Most Perfect Mastership among Divinity, and

Oυκουν ει εστιν η ακριβεστατη δεσποτεια παρα τω θεω και

The Most Perfect Self Knowledge, then neither will The Mastership of Those Gods Rule

η ακριβεστατη αυτη επιστημη, ουτ’ αν η δεσποτεια εκεινον δεσποσειειν

over us at any time, nor will Their Knowledge Know of us, nor of any other of our concerns,

134E αν ημων ποτε, ουτ’ αν η επιστημη γνοη ημας ουδε τι αλλο παρ’ ημιν των, and in a similar way, we cannot rule over Them by our rule, nor can we Know/Recognize

αλλα ομοιως, ημεις ουκ αρχομεν τε εκεινων παρ’ ημιν τη αρχη ουδε γιγνωσκομεν

That which Is Divine, in any way, through the assistance of our knowledge. And again,

του θειου ουδεν τη ημετερα επιστημη, ου

according to The Self/Same Logos, They will neither, be our (Immediate-JFB, Sym 202e-203a)

κατα τον αυτον λογον εκεινοι τε ουτε εισιν ημων

Rulers (Apology 31a, Phaedo 62b) nor have any Cognition of human affairs (by Self-Knowledge).

dεσποται ουτε οντες γιγνωσκουσι τα ανθρωπεια πραγματα.

Socrates: But then would not The Logos, be wondrous in the extreme,

Αλλα μη ο λογος Αλλα θαυμαστος λιαν

insofar as one were to deprive Divinity of knowing?

η τις ει αποστερησει τον θεον του ειδεναι.

ουκουν ει παρα τω θεο αυτη έστιν η άκριβεστατη δεσποτεια και αυτη η άκριβεστατη επιστημη, ουτ’ αν η δεσποτεια η εκεινων ημων ποτε αν δεσποσειειν, ουτ’ αν επιστημη ημας γνοη ουδε τι άλλο των παρ’ ημιν, αλλα ομοιως ημεις τε εκεινων ουκ άρχομεν τη παρ’ ημιν άρχη ουδε γιγνωσκομεν του θειου ουδεν τη ήμετερα επιστημη, εκεινοι τε αυ κατα τον αυτον λογον ουτε δεσποται ημων εισιν ουτε γιγνωσκουσι τα ανθρωπεια πραγματα θεοι οντες.

αλλα μη λιαν, έφη, η θαυμαστος ο λογος, ει τις τον θεον άποστερησει τοι ειδεναι.

Parmenides
“And yet, Socrates,” said Parmenides, [135a] “these difficulties and many more besides are inseparable from the ideas, if these ideas of things exist and we declare that each of them is an absolute idea. Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the ideas do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and, as I was saying just now, he is amazingly hard to convince. Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence,
Parmenides: Nevertheless, O Socrates, these and very many other consequences besides these, 135A μεντοι, ο Σωκρατες, Ταυτα και πανυ πολλα αλλα ετι τουτοι
must be so in relation to The Ideas, if The Ideal Selves of The Real Beings Exist, and if one
αναγκαιον εχειν προς τα ειδη, ει αι ιδεαι αυται των οντων εισαι και τις
determines that Each One is a Certain Ideal Self; so that one who hears these words is puzzled
οριειται εκαστον τι ειδος αυτο: ωστε τον ακουοντα απορειν
and questions whether Selves do exist; or if They do Exist, that They Exist in The Highest
τε και αμφιβητειν ως ταυτα ουτε εστι, τε ει στι ειη μαλιστα
Degree, so that it appears abundantly necessary that Selves must be unknown by human nature.

And whosoever speaks in this way, may appear to say something important; and, which
και λεγοντα ταυτα δοκειν λεγειν τε τι, και, о
we just now said, may be thought of as being an extraordinary statement, by remaining unable
αρτι ελεγομεν, ειναι θαυμασσως ως δυσ–
to be persuaded. And yet on the one hand, as it falls to The Ability of an Individual of a Very
–αναπειστον. και μεν ως δυνησομενου του ανδρος πανυ
Good Natural Disposition, to be able to learn that there is a certain Genus of Each Idea, and
ευφυους (Phi32B, Rep399C) μαθειν εστι τι γενος εκαστου και
That of The Self of Ousia by Her Self,
135B αυτη ουσια καθ’ αυτην,
“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “for what you say is very much to my mind.”

“But on the other hand,” said Parmenides, “if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of ideas of things, and does not assume an idea under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss,
so on the other hand, they will deserve - even
dε του θαυμασ- ετι
greater admiration, who having made this discovery, shall be able to teach yet another person
-τοτερου ευφησοντος δυνησομενου διδαξαι και αλλων
how to thoroughly-well-distinguish all these particulars, in a Sufficiently-Efficient Way.
διευκρινησαμενον παντα ταυτα ικανως .

Socrates: I agree with you entirely, O Parmenides, for you speak According to my Mind.
Συγχωρω σοι πανυ, ο Παρμενιδη, γαρ λεγεις κατα μοι νουν.

Parmenides: But nevertheless in turn, O Socrates, if anyone indeed, does not permit The
Αλλα μεντοι αυ, ο Σωκρατες, ει τις γε μη εασει
Ideas of Real-Beings to be, by not Keeping their Mind Fixed upon all these recent objections
ειδη των οντων ειναι, αποβλεψας εις παντα δη νυν τα
and others like them, and does not Define One of Each Particular Idea/Genus/Paradigm,
και αλλα τουατα, μηδε οριεται ενος εκαστου τι ειδος
surely then, they will have no where to turn their understanding,
δη εχει ουδε οπη τρεψει την διανοιαν

Parmenides
[135c] since he denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. You seem to have been well aware of this.”

“Quite true,” he said.

“Then what will become of philosophy? To what can you turn, if these things are unknown?”

“I do not see at all, at least not at present.”
while they do not allow that

**The Idea of Each One of The Real Beings Is Always of The Self, and in this way,**

entirely destroy **The Power of Dialectics.**

Therefore, in such a way, you also appear to perceive much According to my **Mind.**

Socrates: You speak **The Truth.**

λέγεις Ἀλήθη.

Parmenides: 8 What then will you do in relation to **Philosophy?**

In what way will you **Turn** your **Mind,** if you are ignorant of these **Particular Ideas?**

Socrates: At the present time, I do indeed appear, not to see in what way at all.

Parmenides

μὴ ἔων ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτήν αἰεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὗτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεί. τοῦ τοιοῦτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἦσθησθαι.

Ἀλήθη λέγεις, φάναι.

τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψῃ ἀγνοουμένου τούτων;

οὐ πάνω μοι δοκῶ καθοράν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι.

Parmenides
“No, Socrates,” he said, “for you try too soon, before you are properly trained, to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all the other ideas. [135d] You see I noticed it when I heard you talking yesterday with Aristoteles here. Your impulse towards dialectic is noble and divine, you may be assured of that; but exercise and train yourself while you are still young in an art which seems to be useless and is called by most people mere loquacity; otherwise the truth will escape you.”

“What, then, Parmenides,” he said, “is the method of training?”
Parmenides: That is because, you exercise yourself too early in this manner, O Socrates.

You should endeavor beforehand to Define what is Beautiful and Just and Good, and Each:

One of The Ideas. For I also just recently mentally noted this, while hearing you discoursing

with Aristotle here. Thus on the one hand, that Impulse, by which you are impelled towards The Logos, is Beautiful and Divine -you may be sure of that- but on the other hand,

You Must Collect Thy Self Together, by exercising more in that way; which appears to be useless to the multitude, and is called by them empty talk; while you are still young, for if you do not, The Truth will utterly-elude Thee.

Socrates: What then, O Parmenides, is this manner of exercise?

Πρὶς οὖν, ο Παρµενίδη, ο τρόπος της γυµνασίας:
“That which you heard Zeno practising,” said he. [135e] “However, even when you were speaking to him I was pleased with you, because you would not discuss the doubtful question in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to what we conceive most entirely by the intellect and may call ideas.”

“Yes,” he said, “that is because I think that in that way it is quite easy to show that things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.”

“Quite right,” said he, “but if you wish to get better training, you must do something more than that;
Parmenides: *The Way* is just *That* which you heard Zeno *practicing*. Except that I was also

135E οὐπέρ Ὄυτος ἣκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν καὶ

quite pleased with what you said to him, because you would not allow him to look upon

γε ἡγασθήν πρὸς τοῦτο σου εἰπόντος τοῦτον ὅτι οὐκ εἶας (εἰσε) ἐπισκοπέειν

the wandering that exists among the objects of sight nor upon the wandering that exists

την πλανὴν ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ

in relation to them, but to consider according to *That which one can grasp especially by Logos*

peri ταυτα, ἀλλὰ peri εκεῖνα α τις αν λαβοι μάλιστα λογο

and *in this way*, one would thus be led to *See The Ideas*.

καὶ αν ενειαι ἡγήσαιτο εἰδη.

Socrates: For it appears to me, that *in this way* it *may indeed* be shown *without difficulty*,

γαρ Δοκεί μοι ταυτη γε αποφαίνειν οὐδὲν χαλεπον

that *The Beings* experience both *Like* and *Unlike*, and anything else that *exists*.

τα οντα πασχοντα και ομοια και ανομοια και οτιουν αλλο ειναι.

Parmenides: Quite rightly indeed. But it is also necessary that, besides this,

γ᾽ καλως και. δε και χρη πρὸς τοῦτω

Parmenides
you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.”

“What do you mean?” he said.

“Take, for instance,” he replied, “that hypothesis of Zeno’s if the many exist, you should inquire what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and to the many, and also what will happen to the one and the many in relation to themselves and to each other, if the many do not exist.
you should still also
eτι καὶ
suppose the following; to consider not only the consequences resulting from the hypothesis, ποιεὶν τὸ δὲ, σκοπεῖν μὴ μονὸν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, whether Each Ideal-Self being hypothesized exists, but also the consequences resulting from 136A ἐι ἑκαστὸν ὑποτιθεμένον ἐστὶν, ἄλλα καὶ hypothesizing if This Ideal-Self does not exist, if you wish to be more exercised in this way. υποτιθεσθαι ἐι τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐστὶ, ἐι βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι 

Socrates: In what way do you mean? (Πῶς λέγεις;) Parmenides: Such as, if you should wish to exercise Your Self in this same hypotheses, which Οἶνον, ἐι βούλει περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Zeno hypothesized; (1) that if Many (Beings 127e) Exist, what must result both to The Many Ζῆνων ὑπεθέτο, ἐι πολλὰ ἐστὶ, τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς Selves in relation to The Selves and in relation to The One, and again if Many (Beings) Exist, αὐτοὶς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐν καὶ what must result for The One in relation to The Self and in relation to The Many; and in turn, τῷ ἐν πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ: καὶ αὖ if The Many do not Exist, to consider in turn, what will result both in relation to The One ἐι πολλὰ μὴ ἐστὶ, σκοπεῖν παλῖν, τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνι and to The Many, both in relation to The Selves and in relation to Each-Other. 136B καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα:
[136b] And likewise if you suppose the existence or non-existence of likeness, what will happen to the things supposed and to other things in relation to themselves and to each other under each of the two hypotheses. The same applies to unlikeness and to motion and rest, creation and destruction, and even to being and not being. In brief, whatever the subject of your hypothesis, if you suppose that it is or is not, or that it experiences any other affection, you must consider what happens to it and to any other particular things you may choose, and to a greater number and to all in the same way;
And again in turn (2), one should hypothesize, if Likeness Exists, or if It does not exist, καὶ αὐτὸς αὐ, εἰ ὑποθῆ, εἰ ὁμοιοτής ἐστιν ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐστιν, what will result for each of the hypothesis, both to The Selves that are being hypothesized τὴν ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσαι and to The Others, both in relation to The Selves and to Each-Other. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα.

And (3) The Self/Same Logos must also be applied to The Unlike, to Motion and Rest, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου περὶ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως to Generation and Dissolution and to The Self that Is and to The Self that Is not, and in One περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς καὶ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ καὶ ἐν Logos, concerning That which should be hypothesized as Always-Being and as not-Being and λόγο (Pro-Tim 168c), περὶ αὐτοῦ αὖ ὑποθῆ ὡς αἰεί ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ anything else that undergoes any experience whatsoever, one must consider the consequences ἄλλο πασχόντος παθος στις, δεί σκοπεῖν τὰ ἐξυμβαίνοντα in relation to The Self and in relation to each one of The Others being considered, which may set-up for this purpose, and in relation to Many, and similarly in relation to Everything. αὖ προελη τι καὶ πρὸς πλεῖο καὶ ὦςαυτῶς πρὸς ἐξυμπάντα

καὶ αὖς αὐ δὲν ὑποθῆ αἱ ἐστὶν ὁμοιοτής ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν, τι ἐφ’ ἐκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβάλλεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν τι ὑποθῆ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὡς ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δέοι σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς ἑκαστὸν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προελη, καὶ πρὸς πλεῖο καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὀσαύτως:

Parmenides
[136c] and you must consider other things in relation to themselves and to anything else you may choose in any instance, whether you suppose that the subject of your hypothesis exists or does not exist, if you are to train yourself completely to see the truth perfectly.”

“Parmenides,” he said, “it is a stupendous amount of study which you propose, and I do not understand very well. Why do you not yourself frame an hypothesis and discuss it, to make me understand better?”
And in turn (4), how The Others are related to The Selves and to any Other which one may select, whether you hypothesize as the subject of your hypothesis That which Always Is, or as that which Is-not; if you care about being Perfectly exercised to Thoroughly-Behold The Truth, in a Masterful Way.

Socrates: You speak, O Parmenides, of an extraordinary undertaking, and I do not quite understand. But why not hypothesize in detail a Certain/Definite Self for me, in order that I may be more able to understand?

καὶ τάλλα αὖ πρός αὐτὰ τε καὶ πρός ἄλλο ὁτι ἂν προαίρη ἂεὶ, ἐὰν τε ὁ ὑποθῆ ὃς ὑπετίθεσο ὁ αἰεὶ ὁν or as that which Is-not, if you care about being Perfectly exercised to Thoroughly-Behold The Truth, in a Masterful Way.

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“That is a great task, Socrates,” he said, “to impose upon a man of my age.”

“But you, Zeno,” said Socrates, “why do not you do it for us?”

Pythodorus said that Zeno answered with a smile:

“Let us ask it of Parmenides himself, Socrates; for there is a great deal in what he says, and perhaps you do not see how heavy a task you are imposing upon him. If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him; for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age;
Parmenides: You assign, O Socrates, much work, for one as old as me.

Socrates: Then in that case, Zeno, why don’t you unfold it in detail for us?

Antiphon: Then Zeno, laughing, said: (Και τον Ζήνωνα γελασαντα φαναι:)

Zeno: We must ask Parmenides himself, O Socrates. For, as it has been said, it is indeed, no trifling matter. Or do you not see the magnitude of the work you are assigning? If, then, on the one hand, more of us were present, it would not be appropriate to make such a request; for it is unsuitable, and especially for a man of his age, to speak of matters such as these in the presence of many people.

Parmenides
[136e] for the many do not know that except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain to the truth. So I, Parmenides join Socrates in his request, that I myself may hear the method, which I have not heard for a long time.”

Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when Zeno said this he himself and Antisthenes and the rest begged Parmenides to show his meaning by an example and not to refuse.
For the many are ignorant that, without This Discursive γαρ οἱ πολλοὶ αγνοοῦσιν στὶ. ανεύ ταῦτης διεξ—

Procession and Wandering through All Beings/Cities (Poem-Frag1), it happens to be impossible —όδου τε καὶ πλανῆς διὰ πάντων εντυχόντα αδύνατον for The Mind to hold-on to The Truth. Therefore, O Parmenides, I ask in conjunction with νουν σχειν το αληθει. μεν ουν, ὦ Παρμενιδή, εγὼ συνδέομαι Socrates, that you yourself undertake the discussion, in order that I may also hear to the end, Σωκρατεί, αυτος ἵνα καὶ διακούσω that which I heard some time ago. δια χρόνου.

Antiphon: 9 Then when Zeno asked this, Pythodorus said, that he also, and Aristotle, and δὴ Ζήνωνος τοῦ εἰπόντος Ταῦτα, τὸν Πυθοδωρὸν φανει αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν Αριστοτέλη the others asked Parmenides, to demonstrate that which he spoke of and not do otherwise. καὶ τοὺς αλλοὺς δεισθάι τοῦ Παρμενιδοῦ, ενδειξασθαι ν το λέγοι καὶ μὴ ποιειν αλλως.

ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ δὴ ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον εντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεί νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενιδή, Σωκρατεί συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτὸν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενιδοῦ καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι δὲ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλος ποιεῖν.
And Parmenides said: “I must perforce do as you ask. [137a] And yet I feel very much like the horse in the poem of Ibycus—an old race-horse who was entered for a chariot race and was trembling with fear of what was before him, because he knew it by experience. Ibycus says he is compelled to fall in love against his will in his old age, and compares himself to the horse. So I am filled with terror when I remember through what a fearful ocean of words I must swim, old man that I am.
Parmenides: It is necessary to comply with your request. And yet, I appear to my self to
sympathize with the fate of the horse of Ibycus, which being a race-horse, and being advanced
in years, when being about to contend in the chariot races, and by knowing the experience,
trembled with fear at the forthcoming event, and to whom, Ibycus, comparing him self, said
And My Self being so old is Involuntarily Compelled to Return to The Object of My Love -
remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great a sea of discourse.

And I also, being as old as I am appear to my self to exceedingly dread the present undertaking,
remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great a sea of discourse.

Parmenides
However, I will do it, for I must be obliging, especially since we are, as Zeno says, alone. [137b] Well, how shall we begin? What shall be our first hypothesis? Or, since you are determined that I must engage in a laborious pastime, shall I begin with myself, taking my own hypothesis and discussing the consequences of the supposition that the one exists or that it does not exist?"

“By all means,” said Zeno.

“Who then,” said he, “to answer my questions? Shall we say the youngest? He would be least likely to be over-curious and most likely to say what he thinks and moreover his replies would give me a chance to rest.” [137c]

“I am ready, Parmenides, to do that,” said Aristoteles, “for I am the youngest, so you mean me. Ask your questions and I will answer.”
For thus it is necessary to take this task in hand, seeing that, it is at the request of Zeno,
and in any case, we are by our selves.

Therefore, from whence then, shall we begin, and what shall we hypothesize first?

Or are you willing, seeing that it certainly appears that we must play a very laborious game, I
must begin from my Self and the hypothesis of my Self; by hypothesizing about The One Self,
whether One Is, or whether One is not, what must the result be?

Zeno: By all means.

Parmenides: Who then, will answer to me? Or will it be the youngest among you?

For the labor will be very much less, should he answer what he thinks; and his answer,
at the same time, will afford me a time for resting from that arduous investigation.

Aristotle: I will attend to you in this, O Parmenides, for you may call upon me
as calling upon the youngest. Ask me, then, as one who will answer you.

Parmenides
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IBYCUS

6th Century B.C.

Eros,
Even now
Looks at me,
From Under Dark Eyelids
With Tenderness
And Casts me
Spellbound
Into Aphrodite’s Nets
Where I lie
Inextricably Caught,

For I Swear
His Mere Approach
Makes me tremble

EROS: Ibycus : Like: Race: Chariot-horse

An Old Champion Chariot Horse
As he draws
A swift cart/chariot

Unwillingly
To The Race.
“Well then,” said he, “if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?”

“No, of course not.”

“Then there can be no parts of it, nor can it be a whole.”

“How is that?”

“The part surely is part of a whole.”

“Yes.”

“And what is the whole? Is not a whole that of which no part is wanting?” [137d]

“Certainly.”

“Then in both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole and having parts.”

“Inevitably.”
The First Hypothesis

**Parmenides:** 10 Well then, if One Is, could not The One Be Many in Some Other Way?

Εἰεν δὴ, εἰ εὖ εἰστιν, ἂν οὐκ ὑπ’ ἐν εἰῇ πολλ’ ἄλλο;

**Aristotle:** How could it be many? (πῶς ἂν γὰρ;)  

**Par:** Accordingly then, neither Can any Part Belong to Self nor Can Self Be a Whole.

αρα οὔτε δεῖ μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε αυτὸ εἶναι ὅλον.

**Ari:** Why not then? (τι δή;)  

**Par:** Because The Part Is in some way a Part of a Whole.

τὸ μέρος εστὶν ποὺ μέρος ὅλου.

**Ari:** Yes. (Ναι.)  

**Par:** What then about The Whole? Would not That from which no Part Is absent Be Whole?

Τι δὲ τὸ ὅλον; ἂν οὐχὶ οὐ μηδὲν μέρος ἀν αὕτη εἰῇ ὅλον;

**Ari:** Entirely so. (πανὺ γε.)  

**Par:** Accordingly then, from both these consequences The One would Be Composed of Parts,  

αρα αὐτῷ ἀμφοτέρως τὸ εῦ αὐτὸ εἶναι εἰκ μέρων,  

by Being a Whole and by Possessing Parts.

ον ὅλον τε και εχον μερη.

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

εἰεν δὴ, φάναι: εἰ ἐν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴῃ πολλὰ τὸ ἔν;  

πῶς γάρ ἂν;

οὔτε ἃρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.

τι δή;  

τὸ μέρος ποὺ ὅλον μέρος ἔστιν.  

ναῖ.  

τι δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὐ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ ὅλον ἂν εἴῃ;  

πάνυ γε.  

ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἃρα οὕτως τὸ ἔν πολλὰ εἴῃ ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἔν.  

ἀληθῆ.
“Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.”

“True.”

“Yet it must be not many, but one.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts.”

“No.”

“And if it has no parts, it can have no beginning, or middle, or end, for those would be parts of it?”

“Quite right.”

“Beginning and end are, however, the limits of everything.”

“Of course.”

“Then the one, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”

“Yes, it is unlimited.”
Accordingly then, in both ways, The One will Be Many, but Not-One.

Par: Accordingly then, in both ways, The One will Be Many, but Not-One.

Ari: True. (ἀλήθη.)

Par: But It Must indeed, not Be Many, but One Self. (See 142A)

Ari: True. (ἀληθή.)

Par: But It Must indeed, not Be Many, but One Self. (See 142A)

Ari: It must. (δει.)

Par: Hence It will neither Be a Whole, nor Possess Parts, if The One “Is to Be” One.

Ari: It will not. (ου γαρ.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if It Can have No Part, then neither Can It have a Beginning nor Middle nor End; for those such as these would already Be Parts of Self?

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ᾽ ου;) 

Par: Accordingly then, The One is Unlimited, if It has either Beginning or End?

Ari: Unlimited. (απειρον.)
“And it is without form, [137e] for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight.”

“How so?”

“The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center.”

“Yes.”

“And the straight, again, is that of which the middle is in the nearest line between the two extremes.”

“It is.”

“Then the one would have parts and would be many, whether it partook of straight or of round form.”

“Certainly.”
Par: Accordingly then, It Must also “Be” without Figure/Form/Shape,
καὶ ἀνεύ σχήματος:
for It Can neither Participate of The Circular nor of The Straight/Rectilinear.
137E γὰρ αν οὔτε μετέχει στρογγυλοῦ οὔτε εὐθεὸς.
Ari: How is this the case? (πῶς;)
Par: For The Circular Is indeed that in which The Extremities Must Be
στρογγυλὸν εστὶ γε τοῦτο οὐ τα ἐσχάτα αὐτὸ
in every way Equally distant from The Middle.
πανταχῆ ποὺ ἰσον απεχῆ απὸ τοῦ μέσου.
Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)
Par: And The Straight Is indeed that in which The Middle
καὶ εὐθὺ γε μὴν η ᾠ τὸ μέσον Is situated in line with both The Extremes?
πιπροσθέν αἱμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν.
Ari: It is so. (οὔτως.)
Par: It is not the case then, that The One will then Possess Parts and Be Many,
οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶχοι μερῆ καὶ αὐτῷ εἴη πολλά, by Participating of either a Straight or of a Round Figure?
μετέχοι εἶτε εὐθέος εἶτε περιφεροῦσ σχήματος.
Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)
“Then it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts.” [138a]

“Right.”

Moreover, being of such a nature, it cannot be anywhere, for it could not be either in anything else or in itself.”

“How is that?”

“If it were in something else, it would be encircled by that in which it would be and would be touched in many places by many parts of it; but that which is one and without parts and does not partake of the circular nature cannot be touched by a circle in many places.”

“No, it cannot.”
Par: Accordingly then, It is neither Straight nor Round, seeing that It has No Part.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: And certainly, by “Being” Such, It will indeed exist in-no-way-whatsoever, for It will neither exist In-Another, nor In-It-Self.

Ari: How so? (πως δη;)
“But, furthermore, being in itself it would also be surrounding with itself naught other than itself, [138b] if it were in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not surround it.”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then that which surrounds would be other than that which is surrounded; for a whole cannot be both active and passive in the same action; and thus one would be no longer one, but two.”

“True.”

“Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in something else.”

“No, it is not.”

“This being the case, see whether it can be either at rest or in motion.”

“Why not?”
Par: But surely, if Self were indeed In-It-Self, then Self would also Contain It-Self, and if indeed, by Being no other than Self, Self would Be In-It-Self; for it is Impossible that anything not be Contained by That in which it is.

Ari: For it is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.)

Par: Is it not so then, that on the one hand, The Self that Contains Is One Certain Aspect, while on the other hand, That which is Being Contained is Another? For The Same Whole can indeed not, be both acted upon (Passive) and also be The Creative Principle (Active), and in this way, The One would no longer be One, but Two At-Once.

Ari: For then it would not. (γαρ οὖν οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly, The One Is Not Anywhere, by Being Neither In-It-Self nor In-Another.

Ari: It is not. (οὐκ ἐστίν.)

Parmenides: 11 Observe then, if It Has to Be Understood in such a way as this; then It Is either Remaining-Stationary or Being-Moved.

Aristotle: Why then could it not? (τι δὴ γαρ οὐ;)
[138c] “Because if in motion it would be either moving in place or changing; for those are the only kinds of motion.”

“Yes.”

“But the one, if changing to something other than itself, cannot any longer be one.”

“It cannot.”

“Then it is not in motion by the method of change.”

“Apparently not.”

“But by moving in place?”

“Perhaps.”

“But if the one moved in place, it would either revolve in the same spot or pass from one place to another.”

“Yes, it must do so.”

“And that which revolves must rest upon a center and have other parts which turn about the center;
Par: Because indeed That which is Moving, will either Move-in-place or change-from-place-to-place; for these alone, are the types of Motion.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But if The One were to in any way undergo alteration of-or-from It-Self, it is Impossible that It could still Remain One.

Ari: Impossible. (αδύνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not Be Moved according to alteration.

Ari: It has come to Light that it will not. (φαίνεται οὐ.)

Par: But will It then Be Moved in-place?

Ari: Perhaps. (ἰσως.)

Par: But certainly, if The One Is Moved in-place, then Self will either be Carried around in-a-circle, or It will Change from-one-place-to-another.

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: So then on the one hand, That which is Being Carried around in-a-circle, must Stand-firm in The Middle, and have the other Parts of It-Self Carried around The Middle. ὅτι κινούμενον γε ἑ φέροιτο ἢ ἄλλοιοῖτο ἢν: αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

Ari: Because indeed That which is Moving, will either Move-in-place or change-from-place-to-place; for these alone, are the types of Motion.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But if The One were to in any way undergo alteration of-or-from It-Self, it is Impossible that It could still Remain One.

Ari: Impossible. (αδύνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not Be Moved according to alteration.

Ari: It has come to Light that it will not. (φαίνεται οὐ.)

Par: But will It then Be Moved in-place?

Ari: Perhaps. (ἰσως.)

Par: But certainly, if The One Is Moved in-place, then Self will either be Carried around in-a-circle, or It will Change from-one-place-to-another.

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: So then on the one hand, That which is Being Carried around in-a-circle, must Stand-firm in The Middle, and have the other Parts of It-Self Carried around The Middle. βεβηκέναι επὶ μεσοῦ, καὶ εχεῖν τα ἄλλα μερη εαυτου φερομενα το μεσον.
[138d] but what possible way is there for that which has no center and parts to revolve upon a center?”

“There is none.”

“But does it change its place by coming into one place at one time and another at another, and move in that way?”

“Yes, if it moves at all.”

“Did we not find that it could not be in anything?”

“Yes.”

“And is it not still more impossible for it to come into anything?”

“I do not understand why.”

“If anything comes into anything, it must be not yet in it, while it is still coming in, nor still entirely outside of it, if it is already coming in, must it not?”

“It must.”
But on the other hand, by what device would it be fitting for That which has neither Middle nor Parts to ever be carried in-a-circle about The Middle?

Ari: By none at all. (οὐδεμιᾷ.)

Par: But surely then, by changing place, it would become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved? (καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;)

Ari: In this case it would most certainly indeed. (εἰπερ γε δή.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that it has been declared impossible, on the one hand, for Self, to be in-anything at all (138B)?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Take notice then, is it not still even more impossible that it become in-anything?

Ari: I do not grasp in what way, you mean this. (οὐκ εννοῶ ὅπῃ.)

Par: If anything comes to be in-anything, is it not necessary

that it should neither yet be in-that, since it is still coming to be;

nor yet can it be entirely out-of-that, since then, it would already have come to be?

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκηκ.)
[138e] “Now if anything goes through this process, it can be only that which has parts; for a part of it could be already in the other, and the rest outside; but that which has no parts cannot by any possibility be entirely neither inside nor outside of anything at the same time.”

“True.”

“But is it not still more impossible for that which has no parts and is not a whole to come into anything, since it comes in neither in parts nor as a whole?”

“Clearly.”
Par: Then if this can take place in something else, then it **Must Only** happen to That which has **Parts**; for **One Part of Self** will already be **in-That Whole**, but Another Part will be ει ἡ μερη: γαρ το μεν αυτου αν ηθη εν εκεινω τι, δε το ειη

*At-Once, out-of-That Whole*, whereas That which has No Parts Cannot be **One Whole at-Once**, out-of-That Whole, where That which has No Parts Cannot in any way be ειη µερη: γαρ το μεν αυτου αν ηθη εν εκεινω τι, δε το ειη

*Wholly-within*, nor again, *Wholly-without* anything, at the same time. ολον µητε εντος µητε τε εξω ουδενι τινος αμα .

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: But is it not even **much more Impossible** that That which has neither Parts nor happens to be a Whole to become in any way; since **It can neither exist**

*in a state of becoming* according to Parts, nor according to a Whole? εγγιγνομενον κατα µερη µητε κατα ολον;

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)
[139a] “Then it does not change its place by going anywhere or into anything, nor does it revolve in a circle, nor change.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then the one is without any kind of motion.”

“It is motionless.”

Furthermore, we say that it cannot be in anything.”

“We do.”

“Then it is never in the same.”

“Why is that?”

“Because it would then be in that with which the same is identical.”

“Certainly.”

“But we saw that it cannot be either in itself or in anything else.”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then the one is never in the same.” [139b]

“Apparently not.”
Par: Accordingly then, The One does not Change place by going Anywhere and by becoming in-any-thing, nor by Being Carried around in-that which Is Self, nor by undergoing any Alteration. (ουτε αλλοιουμενον.)

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One “Is” Immoveable according to every kind of Motion.

Ari: Immoveable. (ακινητον.)

Par: But we have certainly indeed also said that it is Impossible for Self to Be in-anything (138b).

Ari: We have said so. (γαρ φαμεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, It cannot ever Be in-That which Is Self.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη;) 

Par: Because then Self would already Be in-That, in which Self Is.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: But Self was also found to Be such that It Can neither Be in-It-Self nor in-Another.

Ari: It cannot. (ου γαρ ουν. )

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is never in The Self.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

τω γνησιωμενον χωραν αλλατει χωραν ουν ποι και γγνομενον

εν τω, ουτε περιφερομενον εν τω αυτω

ουκ εοικεν.

κατα πασαν αρα κινησιν το εν ακινητον.

αλλα μην γε και φαμεν αδυνατον

φαμεν γαρ.

ουτε αρα ποι ιον και εν οαδη αρα ποτε εν τρο αυτω εστιν.

τι δη:

οτι ιδη αν εν εκεινω ειη εν ου τρο αυτω εστιν.

πανυ μεν ουν.

αλλε ουτε εν αυτω ουτε εν ολλω οιον τε ιν αυτο ενειναι.

ου γαρ ουν.

οδεποτε αρα εστι το εν εν τρο αυτω.

ουκ εοικεν.
“But that which is never in the same is neither motionless nor at rest.”  

“No, it cannot be so.”

“The one, then, it appears, is neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No, apparently not.”

“Neither, surely, can it be the same with another or with itself; nor again other than itself or another.”

“Why not?”

“If it were other than itself, it would be other than one and would not be one.”

“True.”
Par: But most certainly, since It can never Be in The Self, then
\[\alphaλλα \gammaε \muην \ \tauο \muηδεποτε \ \epsilonν \ \tauο \ \alphaυτω\]
It will never Be At-Rest/At-Peace nor Be Led to Stand still.
\[ουθ’ \ \sigmaν \ \etaσυχιαν \ \ουθ’ \ \αγει \ \εστηκεν.\]
Ari: For it is not such that it can be. (γαρ τε ου οιον.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One, as it is likely, neither Stands-still nor Is Moved.
\[\alphaρα \ \tauο \ \epsilonν, \ \omegaς \ \εοικεν, \ \ουθ’ \ \εστηκεν \ \ουτε \ \κινεται.\]
Ari: It certainly does not appear to be the case.
\[\gammaε \ \ουκουν \ \φαινεται \ δη.\]
Par: It will certainly not indeed Be The Same, neither with-The Other,
\[\muην \ \Ουδε \ \γε \ \εσται \ \tauαυτον \ \ουθ’ \ \ετερω
\\]
nor with It-Self, nor in turn will It Be Other, neither from-The Self nor from-The Other.
\[ουτε \ \εαυτω, \ \ουδ’ \ \αυ \ \\alphaν \ \ειν \ \ετερον \ \ουτε \ \\alphaυτον \ \ουτε \ \\epsilonτερου.\]
Ari: In what way then? (πη δη;)  
Par: For if on the one hand, by Being in any way Other than It-Self, then
\[\muεν \ \ον \ \\piου \ \\epsilonτερον \ \\epsilonαυτου\]
It would Be Other than One, and so It would Be Not-One.
\[\\alphaν \ \\epsilonιν \ \\epsilonτερον \ \\ενος \ \\και \ \\\alphaν \ \\epsilonιν \ \ουκ \ \\epsilonν.\]
Ari: True. (αληθη.)
“And, surely, if it were the same with another, it would be that other, and would not be itself; [139c] therefore in this case also it would not be that which it is, namely one, but other than one.”

“Quite so.”

“Then it will not be the same as another, nor other than itself.”

“No.”

“But it will not be other than another, so long as it is one. For one cannot be other than anything; only other, and nothing else, can be other than another.”

“Right.”

“Then it will not be other by reason of being one, will it?”

“Certainly not.”
Par: And most certainly by Being The Same with-The Other, It would Be That;

139C καὶ γε μὴν ον ταυτον ετερῳ αν ειη εκεινον,
thus It could not Be The Self; so that neither in this way could It “Be” just as It “Is”, One,
δ’ αν ουκ ειη αυτοι: woste ouδ’ ουτως αν ειη οπερ εστιν, εν,
but The Other One. (αλλ’ ετερον ενος.)

Ari: It could not. (ου γαρ ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, It will not Be The Same with-The Other, or
αρα μεν ουκ εσται ταυτον ετερω η
Other than It-Self.
ετερον εαυτου.

Ari: For It could not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But on the other hand, surely It will not Be Other from-Another, so long as
δε γε αν ουκ εσται ετερον ετερου, εως
and in so far as It “Is” One. For it is not Proper for The One to Be Other than anything,
η εν. γαρ ου προσηκει ενι ειναι ετερω τινος,
but Simply Other, but not in any way another from-The Other.
αλλα μονω ετερω δε ουδενι αλλω ετερου.

Ari: Properly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Thus, on the one hand, It will not Be Other since It “Is” One; or what do you think?
αρα μεν ουκ εσται ετερον τω ειναι εν: η οιει ;
Ari: Not in any way at all. (ου δητα. )
“And if not for this reason, not by reason of itself; and if not by reason of itself, not itself; but since itself is not other at all, [139d] it will not be other than anything.”

“Right.”

“And yet one will not be the same with itself.”

“Why not?”

“The nature of one is surely not the same as that of the same.”

“Why?”

“Because when a thing becomes the same as anything, it does not thereby become one.”

“But why not?”

“That which becomes the same as many, becomes necessarily many, not one.”

“True.”

“But if the one and the same were identical, whenever anything became the same it would always become one, and when it became one, the same.”

“Certainly.”
Par: But surely if not by reason of this, then it will not be other from-it-self; but if self is not at all other from-self, then by being in no way other, self will be other than-nothing. oúde μή αὐτῷ: δε ὁν μηδαμὴ ετερον αυτο εσται ετερον οὐδενὸς.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

Par: Nor yet will it be the same with-it self.

Ari: Why not then? (πως οὔ;)

Par: Since whenever anything comes to be the same with-anything it does not become one.

Ari: But what then indeed? (ἀλλὰ τί μήν;)
“Then if the one is the same with itself, [139c] it will not be one with itself; and thus, being one, it will not be one; this, however, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for one to be either the other of other or the same with itself.”

“Impossible.”

“Thus the one cannot be either other or the same to itself or another.”

“No, it cannot.”

“And again it will not be like or unlike anything, either itself or another.”

“Why not?”

“Because the like is that which is affected in the same way.”

“Yes.”

“But we saw that the same was of a nature distinct from that of the one.”

“Yes, so we did.”
Par: Accordingly then, if The One Is to Be The Same with-It-Self, then It will Be,

That which is Not-One with-It-Self. And in this way One Being will Be Not-One;

but certainly, this is indeed Impossible. Accordingly then, it is also Impossible for The One
to Be either, Other from-The Other or The Same with-It-Self.

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

Par: So in this way The One will not Be Other or The Same with-Self nor with- Other.

Ari: For thus it could not.

Par: Surely then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike anything,

neither in relation to It-Self nor in relation to The Other.

Ari: Why not then. (τι δη;) 

Par: Because The Like Is That which Is affected in some way by The Same.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But it was shown that The Nature of The Same Is indeed Separate from The One.

Ari: It was so shown. (γαρ εφανη.)
“But if the one were affected in any way apart from being one, it would be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one cannot possibly be affected in the same way as another or as itself.”

“Evidently not.”

“No, so it appears.”

“Nor can the one be so affected as to be other; for in that case it would be so affected as to be more than one.”

“Yes, it would be more.”
Par: But certainly, if The One would experience anything Apart from Being One, then It would experience to Be More than One, but this, is Impossible.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, it is not in any way possible for The One to experience Being The Same; neither with-Another nor with-It-Self.

Ari: It has not come to Light. (οὐ φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, it Is Not Possible for Self to be Like, neither to-Another nor to-It-Self.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (οὐκ έοικεν.)

Par: Most certainly then, neither can The One experience Being Other; for in this way, It would also experience to Be More than One.

Ari: For then It would be more. (γαρ πλειω.)

ἀλλά μήν εἰ τι πέπονθε χωρίς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, πλεῖω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἐν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί.

οὐδαμώς ἔστιν άρα ταύτων πεπονθῶς εἶναι τὸ ἐν οὕτε ἄλλω οὕτε έαυτῷ.

οδ φαίνεται.

οὔδε ὁμοιον ἃρα δυνατόν αὐτῶ εἶναι οὕτε άλλῳ οὕτε έαυτῷ.

οὐκ έοικεν.

οὔδε μήν ἐπερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐν: καὶ γαρ οὕτω πλεῖω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἐν. πλεῖω γάρ.
“But that which is affected in a way other than itself or other, [140b] would be unlike itself or other, if that which is affected in the same way is like.”
“Right.”

“But the one, as it appears, being never affected in a way other than itself or other, is never unlike either itself or other.”
“Evidently not.”

“Then the one will be neither like nor unlike either other or itself.”
“So it seems.”

“Since, then, it is of such a nature, it can be neither equal nor unequal to itself or other.”
“Why not?”
“If it is equal, it is of the same measures as that to which it is equal.”
“Yes.”
Par: Most certainly then that which undergoes Being Other than-It-Self or Another, will Be Unlike either It-Self or Another, if indeed That which experiences The Same Is Like.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: But The One, as it is indeed likely, by not experiencing in any way Being Other, “Is” neither Unlike It-Self nor The Other.

Ari: For thus it cannot. (γαρ οὖν οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike, neither to-The Other nor to-It-Self.

Ari: It has not come to Light. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

Par: And most certainly then, by “Being” Such, It will neither Be Equal nor Unequal, neither to-It-Self nor to-Another. (οὔτε εαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.)

Ari: In what way? (πη;)

Par: For on the one hand, if It were Equal, It would Be of The Same/Self Measures with-that-to-which It Is Being Equal.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

καὶ μήν τοιοῦτον γε ὅτι οὔτε ἑσται οὔτε ἄνισον οὔτε ἕτερῳ οὔτε Ἐσται τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων

μέν η ἑσται τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων

ἐκαίνω ὁ συν ἑσον.

πή;
“And if it is greater or less than things [140c] with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the things which are less and less measures than the things which are greater.”

“Yes.”

“And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will have smaller measures than some and greater measures than others.”

“Of course.”

“Is it not impossible for that which does not participate in sameness to have either the same measures or anything else the same?”

“Impossible.”

“Then not having the same measures, it cannot be equal either to itself or to anything else.”

“No, apparently not.”
Par: But on the other hand, by Being in some way Greater or Lesser than that-to-which

It is Commensurate, It will have more Measures than the lesser, but fewer than the greater. An ξύμμετρον, μεν εξει πλειω μετρα των ελαττωνων, δε ελαττω των μειζωνων.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Thus to those-to-which It would not be Commensurable, on the one hand, It will have δ′ οις αν μη συμμετρον, μεν εσται smaller Measures than some, but on the other hand, greater Measures than others. ομικροτερων των δε μειζωνων μετρων των.

Ari: How could it not. (πως γαρ ου;) 

Par: Is it not Impossible then, for That which does not Participate of The Self

ουκουν αδυνατον το μη μετεχον του αυτου
to either Be of The Same/Self Measures, or of anything else of The Same/Selves?

η ειναι των αυτων μετρων η αλλων ωντινωνουν των αυτων; 

Ari: It is impossible. (αδυνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, It will neither Be Equal to-It-Self,

αρα μεν αν ουτ’ ειη ισον εαυτω
nor to-Another, by not Being of The Same/Self Measures.

ουτε αλλω, μη ον των αυτων μετρων.

Ari: It does indeed not appear to be so. (ουκουν γε φαινεται.)
“But whether it have more measures or less, [140d] it will have as many parts as measures and thus one will be no longer one, but will be as many as are its measures.”

“Right.”

“But if it were of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; but we have seen that it cannot be equal to anything.”

“Yes, so we have.”

“Then it will partake neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor will it partake at all of the same, nor will it ever, apparently, be equal to itself or to anything else; nor will it be greater or less than itself or another.”

“Perfectly true.”
Par: But most certainly then, by *Being* of *more* or *fewer* *Measures* It will also *Be*

\[\alphaλλα \ γε \ μην \ \text{ον \ πλειονον \ η \ ελαττονων \ μετρων, \ αν \ και \ ειη} \]
of as many *Parts* as there are *Measures*; and in this way it will again, no longer “*Be*” *One*,

140D *τοσαυτων \ μερον, \ οσονπερ \ μετρων, \ και \ ουτως \ αυ \ ουκετι \ εσται \ εν,*

but *Be as many as there are also* *Measures*.

\[\alphaλλα \ τοσαυτα \ οσαπερ \ και \ \tauα \ μετρα. \]

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: But if indeed *It* would *Be* of *One Measure*, *It* would *Become Equal to That Measure*.

\[\text{δε \ ει \ γε \ ειη \ ενος \ μετρου, \ αν \ γιγνοιτο \ ισον \ τω \ μετρω:} \]

But This has come to *Light* that it is *Impossible*; that *The Self* *Be Equal to anything*.

\[\text{δε \ τουτο \ εφανη \ αδυνατον, \ αυτο \ ειναι \ ισον \ τω.} \]

Ari: It has so come to *Light*. (γαρ εφανη.)

Par: Accordingly then, *It* will neither *Participate of One Measure*, nor of *Many*, nor of a

\[\alphaρα \ ουτε \ μετεχον \ ενος \ μετρου \ ουτε \ πολλων \ ουτε \]

few; for *That which in no way Participates of The Self, Can Ever Be Equal*, as it is likely,

\[ολιγων \ \tauο \ ουτε \ παραπαν \ μετεχον \ \tauου \ αυτου \ \piοτε \ \epsilonσται \ \ισον, \ \omegaς \ \epsilonοικεν, \]

*to-It-Self nor to-Another*, nor in turn *Be greater or lesser than-It-Self nor than-The Other*.

\[\epsilonαυτω \ ουτε \ αλλοι: \ \text{ουδ’} \ \alphaυ \ \muειζον \ ωυδε \ \epsilonλαττον \ ουτε \ \epsilonαυτου \ \ουτε \ \epsilonτερου. \]

Ari: It is thus so in every way.

\[\muεν \ \ουν \ \ουτω \ \πανταπασι. \]

\[\alphaλλα \ \muην \ \πλειονον \ \gammaε \ \muετρων \ \dε \ \η \ \epsilonλαττονων, \ \δουσονπερ \ \muετρων, \ \tauοσο\u03bc\u03b9\u03c4\u03c7\u03b4\u03ca\u03b9\u03c9 \ \και \ \μερων \ \dε \ \epsilonιη: \ \και \ \ουτω \ \alphaυ \ \ουκετι \ \εν \ \εσται \ \αλλα \ \tauοσαυτα \ \δουσαπερ \ \και \ \tauα \ \muετρα. \]

\[\text{ορθως.} \]

\[\epsilonι \ \dε \ \gammaε \ \ενος \ \muετρου \ \epsilonιη, \ \iota\sigmaον \ \dε \ \gammaιγνοιτο \ \tauο \ \muετρω: \ \tauο\u03bc\u03b9 \ \dε \ \αδυνατον \ \epsilonφανη, \ \iota\sigmaον \ \tauω \ \αυτο \ \ειναι. \ \epsilonφανη \ \gammaαρ. \]

\[\ουτε \ \deltaα \ \ενος \ \muετρου \ \muετεχον \ \oυτε \ \πολλων \ \oυτε \ \ολιγων, \ \oυτε \ \το \ \παραπαν \ \tauο \ \αυτο\u03bc\u03b9 \ \muετεχον, \ \oυτε \ \εαυτω \ \ποτε, \ \\omegaς \ \epsilonοικεν, \ \εσται \ \iota\sigmaον \ \ουτε \ \αλλωι: \ \oυτε \ \αυ \ \muειζον \ \oυδε \ \epsilonλαττον \ \oυτε \ \εαυτου \ \oυτε \ \epsilonτερου. \ \\piανταπασι \ \μεν \ \oυν \ \ουτω. \]
[140e] “Well, does anyone believe that the one can be older or younger or of the same age?”

“Why not?”

“Because if it has the same age as itself or as anything else, it will partake of equality and likeness of time, and we said the one had no part in likeness or equality.”

“Yes, we said that.”

“And we said also that it does not partake of unlikeness or inequality.”

“Certainly.”
Parmenides: 12 What next then? Do you believe that The One Has to Possess The Power
to Be Older or Younger or of The Self/Same Age?

Aristotle: Is there any reason why not? (δη γαρ τι ου;

Par: Since on the one hand, if It somehow Has The Self/Same Age as Self, or as Another,
then, It will Participate of the Equality and Likeness of Time; of which we said,
The One, did not Participate; that is, of neither Likeness nor Equality.

Ari: Yes, we said that. (ουν γαρ ελεγομεν.)

Par: We also said, that It certainly does not Participate of Unlikeness nor Inequality.

Ari: By all means. (πανυ μεν ουν.)
“How, then, being of such a nature, can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything?”

“In no way.”

“Then the one cannot be younger or older or of the same age as anything.”

“No, evidently not.”

“And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself?”

“It must.”

“And the older is always older than something younger?”

“Certainly.”
**Par:** How then, by “Being” of Such a Nature, can It be either Older or Younger or of The Self/Same Age as such a thing that has to Be?

**Ari:** In no way, whatsoever! (οὐδαμῶς.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, The One, could not indeed Be Younger nor Older nor have to Be of The Self/Same Age as Self nor as Another.

**Ari:** It has not come to Light. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

**Par:** Take notice then, Neither Can it Be Possible for The One to Be in Time, at all, if It “Must Be Such as This”? For if Some Entity were to Be in Time, then in that case, Must not Self, Necessarily, for All Time Be growing Older than Self.

**Ari:** Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)

**Par:** Is it not so then, that the Older Is indeed Always growing Older than the Younger?

**Ari:** Certainly. What next? (μήν τι;)
“Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows older.”

“What do you mean?” [141b]

“This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does not have to become different from that which is already different, but it must be different from that which is already different, it must have become different from that which has become so, it will have to be different from that which will be so, but from that which is becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be, nor can it already be different: it must become different, and that is all.”

“There is no denying that.”
Par: Accordingly then, That which *is* growing older than It Self, *is also at* The Same Time
growing younger than It Self, if indeed It Must Possess That which It grows older Than.

Aristotle: What do you mean? (πως λέγεις.)

Parmenides: The following; it is *in no way necessary* for One which *is* different from another
to *become* different, by *being already* different. Thus on the one hand, by *being already*
growing older on its own, *eiper melleei echein* on the *is growing* older on its own.

Whereas, on the other hand, it will *have* to come to be different, and furthermore it *is going* to be
—γονεναι του γεγονοτος δε μελλοντος

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη γαρ.)

τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἐαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἐαυτοῦ ἀρα γίγνεται, εἰπερ μέλλει ἕχειν ὅτου
πρεσβυτέρον γίγνεται.

πὼς λέγεις;

وحدة: διάφορον ἐτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη οντος διαφοροῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη οντος ἤδη
εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε
μέλλειν οὔτε εἰναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ δή.
“But surely the notion 'older' is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else.”

“Yes, so it is.”

“But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself.”

“So it appears.”

“But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself.”

“That also is inevitable.”
Par: But certainly, That which Is Older Is simply a Difference/Distinction in relation to the Younger, and to nothing else.

Ari: So it is. (γαρ εστι.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Becoming Older than It-Self, Must Necessarily, at the same time, also Become Younger than It-Self.

Ari: It seems likely. (εοικεν.)

Par: But surely, neither can It also Come to Be in more nor less Time than It-Self; whereas It Must Be and Become and have Become and Be about to Be for an Equal Time with It-einaı̂ και γιγνεσθαι και γεγονεναι και μελλειν εσεθαι τον ισον χρονον εαυτω.

Ari: For this is also necessarily the case.  γαρ ταυτα και αναγκη ουν.
“Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time [141d] is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself.”

“I see no escape from that.”

“But the one had nothing to do with such affections.”

“No, it had not.”

“It has nothing to do with time, and does not exist in time.”

“No, that is the result of the argument.”

“Well, and do not the words 'was,' 'has become,' and 'was becoming' appear to denote participation in past time?”

“Certainly.”
Par: Accordingly then, it Is Necessary, as it is Reasonable, that Each Self that Exists in Time
and which indeed Participates of such an Existence, has to Be of The Self/Same Age
as Self, and at the same time, also comes to Be Older and Younger than Self.
Ari: That is likely to be the case. (κινδυνεύει.)
Par: But surely, The One, Cannot indeed, Participate of such experiences.
Ari: It cannot so participate.
Par: Accordingly then, Self does not Participate in Time, nor does It Exist in any Time.
Ari: Surely then, such cannot be the case, as The Logos surely proves.
Par: What then? Does it appear that “Was” and “has Become” and “Was Becoming”,
signify the Participation of Time at some period that has come to Be in The Past?
Ari: Indeed it does.

ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἦστιν, ώς ἔοικεν, ὡς γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἦστιν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἐκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον αὐτῷ.
κινδυνεύει.
ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ ἐνι οὐδὲν γε μετην των τοιουτων παθηματων.
Pαρ: Εν μετέχει του τοιουτου, εχειν την αυτην ηλικιαν και γυνεσθαι πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον αυτου.
Αρι: Και γε τα ουδεν γε των τοιουτων παθηματων.
Pαρ: Αλλα μην τω ενι ουδεν γε μετην των τοιουτων παθηματων.
Αρι: Ουδεν γε των τοιουτων παθηματων.
Pαρ: Αλλα μην των τοιουτων παθηματων ουδεν μετην.
Αρι: Ουδεν γε των τοιουτων παθηματων.
Pαρ: Ουδεν γε των τοιουτων παθηματων ουδεν μετην.
Αρι: Αλλα μην των τοιουτων παθηματων.
[141e] “And 'will be,' 'will become,' and 'will be made to become,' in future time?”

“Yes.”

“And 'is' and 'is becoming' in the present?”

“Certainly.”

“Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.”

“Very true.”
Par: What then? Does “Will Be” and “Will come to Be” and “Will Be coming to Be”, not signify Time hereafter, at some period in The Future?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But surely then, does not That which “Is” and That which “Is Becoming” signify Time which Is Now, Present?

Ari: By all means. (πανυ μεν οὖν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The One, does not Ever Participate of Time in any way at all, then neither has It ever come to Be, nor was coming to Be, nor was, neither has It ever come to Be, nor Become, nor Is in The Now, neither will It ever come to Be, nor will have come to Be, nor will It ever Be.

Ari: Most True! (ἀληθέστατα.)
“Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?”

“It cannot.”

“Then the one has no share in being at all.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then the one is not at all.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted.” [142a]

“That seems to be true.”
Par: Therefore, is it possible for It to Participate of Ousia,
οὖν εστίν αν μετασχοι ουσίας
in any other way other than according to any one of those ways?
τι αλλως σπως η κατα τι τοιτων;

Ari: It is not possible. (εστίν ουκ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One in no way whatsoever Participates of Ousia.
αρα το εν ουδαιμως, μετεχει ουσιας.

Ari: It is not likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, in no way whatsoever, Is.
αρα το εν ουδαιμως εστι.

Ari: It has not come to Light. (ου φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither Is It, in such a way, so as “To Be” One,
αρα ουδε εστιν ουτως ωστε ειναι εν
for It would already Be, by Being and by Participating of Ousia; whereas According
γαρ αν ηδη ειη ον και μετεχον ουσιας: αλλ ος
to Reason, The One Is neither One nor Is, if one Must Trust in such a Logos.
εοικε το εν εστιν ουτε εν ουτε εστιν, ει δει πιστευειν τοιωδε λογω.

Ari: I dare say so. (κινδυνευει.)

ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας δπως αν τι μετάσχοι ἀλλως η κατα τούτων τι;
οὐκ ἔστιν.
οὐδαιμὸς ἀρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει.
οὐκ ἔοικεν.
οὐδαιμὼς ἀρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν.
οὐ φαίνεται.
οὐδ’ ἀρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὡστε ἐν εἴναι: εἰη γάρ ἄν ἰδη ὅν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον: ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιώδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.
κινδυνεύει.
“But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?”

“Of course not.”

“Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

“Evidently not.”

“And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.”

“Apparently not.”

“Is it possible that all this is true about the one?”

“I do not think so.”
Par: But, could any non-Being Be of Self, of The One which Is Not, or could any non-Being Belong to This Self?  (Not According to 137D: Pierre Grimes “The Self must Be One”)

Ari: And how could it?

και πως;

Par: Accordingly then, there Is neither Name, nor Logos, nor any Knowledge nor perception, nor opinion, that can be attributed to Self.

Ari: It has not come to Light.

οὐ φαίνεται.

Par: Accordingly then, neither can It Be named, nor Be spoken of, nor Be opined of nor Be The Object of Knowledge, nor do The Real Beings have a perception of Self.

Ari: It is not likely. (οὐκ εοικεν.)

Par: Therefore Is it Possible that these conclusions have to Be in this way about The One?

Ari: To me at least, it certainly does not appear to be in this way.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>0.61</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being one</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>One partakes being</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Theorem I**

| Whole part | 2.10 |
| Infinite number | 2.13 |
| Is | 2.15 |
| Many | 1.6 2.10 |
| Different | 2.19 |
| Individually one | 2.29 |
| Necessarily | 2.36 |
| Number exist | 2.37 |
| Unity attribute | 2.45 |
| Absolute one | 2.51 |

*One many whole parts limited infinite*

*Beginning middle end*

**Brumbaugh 2.054A Theorem II**

| Shape | 2.58 |

**Theorem III**

| In itself | 2.65 |
| In something | 2.69 |
| In itself other | 2.70 |

**Theorem IV**

| Motion rest | 2.75 |

**Theorem V**

| Part whole itself | 2.79 |
| Same itself | 2.82 |
| In itself other 2.70 | 2.84 |
| Other itself | 2.85 |
| Other others | 2.88 |

*Part whole one not one*

*Same 2.77*

| Same | 2.102 |
| Other same other itself | 2.103 |

**Theorem VI**

| Other 2.86 2.88 | 2.104 |
| Other others other other name | 2.105 |
| Same state 1.59 2.108 | 2.106 |
| Like | 2.113 |
| Same 2.101 | 2.115 |
| Like 2.115 | 2.116 |
| Unlike | 2.119 |
| Like unlike | 2.121 |
| Like unlike others | 2.123 |
| Like unlike itself | 2.126 |
On the one hand, it appears that Aristotle is indeed following The Reasoned Account of Parmenides, but on the other hand, he refuses to believe, let alone Trust The Same Reasoned Account! For how can anything possess anything, if first of all it does not possess Being nor existence???

How about, **THE VERY CAUSE** of *Ousia Her Self*;

“**TRANSCEndANT IN DIGNITY AND POWER**” -Republic 509b-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theorem VII</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absolute smallness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- greater smaller one other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal itself others</td>
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<td>equal greater less itself others</td>
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<td>equal greater less itself other</td>
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<tr>
<th>Theorem VIII</th>
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<td>be 2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>partakes time</td>
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<tr>
<td>becoming younger becomes older 1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>becomes older younger itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>older itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>younger itself</td>
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<tr>
<td>- older younger itself</td>
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<tr>
<td>younger other older one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parts beginning middle end 2.8 2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>younger one older others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same age</td>
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<tr>
<td>older 2.11 2.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>becomes - becomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>is becomes - is becomes older younger itself others</td>
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<tr>
<td>was is will be becoming become</td>
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<tr>
<td>relation</td>
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<tr>
<td>knowledge opinion perception</td>
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<td>name definition named defined attributes pertain</td>
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</table>
The One That Is

The Book of TAO

XV. The Wise Ones of Old

had Subtle Wisdom and Depth of Understanding;

They were so Profound that They could not be Understood;

And since They could not be Understood,

then They must necessarily be Described in the following way:

Cautious; Like crossing a Wintry Stream...

Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India, edited by JFB
“Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see [142b] if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?”

“By all means.”

“We say, then, that if the one exists, we must come to an agreement about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not?”

“Yes.”

“Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being?”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it,
The Second Hypothesis

Parmenides: Do you wish then, that we Return again to The Hypothesis from The Beginning, to See if anything of Another Kind may come to Light for us who are Returning?

Aristotle: By all means then, I do so wish.

Par: Is it not the case then, that if we say “One Is”, then we must go through The Same Logos about these following conclusions about Self, whatever they happen to Be; or is it not so? about The Beginning.

Ari: Yes it is so. (Ναι.)

Par: See then, from The Beginning. Accordingly then, on the one hand, if One Is, then Can such as It Is, while on the other hand, It does not Participate of Ousia?

Ari: It could not be so. (ουχ οιον τε.)

Par: And is it not the case then, that The Ousia of The One Could Not Be The Same Being as The One; for if That Were Not The Ousia of That One,

και ουκουν η ουσια του ενος αν ου ειη ταυτον ουσα

τω ενι: γαρ εκεινη αν ην ου ουσια εκεινου,
[142c] but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree?”

“Certainly.”

“In the belief that one and being differ in meaning?”

“Most assuredly.”

“Then if we say concisely ‘one is,’ it is equivalent to saying that one partakes of being?”

“Certainly.”

“Let us again say what will follow if one is and consider whether this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a nature as to have parts.”

“How does that come about?”
then neither Could This One

οὐδ’ απ’ εκείνο το εν

Participate of That, for then to say “One is” would also be like saying “One One”,

142C μετείχειν εκείνης, ἄλλ’ λέγειν εν εἰναι αὐτῇ καὶ τού ὁμοίου εν εν ἐν .

Whereas our Present Hypothesis is not This (First) One; that is; “What Must “Be” the result

de νῦν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εστὶν οὐχ ἀυτῇ , τί θρή ξυμβαίνει

if One One?” but “What Must Be the result, if One Is”. Is it not so?

εἶ εν εν , ἄλλ’ εἰ εν εστὶν , οὐχ οὔτω?

Ari: It certainly is so. (πανύ μεν οὖν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that That which Is, signifies Something Different than The One?

ουκουν οτι επειδαν τις εἴπῃ ὅτι εν εστίν , ἄλλο ην

to λεγομενον τουτ’ συλληβδην αν εἰη το εν μετεχει ουσιας.

Ari: By all means indeed, (πανυ γε.)

(The 1st Intelligible Triad,1246 (P6) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, that whenever anyone says that One Is, that another way

142C−6 αρα οὖν στι επειδαιν τις εἰπῃ στι εν εστὶν , ἄλλο η

to say this concisely, would be; “The One Participates of Ousia”.

tο λεγομενον τουτ’ συλληβδην αν εἰη το εν μετεχει ουσιας.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then, let us say again, what will happen “If One Is”. Consider then,

δη λεγομεν παλιν τι συμβησεται , εἰ εν εστι. οκοπει οὖν

if it is not Necessarily the case, that This Hypothesis signifies The One Being,

εἰ οὐκ αναγκη ταυτην την υποθεσιν σημαινειν το εν ον

in such a way, as to Possess/Contain Parts/Members (Whole Parts such as Head, Torso...)?

tοιοτουν οιον εχειν μερη ;

Ari: How? (πως;)

οδ’ αν εκείνο , το ’εν , εκείνης μετείχεν , ἄλλ’ ομοίων αν ζην λέγειν ’εν τε εἶναι και ’εν ἐν . νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ή υπόθεσις , εἰ ’εν ’εν , τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν , ἄλλ’ εἰ ’εν ἐστὶν : οὐχ οὕτω;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκονδ’ ως ἄλλο τι σημαινον το ἔστι τοῦ ἐν;

ἀνάγκη.

ἀρα οὖν ἄλλο ἡ ὃτι οὐσίας μετέχει το ’εν , τούτ’ αν εἰη το λεγόμενον , ἐπειδαιν τις συλληβδην εἴπῃ δι’ ὅτι ἐν ἐστιν;

πάνυ γε.  

πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν , εἰ εἰ ἐστιν , τί συμβησεται. σκοπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ανάγκη ταυτην την υπόθεσιν τοιοτουν ὅν το ’εν σημαινειν , οὖν μέρη ἔχειν;

πως;
“In this way: [142d] If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?”

“Inevitably.”

“And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?”

“A part of the whole.”

“Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part.”

“Certainly.”
Par: In the following way. If That which Is, is said to Belong to The One Being,
it will also mean that, The One Belongs to The Being of The One. Whereas, it is not the case
that both The Ousia and The One Are The Self, since both Belong to That Self which
we hypothesized; such as The One Being. Accordingly then, on the one hand, Must not
The One Being, Necessarily Be The Whole Self, whereas on the other hand,
be called, at the very least, a Member/Part of The Whole?
προσρητέον το γε μοριον του ολου;
Ari: Of The Whole. (του ολου.)
“Snatch All The Wine-Members, and Lead Them to Me!” -Orpheus-
(The 2nd Intelligible Triad, 1247 (P8) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)
Par: And since It Is One which Is also a Whole, It will Contain a Part.
και αρα εστιν εν, ο η και ολον αν εχει μοριον.
Ari: By all means indeed. (πανυ γε.)
“Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? [142c] Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity?”

“No.”

“And again each of the parts possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts; for always unity has being and being has unity;
Par: What then? Can each of These Parts of The One Being; both The One
τι οὖν; αρα εκατερον τουτων των μοριων του ενος οντος, τε το εν
and The Being abandon each other, so that neither The One be a Part of The Being, nor
142E και το ον απολειπεσθον, η το εν ειναι μοριου του η
The Being be a Part of The One?
tο ον μοριου του ενος;
Ari: That could not be. (ουκ αν ειη.)
Par: Accordingly then, once again, Each of These Members, Maintains/Has both The One
αρα παλιν και εκατερον των μοριων ισχει(ισχω) τε το εν
and The Being so that the least (mud,hair,dirt) part in turn becomes a part composed of The Two,
και το ον και το ελαχιστον το μοριον αν γιγνεται μοριοιν εκ δυοιν,
and The Self/Same Logos Is Always According to This Way, so that whenever a
και τον αυτον λογον αει κατα ουτως, οτιπερ αν
Part comes to Be, This Relationship Is Always Maintained with The Part: For it Is Always
γενηται τουτω αει ισχει τω μοριων γαρ αει
the case that both, The One will Maintain/Keep The Being and The Being Keep The One.
tε το εν ισχει το ον και το ον το εν:

τι οὖν; των μοριων έκατερον τούτων τούτων τού ἐνός οντος, τό τε ἐν καὶ τό ὄν, ἀρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τό ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τό ὄν τοῦ ἐνος μορίου;
οὐκ ἂν εἴη.
πάλιν ἀρα καί των μορίων έκατερον τό τε ἐν ἵσχει καί τό ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τό ἑλάχιστον ἐκ δύοιν αὐτοῦ μορίων τό μόριον, καί κατά τόν αὐτόν λόγον αὐτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἄν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τῷ μορίῳ ἀεὶ ἵσχει: τό τε γὰρ ἐν τό ὄν ἂεὶ ἵσχει καὶ τό ὄν τό ἐν:
[143a] and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one.”

“Certainly.”

“Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number?”

“Apparently.”

“Let us make another fresh start.”

“In what direction?”

“We say that the one partakes of being, because it is?”

“Yes.”

“And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be many.”

“Yes.”

“Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many?”

“One, I should say.”
So that it is Necessary that The Two Members Always Come to Be, but Never only one.

Ari: By all means, it is so! (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that in This Way The One Being will be Unlimited Multitude?

Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

Par: Surely then, let us proceed again in the following way, even further.

Ari: In what way? (πη;)

Par: We say that The One Participates of Ousia, on which account, One Is?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And because of this, it was indeed brought to Light that The One Being is Many.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)

Par: What next? What of The One Self, which we surely say Participates of Ousia.

Ari: One, at least, I think. (εν εγωγε οιμαι.)

(compare to 155E 3rd Hypo)
[143b] “Just let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being?”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being, but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different.”

“Certainly.”

“Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being.”

“Certainly not.”
Par: Let us see then. On the one hand, must not The Ousia of Self Be/Exist in-One-Certain-Way, whereas on the other hand, Self Is Different, if indeed The One Is Not The Ousia, but is Seen as Being One, by Participating of The Ousia. 

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if on the one hand, The Ousia Is Different, while on the other hand, The One Is Different; then in that case, it is neither by The One of The Ousia that The One Is Different, nor by The Ousia of The One that Is, that The Ousia is Other, but by That which is Different and also Other, that They are Different from Each Other.

Ari: By all means so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: So that That which Is Different Is not The Same with either The One nor The Ousia.

Ari: How is this the case? (πως γαρ;)
“Well, then, if we make a selection among them, whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both?”

“What do you mean?”

“I will explain. We can speak of being?”

“Yes.”

“And we can also speak of one?”

“Yes, that too.”

“Then have we not spoken of each of them?”

“Yes.”

“And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both?”

“Certainly.”

“And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both?”

“Yes.”
Par: How then you ask? If you wish that we make a Selection of Selves; such as either of The Ousia and The Other/Different, or, of The Ousia and The One, or of The One and The Other, accordingly then, is it not the case, that in either way that we may choose, we are choosing a certain Duality, which can Correctly be called, Both?

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: In the following way. Is it possible to say Ousia? (ωδε: εστιν ειπειν ουσιαν:)

Ari: It is. (εστιν.)

Par: And in turn, is it possible to say One? (και αυθις ειπειν εν;)

Ari: This also. (τουτο και.)

Par: Take notice then, have we not spoken of Each One of The Two Selves?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: What about when I say Ousia and One, have I not accordingly mentioned Both?

Ari: By all means indeed. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if there is Both Ousia and Other, or Both

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Other and One, then in this way, I speak of Each Pair, in every way, as Both?

ετερον και εν, και ουσια λεγω εφ’ εκαστοι παναταχω ομφω;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

τι ουν; εαν προελομεθα αυτων ειτε βοϋλει την ουσιαν και το ετερον ειτε την ουσιαν και το εν ειτε το εν και το ετερον, αρ’ ουκ εν εκαστη τη προαιρεσει προαιρουμεθα τινε ου δει ορθως καλεισθαι ομφοτερω;

πως;

ωδε: εστιν ουσιαν ειπειν;

και αυθις ειπειν εν;

και τουτο.

αρ’ ουν ουχ εκατερον αυτοιν ειρηται;

ναι.

τι δ’ οταν ειπω ουσια τε και εν, αρα ουκ ομφοτερω;

πανυ γε.

ουκοθν και εαν ουσια τε και ετερον η ετερον τε και εν, και ουτω παναταχως εφ’ εκαστου ομφω λεγω;

ναι.
“If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two?”

“They cannot.”

“And if things are two, must not each of them be one?”

“Certainly.”

“Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one.”

“That is clear.”

“But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three?”

“Yes.”

“And three is an odd number, and two is even?”

“Of course.”
Par: If Both of which have been Named Correctly; then on the one hand, can it possibly be the case, for Self to be Both, and on the other hand, not be Two?

Ari: It cannot exist in such a way. (ουχ οιον τε.)

Par: Concerning which then, if Two should exist [ητον-subj.dual for ειμι], then could Each –τερον αυτοιν εστι τις μηχανη ουχ ειναι εν;

Ari: Not in any way! (ουδεμια.)

Par: Accordingly then, seeing that Each of These Pairs turns-out to be a Couple, so that Each Pair would also be One Couple. (εκαστον αν και ειη εν.)

Ari: It has so come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: But if Each of The Selves, Is One, by Adding-together [from συντιθη] whatsoever δε ει εκαστον αυτων εστι εν, συντεθεντος οποιουουν Yoked-Pair (Phaedo 71c) to any One, would not All The Yoked-Pairs Become Three?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But is not Three an Odd Number and Two an Even Number?

Ari: How could they not be; (πως δ’ ου;)
[143e] “Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is thrice one?”

“There must.”

“But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two? And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice three?”

“Of course.”

“Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two?”

“Inevitably.”
Par: What next then? By Being Two,

143E τί δὲ; οὖν τοῖν δύοιν

is it not Necessary, that Twice, also Exists,

ουκ ἀναγκή δις καὶ εἰναι

and by Being Three, Thrice, if indeed Two, First-Arises from Twice The One

καὶ οὖν τριῶν τρίς εἰπέρ τῷ δύο ὑπάρχει τε δις τὸ εὖ

and Three, First-Arises from Thrice The One?

καὶ τῷ τριᾷ τρίς τὸ εὖ;

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη).  

Par: Then, by Being Two and Twice, is it not also Necessary that Twice-Two Exist?

δὲ οὖν τοῖν δύοιν καὶ δίς οὖκ ἀναγκή δις δύο εἰναι;

and in turn by Being Three and Thrice, is it not Necessary that Thrice-Three also Exist?

καὶ οὐ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀναγκή τρις τρια εἰναι;

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ ου;)  

Par: What next then? By Being Three and Twice and by Being Two and Thrice,

τί δὲ; οὖν τοῖν τριῶν τρίς εἰναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν οὖν τρίς, εἰπέρ ὑπάρχει τῷ τῷ δύο τὸ δίς ἐν καὶ τῷ τριᾷ τῷ τριᾷ ἐν;

ἀνάγκη.  

δυοίν δὲ οὖν καὶ δίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δίς εἰναι;

καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τριᾷ τριᾷ εἰναι;

πώς δ’ οὖ;  

τί δὲ; τριῶν οὖν καὶ δίς οὖν καὶ δυοίν οὖν καὶ τριῶν οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῇ τριᾷ δίς εἰναι καὶ δύο τριᾷ;

πολλή γε.
“Then there would be even times even, [144a] odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd.”

“Yes.”

“Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left out, which does not necessarily exist?”

“By no means.”

“Then if one exists, number must also exist.”

“It must.”

“But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude, of existences; or is not number infinite in multitude and participant of existence?”

“Certainly it is.”

“Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number will partake of it?”

“Yes.”
Accordingly then, there would also exist even-times even and odd-times odd and even-times even and even-times odd.

Ari: It is so. (estin autō.)

Par: If then, these aspects have to be in this way, can you think of some number, or is not unlimited number and indeed an unlimited multitude of beings; or is not unlimited number and is not a multitude arising into existence while participating of ousia?

Ari: By all means indeed! (και πανυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if all number participates of ousia, then, each part of number, would also participate of her self?

Ari: Yes! (ναι.)

ἄρτιά τε ἀρα ἀρτιακίς ἄν εἰ ἢ καὶ περιττά περιττάκις καὶ ἀρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττά ἀρτιακίς.

καὶ περιττάκις ἀρτια καὶ ἀρτιακίς περιττά.

εἰ οὖν ταύτα ἐξει οὔτως, οὐει τινα αρίθμον

υπολειπεσθαί, ον ουκ αναγκη ειναι;

Ari: Not in any way indeed. (ουδαμως γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, if one is, then also, number has to necessarily exist.

Ari: Necessarily.

Aρα ει εν εστιν, και αριθμον αναγκη ειναι.

Par: Then certainly, if number is, then many would also exist,

αλλα μην αριθμον οντος πολλα’ αν και ει

and indeed an unlimited multitude of beings; or is not unlimited number and γε απειρον πληθος των οντων: η ουκ απειρος αριθμος

Quantity/Multitude Arising into Existence while Participating of Ousia?

πληθει γιγνηται μετεχων ousias;

Ari: By all means indeed! (και πανυ γε.)

Par: If then, these aspects have to be in this way, can you think of some number, or is not unlimited number and is not a multitude arising into existence while participating of ousia?

Ari: By all means indeed! (και πανυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if all number participates of ousia, then, each part of number, would also participate of her self?

Ari: Yes! (ναι.)

ἄρτια τε ἀρα ἀρτιακίς ἄν εἰ ἢ καὶ περιττά περιττάκις καὶ ἀρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττά ἀρτιακίς.

εἰ οὖν ταύτα οὔτως ἐξει, οιει τινα ἀριθμών υπολειπεσθαί ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰναι;

οὐδαμως γε.

εἰ ἀρα ἔστιν ἐν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμον εἰναι.

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλα μην ἀριθμοῦ γε οντος πολλά ἄν εἰ καὶ πλήθος ἀπειρον τῶν οντῶν: ἢ οὐκ ἀπειρος ἀριθμός πλήθει και μετέχουν οὕσιας γίγνεται;

καὶ πάνω γε.

οὕκον ει πας ἀριθμος οὕσιας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἐκαστὸν τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἄν αὕτης; ναι.
“Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the smallest? Indeed, is it not absurd even to ask that question? For how can existence be wanting in any existing thing?”

“It cannot by any means.”

“Then it is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existences nothing else is so much divided, [144c] and in short the parts of existence are infinite.”

“That is true.”
Parmenides: 14 Accordingly then, The Ousia has been Distributed to All Beings, which are Many, and will not abandon a Single One of The Real-Beings, neither The Least nor The Greatest? Rather, is it not irrational to even ask this question? For surely then, how can Ousia indeed abandon Any of The Real-Beings?

Aristotle: Not in any way. (οὐδαμῶς.)

[[The Second Member of The Yoked-Pair/Couple: The Dividing Power of Number. Pierre

Par: Accordingly then, The Ousia, as Such, has been thoroughly and in-every-way cut-up-in-pieces; into both The Least and The Greatest Beings, and so She is The Most divided of All Beings, and thus She Contains Unlimited/Inexterminable Parts/pieces.

Ari: It has to be so. (ἐχει οὕτω.)
“Its parts are the most numerous of all.”

“Yes, they are the most numerous.”

“Well, is there any one of them which is a part of existence, but is no part?”

“How could that be?”

“But if there is, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.”

“That is inevitable.”

“Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.”

“True.”
Par: Accordingly then, The Parts/pieces of Her Self Are very Many.

αρα τα μερη αυτης εστι πλειστα.

Ari: Very many indeed. (πλειστα μεντοι.)

Par: What follows then? Is there any one of These Selves which Exists, on the one hand,

τι ουν; εστι τι αυτων ο εστι μεν

a Part/piece of The Ousia, but yet, it is Not One Part/piece?

μερος της ουσιας, μεντοι ουδεν μερος;

Ari: And how can this come to be? (και πως αν τουτο γενοιτο;) 

Par: But surely if it is indeed the case, then I suspect, that it Must Always Be the case, that

αλλ᾽ γε ειπερ εστιν , οιμαι, αναγκη αει ,

as long as Self is such as It Is, It Must Indeed Be a Certain One; and so It cannot be nothing.

εωςπερ αυτο η αν γε ειναι τι εν, δε αδυνατον μηδεν.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, Is Present with Each and Every Part/piece of The Ousia

αρα το εν προεστι προς τω εκαστω απαντι μερει της ουσιας

by not abandoning any Part/piece, neither small nor Great, nor any other Singular Part.

ουκ απολειπομενον μερους ουτε σμικροτερου ουτε μειξονος ουτε αλλου ουδενος.

Ari: It is so. (ουτω.)
[144d] “Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole? Consider that question.”

“I am considering and I see that it is impossible.”

“Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole; for it cannot be attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided.”

“I agree.”

“And that which is divided into parts must certainly be as numerous as its parts.”

“It must.”

“Then what we said just now—that existence was divided into the greatest number of parts—was not true.”
Par: Therefore, can One Being Be a Whole that Exists in Many Ways/Places At-Once?

Ari: But I do consider it and I “see” that it is impossible.

Par: Accordingly then, One Being has been cut-up in pieces, if indeed It Is not Whole

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And most certainly then, that which is partible Must Be as many as its pieces.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then we did not just now speak The Truth, when we said that The Ousia

Distributed into very many Parts.

144D οὖν άρα εν ον ολον εστι πολλαχου αμα;

Consider this. (αθρει τουτο.)

Ari: But I do consider it and I “see” that it is impossible.

αλλ’ αθρω και ορω στι αδυνατον.

Par: for in no other way at all, can It Be Present with All The Parts/pieces of The Ousia

γαρ ουδαμως αλλως που παρεστι απασι τοις μερεσιν της ουσιας

other than by existing in a cut-up/scattered state (At-Once like The Harmonic Inter-dependant

Parts in a Homogeneous Whole and in the pieces of

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

~~~ Indivisible Beings/Parts as opposed to divisible pieces~~~

Par: And most certainly then, that which is partible Must Be as many as its pieces.

και γε μην το μεριστον αναγκη ειναι οσαπερ πολλη τοσαυτα μερη.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then we did not just now speak The Truth, when we said that The Ousia

Distributed into very many Parts.

144E ειη νενεμημενη πλειστα μερη.

ἄρα οὖν ἐν ὧν πολλαχοδ ἁμα ὅλον ἔστι τοῦτο ἀθρει.

ἄλλ’ αθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ στι ἀδύνατον.

μεμερισμένων ἁμα, εἶπερ μη ὅλον: ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἁμα ἀπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν

παρέσται ἤ μεμερισμένων.

ναι.

καὶ μὴν το γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὀσαπερ μέρη.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκ ἁμα ἀληθὴ ἄρτι ἐλεγομεν λέγοντες ὡς πλειστα μέρη ἢ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἶη.
for it is not divided, you see, into any more parts than one, [144e]
but, as it seems, into the same number as one for existence is not
wanting to the one, nor the one to existence, but being two they are
equal throughout.”

“That is perfectly clear.”

“The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in
number.”

“Clearly.”

“Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one
divided by existence, must be many.”

“Certainly.”
For She is not Distributed into more Parts than The One is,
gar oude meneimetai plaios tou enos,
but as it is likely, She Is Equal to The One. For The Being does not abandon The One, nor
allw os eoike, isas to evi. gar to on oute apoileipetai tou enos ou te
does The One abandon The Being; but Always Subsist as Two Parts Equalized Through All.
to ev tou onton, allw ae i onte duo eixousouthon para pantai.
Ari: It has come to Light entirely in this way. (phainetai pantapasin ouwai.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, has been Distributed by The Ousia
arai to en auto kekermatismenon upo tisousiak
which is both Many and also Unlimited Multitude.
estin te polla kai apeira plithos.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (phainetai.)
Par: Accordingly then, not only Is The One Being Many, but it is also Necessary
arai ou monon estin to ev on polla, alla kai anagki
that The One Self which is Distributed by The Being to Be Many.
to ev auto dianevemimenon upo tou ontos einai polla.
Ari: Entirely so. (pantapasi mev ouv.)

oude gar plaios tou enos meneimetai allw iisa, os eoike, to eni: ouste gar to on toou enos apoleipetai ouste
to en toou onton, allw eixousouthon duo onte ae i para pantai.
pantapasin ouwai phainetai.
to en ara auto kekermatismenon upo tisousiak polla te kai apeira to plithos estin.
phainetai.
oi monon ara to on polla estin, alla kai auto to en upo toou onton dianenevemimenon polla anagki
einaip.
pantapasi men ouv.
“And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole; [145a] or are not the parts included by the whole?”

“They must be so.”

“But surely that which includes is a limit.”

“Of course.”

“Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number.”

“So it appears.”

“Then if limited it has also extremes?”

“Certainly.”

“Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole?”

“It will not.”
**Parmenides:** 15 And certainly, since The Parts Are indeed Parts of a Whole, in that case
καὶ μὴν στὶ τὰ μορία γε μορία ὅλου

The One will Be Limited by The Whole; or are not The Parts Contained by The Whole?
145A τὸ εν αὐτῷ πεπερασμένον κατὰ τὸ ὅλον; ἣ οὐ τὰ μορία περιεχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ

**Aristotle:** Necessarily so. (αναγκὴ.)

**Par:** Then certainly, That which Contains will indeed Be The Limit.

αλλὰ μὴν τὸ περιεχὸν αὐτὸν γε εἰὴ περάς.

**Ari:** How could it not be? (πῶς δ’ οὖ;)

(The 2nd Intelligible & Intellectual Triad of Gods, 1251 (P31) Proclus Commentary Book 8)

**Par:** Accordingly then, The One Being, Is in some way, both One and Many,
145A–3 αρὰ τὸ εν ὕπο τοῦ πολλα, both Whole and Parts, and Limited/finite and Unlimited/infinite Multitude.
καὶ ὅλον καὶ μορία, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ απειρον πληθεὶ.

**Ari:** So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

(The 3rd Intellectual Triad of The Perfective-Preservative Gods, 1252 (P34) Proclus Book 8)

**Par:** Take notice then, if It Has indeed been Limited, then Must It not also Possess Extremes?
145A–5 αρ’ οὖν ἐπεὶ πεπερασμένον, οὐκ καὶ εχὸν εὐχάσατα;

**Ari:** It must. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** What then? If The One Being Is a Whole, then will It not also Possess a Beginning,

τι δ’ εἰ ὅλον, αὐτὸν αποστατή, εὐχάσει εἰναι ετὶ ὅλον;

**Ari:** It will not be so disposed. (οὐκ εὐχάσει.)

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλο τὰ μόρια μορία, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἰὴ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἔν: ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια;

ἀνάγκη.

アルバム μὴν τὸ περιεχὸν πέρας ἂν εἰὴ.

πῶς δ’ οὖ;

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὃν ἐν τέ ἐστὶ ποὺ καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἀπειρον πληθεὶ.

φαίνεται.

ἀρ’ οὖν οὐκ, ἐπεὶ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἐσχάτα ἔχον;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δ’ εἰ ὅλον, οὐκ καὶ ἄρχῃν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτῆν: ἢ οἶνον τέ τὶ ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων:
κἂν τὸν ἐν ὁποῖον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῆ, ἐθελήσει ἑτὶ ὅλον εἶναι;

οὐκ ἐθελήσει.
“Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end.”

“It will.”

“But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle.”

“No.”

“And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two.”

“Yes, it will.”

“This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other?”

“How is that?”

“Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole.”

“True.”
Par: And thus, The One, as it is Reasonable, will Possess a Beginning, an End and a Middle.

καὶ δὴ τὸ εὖ, ὡς εοίκεν, αὐν ἔχοι αρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.

Ari: It will possess these. (ἐξολ.) (Inherent Overall Symmetry)

Par: Then The Middle will most certainly Be Equally Distant from The Extremes;

ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον μὴν γε ἰσον επέχει των εσχατῶν:

for It could not be The Middle in any other way. (Parmenides Poem, Fragment 8 42-44)

γὰρ αὖ οὕτω μέσον ἀλλὰ.

Ari: It could not. (γὰρ οὕτω.)

Par: And certainly, as it Reasonable, by Being So Disposed, The One will Participate

καὶ δὴ, ὡς εοίκε, ὁν τοιοτον το εὖ αὖ μετεχοι

of a Certain Figure, whether Straight or Round, or of a Certain Mixture from both.

τινος σχήματος ἢτοι εὐθεὸς ἡ στρογγύλου ἡ τινος μικτοῦ ἢξ αμφοῖν.

Ari: For it will so participate. (γὰρ οὖν μετεχοῖ.)

(Kronos: The Monad of The Intellectual Gods/Hebdomad, 1253 (P40) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, by Being Maintained in this way, will Self not Subsist

145B–8 Άρ’ οὖν ἔχον οὔτως αὐτὸ οὐκ εσται

both In-It-Self and In-Another?

τὸ εὖ εἰσιτω καὶ εὖ ἀλλὰ;

Ari: How? (πῶς?)

Par: For Each One of The (Beginning-Middle-End/Future-Present-Past) Parts Is, in some way, μέρων εστὶ που

In The Whole, and is not in any way Outside of The Whole.

ἐν τῷ ολῷ καὶ οὐδὲν εκτὸς τοῦ ολοῦ.

Ari: It is so. (οὔτως.)

καὶ ἁρχὴν δὴ, ὡς ἐοίκεν, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἐὖ.

ἔχοι.

ἄλλα μὴν τὸ γε μέσον ἰσον τῶν εσχάτων ἀπέχει: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἰη.

οὐ γὰρ.

καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἐοίκε, τοιούτον ὁν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἐὖ, ἦτοι εὐθέος ἡ στρογγύλου ἡ τινος μικτοῦ ἢξ ἀμφοῖν.

μετέχοι γὰρ ἂν.

ἀρ’ οὖν οὔτως ἔχον οὔκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἐσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ;

πῶς;

τῶν μερῶν που ἐκαστον ἐν τῷ ολῷ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου.

οὔτω.
“And all the parts are included in the whole?”

“Yes.” [145c]

“And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all.”

“Certainly.”

“But the whole is the one, is it not?”

“Of course.”

“Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself.”

“Evidently.”
Par: Thus All The Parts Are Comprehended/Contained by The Whole?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And certainly, The One Is indeed All The Parts of Self;
και μην το εν εστι γε παντα τα μερη αυτου,
and is neither any more, nor any less than All.
και ουτε τι πλεον ουτε ελαττον η παντα.

Ari: How could it not be. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One, Is also The Whole?
ουκουν το εν εστιν και το ολον;

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως δ’ ου;)

Par: Accordingly then, if All The Parts happen to Be In The Whole, since All
αρα ει παντα τα μερη τυγχανει εν ολω, δε παντα
The Parts Are both The One and It Is The Whole Self, then since All The Parts
τα οντα τε το εν και εστι το ολον αυτο, δε παντα τα
Are Comprehended by The Whole, then The One will Be Comprehended by The One,
περιεχεται υπο του ολου, το εν αν περιεχοιτο υπο του ενος,
and in this way, The One Self will already Be In-It-Self.
και ουτως το εν αυτο αν ηδη ειη εν εαυτω.

Ari: It has so come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

πάντα δε τα μέρη υπο του ολου περιέχεται;
ναι.
και μην τα γε πάντα μέρη τα αυτοι το εν εστι, και ουτε τι πλέον ουτε έλαττον η πάντα.
οδ γάρ.
ούκον και το ολον το εν εστιν;
πως δ’ ου;
ει αρα πάντα τα μέρη εν ολω τυγχανει οντα, εστι δε τα τε πάντα το εν και αυτο το ολον, περιέχεται δε
υπο του ολου τα πάντα, υπο του ενος αν περιεχοιτο το εν, και ουτως αν ηδη το εν αυτο εν εαυτω ειη.
φαίνεται.
“But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any.
[145d] For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in
any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and
the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?”

“It cannot in any way.”

“Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some
parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.”

“Yes, it is impossible.”

“But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in
something else or cease to be anywhere at all?”

“It must.”
Par: But certainly in turn, The Whole Is indeed not In The Parts; neither In All, nor In a Certain One. For if It Were In All, then It would Necessarily also Be In One: for if oute en tini γαρ ει en pasion, αναγκη και en eni: γαρ It Were not In a Certain One, then It would indeed not still Be Able to Be, somehow, In All; μη en tini eni αν γε ouk eti on δυναιτο ειναι που εν απαισιν; but if on the one hand, This One Is The One of All The Parts, whereas on the other hand, δε ει μεν , touto esti to en toin απαιτων, de The Whole Is not In This One, then how can It still indeed Be In All The Parts? το oлон μη en touto eni, πως eti γε ενεσται en pasion tois;

Ari: In no way at all. (ουδαμως.) Par: Surely then, It cannot Be In Any of The Parts. For if The Whole Were In Any μην oude en tisi toin meros, γαρ ει to olon eni en tisi of The Parts, then The Greater would Be In The Less, which is Impossible. το πλεον αν ειη en tou elattoni, o estin adunaton.

Ari: It is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.) Par: Then by not Being In Many, nor In One, nor In All of The Parts, then Must not δ’ μη on en plesos miδ’ en eni miδ’ en apaisi tois meresι ουκ The Whole Necessarily Be, In some other way, or cease to Be in any way at all? το olon anagkη ειναι en tini etepo η eti ειναι miθαμου;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
“And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not?” [145e]

“Certainly.”

“Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other.”

“It must.”

“This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?”

“How is that?”
Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, by Being in no way at all, It would be nothing, but on the other hand, by Being Whole, if indeed It Is not In-Self, then It Must Necessarily Be In-Another?

Ari: By all means indeed. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, inasmuch as The One Is Whole, It Is In-Another, whereas on the other hand, by Self Being In-It-Self, It happens to Be All The Parts, and in this way The One Self Must Necessarily Be both In-It-Self and In-Another.

Ari: It must be so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then, since The One Disposition Is-Established in this way, is it not then Necessary that It should also Be Moved (In-Another) and Remain-Still (In-It-Self)?

Ari: In what way? (πη;)

οὐκοὖν μηδαμοὶ μὲν ὅν οὐδὲν ἄν εἰη, ὅλον δὲ ὅν, ἐπειδή οὐκ ἐν αὕτῳ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι; πάνυ γε.

η μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν: ἣ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὅντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.

ἀνάγκη.

οὕτω δὴ πεφυκός τὸ ἐν ἂρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι;

πη:
“It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, [146a] and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself.”

“It is.”

“But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest.”

“Certainly.”

“Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?”

“True.”

“Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest.”

“That is clear.”
Par: On the one hand, It must somehow **Stand-still**, if indeed **Self Is In-It-Self.** For by μεν που εστικε, ειπερ αυτο εστιν εν εαυτω. γαρ

**Being In One** and by not departing from **This, It will Be In-The Self;** that is, **In-It-Self.**

146A γαρ ον εν ενι και μη μεταβαινον εκ τουτου αν ειη εν τω αυτω, εν εαυτω.

Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)

Par: But **That which Is** indeed **Always In The Self,** without a doubt, **Must Necessarily** δε το γε αει εν τω αυτω δηπου αναγκη

**Always Be At-Rest.** (αει ειναι εστος.)

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: What follows then? On the contrary, is it not **Necessary** that **That which Is**

τι δε; το εναντιον ου αναγκη το ου

Always **In-Another Must Never Be In The Self?** But if **It Never Is In The Self,**

αει εν ετερω μηδεποτ' ειναι εν τω αυτω, δε μηδεποτε ον εν τω αυτω then neither **Can It Stand-still.** But if **It Cannot Stand-still,** then **It Must Be In-Motion?**

μηδε εσταναι, δε μη εστος κινεισθαι;

Ari: It must be so. (ουτως.)

(Rhea: The Monad of The 1st Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1254 (P45) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Accordingly then, by **The Self Always Being** both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another,**

146A–7 αρα αυτο αει ον τε εν εαυτω και εν ετερω, then **The One Must Necessarily Always Be In-Motion,** and also **Always Be At-Rest.**

το εν αναγκη αει κινεισθαι τε και εσταναι.

Ari: So it has come to **Light.** (φαινεται.)
“And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, [146b] and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true.”

“How is that?”

“Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part.”

“Obviously.”

“Now is the one a part of itself?”

“By no means.”

“Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself.”

“No, that is impossible.”

“Nor can it be other than itself.” [146c]

“Certainly not.”
Par: And Self Must certainly Be The Same With-It-Self and Other Than-It-Self;

Is either The Self/Same with or Other than something: or if It Is not The Same nor Other, it will have The Same Dynamic that a Part Has to a Whole or that a Whole Has to a Part.

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: In some way, Everything Has to Be in this way in Relation to Everything. For everything has to be in this way in relation to everything. For

Ari: It has so come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

Par: Take notice then, Is The One Self a Part of Self?

Ari: Not at all. (ουδαμῶς.)

Par: Accordingly then, Self will not Have a Whole to Part Relationship with It-Self, as if It were a Part of Self. (οίς ου μερος συντου.)

Ari: That is not possible. (γαρ ου οιον τε.)

Par: But accordingly then, Oneness/Unity is Other than The One?

Ari: Without a doubt. (ου δήτα.)

και μήν ταύτων γε δει εἶναι αὐτῷ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτερον ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑσαύτως ταύτων τε καὶ ἑτερον εἶναι, εἶπερ καὶ τά πρόσθεν πέπονθεν.

πῶς;

πάν ποι πρὸς ἄπαν ὡδὲ ἔχει, ἢ ταύτων ἔστιν ἢ ἑτερόν: ἢ ἔεν μή ταύτων ἢ μηδὲ ἑτερόν, μέρος ἂν εἰ ἔχει ταύτων πρὸς ὃ ὀϋτως ἔχει, ἢ ὃς πρὸς μέρος ὁλον ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται.

ἄρ’ οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑσαύτῳ μέρος ἐστίν;

οὐδαμῶς.

οὔτ’ ἄρα ὃς πρὸς μέρος αὐτῷ ὑσαύτῳ ὁλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτῷ μέρος ὄν.

οὐ γάρ οἶον τε.

ἄλλ’ ἄρα ἑτερόν ἔστιν ἑνός τὸ ἐν;

οὐ δήτα.
“Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?”

“It must.”

“Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?”

“I think so.”

“Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time.”

“Yes, we saw that it was so.”

“Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself.”

[146d] “So it appears.”
Accordingly then, nor can Unity/Oneness indeed be Other than It-Self.

Ari: Certainly not. (μέντοι οὖν.)

Par: Therefore, if Self is neither Other nor a Whole nor a Part in Relation to It-Self, then Self Must Necessarily not already Be, The Same with It-Self?

Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)

Par: What then? By Self Being In The Self, is not That which Is elsewhere than with It-Self Necessarily Be Other than It-Self, if indeed Self will also Be elsewhere than with It-Self?

Ari: It so appears to me at least. (δοκει εµοιγε.)

Par: In this way, as it has come to Light, The One Being certainly Has to Be At-Once, both In-It-Self and In-Another? (τε εν εαυτου και εν ετερω;)  

Ari: For it has come to Light. (γαρ εφανη.)

Par: Accordingly then, as it is likely, from this account The One will Be Other than It-Self.

Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

(Loeb Greek) οὐδ᾽ ἃρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἔτερον ἂν εἴη.
(Loeb Greek) οὐ μέντοι.

εἰ οὖν μήτε ἔτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ ἓταν τούτων εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; ἀνάγκη.

τί δὲ; τὸ ἐτέρωθι ὅτι αὐτό ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἔτερον εἶναι, εἰπέρ καὶ ἐτέρωθι ἔσται;

ἔριοι δοκεῖ.

οὕτω μὲν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἔν, αὐτῷ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅν ἃμα καὶ ἐν ἐτέρῳ.

ἐφάνη γὰρ.

Ἔτερον ἃρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἔν.

ἐοικεν.
“Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?”

“Certainly.”

“Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?”

“Of course.”

“Then the one would be other than the others.”

“Yes, it is other.”

“Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?”

“Of course.”

“Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?”

“No.”
**Par:** What follows then? If *Anything Is Other from Another*,

will *It* not *Be Other from That* to which *It Is Being Other*?

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

**Parmenides:** 16 Is it not the case then, that *As many as Are Not-One*,

*Oukouν* ὁσα ἐστιν μη ἐν,

*So many Are Other* than *The One*; and is not *The One Other* from *Those* that are *Not-One*?

**Aristotle:** How could it not be? (πως δ’ ου;)  

**Par:** Accordingly then, *The One* will be *Other* than *The Others*.

αρα το εν αν ειη ετερον των αλλων.  

**Ari:** It is other. (ετερον.)

**Par:** See then; are not both *The Self/Same* and *The Other Opposite* to each other?

ορα δη: αρ’ ουκ τε ταυτον και το ετερον εναντια αλληλοις;  

**Ari:** How could they not be? (πως δ’ ου;)  

**Par:** Therefore, will *The Self/Same* ever *Be Truly Disposed In The Other*, or *The Other* *

ουν ταυτον ποτε ειναι εθελησει εν τω ετερω η το ετερον*

*In The Self/Same?* (ἐν ταυτω;)  

**Ari:** They will not be so disposed. (ουκ εθελησει.)

**Par:**  

τι οὖν; εἰ τοι τι ἐτερόν ἐστιν, οἰχ ἐτέρου ὅντος ἐτερον ἔσται;  

ἀνάγκη.  

οὐκουν δοσα μὴ ἐν ἐστιν, ἀπανθ’ ἐτερα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν;  

πῶς δ’ οὗ;  

ἐτερον ἄρα ἄν εἰη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων.  

ἐτερον.  

ἄρα δὴ: αὕτο τε ταυτὸν και τὸ ἐτερον ἄρ’ οὐκ ἐναντια ἄλληλοις;  

πῶς δ’ οὐ;  

ἡ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταυτὸν ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἡ τὸ ἐτερον ἐν ταυτῷ ποτε εἶναι;  

οὐκ ἐθελήσει.
“Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing [146e] in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?”

“Yes, it would.”

“But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.”

“True.”

“Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one.”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one.”

“No.”

“And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.” [147a]

“Of course not.”
Par: Accordingly then, if The Other will Never Be In The Self/Same, then there Are None of The Beings In which The Other Ever Subsists. For if It Were in any Being at any time at all, then at that time, The Other would also Be In The Self/Same. Or is it not so? Then at that time, The Other would also Be In The Self/Same. Or is it not so?

Ari: It would be so. (οὔτως.)

Par: But since It Is never In The Self/Same, The Other will never Be In any of The Beings. For if It Were in any Being at any time at all, then at that time, The Other would also Be In The Self/Same. Or is it not so? Then at that time, The Other would also Be In The Self/Same. Or is it not so?

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Other will not Be In Those that Are Not-One, nor In The One. Accordingly then, The Other will not Be In Those that Are Not-One, nor In The One.

Ari: It will not be so. (γαρ οὖν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, will indeed not Be Other from Those that Are Not-One nor The Beings which Are Not-One Be Other than The One by That which is Other. Accordingly then, The One, will indeed not Be Other from Those that Are Not-One nor The Beings which Are Not-One Be Other than The One by That which is Other.

Ari: Indeed not. (γαρ οὖν.)

Par: Then They will not Be Other than Each Other by not Participating of The Other. Then They will not Be Other than Each Other by not Participating of The Other.

Ari: How can they? (πώς γαρ;)

εἰ άρα τὸ ἑτέρον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἐσται, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐν ὑπό ἐστιν τὸ ἑτέρον χρόνον οὐδένα: εἰ γὰρ ὠντινοῦν εἰή ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταῦτῳ εἴη τὸ ἑτέρον. οὔχ οὖτως; οὔτως.

ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἰη τὸ ἑτέρον.

ἀληθῆ.

οὔτε ἀρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐνείη ἂν τὸ ἑτέρον.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐκ ἀρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ᾽ ἂν εἰη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὐδὲ τά μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνος ἑτερα.

οὐ γὰρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν εαυτοῖς γε ἑτερ᾽ ἂν εἰη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου.

πώς γαρ;
“But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?”

“Quite impossible.”

“But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.”

“True.”

“Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.”

“No, they would not.”

“Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?”

“Yes, they would partake of it.”
Par: But if They are neither Other from-Them Selves, nor from The Other, then Must
They not Already Entirely Flee from (Phaedo 104c) That which Is Other from Each Other?

Ari: They must flee. (εκφευγοι.)

Par: Most certainly then, neither will Those that are Not-One Participate of The One;
for if They did, then They would no longer Be Not-One, but in a certain way Be One.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, Those that are Not-One will not Be Number; for in this way,
by indeed Possessing Number, They could not entirely Be, Not-One.

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ οὐν οὐ.)

Par: What follows then? Are Those that are Not-One, Parts of The One? Or would Those
that are Not-One, by Possessing Number in this (Negative) way, Partake of The One?

Ari: They would so participate. (μετείχεν.)

\[ \text{εἰ δὲ μήτε αὐτοῖς ἑπερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἑπέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἥδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μή ἑπερὰ εἶναι ἀλλήλων; ἐκφεύγοι.} \]
\[ \text{ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἐν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἐν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πη ἂν ἦν ἦν.} \]
\[ \text{ἀληθῆ.} \]
\[ \text{οὐδὲ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἰη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἐν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὐτῳ μὴ ἐν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα.} \]
\[ \text{οὐ γὰρ οὖν.} \]
\[ \text{τὶ δὲ; τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄρα μόρια ἔστιν; ἢ κἂν οὐτῳ μετείχε τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν; μετείχεν.} \]
[147b] “If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.”

“No.”

“But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.”

“Yes, we did.”

“Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?”

“Yes, let us say that.”

“The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.” [147c] 

“That appears to be the result of our argument.”
Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, if The (Positive) One Is entirely One, then

nor could The One Be a Whole in relation to Those that are Not-One; The One will not Be a Part of Those that are Not-One, nor could The One Be a Whole in relation to Them, as if They were Parts; nor in turn, will Those that are Not-One Be Parts of The One, nor Wholes, just as if The One Were a Part.

Ari: They will not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But we have certainly said that Those that Are neither Parts nor Wholes, nor Other from Each Other, will have to Be The Same with Each Other.

Ari: For we have said so. (φωμεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, shall we also say that The One Has The Relationship to Those that Are Not-One, in the same way as The Self Has to Be to Selves? from The Others and from It Self and The Self/Same as Those and with It Self.

Ari: It has indeed come to Light from this Logos to venture saying it.

147C γε φαίνεσθαι εκ του λόγου κινδυνεύει.

ei ἄρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἔστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὔτε ἃν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐν εἴη οὔτε δὸν ὡς μορίων: οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τὸ ἐνί. οὐ γάρ.

ἄλλα μὴν ἐφαμεν τὰ μὴν μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἐτερα ἀλλήλων ταῦτα ἐσεσθαι ἀλλῆλοις.

φωμεν γάρ.

φωμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὔτως ἔχων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς;

φωμεν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς οὐκέκεκ, ἐτερόν τε τῶν ἀλλών ἐστίν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ταύτων ἑκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ. κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου.
“Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?”

“Perhaps.”

“At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it.”

“Of course.”

“Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?”

“Certainly.”

“And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?”

“Yes.”

“In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected [147d] in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.”

“What do you mean?”
Take notice then, Is It also Like and Unlike It-Self and Like and Unlike The Others?

Seeing that The One Has come to Light Other/Different from The Others, then surely The Others will also Be Other/Different in some (indefinite) way from That.

Accordingly then, if It is neither more nor less (in this Difference)?

The Self/Same both in relation to The Others and The Others in relation to The One.

What do you mean? (πως λέγεις;)

ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον εἰσωτ’ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἵσως.
ἐπειδή γοῦν ἐτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ ταλλὰ καὶ ετερ’ ποιον εκείνου.

οὐκοῦν οὔτως εἰσωτ’ τοις ἄλλοις καὶ ταλλὰ τῷ ἕνι.
“I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?” 2.109

“Yes.”

“Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?” 2.110

“Yes.”

“And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?”

“The same thing, of course.”

“The word other is the name of something, is it not?” 2.112

“Certainly.”
Par: The following. Do you not assign every Name to something?

ωδε. ουκ καλεις εκαστον των ονοματων επι τινι;

Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε.)

Par: What follows then? Can you pronounce The Self/Same Name either often or once?

τι ουν; αν ειποις το αυτο ονομα πλεονακις η απαξ;

Aris I can at least. (εγωγε.)

Par: Therefore on the one hand, do you Name That to which the name belongs, when

ουν μεν ποτερον ειπης ουπερ τουνομα εστι εαν

you say It once; but not on the other hand, when you say that Name often? Or rather, must you always mean The Same Name whether you utter The Same Name once or often?

αναγκη σε αει λεγειν ταυτον ονομα εαντε φθεγξη ταυτον απαξ εαντε πολλακις;

Ari: Of course, what follows then? (μην τι;)

Par: Is it not the case then, that Another Name also belongs to some particular?

ουκουν το ετερον ονομα και εστιν επι τινι.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

ὁδε: εκαστον των ονοματων ουκ επι τινι καλεις;

ἔγωγε.

τι ουν; το αυτο ονομα ειποις αν πλεονακις η άπαξ;

ἔγωγε.

ποτερον ουν έαν μεν άπαξ ειπης, εκεινο προσαγορευεις ουπερ έστι τουνομα, έαν δε πολλακις, ουκ εκεινο; ή εαντε άπαξ εαντε πολλακις ταυτον ονομα φθεγξη, πολλη άναγκη σε ταυτον και λεγειν άει;

τι μην;

ουκουν και το έτερον ονομά έστιν επι τινι;

πανυ γε.
“Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name.”

“Assuredly.”

“Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name.”

“Certainly.”
Par: Accordingly then, when you utter Self whether once or often, you do not apply the Name to nothing else, nor mean anything else, than That to which the Name belongs.

επ’ αλλώ ούδε αλλό τι η ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ ονομα ἦν.

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then when we say, on the one hand, that The Others Are Other from The One,

δη οταν λεγονεν μεν οτι ταλλα ετερον του ενος,

and on the other hand, that The One Is Other from The Others, by saying Other Twice,

δε το εν ετερον των αλλων, ειποντες το ετερον δις

we still signify nothing else, but That Nature of which This Name is Always The Self/Same.

μαλλον λεγομεν ουδεν τι επ’ αλλη, αλλ’ τη φυσι ησπερ επ’ εκεινη τουνομα ην αει αυτο.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἀπαξ ἐάντε πολλακις, οὐκ ἐπ’ ἄλλο οὐδε ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ ἢν ὀνομα.

ἀνάγκη.

ὅταν δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ἑτερον μὲν ταλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἑτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, δις τὸ ἑτερον εἰποντες οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ’ ἄλλη, ἄλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνη τῇ φώσει αὐτὸ ἅει λέγομεν ἡσπερ ἢν τουνομα.

πάνυ μεν ουν.
[148a] “In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?”

“Yes,.”

“Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things.”

“So it appears.”

“But the like is opposed to the unlike.”

“Yes,.”

“And the other to the same.”

“That is also true.”

“But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others.” [148b]

“Yes, it was.”
Par: Accordingly then, inasmuch as The One Is Other from The Others, and The Others from The One, by having experienced The Other Self, otherwise, The One will not experience Being Other, but Be The Self/Same as The Others. But Is not That which experiences The Self/Same in some way Similar?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Surely then inasmuch as The One experiences That which Is Other from All The Others, then Absolutely All The Others will Be Similar to This Self; for All Are Other from All. It is also that which This Self/Same experiences in some way Similar? but with The Others.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Is it not also the case, that The Other/Different Is contrary to The Self/Same?

Ari: And this also. (και τουτο.)

Par: But certainly this was indeed also shown; that in an according way, The One Is The Self/Same with The Others.

Ari: For it has come to Light. (γαρ εφανη.)
“And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.”

“Certainly.”

“In so far as it was other it was shown to be like.”

“Yes.”

“Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.”

“Yes.”

“Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.” [148c]

“So it appears.”
Par: But to Be The Self/Same with The Others is indeed the opposite experience from that to Be Other from The Others.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Most certainly, insofar as The One Is Other, It has come to Light to Be Like.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, insofar as It Is The Self/Same, It will Be Unlike, by experiencing the experience that Is opposite to That which makes It Like.

Whereas on the other hand, The Other in some way made It Like?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is The Self/Same will make It Unlike; otherwise The Same will not Be opposite to The Other.

Ari: It is reasonable. (εοικεν.)

tοῦναντιῶν δὲ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τό εἶναι ταῦτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἐφανῆ ομοιοῖο.

πάνυ γε.

ἡ γε μὴν ἑτέροις ἡμοιοῖο ἑφανῆ.

ναι.

ἡ ἄρα ταῦτων, ἁμοιοίοις ἐσται κατὰ τοῦναντιῶν πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῖον πάθει. ὁμοίως δὲ ποι τό ἑτέρῳν;

ναι.

ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τῷ ταῦτῳν, ἡ οὐκ ἑναντιῶν ἐσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

ἐοικεν.
“Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same.”

“Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable.”

“But there is another besides.”

“What is it?”

“In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike.”

“True.”

“Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.” [148d]

“Certainly.”
Accordingly then, The One will Be both Like and Unlike The Others. On the one hand, insofar as It Is Other, It will Be Like; but on the other hand, insofar as It Is Same, Unlike.

As it is reasonable, and according to This Logos, it surely has to be so.

For The One also has to Be in the following way.

In what way? (τινα;)  
Insofar as It experiences Being The Same, It does not experience alteration; whereas if It does not experience alteration, It Cannot Be Unlike; but if It Is not Unlike, It Is Like; but insofar as It experiences Being Other, then It experiences alteration, thus by Being altered It Is Unlike. (αλλοιον ειναι ανομιοιον.)

You speak The Truth. (λεγεις αληθη.)

Accordingly then, since The One Being Is both The Same and Other from The Others, according to both and according to each, thus, It will Be both Like and Unlike The Others.

Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
“And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and like unlike itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself.”

“That is inevitable.”

“Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things.”

“I am considering.”

“The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself.”

“Right.”

“And the one is also in other things?”

“Yes.”
Par: And in a similar way, is This not the case, in relation to-Itslef, Seeing that The One και ωσαυτως ουκουν εαυτω επειπερ

Being has come to Light both Other from-Itslef and The Same with-Itslef;

εφανη τε ετερον εαυτου και ταυτον εαυτω,

according to both and according to each, thus, It will come to Light both Like and Unlike?

κατ’ αμφοτερα και κατα εκατερον φανησεται τε ομοιον και ανομοιον;

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)
(Proclus)

(The Unpolluted/Liberated/Super-Kosmic & Kosmic Middle Order of Gods, (P58)

Par: What then? Consider how The One Has to Be in relation to Grasping/Touching.

148D–6 Τι δη δε; σκοπει, πως το εν εχει περι απτεσθαι

according to The Self and to The Others, and then in relation to not Grasping/Touching.

περι του αυτου και των αλλων και του μη απτεσθαι.

Ari: I so consider. (σκοπω.)

Par: For The One Being has come to Light in some way In The Whole It-Self.

σκοπει το εν αν εφανη ποι εν όλω εαυτω.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Is also In The Others?

ουκουν το εν και εν τοις αλλοις;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
“Then by reason of being in the others [148e] it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.”

“That is clear.”

“Thus the one would touch itself and the other things.”

“It would.”

“But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it?”

“It must.”

“Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is.”

“Yes, it must.”
Par: Thus on the one hand insofar as The One Is In Others, It will Grasp The Others; but insofar as Self Is In It-Self, on the one hand, It will be kept from Grasping The Others, whereas on the other hand, Self will Grasp Self, by Being In It-Self.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: In this way then, on the one hand, The One will Grasp both Self and The Others.

Ari: It will so grasp. (απτοιτο.)

Par: But on the other hand, what about the following? Must not Everything which is about to Grasp Anything, be situated next to That which It is about to Grasp, by Filling-up That Same Place, which lies Besides That, so as to Grasp It? (Direct Contact, (No Intermediary)

Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The One Self were also about to Grasp Self, then It must be situated Immediately Next to It-Self; by Filling-up That Neighboring Place, In-which, Self Is.

Ari: It must do so. (γαρ δει ουν.)

ἧι μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπτοῖτο ἄν: ἦ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείρῳ ἀπτεσθαί, αὕτῳ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀπτοῖτο ἄν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν.

φαίνεται.

οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἀπτοῖτο ἄν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἀπτοῖτο.

τί δὲ τῆδε; ᾧ’ οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄφεσθαι τινος ἐφεξής δεὶ κεῖσθαι ἕκεινῳ οὐ μέλλει ἀπτεσθαί, ταύτῃ τῇ ἑδρᾳ κατέχοι ἦ ἄν μετ’ ἕκεινην ἦ ἑδρα ἦ ἄν κείται, ἀπτεται;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ ἄφεσθαι, ἐφεξής δεὶ εὐθὺς μετὰ έαυτὸ κείσθαι, τῆν ἑχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἕκεινης ἦ ἄν αὐτῷ ἐστιν.

δεὶ γὰρ οὐν.
“The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not?”

“No, it will not.”

“The one can no more touch itself than it can be two.”

“No.”

“Nor, again, will it touch the others.”

“Why not?”

“Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next to it, and there must be no third between them.”

“True.”

“Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact.”

“There must.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, if The One Being were made Two; then

These Two Selves could also come-to-Be in Two Places at the same time; but on the other
to one hand, as long as and inasmuch as It Is One, It will not Be so Disposed?

Ari: It will not do so. (γαρ οὖν.

Par: Accordingly then, The Self/Same Necessity Applies to The One;

so that It can neither Be Two, nor can Self Be Grasped by Self.

Ari: The Self/Same necessity. (η αυτη.)

Par: Certainly then, It will not Grasp The Others.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη;

Par: For we say that, That which is about to Grasp, must be Separate from That, by Being

next to That which It Is about to Grasp; thus there Is no Third Term Between Them Selves.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, at the very least Two Terms Are Necessary, if Contact is about to be.

Ari: It is necessary. (δει.)

οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὅν τὸ ἐν ποιῆσειν ἄν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἄμα γένοιτο: ἐως δ᾽ ᾗ ἐν, σὲ ἐθέλησεις;

οὐ γάρ ὁδὲ.

ἡ αὐτή ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐνί μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτῷ.

ἡ αὐτή.

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀφεται.

τι δῆς;

ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἀφεσθαι χωρίς ὅν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀφεσθαι, τρίτων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ.

dύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄφις εἶναι.

dεῖ.
“And if [149b] to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts.”

“Yes.”

“And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts.
Par: But if on the one hand, a Third Term is added right after The Two, then (Their) Selves will be Three, but Their Contacts (Relationships) will Be Two.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And surely then in this way, whenever One Term Is added, One Contact Is also added, and the amount of all the Contacts will Always Be One less than The Number of Terms. For every succeeding Number of Terms exceeds the amount of all Contacts, by just as much as, the Number of their Contacts was exceeded by The Number of the first Two Terms.

The Number of their Contacts was exceeded by The Number of the first Two Terms.
[149c] For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts.”

“Right.”

“Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less.”

“True.”

“But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact.”

“Of course not.”

“We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other.”

“They do not.”

“Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them.”

“Of course not.”
For the rest, One Term Is immediately added to both The Number of Terms and at the same time One Contact Is immediately added, to The Contacts.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Accordingly then, whatever The Number of Terms there Are of The Selves, αρα οσσα τον αριθμον τα οντα εστι αυτων

Their Contacts will Always Be less, by One.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Then, if indeed Only One Term Exists, but Two Are not, then there can Be no Contact.

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Have we not said that, Those that Are Other than The One Are Not-One, ουκουν, φαμεν, τα αλλα του ενος εστιν αυτων εν

nor do They Participate of Self, if indeed They Are Other?

Ari: Neither. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, there Is no Number that Is Inherent In The Others, αρα ουκ αριθμος ενεστιν εν τοις αλλοις,

since One/Unity Is not Inherent In Them.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

δη γαρ το λοιπον άμα εν τε τω άριθμω προσγιγνεται και μια άφις ταις άφεσιν.

ορθως.

όσα άρα εστιν τα οντα των άριθμων, αει μια αι άφεις ελαττους εισιν αυτων.

αληθη.

ει δε γε ειν μονον εστιν, διας δε μη εστιν, άφις ουκ άν ειη.

πως γαρ;

ουκουν, φαμεν, τα αλλα του ενος ουτε εν εστιν ουτε μετεχαι αυτοι, ειπερ αλλα εστιν.

οδ γαρ.

οικ άρα ενεστιν αριθμως εν τοις αλλοις, ενος μη ενοντος εν αυτοις.

πως γαρ;
“Then the others are neither one nor two, [149d] nor have they the name of any other number.”

“No.”

“The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two.”

“That is clear.”

“There is no contact if there are no two terms.”

“No, there is none.”

“Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact.”

“No, certainly not.”

“Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others.”

“So it appears.”

“And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?”

“How is that?”
Par: Accordingly then, The Others Are neither One nor Two,

nor do They Possess The Name of any other Number.

Ari: They do not. (ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is One, Alone, and It will not Be Two.

Ari: It will not so come to Light. (ου φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no Contact; since there are no Two Terms/Beings/Selves.

Ari: There are not. (εστιν ουκ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One will neither Grasp The Others,
nor will The Others Grasp The One, if indeed there Is no Contact.

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ οὖν).

Par: Surely then in this way, according to all these statements, The One will both

Grasp and not Grasp The Others and It-Self.

Ari: It is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)

(Proclus Book 8)

Parmenides: 18 Take notice then, Is The One Equal and Unequal to Self and to The Others?

Aristotle: How? (πως.)

πῶς: Αρ’ οὖν καὶ ἰσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;
“If the one were greater or less than the others, [149e] or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?”

“Certainly.”

“These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.”

“That is obvious.”
Par: If The One were bigger or smaller than The Others, or in turn if The Others were bigger or smaller than The One, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither The One by Being nor The Others by Being Other than The One would Be something bigger nor something smaller than Each Other, by Virtue of The Selfhood of Their Ousias. But if Each One, except Being Such as They Are, would also Possess Equality, then They would Be Equal to Each Other. But if, The Others Possessed Bigness but The One Smallness, or The One and Others would be in such a way that on the one hand, wherever The Idea of Bigness would be present, the One in which Smallness Exists would be smaller. Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that both These Certain Ideas; Bigness and Smallness, do indeed Exist? For if They did not Subsist in some way, then They would certainly never exist; γε εστον; γε ειτην ουκ αντε που ουκ αν γε oppose Each Other and They would never have Come to Be among The Real Beings. How could they? (πως αν γαρ;)

ει μειζον ειη το εν η ταλλα η ελαττων, η αδ τα άλλα τοι τον μειζον ή ; Αρα ωκ αν το μεν εν ειναι το εν και ταλλα άλλα τον ενος ουτε τι μειζον ουτε τα ελαττων αν ειη άλληλων αυταις γε ταυταις ταις ουσιαις; άλλες ει μεν προς τοιαυτα ειναι εκατερα ισοτητα εχοιεν, ισα αν ειη προς άλληλα: ει δε τα μεν μεγεθος, το δε σιμικροτητα, ή και μεγεθος μεν το εν, σιμικροτητα δε ταλλα, οποτερω μεν το ειδε μεγεθος προσεην, μειζον αν ειη, ω δε σιμικροτης, ελαττων; αναγκη.

ουκοι εστον γε τιν τοιν αντε ειδη, το τε μεγεθος και ή σιμικροτης; ου γαρ αν που μη οντε γε εναντιω το αλληλων ειτην και εν τοις ουσιν εγγιγνοισθην. πως γαρ αν;
[150a] “Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.”

“Necessarily.”

“What if it be in the whole of one? Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?”

“Clearly.”

“And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?”

“Of course.”

“But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?” [150b]

“No, it cannot.”
Par: Accordingly then, if Smallness Comes to Be In The One, then It will either Be Present

\[8\alpha\] αρα ει σμικρωτης εγγιγνεται εν τω ενι, αν ητοι ενειη

In The Whole of Self or In a Part of Self.

εν ολω αυτου η εν μερει 

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: What then, if Smallness would Come to Be In The Whole? Will It not either Be

\[\tau\] τι δ’ ει εγγιγνοιτο εν ολω; αν ουχι η ειη extended Equally throughout The Whole of The One Self or Encompass/Contain Self?

εξ τεταμη ισου δι’ ολου τω ενι αυτου η περιεχουσα αυτο;

Ari: Manifestly so. (δηλον δη.)

Par: Take notice then, if on the one hand, Smallness Is extended Equally to The One, then It

\[8\alpha\] αρ’ ουν η μεν σμικρωτης εξ ισου τω ενι will Be Equal to Self; whereas, if It Encompasses The One, then Smallness will be bigger?

αν ειη ιση αυτω, δε περιεχουσα μειξων;

Ari: How could it not be so?

πως ου δ’;

Par: Therefore, Is it indeed Possible for Smallness to Be Equal or bigger than anything, and to

ουν γε δυνατον ομικροτητα ειναι ισην η μειξω τω τινος, και do the functions of Bigness/Magnitude and Equality, but not perform the functions of It-Self?

πραττειν τα μεγεθου τε και ισοτητος, αλλα μη τα εαυτης;

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

ει άρα εν τω ένι σμικρωτης εγγιγνεται, ήτοι έν ολω αν η γε ιση ου και 

άναγκη.

τι δ’ ει εν δλω εγγιγνοιτο; οηχι ή εξ ίσου αν τω ένι δι’ δλου αυτου τεταμενη ειη η περιεχουσα αυτο;

δηλον δη.

δια ουν ογκ εξ ίσου μεν οδοσα η σμικρωτης τω ένι ιση ου και 

πως δ’ ου;

δυνατον ογκ σμικρωτητα ισην το ειναι η μειξω τινος, και πραττειν τα μεγεθους τε και ισοτητος, άλλα μη 

τα εαυτης;

αδυνατον.
“Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.”

“Yes.”

“And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.”

“Inevitably.”

“Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.”

“So it appears.”
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, Smallness will not Be extended throughout the Whole of The One, but in a Part, if indeed at all.

ολω τω ενι, αλλ’ εν μερει ειπερ.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Nor indeed in turn, In The Whole Part; for if It did, then would not these Be functions of The Whole Part, just as it happened in relation to The Whole; in which case, It will Always Be either Equal or bigger than that in which Smallness happens to Be extended.

αει εσται ιση η μειζων ενη.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, Smallness will never Exist in any of The Real Beings, since It cannot Exist in a Part nor in a Whole; nor will there Be anything small except The Smallness of Self.

εγγιγνομενη εν μερει μητ εν ολω: ουδε εσται τι σμικρον πλην σμικροτητος αυτης.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

ἐν μεν διό ειρα τῳ ἐνι οὐκ ἀν εἶ ἡ σμικρότης, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.

ναι.

ούδε γε ἐν παντί αὐτῷ μέρει: εἰ δὲ μή, ταύτα ποιήσει ἀπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον: ἵσι ἐσται ἡ μεῖζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ψι ἀν ἀει ἐνῇ.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐδένι ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν οντων σμικρότης, μήτ’ ἐν μέρει μήτ’ ἐν διό εγγιγνομενη: οὔδε τι ἐσται σμικρὸν πλῆν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος.

οὔκ εοικεν.
“Nor will greatness exist in the one. [150c] For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.”

“True.”

“But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness.”

“No.”
Par: Accordingly then, neither will Magnitude be inherent in Self. For then there will be some other big aspect besides The Magnitude of Self; That in which Bigness is inherent; even if The Being of Smallness is not; these which Self must surpass by whatever is big; but this, Is Impossible, seeing that Smallness cannot ever be inherent in any being.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Then certainly, Self Magnitude will not be bigger than another, except Self Smallness, nor will Smallness be smaller than another, except Self Magnitude.

Ari: It will not. (γὰρ οὐ.)
“Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?”

“Certainly not.”

“Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an, equality and being on an equality, must be equal.”

“Of course.”
**Par:** Accordingly then, neither will The Others be bigger nor smaller than The One, since accordingly the one and the other are of equal magnitude, or of exceeding or of being exceeded, but this will only be the case in relation to The One, of either surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will only be the case in relation to Each Other; nor in turn will The One be either bigger nor smaller than These which has the power of The One, of either surpassing or of being exceeded, but this will only be the case in relation to Each Other; nor in turn will The One be either bigger nor smaller than These

**Ari:** It has not indeed come to Light.

**Par:** Take notice then, if The One is neither bigger nor smaller than The Others, then Self Must Necessarily neither surpass or be surpassed by Them?

**Ari:** It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Is it not Abundantly Necessary Indeed, for That which neither surpasses nor Is surpassed to be equally extended; for by Being equally extended It must be equal. Self had exceeded one and the other, and the excess of the one were equal to both of them and to the other.

**Ari:** How could it not? (πως γαρ οὐ;) (Nicomachus Book I Chapter 17-3, Intro. to Arith.)
[150e] “And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.”

“Certainly.”

“The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.”

“Evidently.”

“But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself,”
Par: And most certainly, The One Self will also have to Be in The Same relation to It-Self;
by neither Possessing Bigness nor Smallness in It-Self, nor will It surpass nor will It Be surpassed by It-Self; but by Being Equally extended, It will Be Equal to It-Self.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One will Be Equal both to It-Self and to The Others.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

Par: And certainly if Self were in It-Self, then It would also be Outside About It-Self, and indeed on the one hand, by Containing It-Self, It would Be bigger than It-Self;

ἐχον οὔτ’ ἀν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ’ ἀν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐξ Ἰσον ὅν Ἰσον ἂν εἰη ἑαυτῷ,
πάνυ μὲν οὐν.

τὸ ἐν ἂρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰσον ἂν εἶη.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἰη ἐξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἂν ἑαυτῷ εἶη,
and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; [151a]
thus the one would be both greater and less than itself.”

“Yes, it would.”

“And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one
and the others?”

“Of course.”

“But that which exists must always exist somewhere.”

“Yes.”

“And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in
the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can
it?”

“No, it cannot.”

“But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others,
and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the
others in the one and the one in the others, [151b] or else be
nowhere at all?”

“Clearly.”
but on the other hand, by Being Contained, It would Be smaller than It-Self; and in this way

The One Self would be bigger and smaller than It-Self.

to en autō an eι̇ mei̇zon kai̇ elattōn eautou.

Ari: It would be so. (αν ει̇ γαρ.)

Par: Must not the following also be the case; that there Is nothing at all Outside

αναγκη ουκουν τοδε και, ειναι μηδεν εκτος

of The One and The Others? (που ενος τε και των αλλων;)

Ari: How could it not be in this way? (πως ου γαρ;)

Par: But it Must Be the case that, That which Is, Must Always Be somewhere.

αλλα δει γε μην το ον αει ειναι που.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Is it not indeed the case that, That which Is in anything, will Subsist

ουκουν γε το ον εν τω εσται

by Being the smaller in the bigger? For otherwise, One cannot Subsist in The Other.

ον ελαττον εν μειζονι; γαρ αλλως ετερον αν ου ειη εν ετερω.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But since there Is no Other, apart from The One and The Others, then Selves

dε επειδη εστι ουδεν ετερον χωρις του ενος και των αλλων, δε αυτα

Must Be in something. Then is it not also Necessary that since Selves Are already in

δει ειναι εν τω, ουκ αναγκη ειναι ηδη εν

Each-Other, then The Others also Subsist in The One and The One also Subsists in

αλληλοις, τα αλλα τε εν τω ενι και το εν εν

The Others, or else Selves Exist in no way whatsoever?

151B τοις αλλοις, η ειναι μηδαμου;

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

περιεχομενον δε έλαττον, και ουτω μειζον αν και έλαττον ειη αυτο εαυτοι το έν.

ειη γαρ αν.

οικοιν και τοδε αναγκη, μηδεν ειναι εκτος του ενος τε και των αλλων;

πως γαρ ου;

αλλα μην και ειναι που δει το γε δν άει.

ναι.

οικοιν το γε έν τω δν εν μειζον εσται έλαττον ον; ου γαρ αν αλλως έτερον εν έτεροι ειη.

ου γαρ.

επειδη δε ουδεν έτερον έστι χωρις των αλλων και τοι ενος, δει δε αυτα έν τω ειναι, ουκ αναγκη ήδη εν

αλληλοις ειναι, τα τε αλλα έν τρι ένι και το έν έν τοις αλλοις, η μηδαμοι ειναι;

φαινεται.
“And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.”

“So it appears.”

“Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others.”

“Evidently.”
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, since *The One Is Inherent in The Others*, then

\[ \alpha \rho \alpha \mu \varepsilon \nu \sigmai \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \epsilon n e \sigma e \tau i \ \epsilon n \ \tau o i s \ \alpha l \lambda o i s, \]

*The Others* will **Be bigger than** *The One*, by Comprehending/Containing *The Self*;

\[ \tau a \ \alpha l \lambda a \ \alpha n \ \epsilon i \eta \ \mu e i \zeta o \ \tau o u \ \epsilon n o s, \ \pi e r i e \chi o n t a \ \alpha u t o, \]

whereas on the other hand, *The One* will **Be smaller than** *The Others* by Being Contained;

\[ \delta e \ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \epsilon l \alpha \tau t o n \ \tau o n \ \alpha l \lambda o n, \ \pi e r i e \chi o m e n o n: \]

but since *The Others Are Inherent in The One*, then by *The Self/Same Logos*, *The One* will **Be bigger** than *The Others*; and thus, *The Other Beings* will be **smaller** than *The One*.

\[ \alpha n \ \epsilon i \eta \ \mu e i \zeta o n \ \tau o n \ \alpha l \lambda o n, \ \delta e \ \tau a \ \alpha l \lambda a \ \epsilon l \alpha \tau t o \ \tau o u \ \epsilon n o s. \]

Ari: As it is **Reasonable**. (\( \epsilon o i k e n. \))

Par: Accordingly then, *The One Self*, **Is Equal to**, and **bigger and smaller than**, both *Self* and *The Others*.

\[ \alpha \rho \alpha \ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \alpha u t o \ \epsilon o s t i n \ \iota s o n \ \tau e \ \kappa a i \ \mu e i \zeta o n \ \kappa a i \ \epsilon l \alpha \tau t o n \ \tau e \ \alpha u t o u \ k a i \ \tau o n \ \alpha l \lambda o n. \]

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (\( \phi a i n e t a i. \))

\[ \delta i \ \mu e n \ \alpha r a \ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \tau i s \ \alpha l \lambda o i s \ \epsilon n e s t i, \ \mu e i \zeta o \ \alpha n \ \epsilon i \eta \ \tau a \ \alpha l \lambda a \ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \epsilon n o s, \ \pi e r i e \chi o n t a \ \alpha u t o, \ \tau o \ \delta e \ \epsilon n \ \epsilon l \alpha \tau t o n \ \tau o n \ \alpha l \lambda o n, \ \pi e r i e \chi o m e n o n: \ \delta i \ \delta e \ \tau a \ \alpha l \lambda a \ \epsilon n \ \tau i \epsilon \ \epsilon n i, \ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \tau o n \ \alpha l \lambda o n \ \kappa a t a \ \tau o n \ \alpha u t o n \ \lambda o g o n \ \mu e i \zeta o n \ \alpha n \ \epsilon i \eta, \ \tau a \ \delta e \ \alpha l \lambda a \ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \epsilon n o s \ \epsilon l \alpha \tau t o. \]

\( \epsilon o i k e n. \)

\[ \tau o \ \epsilon n \ \alpha r a \ \iota s o n \ \tau e \ k a i \ \mu e i \zeta o n \ k a i \ \epsilon l \alpha \tau t o n \ \epsilon s t i n \ \alpha u t o \ \tau e \ \alpha u t o u \ k a i \ \tau o n \ \alpha l \lambda o n. \]

\( \phi a i n e t a i. \)
“And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and
[151c] less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal,
more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.”

“Of course.”

“And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and
more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in
number to itself and the others.”

“How is that?”

“If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than
they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or
equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.”

“True.”
Par: And certainly, if indeed It is bigger, smaller and Equal, then It will Be of Equal, more
and less Measures than Self and The Others; whereas if of Measures, then also of Parts.

Ari: How could it not be? (πως δ’ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by Being of Equal, more and lesser Measures,
then It will also Be less and more in Number, both in relation to Self and The Others,
and also, according to The Same Logos, It will Be Equal to Self and to The Others.

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: Whatever Is big, will also Be in some way of more Measures than Selves, whereas
whatever esti meizōn, an και ειη που πλειονων μετρων αυτων: δε
it will also Be of as many Measures as Parts; and in the same way for that which Is small,
and according to The Same Logos for that which Is equal.

Ari: In the same way. (οὕτως.)
“Then one, being greater and less than itself [151d] and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?”

“Of course.”

“And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.”

“Clearly.”

“And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others?”

“Yes, it must.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that by Being big and small and Equal to It-Self,

\[ \text{ουκουν \ ον \ μειζων \ και \ ελαττων \ και \ ισων \ εαυτου,} \]

It will also Be of Equal Measures, and of more and of less Measures than Self?

\[ \text{αν \ και \ ει \ ισων \ μετρων \ πλειονων \ και \ ελαττωνων \ αυτω,} \]

But if this is indeed the case of Measures, then will it not also Be the case for Parts?

\[ \text{δε \ επειδη \ μετρων, \ και \ μερων;} \]

Ari: How could it not be? (πως ου δ’;)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by Being of Equal Parts to Self,

\[ \text{αρα \ μεν \ ον \ ισων \ μερων \ αυτω} \]

It will Be Equal in Multitude to Self; but on the other hand, if of more, then more,

\[ \text{αν ει \ ισων \ το \ πληθος \ αυτω, \ δε \ πλειονων \ πλεον,} \]

but if of less, then less in Number, than Self.

\[ \text{δε \ ελαττονων \ ελαττων \ τον \ αριθμον \ αυτω.} \]

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Has to Be Related in the same way to The Others?

\[ \text{ουκουν \ το \ εν \ εξει \ ωσαυτως \ προς \ ταλλα;} \]

For on the one hand, It has come to Light bigger than Them Selves, and so It must Be more

\[ \text{οτι \ μεν \ φαινεται \ μειζων \ αυτων, και \ αναγκη ειναι πλεον \ in Number \ than \ Selves. \ But, \ since \ It \ Is \ smaller, \ then \ must \ It \ not \ also \ Be \ less \ in Number?} \]

\[ \text{τον \ αριθμον \ αυτων: \ δε \ οτι \ σμικροτερον, \ ελαττων \ :} \]

And since It Is Equal in Magnitude, Must It not also Be Equal in Multitude to The Others?

\[ \text{δε \ οτι \ ει \ ισων \ μεγεθει, \ και \ ειναι \ ισων \ το \ πληθος \ τοις \ αλλοις;} \]

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

\[ \text{ουκουν \ εαυτοι \ μειζων \ και \ ελαττον \ ον \ και \ ισων \ ισων \ αν \ ει \ μετρων \ και \ πλειονων \ και \ ελαττωνων \ αυτω,} \]

\[ \text{επειδη \ δε \ μετρων, και \ μερων; \ πως \ δ’ \ ου;} \]

\[ \text{ισων \ μεν \ αρα \ μερων \ ον \ αυτω \ ισων \ αν \ το \ πληθος \ αυτω \ ει, \ πλειονων \ δε \ πλεον, \ ελαττωνων \ δε \ ελαττων \ τον \ αριθμων \ αυτων.} \]

\[ \text{φαινεται. \ ουκουν \ και \ προς \ ταλλα \ ωσαυτως \ εξει \ το \ εν; \ οτι \ μεν \ μειζων \ αυτων \ φαινεται, \ αναγκη \ πλεον \ ειναι \ και \ τον \ αριθμων \ αυτων: \ οτι \ δε \ σμικροτερον, \ ελαττων: \ οτι \ δε \ ισων \ μεγεθει, \ ισων \ και \ το \ πληθος \ ειναι τοις \ αλλοις; \ αναγκη.} \]

151D

\[ \text{ουκουν \ ον \ μειζων \ και \ ελαττων \ και \ ισων \ εαυτου,} \]

\[ \text{It will also Be of Equal Measures, and of more and of less Measures than Self?} \]

\[ \text{αν και ει \ ισων \ μετρων \ πλειονων \ και \ ελαττωνων \ αυτω,} \]

\[ \text{But if this is indeed the case of Measures, then will it not also Be the case for Parts?} \]

\[ \text{δε \ επειδη \ μετρων, και \ μερων;} \]

\[ \text{Ari: How could it not be? (πως ου δ’;)} \]

\[ \text{Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by Being of Equal Parts to Self,} \]

\[ \text{αρα \ μεν \ ον \ ισων \ μερων \ αυτω} \]

\[ \text{It will Be Equal in Multitude to Self; but on the other hand, if of more, then more,} \]

\[ \text{αν ει \ ισων \ το \ πληθος \ αυτω, \ δε \ πλειονων \ πλεον,} \]

\[ \text{but if of less, then less in Number, than Self.} \]

\[ \text{δε \ ελαττονων \ ελαττων \ τον \ αριθμον \ αυτω.} \]

\[ \text{Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)} \]

\[ \text{Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Has to Be Related in the same way to The Others?} \]

\[ \text{ουκουν \ το \ εν \ εξει \ ωσαυτως \ προς \ ταλλα;} \]

\[ \text{For on the one hand, It has come to Light bigger than Them Selves, and so It must Be more} \]

\[ \text{οτι \ μεν \ φαινεται \ μειζων \ αυτων, και \ αναγκη ειναι πλεον \ in Number \ than \ Selves. \ But, since It Is smaller, then must It not also Be less in Number?} \]

\[ \text{τον \ αριθμον \ αυτων: \ δε \ οτι \ σμικροτερον, \ ελαττων \ :} \]

\[ \text{And since It Is Equal in Magnitude, Must It not also Be Equal in Multitude to The Others?} \]

\[ \text{δε \ οτι \ ει \ ισων \ μεγεθει, \ και \ ειναι \ ισων \ το \ πληθος \ τοις \ αλλοις;} \]

\[ \text{Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)} \]
“And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.”

“Yes, it will.”

“And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?”

“What do you mean?”

“If one is, it is thereby shown to be.”

“Yes.”
Par: Surely then, in this way in turn, as it is Reasonable, The One Self will Be Equal, and more and less in Number, than both Self and The Others.

Ari: It will be so. (εσται.)

(Time: Kosmic Souls, (P68, P92) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, will The One also Participate of Time? And does Self also become younger and older, both than It-Self and The Others, and also auto te και γίγνεται νεώτερον τε και πρεσβύτερον τε εαυτου και των αλλων, και neither younger nor older than It-Self nor The Others, by Participating of Time?

Aristotle: How? (πως;)

Par: On the one hand, To Be, Is Present in some way with Self, if indeed It Is One.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

οὗτο δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἑν καὶ ἵσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον τὸν ἄριθμον αὐτὸ τε αὐτῷ ἐσται καὶ τῶν ἀλλών.

ἐσται.

ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἑν, καὶ ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτὸ τε ἔαυτῳ καὶ τῶν ἀλλων, καὶ οὐτέ νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ὀὔτε ἔαυτῳ οὔτε τῶν ἀλλών, χρόνου μετέχον; πῶς;

εἶναι μὲν ποι αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἰπέρ ἑν ἐστιν.

ναὶ.
“But is 'to be' anything else than participation in existence together with present time, [152a] just as 'was' denotes participation in existence together with past time, and 'will be' similar participation together with future time?”

“True.”

“Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.”

“Certainly.”

“And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?”

“Yes.”

“Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.”

“Certainly.”

“Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it?”

“Yes, we do.”
The Present of Time? Just as, The Was Is The Participation of Ousia with
The Past, and in turn, The Will be Is The Communion of Ousia with The Future?
Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)
Par: Accordingly then, It Participates of Time, if indeed It also Participates of The To Be.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: Will not then, The Time of which It Participates, Be in a state of Procession?
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Accordingly then, It Is Always becoming older than It-Self,
if indeed It Proceeds according to Time. (As opposed to Abiding in The Eternal)
Ari: Necessarily. (σαναγκη.)
Par: Take notice then, do we remember (141a) that whatever becomes younger does so,
because the older becomes older (than it)?
Ari: We do remember. (μεμνημεθα.)
“Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, [152b] would become older than a self which becomes younger?”

“There is no doubt of it.”

“Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself.”

“Yes.”

“And it is older, is it not, when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present.”

“No, it cannot.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that while The One, becomes older than It-Self, that It is becoming older than It-Self, while It is becoming younger than It-Self?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then in this way, on the one hand, It will become younger and older than Self.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But accordingly, on the other hand, It Is not in any way older, when Coming-to-Be according to The Present Time; That which Is between The Was and The Will Be? For by Proceeding from The Past to The Future, It will not somehow go-beyond The Present? How could it. (γαρ ου.)
“Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older [152c] when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.”

“True.”

“But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become [152d] and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.”

“Clearly.”
Par: Take notice then, will It not at that time cease to become older, since It arrives at The Now and is no longer becoming, but at that time It Is already older? For when It Proceeds νυν και ou γιγνεται, αλλ τοτ εστι ηδη πρεσβυτερον; γαρ ποτε προιον It will not Be Grasped by The Now. For That which Proceeds Has To Be in such a way as αν ουκ ληφθει υπο του νυν. γαρ το προιον εχει ουτως ως to Grasp both The Now and The Future; on the one hand, by Departing from The Now, while εφαπτεσθαι αμφοτερων, του νυν τε και του επειτα, μεν αφιεμενον του νυν, δ επισχει also Apprehending The Future, by Coming-to-Be Between both The Future and The Now. επιλαμβανομενον του επειτα, γιγνομενον μεταξυ αμφοτερων, του επειτα τε και του νυν. Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: But if it is indeed Necessary that All that Is becoming should not by-pass δε ει γε αναγκη παν το γιγνομενον μη παρελθειν to The Now; since, as soon as it arrives at This Now, That/Ousia will Always cease becoming, το νυν, επειδαν η κατα τουτο, του αει επισχει γιγνεσθαι and Is, at that time, That which It was Aiming to become. 152D και εστι τοτε τουτο ο τι αν τυχη γιγνομενον. Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)
“The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.”

“Certainly.”

“It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.”

“Yes.”

“And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not?”

“It is.”

“Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.” [152e]

“Undoubtedly.”
Par: Accordingly then, The One, also, *in Aiming at becoming older,* when It Hits-upon

αρα
to
και
gιγνομενον
πρεσβυτερον
οταν
εντυχη

The One, It will also *cease becoming at that time* that It *is older.*

tων
και
επεχεν
του
γιγνεσθαι
τοτε
εστι
πρεσβυτερον.

Ari: Entirely so.

πανυ
γε.

Par: Is it not the case then, that It is also *older* than *that,* in relation to which

ουκουν
εστιν
και
πρεσβυτερον
τουτου
ουπερ

*It has become older,* when it was thus *becoming older* than Self?

εγιγνετο
de
εγιγνετο
αυτου;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But the *older* is *older* than the *younger?*

δε
το
πρεσβυτερον
εστι
πρεσβυτερον
νεωτερου;

Ari: It is. (εστιν.)

Par: Accordingly then, at that time, The One is *younger* than Self,

αρα
τοτε
to
εν
εστι
νεωτερον
αυτου,

when by *becoming older* It Hits upon The Now.

οταν
γιγνομενον
πρεσβυτερον
εντυχη
των

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

και
tο
εν
αρα,
οταν
πρεσβυτερον
γιγνομενον
εντυχη
των
επεχεν
του
γιγνεσθαι
και
εστι
τοτε
πρεσβυτερον.

πανυ
μεν
οιν.

ουκουν
ουπερ
εγιγνετο
πρεσβυτερον,
tουτου
και
εστιν:
εγιγνετο
de
αυτου;

ναι.

εστι
dε
το
πρεσβυτερον
νεωτερου
πρεσβυτερον;

εστιν.

και
νεωτερον
αρα
tοτε
αυτου
εστι
το
εν,
οταν
πρεσβυτερον
γιγνομενον
εντυχη
των.

αναγκη.
“But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is.”

“Of course.”

“Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself.”

“So it appears.”

“And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?”

“For an equal time.”

“But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age.”

“Of course.”

“But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger.”

“No.”

“Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself.”

“I agree.”
Par: Most certainly then, The Now is Always Present with The One (Like @ 142c 6), through-out The Whole of Its Being: For It Is Always Now, as long as and insofar as, It Is. 

Ari: How could it not be? (πως γαρ οὕ;) 

Par: Accordingly then, The One Always Is and also becomes older and younger than It-Self. 

Ari: It is Reasonable. (εοικεν.) 

Par: But Is or does Self become in a more-extended or in an Equal Period of Time to It-Self? 

Ari: In an equal period of time. (τὸν ἴσον.) 

Par: But most certainly, That which either Is or becomes in an Equal Period of Time, has to be of The Same Age. 

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ᾽ οὕ;) 

Par: But That which is of The Same Age, is neither older nor younger. 

Ari: It is not. (γαρ οὕ;) 

Par: Accordingly then, since The One Self both becomes and Is in a Period of Time that Is Equal to It-Self, then It neither Is nor becomes neither younger nor older than It-Self. 

Ari: It does not appear to me, that it can. (οὐ δοκεῖ μοι.) 

tὸ γε μὴν νῦν ἂεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἦστι γὰρ ἂεὶ νῦν ὤτανπερ ἢ. 

πός γάρ οὗ; 

ἀεὶ ἄρα ἦστι τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἐν. 

ἐοικεν. 

πλείον δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἦστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον; 

τὸν ἴσον. 

ἄλλα μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλκιαν ἐχει. 

πός δ᾽ οὗ; 

tὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλκιαν ἢστιν οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἦστιν. 

οὐ γάρ. 

tὸ ἐν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὄν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἦστιν οὔδε γίγνεται. 

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.
“Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?”

[153a] “I cannot tell.”

“But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not
an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were
an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are
more than one and have multitude.”

“Yes, they have.”

“And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.”

“Of course.”

“Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the
greater or the smaller numbers?”

“The smaller.”

“Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it
not?” [153b]

“Yes.”
Par: What follows then, in relation to The Others?

Ari: I know not what to say. (οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.)

Par: You may certainly say the following; that Those Other than The One,

if indeed They Are indeed Other (plural), but not Another (singular), Are more than One.

For on the one hand, by Being Other, They will also Be One; but on the other hand, by Being

Others, They Are more than One, and They will Possess Multitude.

Ari: They will possess it. (γαρ αν εχοι.)

Par: But by Being Many They will Participate of a greater Number than The One.

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ ου;)  

Par: What then? Do we say that Those that are more in Number are generated, and

και γεγονεναι προτερον η τα ελαττω;

Ari: The few. (τα ελαττω.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Least Is First. But This Is The One. Can it be so?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

τι δὲ; τῶν ἄλλων;

οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς, εἰτερ έτερα ἐστίν, ἄλλα μὴ έτερον, πλείω ἐστίν ἑνὸς: ἐτερον μὲν γάρ ὅν ἐν ἄν ἴν, ἐτερα δὲ ὅντα πλείω ἑνὸς ἔστι καὶ πλῆθος ἄν ἐχοι.

ἔχοι γάρ ἄν.

πλῆθος δὲ ὅν ἀριθμοῦ πλείωνος ἄν μετέχοι ἤ τοῦ ἑνὸς.

πῶς δ’ οὐ;  

τι οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἤ τὰ ἐλάττω;

τὰ ἐλάττω.

τὸ ἀριθμόν ἄρα πρῶτον; τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑν. ἦ γάρ;

ναι.
“The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other.”

“They have.”

“And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.”

“Yes, they would.”

“Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?”

“It is impossible.”
Par: Accordingly then, The One has become The First of All Those Possessing Number:

But All The Others also Possess Number, if indeed They are Others and not Another.

de παντα ταλα και εχει αριθμον, ειπερ εστιν αλλα και μη αλλο.

Ari: They have to be. (γαρ εχει.)

Par: But indeed, by having-come-to-be First, I think, It came-to-be Before,

de γε γεγονος πρωτον, οιμαι, γεγονε προτερον,

but The Others came-to-be Later. But Those that have-come-to-be Later are younger

de τα αλλα υστερον. δ' τα γεγονοτα υστερον νεωτερα

than That which has come-to-be Before: and thus, The Others will Be younger

tου γεγονοτος προτερον: και ουτως ταλα αν ειη νεωτερα

than The One, but The One will be Older than The Others.

tου ενος, δε το εν πρεσβυτερον των αλλων.

Ari: For it will be.

γαρ αν ειη.

Parmenides: 20 But what about the following? Could it Be the case, that The One

το τι τοδε; αρ′ αν ειη το εν

has come-to-Be, contrary to The Nature of Self, or is this Impossible?

Aristotle: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)
“But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.”

“Yes.”

“And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?”

“Certainly.”

“And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.”

“Yes, we shall say that.”
Par: But surely, The One has indeed come to Light to consist of Parts (Older, Same, Younger); but if of Parts, then also of a Beginning, End and Middle. 

Ari: Yes. (ναὶ.)

Par: Is it not so then, that The Beginning (HYPARXIS) Is The First of All to come to Light, of both The One Self and of Each of The Others; and after that, The Beginning of All the others as far as to the end? 

Ari: What follows then? (τί μήν;)

Par: And we shall most certainly say that All these Others, Are Parts of The Whole and of The One; but That Self has come-to-Be At-Once with The End, One-and-Whole. 

Ari: We shall say so. (γάρ φήσομεν.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἑφάνη τὸ ἐν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον. 

ναὶ.

οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τάλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; 

τί μήν; 

καὶ μὴν μόρια γε φήσομεν ταῦτ’ ἐἶναι πάντα τάλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός, αὕτω δὲ ἐκείνο ἄμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον. 

φήσομεν γάρ.
“The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; [153d] so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.”

“That is clear.”

“Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.”

“I think that is clear, too.”

“Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?”

“It must.”
Par: But The End I suspect, comes-to-Be the very last of all. Thus The One Naturally
de τέλευτῃ, οἷμαι, γίγνεται γε υστατον: δ’ το εν πεφυκε
comes-to-Be in this way At-Once; so that, if indeed it Is Necessary that The One Self
153D γιγνεσθαι ουτω αμα: ωστ’ ειπερ αναγκη το εν αυτο
come-to-Be contrary to Nature, in that The One would have come-to-Be, At-Once
μη γιγνεσθαι παρα φυσιν, αν γεγονος αμα
with The End; which will Be Naturally Generated Last of The Others.
tελευτη αν ειη πεφυκος γιγνεσθαι υστατον των αλλων.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is younger than The Others,
αρα 
while The Others are older than The One.
δ’ τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα του ενος.

Ari: To me, it has come to Light in this way in turn. (μοι φαινεται ουτως ου.)

Par: But what then? Must not The Beginning or any other Part whatsoever
dε τι δη; ουκ αρχην η αλλο μερος οτιουν
of The One, or of anything else, if indeed and inasmuch as it Is a Part (singular),
tου ενος η οτουουν αλλου, εανπερ 
but not Parts (plural), Necessarily be One, if it Is indeed a Part?
αλλα μη μερη, αναγκαιον ειναι εν, ον γε μερος;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
“Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.”

“True.”

“Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Has-come-to-Be At-Once with both The First Part, and also Will come-to-Be At-Once with The Second Part; and It does not abandon a single one of The Others that are coming-to-Be, nor any Part to which It Can Be Attached; until Arriving at The Extreme Part, It Becomes One Whole; by neither Being excluded of The Middle nor of The First nor of The Last, nor of any other Part in Its coming-to-Be.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, will Possess The Self/Same Age with All The Others.

So that if The One was not Produced contrary to Its Self Nature, then It has come-to-Be at-the-same-time with Them.
[154a] And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one.”

“Certainly.”

“In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?”

[154b]

“I cannot say.”
And by This και κατὰ τοῦτον

Relationship, The One will neither be older nor younger than The Others, nor The Others τον λόγον, το εν αν ουτε ειν πρεσβύτερον ουτε νεώτερον των αλλων ουδε ταλλα than The One. Whereas, according to the former Relationship, The One was both older του ενος: δε κατα τον προσθεν τε πρεσβύτερον and younger than The Others, and The Others, in a similar way, than That. και νεώτερον , και ταλλα ωσαυτως εκεινου.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, on the one hand, The One Is and Has-to-Be and Has-come-to-Be in this way δη μεν εστι τε εχον και γεγονος ουτως also. But then in turn, what shall we say about Self coming-to-Be older and also younger και. αλλα σω τι περι αυτο γιγνεσθαι πρεσβυτερον τε και νεοτερον than The Others, and The Others than The One; and again, that It neither comes-to-Be των αλλων και ταλλα του ενος, και μητε γιγνεσθαι younger nor older? Therefore does It Have-to-Be in the same way with That which Is νεωτερον μητε πρεσβυτερον; αρα εχει ουτω περι του ειναι just as It also does with That which Is coming-to-Be, or otherwise? ωσπερ και περι του γιγνεσθαι , η ετερως;

Ari: I am not able to say. (εχω ουκ λεγειν.)
“But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first.”

“Yes, of course.”
Par: But I am indeed able to affirm the following, that if One Member is also older than Another Member, Self cannot still become even older, other than by the age difference ετερου, αυτο αν ουκ δυναιτο ετι γιγνεσθαι ετι πρεσβυτερον, η τη ηλικια δηνεγκε which Self First possessed as soon as Self came-to-Be; nor in turn that by Being younger can It ως το πρωτον ευθυς γενομενον, ουδ’ αυ το ον νεωτερον become still younger; for if Equals are added to un-equals -whether Time is added or anything γιγνεσθαι ετι : γαρ ισα προστιθεμενα ανισοις, χρονοι τε και αλλω whatsoever- It will always make them differ Equally by just as much as they differed at First. οτωον, αν αει ποιει διαφερειν ισω οσωπερ διενεηκη το πρωτον.

Ari: How could it be otherwise? (πως γαρ ου;)
“Then that which exists [154c] can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so.”

“True.”

“And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things.”

“No, it does not.”

“But see whether they become older and younger in this way.”

“In what way?”

“Because the one was found to be older than the others, and the others than the one.”

“What then?”
Par: Accordingly then, **The Being Cannot** indeed **come-to-Be older** nor **younger**

154C αρα το ον αν ουκ γε γιγνοι’ πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον than **The One**, at any time, if indeed **It Is Always Equally** different in age; whereas (του ενος BT) ποτε, ειπερ αει ισω διαφερει την ηλικιαν: αλλ’

It **Is** and **Has Come-to-Be older**, but then **That which Is younger**, does not **come-to-Be**.

εστι και γεγονε πρεσβυτερον, δε δ’ το νεωτερον, ου γιγνεται.

Ari: **True.** (αληθη.)

Par: And so, **The One Being**, will not at any time **become older** nor **younger**, και αρα το εν ον ουτε ποτε γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον than **The Others Beings.** (των αλλων οντων.)

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: Then **See if The One Being becomes older and younger in this way**. 

de ορα ει γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον τηδε.

Ari: In what way then? (πη δη;) 

Par: Insofar as **The One** has come to **Light older** than **The Other Beings**, η το εν εφανη πρεσβυτερον των αλλων and **The Others** than **The One**.

tε και ταλλα του ενος.

Ari: What follows then? (τι ουν;)
“When the one is older than the others, [154d] it has come into being a longer time than the others.”

“Yes.”

“Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction?”

“By a smaller fraction.”

“Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?” [154e]

“Yes.”
Par: At the \textit{Time} when The One has come to \textit{Light older} than The Others, It \textit{has-come-to-be} in some way for a longer Period of Time than The Others.

\hspace*{1cm} \textit{που} πλέω χρόνον \textit{η} τα αλλα. 

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Surely then consider again. If we add an \textit{Equal Time} to a longer and shorter Period of Time, then will the longer differ from the shorter by an Equal or by a smaller Part?

\hspace*{1cm} χρόνω, αρα το πλέον διοισει ου ελαττονος τω ισο η σμικροτερο μοριω; 

Ari: By a smaller part. (σμικροτερω.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One will not be different in age from The Others by as much as
\hspace*{1cm} αρα \textit{το} \textit{εν} ουκ εσται διαφερον ηλικια προς ταλλα οτιπερ 

This Time and in The Future, as It Was at First (longer); but by receiving an Equal Time along with The Others, It will Always differ by a less age than Theirs than before. Or not?
\hspace*{1cm} τοις αλλοις, αει διοισει ελαττον τη ηλικια αυτων η προτερον: \textit{η} \textit{ου}; 

Ari: Yes, this is the case. (ναι.)
“And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older?”

“Yes, it becomes younger.”

“But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?”

“Certainly.”

“Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older;
Par: Is it not the case indeed, that Whatever differs less in age, in relation to anything, than It did before, It will become younger than in the past, in relation to Those to which It was older before? (ην πρεσβυτερον προτερου;) 

Ari: Younger. (νεωτερον.) 

Par: But if in turn, That Is younger, will not The Others Be older than before, in relation to The One? (προς το εν;) 

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.) 

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, That which has-come-to-be younger, 

αρα μεν το γεγονος νεωτερον 

will become older, in relation to That which has-come-to-be before and by Being older; but on γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον προς το γεγονος προτερου τε και ον πρεσβυτερου, the other hand, It never (really) Is older, for It Is Always becoming older than That; 

de ουδεποτε εστι πρεσβυτερον, αλλα αει γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον εκεινου;

ουκον το γε έλαττον διαφέρον ηλικια προς τι η πρότερου νεώτερον γίνοιτ’ αν η εν το πρόσθεν προσ έκεινα προς α ην πρεσβυτερον πρότερου; 

νεώτερον.

eι δε έκεινο νεώτερον, ουκ έκεινα αυ τα άλλα προς το έν πρεσβυτερα η πρότερου; 

πάνυ γε. 

tο μεν νεώτερον ἃρα γεγονος πρεσβυτερον γίγνεται προς το πρότερου γεγονος τε και πρεσβυτερον ον, έστι δε ουδέποτε πρεσβυτερον, αλλα γίγνεται αει έκεινου πρεσβυτερου:
for the latter always tends towards being younger, [155a]
and the former towards being older. And conversely the older
becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are
moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of
one another, the younger older than the older, and the older
younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of
becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would
no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they
become older and younger than one another—the one becomes
younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came
into being earlier,
for on the γὰρ μὲν one hand, That advances to a younger state, but on the other hand, The Other to an older state. 155A ἐκεῖνο επιδίδοσιν ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον, δ’ τὸ επὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. But in turn, in the same way, That which is older is becoming younger than The younger. δ’ αὐς ὡςαυτῶς το πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται νεώτερον τού νεώτερου. For by both of Them tending to that which is opposite, They become opposite to Each other; γαρ αὐτοῖν ἵοντε εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον γίγνεσθον το ἐναντίον ἀλλήλουν, on the one hand, The younger become older than The older, but on the other hand, The older μὲν τὸ νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβύτερου, δε τὸ πρεσβύτερον become younger than The younger; but they will not Be able to Be such. For if They νεώτερον τοῦ νεώτερου: δε αν οὐκ εἰτην γενεσθαι οἰω τε. γαρ ει would-have-become, then They would no longer becoming-to-be, but would Be. But now, γιγνοιτο , αν ουκ ετι γενοιτο , αλλ’ αν ειεν. δε νυν They are becoming both older and younger than Each other. On the one hand, The One γιγνοναι μεν πρεσβυτερα καὶ νεωτερα ἀλλήλων: μεν το εν becomes younger than The Others, because It came to Light Being older, and would-have-giγνεται νεωτερον των ἀλλων, οτι εφανη ον πρεσβυτερον και come-to-Be before; 155B γεγονος προτερον,
[155b] and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier.”

“Yes, that is clear.”

“Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, [155c] and vice versa—

2.233
whereas on the other hand, The Others have-come-to-be older than

\[ \delta \tau \alpha \lambda \lambda \alpha \ \text{preσβυτερα} \]

The One since They have-come-to-be later. According to The Self Logos, The Others
tου ενος στι γεγονε υστερα. κατα τον αυτον λογον ταλλα
will also be related in the same way in relation to The One, inasmuch as They also came-to-
kαι ισχει ουτω προς το εν, επειδηπερ και ε-
Light older than Self, and to-have-come-to-be before.

-φαινη πρεσβυτερα αυτου και γεγονοτα προτερα.

Ari: For It has thus come to Light in this way.

γαρ ουν φαινεται ουτως.

Par: Is it not always the case that, on the one hand, insofar as One Member does not

\[ \alphaει \ ουκουν \ \muεν \ η \ \text{ετερου} \ \text{ουδεν} \]

become older nor younger than Another, by differing from Each Other by an Equal Number,

\[ \gammaιγνεται \ \text{πρεσβυτερον} \ \text{ουδε} \ \text{νεωτερον} \ \text{ετερου} \ \text{το} \ \text{διαφερειν} \ \alphaλληλων \ \ \κατα \ \text{ισω} \ \text{αριθμω}, \]

then neither will The One become older nor younger than The Others, nor The Others than

\[ \ουτε \ \alphaν \ \text{το} \ \text{εν} \ \text{γιγνοιτ} \ \text{πρεσβυτερον} \ \text{ουδε} \ \text{νεωτερον} \ \text{των} \ \alphaλλων, \ \text{ουτε} \ \text{ταλλα} \]

The One; but on the other hand, insofar as Those that are Prior must Necessarily Always

tου ενος: \[ \delta \ \eta \ \text{τα} \ \text{προτερα} \ \text{αναγκη} \ \alphaει \]
diff er by a different part from Those that come-to-be later, and The Later from The Prior.

155C διαφερειν αλλω μοριω \ των γενοµενα υστερον, και τα υστερα των προτερων,
from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?”

“Certainly.”

“For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others.”

“Perfectly true.”
Then, in this way, it is Necessary that They must become older and younger than Each Other; both The Others than The One and The One than The Others? 

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, according to all these accounts, The One Self, both Is, and becomes older and younger than Self and The Others; and in turn, neither Is, nor becomes neither older nor younger than Self nor than The Others.

Ari: That is perfectly so. (μεν παντελως ουν.)

ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερα τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ το ἐν τῶν ἄλλων; 
pάνυ μέν οὖν.

κατά δὴ πάντα ταύτα τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἐστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ’ ἐστίν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. 
pαντελῶς μέν οὖν.
“But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, [155d] must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?”

“It must.”

“Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.”

“Certainly.”

“And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?”

“Certainly.”
Par: But since The One Participates of Time, and of becoming older and younger, is it not Necessary that It should also Participate of The Past, The Future and The Present, if indeed It Participates of Time? (ειπερ μετεχει χρονου;) Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Was, and Is, and Will be; and was-coming-into-Being and Is-coming-into-Being, and will-come-into-Being.

Ari: What follows then? (τι μην;) Par: And there Should/Can/Must/Will Be Something (Ousia, 152a) in relation to That, that also Belongs to That; which Was, and Is, and Will be.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἑν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἄρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἰπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη.

ἡν ἄρα τὸ ἑν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.

τί μήν;

καὶ εἶπῃ ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἤν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.

πάνυ γε.
“And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it.”

“You are right.”

“And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.”

“That is perfectly true.”
Par: Surely then, there Can/Must/Will Be Knowledge, and opinion, and perception of Self, since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning Self, and accounted for; and whatsoever happens to such aspects concerning The Other Beings, and is also the case concerning The One.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λεγεις ορθως.)

Par: Surely then, there Is a Name and a Logos in relation to Self, and so It is Named and accounted for; and whatsoever happens to such aspects concerning The Other Beings, is also the case concerning The One.

Ari: Therefore, it has to be entirely in this way.
one many neither time 2.6 2.186 3.1
one time another time 3.3

generated destroyed 3.7
separated combined 3.9
assimilated dissimulated 3.10
increased diminished equalized 3.11

Theorem IV 3.12
instant - time 3.18
- rest motion 3.19

- is is not comes into destroyed 3.20
- one many separation combination 3.21
- like unlike assimilation dissimulation
- small great equal increase diminution equality

one exists 3.22
“Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?”

“Yes, it must.”

“And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?”

“No, it cannot.”
The Third Hypothesis

Parmenides: Surely then in the third place, let us still relate, that if The One Is such as we have described, is it not Necessary that Self, Is One and Being and Many (143b) and Neither One Nor Many and Participates of Time, because on the one hand, It Is One, then at that Time, It Participates of Ousia; but on the other hand, because It Is Not, then in turn, It does not, at that Time Participate of Ousia?

Aristotle: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Take notice then, is it possible, that It will Participate at the Time that It does not Participate; or that It will not Participate at the Time when It does Participate?

Ari: It is not possible. (ουχ οιον τε.)
“Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.” [156a]

“True.”

“And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it?”

“There is no other way at all.”

“But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming?”

“Yes.”

“And losing existence is destruction?”

“Certainly.”
Par: Accordingly then, **It Participates** at one **Time**, and **does not Participate** at another **Time**.

αρα μετέχει εν αλλω χρόνω και ου μετέχει εν αλλω;

For only thus, will it be possible for **It to Participate** and **not Participate** of **The Self**.

156A γαρ μονως ουτω εν μετέχοι τε και ου μετέχοι του αυτου.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Is there not also such a **Time**, when **It Shares of That** which **Is** and when **It takes-leave of Self**? Or how can it be possible, that **It Will** on the one hand, **Possess The Self** at one **Time**, but at another **Time Not Possess It**, unless if **It both Receives-and-loses Self**?

tοτε δε τοτε μη εχειν εαν μη και λαμβανη και αφιη αυτο;

Ari: No other way. (ουδαμος.)

Par: Surely then, do you not call **The Receiving/Sharing of Ousia coming-to-Be**?

γε δη αρα ου καλεις το μεταλαμβανειν ουσιας γιγνεσθαι;

Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε.)

Par: But accordingly then, is not the **loss of Ousia, to perish/to dissolve**?

dε αρα οικ το απαλλαττεσθαι ουσιας απολλυσθαι;

Ari: Entirely so. (και πανυ γε.)

ἐν ἄλλω ἀρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει: οὔτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.

όρθως.

οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὕτως χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἶν τε ἔσται τοτέ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτέ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, εὰν μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτό καὶ ἀφίη;

οὐδαμῶς.

τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἀρά γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἀρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι;

καὶ πάνυ γε.
“The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is generated and destroyed.” [156b]

“Inevitably.”

“And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?”

“Certainly.”

“And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined?”

“Inevitably.”

“And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and dissimilated?”

“Yes.”
Par: Surely then, The One, as it is Reasonable, comes-to-Be and dissolves,
δη το εν, ως εοικε, γιγνεται τε και απολυται,
by receiving/grasping/taking/seizing and by letting-go/discharging/losing Ousia,
λαμβανον τε και αφιεν ουσιαν.
156B

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then by Being One and Many and by coming-to-Be and by letting-of-Being,
δε ον εν και πολλα και γιγνομενον και απολλιμενον
accordingly on the one hand, when It comes-to-Be One, does It not cease to Be Many,
alpha' μεν οταν γιγνηται εν, το ουχ απολλυται ειναι πολλα,
but on the other hand, when It comes-to-Be Many, does It not cease to Be The One?
δε οταν πολλα, απολλυται ειναι το εν;

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: But accordingly then, by coming-to-Be One and Many,
δε αρ' γιγνομενον εν και πολλα
must It not Necessarily Be both Dispersed/Scattered-apart and Collected-together?
ουκ αναγκη τε διακρινεσθαι και συγκρινεσθαι;

Ari: Very much so indeed. (πολλη γε.)

Par: And most certainly, when It comes-to-Be Unlike and Like,
και γε μην οταν γιγνηται ανομοιον και ομοιον,
It then also comes-to-Be Assimilated and Dissimilated?
ομοιουσθαι και ανομοιουσθαι;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

to εν δη, ως εοικε, λαμβανον τε και αφιεν ουσιαν γιγνεται τε και απολλυται.
αναγκη.
εν δε και πολλα δεν και γιγνομενον και απολλιμενον αρ' ουχ, οταν μεν γιγνηται εν, το πολλα ειναι
απολλυται, οταν δε πολλα, το εν ειναι απολλυται;
πανυ γε.
εν δε γιγνομενον και πολλα αρ' ουκ αναγκη διακρινεσθαι τε και συγκρινεσθαι;
pollh γε.
και μην ανομοιον γε και ομοιον οταν γιγνηται, ομοιουσθαι τε και άνομοιουσθαι;
ναι.
“And when it becomes greater and smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and equalized?” [156c]

“Yes.”

“And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must itself be in no time at all.”

“How is that?”

“It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without

“Of course.”
Par: And when *It comes-to-Be more, less, and Equal*, then *It also Becomes-increased* and *Becomes-decreased* and also *Becomes-Equalized*?

Ari: It becomes in this way. (οὕτως.)

Par: But when *It Is Standing-Still, from-Being-in-the-state-of-motion*, and in turn when *It Is At-Rest, It Is then changed into That which Is In-Motion*, then surely it is necessary that *Self must indeed not Be in Any/Some Singular Period in Time*.

Ari: How could it indeed? (πως δή;)

Par: But that which *was formerly At-Rest, and later-on Moves*, and that which *was-Moving before and later-on Stands-still*; on the one hand, will not *Be Able to experience these experiences without Mutation/Alteration*. on the one hand, will not *Be Able to experience these experiences without Mutation/Alteration.*

Ari: How could it? (πως γάρ;)

καὶ ὅταν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθινειν καὶ ἴσονθαι;

οὕτως.

ὅταν δὲ κινούμενον τε ἱστηται καὶ ὅταν ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γε μηδὲν ἐν ἕνῳ χρόνῳ εἶναι.

πῶς δή;

ἔστος τε πρότερον υπήρξει καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὑπήρξει ἐστάναι, ἀνεύ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐδ’ οἶνον τε ἐσται ταῦτα πᾶσχειν.

πῶς γάρ;
“And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No, there is none.”

“And certainly it cannot change without changing.”

“I should say not.”

“Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time.” [156d]

“No, it does not.”
Par: On the other hand, there is indeed *No-Time (The Gap)*, in which *Anything* can change

*At-That-Same-Time*; that is, neither *when Moving* nor *when Standing-still*.

Aristotle: There is not. (γαρ οὖν οὐ.)

Parmenides: Certainly then, *Nothing Can Be changed* without *Mutation*.

Ari: It is not likely that it can. (οὐκ εἰκός.)

Par: Then *at what Time* will *Anything Change/Mutate/Alter*? For *Nothing*

*Is Altered while Being At-Rest*, nor *while Being In-Motion*, nor *while Being in Time*.

Ari: It will not. (οὐ γαρ οὖν.)

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χρόνος δὲ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς τι οἷόν τε ἀμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι.

οὐ γάρ οὖν.

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβαλλειν.

οὐκ εἰκός.

πότ᾽ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γάρ ἐστός ὅπερ οὔτε κινοῦμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὅν.

οὐ γάρ οὖν.
“Does this strange thing, then, exist, in which it would be at the moment when it changes?”

“What sort of thing is that?”

“The instant. For the instant seems to indicate a something from which there is a change in one direction or the other. For it does not change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving; but there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed
Par: Take notice then, **Is This, That which Is Outside** of the ordinary,

αρ’ οὖν ἐστι τούτο τὸ ἀτοπον

*In Which, It will Be*, at the (No)-**Time** when *It Changes*?

ἐν ὁ ἀν εἰη τὸτ’ ὀτε μεταβάλλει;

Ari: What kind of state is that then? (το ποιον δή)

Par: **The Sudden.** For **The Sudden Is Likely** to signify something **Like This**, such as

tὸ ἐξαιφνης. γαρ τὸ ἐξαιφνης εοικε σημαινειν τι τοιονδε, ως

*That from which It* changes into each of these conditions. For **while It Stands-still, It will**

ἐκεινου εξ μεταβάλλον εις εκατερον . γαρ ετι του ἑσταναι γε

not **Be changed from standing-still, nor while in motion will It Be changed out of the motion**: 

οὐ μεταβάλλει εκ ἑστωτος, οὔτε ὁτι κινουμενης μεταβάλλει εκ της κινησεως:

but **That Nature which Is Outside of the ordinary, The Sudden Her-Self, is Something** situated

άλλα φυσις ατοπος η εξαιφνης αυτη τις εγκαθιηται
between [156e] motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into motion.”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, must change in each direction; for that is the only way in which it can do both. But in changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it can be in no time, and at that instant it will be neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No.”

“And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes?”
Between (The Gap) Motion and The Stationary, by Being in No-Time, and certainly into This and also from This, That which moves, changes to That which Stands-Still, and in turn That which is At-Rest, changes to That which is Moved.

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνεύει.)
Par: And surely, if indeed The One Stands-still and Is Moved, It will Be Changed into Each. For only in this way will It create both of these conditions. But when It Is Changing ef’ ekatera: gar monos outos an poiou amphotera: δ’ metaballon It will Be Changed by The Sudden Turn-About; and when It Changes, It Will Be in No-Time, for At That Time, It will neither be Moved, nor Stand-still. oudean chronon, tote an oude kinoit, oud’ an staith. Ari: For it will not.

gar ou.

Par: Take notice then, does The One also have to Be in this way, in relation to the other ar’ ouv και εχει ουτω προς τας αλλας mutations?

 metabolaz,

μεταξύ τής κινήσεως τε και στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὸ τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπί τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

κινδυνεύει.
καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἑστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἄν ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα—μόνως γάρ ἄν οὕτως ἁμφότερα ποιοὶ—μεταβάλλον δὲ ἐξαιρήθης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἄν εἰη, οὔδε κινοῖτ’ ἄν τότε, οὔδ’ ἄν σταῖη.

οὐ γάρ.

ἀρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει,
When it changes from being to destruction [157a] or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?”

“Yes, so it appears.”

“And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like,
And when It *is changed* from That which *is*, into that which *dissolves*, or from

that which *is not*, to that which *comes-to-be*; does It *become at that time*, Between (The Gap)

certain states of *moving* and of *standing-still*? And *At that time*, It *neither exists*, nor *does not exist*, nor *becomes* nor *dissolves*?

**Ari:** It certainly does appear to be likely.

**Par:** And surely according to The Self/Same Logos (Rep 511B-C), when It *passes from one* into *many* and from *many into one*, It is *neither one* nor *many*, neither is It *dispersed* and *does not* *gathering-together*. And in Passing from *like to unlike*, and from *unlike to like*, *it neither shows nor disappears*.

ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβαλλὴ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξὺ τινῶν τότε γίγνεται κινήσεων τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ τοτὲ οὔτε εστὶ οὔτε οὐκ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπολλυται; ἑοῖκε γοῦν.

κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ εξ ἑνὸς εἰς πολλὰ ἢν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕφ’ ἐν εστὶν οὔτε ἐν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ εξ ὁμοίου εἰς ἀνόμοιον καὶ εξ ἀνόμοιου εἰς ομοίον
it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimilation; [157b] and in passing from small to great and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality.”

“Apparently not.”

“All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists.”

“Yes, certainly.”
It is *neither* Like nor *Unlike*, nor is *Assimilated* nor *Dissimilated*. And while *It Passes from Small into Big*, and into *Equal* and into Its contraries, *It will neither be Small nor Big*, nor *Equal*, nor *increasing*, nor *decreasing*, nor *Equalized.*

*It will neither be Small nor Big*, nor *Equal*, nor *increasing*, nor *decreasing*, nor *Equalized.*

*It will neither be Small nor Big*, nor *Equal*, nor *increasing*, nor *decreasing*, nor *Equalized.*

Ari: It does not appear that it can.

Par: Certainly then, if *The One Is*, *It will undergo* all *these experiences*.

Ari: How could it not? (*πως δ’ οὔ;*)
consider 0.58
- one 4.3

Theorem I 4.4
perfect whole parts 4.11
whole part participate one 4.14
many 4.16
unlimited 4.21
limited 4.22
unlimited limitation 4.24

Theorem VI 4.25
like unlike 4.30
like unlike themselves another 4.31
same other motion rest opposite affections 4.32
“Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?”
“We must.”
“Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists?”
“Let us do so.”
“Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one for if they were, they would not be other than the one.”
“True.”
The Fourth Hypothesis (*passively*)

**Parmenides:** 22 Then must we not consider what will likely *happen* to The Others if One Is?

Aristotle: We must so consider. (σκεπτέον.)

**Par:** Then let us say, if One Is, what *Those Other* than The One Must *experience*?

**Ari:** Let us do so. (λέγωμεν.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, if indeed The Others Are Other than The One,

then They Are not The One; for otherwise they would not Be Other than The One?

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ορθώς.)
[157c] “And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.”

“In what way?”

“Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.”

“True.”

“But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole.”

“Yes, we affirm that they do.”

“But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole.”

“How is that?”
Par: Yet certainly, The Others Are not entirely deprived of The One, but Participate of It, in a Certain (Definite) Way.

Ari: In a certain way then? (πη δη;)
Par: Since The Others Are Other than The One in some (indefinite) way by having Parts, for if They had no Parts, They would Be Entirely One.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)
Par: But we said that since They have Parts, They will Belong to That which Is Whole.

Ari: We have so affirmed. (γαρ φαμεν.)
Par: But certainly, it is indeed Necessary that The Whole will Be One composed of Many, and of which Whole, The Many Parts Are Parts. For Each One of Those Parts must not be a piece/fragment of many, but a Part of a Whole.

Ari: How is this so? (πως τουτο;)
“If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, [157d] which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.”

“That is clear.”
Par: If anything would be a piece of many, among which it would exist, surely then somehow Self would also be a piece of it-self and of each one of the others, which is surely impossible, if indeed it is also a piece of all. For by not being a piece of one of these, it will be a piece of the others, except of this, and thus it will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece of all, πλην τουτου και ουτως ουκ εσται μοριον εκαστου ενος, δε μη ον μοριον of each, It will not in any way be piece of the many. But anything that does not-exist-in-one, εκαστου εσται ουδενος των πολλων, δε τι ον μηδενος αδυνατον cannot exist in all of those of which it belongs to none, neither as a piece or anything else at all. ειπερ και παντων τουτων, ον εστι ουδενος, ουδεν και μοριον και αλλο οτιουν.

Ari: Surely then it has indeed come to Light. ( δη γε φαινεται.)

ει τι πολλων μοριον ειη, εν οις αυτο ειη, εαυτου τε δηπου μοριον έσται, δ έστιν αδυνατον, και των άλλων δη ένος έκαστου, ειπερ και παντων. ένος γαρ μη ον μοριον, πλην τοτου των άλλων έσται, και ουτως ένος έκαστου ουκ έσται μοριον, μη δε μη δε μοριον έκαστου ουδενος των πολλων έσται. μηδενος δε δε παντων τοτων τι ειναι, ουν ουδενος ουδεν έστι, και μοριον και άλλο οτιουν αδυνατον ειναι.

φαινεται γε δη.
“Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept [157e] which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part.”

“Certainly.”

“If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.”

“True.”

“The things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.”

“Yes, they must.”

“And the same reasoning applies to each part for the part must partake of the one. For if each of the parts is a part, [158a] the word 'each'
Par: Accordingly then, The Part Is not a piece of many nor of all; 

157E αρα το μοριον ουκ μοριον τον πολλων ουδε παιντων,

but of One Undefined Idea, and of Some Unity, which we call Whole, which has-come-to-Be αλλα μιας τινος ιδεας και τινος ενος, ο καλουμεν όλον, γεγονος

One Perfect Idea composed from All; of That which The Part will Be a Part.

εν τελειου εξ απαντων, τουτου το μοριον αν ειη μοριον.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The Others have Parts, then they will also Participate

αρα ει ταλλα εχει μορια, καιν μετεχοι

of The Whole and also of One/Unity/Oneness.

του όλου τε και ενος.

Ari: Very much so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, Those that Are Other than The One, Must Be One Perfect

αρα ταλλα του ενος αναγκη ειναι εν τελειου

Whole which has Parts. (ολον εχον μορια.)

Ari: They must be. (αναγκη.)

Par: And most certainly, The Self/Same Logos, also applies to each Part. For

και γε μην ο αυτος λογος και περι του εκαστου μοριου. γαρ

The Part Must Participate of The One. For if each of These Parts Is a Part, then “each”

τουτου αναγκη μετεχειν του ενος. γαρ ει εκαστον αυτων εστι μοριον,το εκαστον

ουκ αρα των πολλων οιδε παιντων το μοριον μοριον, αλλα μιας τινος ιδεας και ένος τινος δ καλουμεν όλον, εξ απαντων εν τελειου γεγονος, τουτου μοριου αν το μοριον ειη.

πανταπασι μεν ον.

ει αρα ταλλα μορια εχει, καν του δολου τε και ένος μετεχου.

πανυ γε.

Εν αρα όλον τελειου μορια εχον αναγκη ειναι ταλλα τοδ ένος.

αναγκη.

και μην και περι τοδ μοριου γε εκαστου δ αυτος λογος και γαρ τουτο αναγκη μετεχειν τοδ ένος.
implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be 'each.'”

“True.”

“But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one.”

“Yes, it is impossible.”

“And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the whole.”

“Yes.”
without a doubt, indeed signifies to Be “One”; by first Being Distinct from the others, then by Being “According to Self”, if indeed It will Be that which Is called, “Each Part”. 

δε ον καθ’αυτο, ειπερ εσται εκαστον.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: But It will indeed Participate of The One, since this Is clear by Being another than One; for otherwise It would not Participate, but It would Be One Self; but now on the one hand, it Is Impossible that some Part to Be One, except by The One Self. 

μεν αδυνατον που ειναι ενι πλην τω ενι αυτω.

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

Par: But on the other hand, it is quite Necessary that both The Whole and The Part Participate of The One; for on the one hand, The Whole of which The Parts Are Parts, will Be One, but the other hand, it Is Impossible that some Part to Be One, except by The One Self.

οὐ γὰρ ἐκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον ἔστι, τὸ γε ἐκαστον εἶναι ἐν δήποτε σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ’ αὐτό δὲ ὃν, εἰπερ ἐκαστον ἔσται.

Ἀδύνατον.

μετέχει δὲ γε ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς δήλου ὅτι ἄλλο ὃν ἢ ἔν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέχειν, ἄλλ’ ἢν ἂν αὐτὸ ἔν.

νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλῆν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔνι ἀδύνατον που.

Αδύνατον.

μετέχειν δὲ γε τοῦ ἐνὸς ἄναγκη τῷ τῇ ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔν ὅλον ἔσται, ὃ μόρια τὰ μόρια: τὸ δ’ αὖ ἐκαστον ἐν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ ἂν ἦ μόριον ὅλου.

οὕτως.
“And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it?”

“Of course.”

“But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything.”

“No.”

“But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number?”

“How so?”

“Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one?” [158c]

“Clearly.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that The Beings which Participate of The One, Participate of Self, by Being Other (as in 148b)?

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ οὐ;) Pare: But Those that Are Other than The One will Be Many in some indefinite way. δ’ τα ετερα του ενος αν ειη πολλα που . For if Those that Are Other than The One Were neither One nor More than One, then They γαρ ει ταλλα του ενος ειη μιτε εν μιτε πλειω ενος, would be nothing. (αν ειη ουδεν.) Ari: They would be nothing then. (ου γαρ ουν.) Par: Since The Beings that Participate both of a Part of One, and The Beings that Participate of The One Whole, Are indeed More than One, then Must not τα του ενος ολου εστι γε πλειω ενος, δε αναεκη ουκ These Beings which Participate of The One already Be Unlimited Multitude? εκεινα τα μεταλαμβανοντα του ενος ηδη ειναι απειρα πληθει; Ari: How? (πως;) Par: Let us See in the following way. At the Time when They Partake of Something other ιδωιμεν οδε. τοτε οτε οντα μεταλαμβανει τι αλλο than The One, do They Participate of Not-One, and do not Participate of Self? του ενος μετεχοντα ουχ εν, ουδε μεταλαμβανει αυτου; Ari: Clearly so. (δηλα δη.)
“Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not?” 4.19

“Yes, they are multitudes.”

“Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one?”

“Whoah.”

“And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not?”

“Certainly.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that They are Multitudes, in which The One Is Not?

158C οὐκουν οντα πληθη εν οις το εν ενι ουκ;

Ari: Multitudes, certainly. (πληθη μεντοι.)

Par: What then? If we would be willing to take away through our Understanding, the least possible Quantity from These, then is it not Necessary that This Very Quantity which is taken away, Must Be a Multitude and also Not-One, if indeed, It does Not Participate of The One?

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: By Always Considering That Other (Ousia) Nature of The Ideas/Kinds/Genera in this way, as Subsisting Her Self by Her Self, will not then, such a Quantity of Her Self, which we may behold, Will Always Be, Unlimited Multitude?

Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οίς τὸ ἔν οὐκ ἔνι; πλήθη μέντοι.

τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἷοί τὲ ἔσμεν ὃτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἔκεινο, εἰπερ τοῦ ἔνος μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἔν; ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂει σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἄν αὐτῆς ἂει ὀρώμεν ἀπειρον ἐσται πλήθει; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
“And, further, when each part becomes a part, [158d] straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts.”

“Undoubtedly.”

“The result, then, to the things which are other than one, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits.”

“So it appears.”

“Then the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation.”

“Certainly.”
Par: And most certainly, whenever Each Part becomes One, Each Part Will Already Possess Limit, in relation to Each Other, and in relation to The Whole, and in relation to The Whole in relation to The Parts.

Ari: Exactly so then. (κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.)

Par: Surely then, on the one hand, it then results for Those Other than The One, as it is Reasonable, both from Their Sharing-a-Commonness with Each Other and from The One, that Something Other Will Come-to-Be within Them-Selves; which certainly Provides Them The Limit in relation to Each Other; but on the other hand, by The Nature of Them-Selves, according to Them-Selves (Other/Many), The Unlimited Comes-to-Be.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

καὶ μὴν ἐπειδὴ γένεται ἕκαστον μόριον γένεται, πέρας ἢ δὲ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια.

κομιδή μὲν οὖν.

τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἕνου συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνος καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινονησάντων, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἔτερον τοις αὐτοῖς παρέσεχε πρὸς περατός.

ἡ δ᾽ ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.

φαίνεται.

οὖτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἕνος καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἀπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.
[158e] “And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves?”

“How is that?”

“Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way.”

“Certainly.”

“And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also.”

“Obviously.”

“And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.” [159a]

“Yes.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that They are Like and Unlike, to Each Other and to Themselves?

Ari: in what way then? (πη δή;)

Par: Since on the one hand, according to Their Own Nature, All of Them will be, καὶ ἡ μὲν κατὰ εαυτῶν τὴν φύσιν πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐν εἰν η in some way Unlimited; and in This Way, They are (passively) affected by The Same. ποῦ απειρα ταύτη εστὶ πεπονθότα ταὐτον.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: And certainly, insofar as They All indeed Participate of Limit, καὶ μὴν ἡ απαντα γε μετέχει περατος, and by Experiencing in This Way, They will All be The Same. καὶ πεπονθότα ταύτη αὐτοὶς εἰν ἑαυτοῖς.

Ari: How could they not; (πως δ’ οὖν.)

Par: But on the other hand, inasmuch as They have been so affected so as to be δὲ ἡ πεπονθέν γε εἰναι both Limited and Unlimited, they are affected by experiences that are opposite to one another. τε πεπερασμένα καὶ απειρα, πεπονθέν παθή εναντια αλλῆλοις.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοῖα τε καὶ ἁνόμοια ἀλλῆλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;

πὴ δή; ἢ μὲν ποῦ ἀπειρὰ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταῦταν πεπονθότα ἄν εἰη ταύτη, πάνυ γε.

καὶ μὴν ἢ γε ἀπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτη πάντ’ ἄν εἰη ταῦταν πεπονθότα.

πῶς δ’ οὖ; ἢ δὲ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἴναι καὶ ἀπειρα πέπονθεν, ἑναντιὰ πάθη ἀλλῆλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν.

ναι.
“But opposites are as unlike as possible.”

“To be sure.”

“Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.”

“Yes, that must be true.”

“Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.”

“So they are.”

“And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things [159b] which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.”

“You are right.”
Par: But **opposites** are indeed as most **Unlike** as it is possible.

Ari: Of course, what then? (τι µην;) 

Par: Thus on the one hand, each of these experiences, will be both **Like them-selves** and **Like each other**; but on the other hand, according to both affections, they are in both ways, **most opposite** and **most Unlike**.

Ari: I dare say so. (κινδυνεῖ.) 

Par: Surely then, in this way, **The Other Beings** will **Themselves** be both **Like** and **Unlike** with **Themselves** and with **Each Other**.

Ari: It is so. (οὕτως.)

Par: Surely then, **They** will be both **The Same** and **Other from Each Other**, and will be **In-Motion** and **Standing-still**, and it will not in any way be difficult for us to discover that all kinds of contrary experiences are **undergone** by **Those** that are **Other** than **The One**, seeing that **They** appear **to have been so affected**.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λεγεῖς ὁρθῶς.)

τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία γε ὡς οἴον τε ἀνομοιότατα.
τί µήν;
κατὰ µὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὁµοιά ἄν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ᾽ ἀµφότερα ἀµφιστέρως ἐναντιώτατα τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα.
κινδυνεῖ. 
οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὁµοία τε καὶ ἀνόµοια ἄν εἴη.
οὕτως.
καὶ ταῦτα δή καὶ ἐτερα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ κινούµεναι καὶ ἑστώτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλέπως εὑρήσοµεν πεπονθότα τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα.  
ὁρθῶς λέγεις.
5.3
- in same

5.6

5.7
separate

5.8

one 1.8

- part whole

- one

- many

- two three

5.10

5.11

5.12

5.13

5.14

5.16

- like unlike

- same other motion rest becoming destroyed greater less equal affections odd even

5.17

all nothing itself others

5.18
“Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative.”

“Certainly.”

“Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one.”

“By all means.”

“Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from the one?”

“Why is that?”
The Fifth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 23 Is it not so then, that if on the one hand, we presently let these matters Be 


as Openly Clear, so then in turn, we can consider, if One Is, whether Those Other than 


The One, do not Have to Be in This Way, or if they Have to be solely in the following way? 


tou enos oux echei outos he monon outo ;

Aristotle: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, let us state from the beginning, if One Is, 


what those other than The One must undergo/experience/suffer.

ti ta allia tou enos chrh pepontvenai.

Ari: Let us do so. (λεγομεν γαρ.)

Par: Take notice then, on the one hand, is not The One Separate/Apart/Distinct 


from the others, and on the other hand, the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel to The One? 


ton allon de talla chrh tou enos;

Ari: Why do you ask? (τι δη;)
“Because there is nothing else besides these, [159c] which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said 'one and the others' we have included all things.”

“Yes, all things.”

“Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be.”

“No.”

“Then the one and the others can never be in the same.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then they are separate?”

“Yes.”

“And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts.”

“How can it have parts?”

“Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts.”

“Of course not.”
Par: Because nothing exists in some other way besides these ways. One which exists by being other than The One, then the other; which exists by being other than the others.

For that is all that can be specified, when we say, The One and the others.

Ari: All indeed. (παντα γαρ.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no other way besides these, in which both The One and the others can subsist in The Self (Parallel) Existence. (Odyssey 602 on Heracles)

Ari: For there is none. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One and the others, never subsist in The Same.

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Are They Separate then? (αρα χωρις;)

Ari: Yes, they are separate. (ναι.)

Par: We most certainly affirmed that That which Is Truly One, has no Parts (137C).

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Are They Separate then? (αρα χωρις;)

Ari: Yes, they are separate. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Whole One be in the others,

nor The Parts of Self, if It is both Separate from the others, and also, if It has no Parts.

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως γαρ;)
“Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole.”

“No, apparently not.”

“The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity.”

“No.”

“But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way.”

“Right.”
Par: Accordingly then, in no way will the others Participate of The One, since they
neither Participate according to a certain Part of Self, nor according to The Whole.

Ari: It does not appear to be likely.

Par: Accordingly then, in no way are the others One, nor have/maintain any One in themselves.

Ari: For they have not then.

Par: Accordingly then, neither are the others Many. For if they were Many, then Each Self
would be One by being a Part of The Whole; but now, those other than The One are neither
One nor Many, nor a Whole, nor Parts, since they in no way Participate of Self.

Ari: Rightly so.

οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἄν τάλλα τοῦ ἕνος, μήτε κατὰ μόριον τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα.

οὐκ ἐοίκεν.

οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἕν τἄλλα ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἐχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδὲν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδ’ ἄρα πολλὰ ἐστι τάλλα: ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν: νέν δὲ οὔτε ἐν
οὕτε πολλὰ οὕτε ὅλον οὔτε μόρια ἐστὶ τάλλα τοῦ ἕνος, ἐπειδή αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει.

ὀρθῶς.
“Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity.” [159e]

“True.”

“Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another.”

“That is clear.”

“But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one.”

“Impossible.”
Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Two nor Three, nor are These Numbers contained in them, since they are entirely deprived of The One.

Ari: So it is.

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor The Same/Selves with The One, nor are Likeness and Unlikeness inherent in them selves. If selves were Like and Unlike, or Contained Likeness and Unlikeness in themselves, then those other than The One would somehow Contain in themselves, Two Opposite Ideas.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

Par: But it is indeed impossible for anything to Participate of Two Opposite Ideas, which do not in any way Participate of The One.

Ari: Impossible. (αδύνατον.)
“The others are, then, not like nor unlike nor both. \[160a\] For if they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two elements, and if they were both, of the two opposites and that was shown to be impossible.”

“True.”

“They are, then, neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor equal, and they experience no similar affections;
Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor Both.

160A ἀρα τάλλα εστιν οὔτ’ ομοία οὔτ’ ανομοία οὔτ’ αμφότερα.

For on the one hand, if they were Like or Unlike, then They would Participate

of One Different Idea; but on the other hand, if they were Both Like and Unlike, then

They would Participate of Two Opposite Ideas; but this has been shown to be impossible.

Ari: This is true. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Accordingly then, they are neither themselves nor others,

nor In-motion nor Standing-still, nor generated nor dissolved, nor are greater nor less,

nor Equal; nor do they undergo anything else of this kind.

Ari:  ὁμοία μὲν ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνομοία ἦν ἃν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δύοιν τοῖς ἑναντίοις: ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφανῆ.

οὔτ’ ἄρα ὁμοία οὔτ’ ἀνομοία ἦστιν οὔτ’ ἀμφότερα τάλλα. ὅρωμα μὲν γὰρ ὃντα ἢ ἀνομοία ἐνὸς ἃν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δύοιν τοῖς ἑναντίοις: ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφανῆ.

ἀληθῆ.

οὔδ’ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὔδ’ ἑτέρα, οὔδε κινούμενα οὔδε ἑστώτα, οὔδε γιγνόμενα οὔδε ἀπολλύμενα, οὔδε μεῖζω οὔδε ἐλάττω οὔδὲ ἵσα: οὔδὲ ἄλλο οὔδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων:
for if the others are subject to such affections, they will participate in one and two and three and odd and even, [160b] in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.”

“Very true.”

“Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.”

“Perfectly true.”
For if they could sustain undergoing

\[ \text{γαρ ει τα αλλα υπομενει πεπονθεναι} \]

any such experience, then They would also Participate of One and Two and Three,

\[ \text{τι τοιουτον, και μεθεξει ενος και δυον και τριων} \]

and of Even and of Odd; all of which, have indeed been shown to be impossible for themselves

\[ \text{160B και περιττου και αρτιου, παντη ω γε εφανη αδυνατον αυτοις} \]

to Participate, by being entirely deprived of The One.

\[ \text{μετεχειν παντως στερομενοις του ενος}.} \]

Ari: All this is most true. (\(\alpha\lambdaη\theta\epsilon\sigma\sigma\tau\alpha\alpha\).)

Par: Surely then in this way, if One Is, then The One Is All, and also, nothing at all;

\[ \text{δη ουτω ει εν εστιν, το εν εστι παντα τε και εστι ουδε εν} \]

and so also in relation to It-Self and in the (non) relation to the other selves.

\[ \text{kai ωσαυτως προς εαυτο και προς τα αλλα} \]

Ari: This is entirely so.

\[ \text{παντελως μεν ουν}.} \]
consider 0.58 6.1
known different 6.6
difference knowledge 6.9
attributes 6.11

unlike unlike 6.12
unlikeness other 6.15
likeness itself 6.20

inequality 6.21
constituents 1.68 1.76 6.26
greatness smallness 6.27
equality 6.31
equality greatness smallness 6.32

conditions 6.11 6.33
existence non-existence 6.34 6.38
existence 6.39
non-existence 6.40

change 6.41
change 1.23 6.42
is is not 6.39 6.40 6.44
motion 6.43 6.45 6.46
- change place 6.48
- turn 6.50
- change other 6.51
rest motion 6.54
moves - move 6.58
changes - change 6.59

comes in perish - comes in perish 6.60
Fanaticism

If X is not, then X must be other
“Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happen if one does not exist?”

“Yes, we ought.”

“What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist? Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?”

“Certainly it is different.”
The Sixth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 24 Very well. Surely then, after this, should we not consider,

Εἰεν: δὴ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο αρ’ οὐ σκεπτεον,

what must be the result, if The One is not?

τι χρὴ συμβαίνειν εἰ τὸ εὖ εστὶ μὴ;

(The Word Hypothesis

Aristotle: We must so consider. (σκεπτεον.) has The Feminine Form)

Par: What then, will be the hypothesis herself, if One is not?

τις οὖν αν εἰη ἡ υπόθεσις αὐτη, εἰ εὐν εστὶν μη;

Will it then differ in any way from the following hypothesis: If Not-One is not?

αρα διαφερει τι τησδε, εἰ μη εὐν εστὶν μη;

[[Pierre: Consider 151E8:

“On the one hand, To Be, is in some way Present with It, if indeed It Is One. But what else is To Be, than The Participation of Ousia with The Present, The Past and The Future?]]

Ari: It will indeed differ. (μεντοι διαφερει.)
“Is it merely different, [160c] or are the two expressions—if not one does not exist and if one does not exist—complete opposites?”

“They are complete opposites.”

“Now if a person should say 'if greatness does not exist,' 'if smallness does not exist,' or anything of that sort, would he not make it clear that in each case the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?”

“Certainly.”

“And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says 'if one is not,' that the thing which is not is different from other things, and do we not know what he means?”

“Yes, we do know.”

“In the first place, then, he speaks of something which is known, and secondly of something different from other things, when he says one,' whether he adds to it that it is or that it is not;
Par: Will it merely differ, or is the expression, if Not-One Is not, Entirely Opposite to the hypothesis, if One Is not?

Ari: Entirely opposite. (παντοναντιον.)

Par: But what if anyone were to say, ‘if Greatness Is not’ or ‘Smallness Is not’, or anything else of this kind, then they should make it clear in each of these cases, that they speak of The Non-Being, as something Other? (The Principle of The 6th.PG)

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυγε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that now they also make it clear what they mean when they say, if One Is not, that The Non-Being Is Other from The Others, and so we will know, That which they mean?

Ari: We will know. (ισιμεν [ειδομαι].)

Par: On the one hand, when they say One, first of all, do they speak of something meν oταν ειπη en, πρωτων αρα λεγει τι that Is Knowable, and secondly, of something Other from The Others, whether they add γνωστον, επειτα ετερον των αλλων, ειτε προσθεις existence to Self or non-existence;

το ειναι αυτω ειτε το μη ειναι:

diaφερει μονον, η και παν τοιναντιον έστιν ειπειν ει μη εν μη έστι τοι ει en μη έστιν; παν τοιναντιον.

τι δ' ει τις λεγοι ει μεγεθος μη έστιν η σμικροτης μη έστιν η τι αλλο των τοιοτων, αρα εφ' εκαστον αν δηλοι οτι ετερον τι λεγοι το μη άν;

πανυ γε.

ουκον και νυν δηλοι οτι ετερον λεγε οτων αλλων το μη άν, δητα ειπη εν ει μη έστι, και ίσμεν ο λεγει; ίσμεν.

πρωτων μεν αρα γνωστον τι λεγει, επειτα ετερον των αλλων, δητα ειπη εν, ειτε το ειναι αυτω προσθεις ειτε το μη ειναι:
[160d] for that which is said to be non-existent is known none the less, and is known to be different from other things, is it not?"

“Certainly.”

“Then we should begin at the beginning by asking: if one is not, what must follow? In the first place this must be true of the one, that there is knowledge of it, or else not even the meaning of the words if the one does not exist would be known.

“True.”

And is it not also true that the others differ from the one, or it cannot be said to differ from the others?”

“Certainly.”
for what they call **non-existence**, will be no less 
γαρ τι τὸ λέγομενον μὴ εἶναι, οὔτεν ἦττον 
recognized/known, and that **non-existence** is **Different** from **The Others**; or is it not so? 
160D γιγνώσκεται, καὶ στὶ διαφορον τον αλλων. η ου;

**Ari:** It is necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, we must affirm from the beginning, what **Must Be**, if **One Is not**, 

αρα ἔρικτεον εξ αρχης τι χρη εἶναι, εἰ εν εστι μη,

in the following way. Thus on the one hand, as it is **Reasonable**, **This Must Belong to Self**;

οδε . ουν μεν , ος εοικεν, τουτο δει υπαρχειν αυτω,

first of all, there **Must Be Knowledge of Self**, or else, nothing which is said 

πρωτον ειναι επιστημην αυτου, η μηδε τι ο λεγεται 

**Will Be Recognized/Known**, when anyone says, if **One Is not**.

γιγνώσκεσθαι , σταν τις ειπη ει ευ εστιν μη.

**Ari:** True. (αληθη.)

**Par:** Is this not also the case then, that **The Others Must Be Other from Self**,

ουκουν και τα αλλα ειναι ετερα αυτου,

or else **That would not Be** said to **Be Other from The Others**?

η εκεινο μηδε λεγεσθαι ετερον των αλλων;

**Ari:** Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
“Then a difference belongs to the one in addition to knowledge; for when we say that the one differs from the others, [160e] we speak of a difference in the one, not in the others.”

“That is clear.”

“And the non-existent one partakes of 'that' and 'some' and 'this' and 'relation to this' and 'these' and all notions of that sort; for the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things which are other than one, nor could anything in relation to the one or belonging to it be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of the notion some or of those other notions.”

“True.”
Par: Accordingly then, **Difference-in-Kind**, besides **The Knowledge, Is Present in Self.**

\textit{αρὰ ἐτεροιότης πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ.}

so that when it is said that **The One Is Other** than **The Others**, they will not speak of

\textit{γὰρ στὰν λέγη τὸ εν ἑτερον τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ λέγει}

the **Difference-in-Kind** of **The Others**, but of **The Difference** of **That**.

\textit{160Ε τὴν ετεροιότητα τῶν ἄλλων, ἄλλα τὴν εἰκὼν.}

Ari: So it has come to **Light.** (φαίνεται.)

Par: And certainly, **The Being that Is Not-One, Must Participate of That** and **of a Certain**

\textit{καὶ γε μὴν τὸ οὖν μὴ εν μετέχει τοῦ εἰκὼν καὶ τίνος}

**One** and **of This** and **in relation to This** and **of These** and **All such as These.** For then,

\textit{τοῦ καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτω καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. γὰρ}

neither could **The One Be** spoken of, nor of **Those Other** than **The One**, nor would

\textit{οὐ αὖ τὸ ἐν ἑλεγετο οὐδ᾿ τοῦ ἑτέρα τοῦ εὐνός, οὐδ᾿ αὖ}

anything **of That Be Present with That**, nor could anything **Be** said about **Self**,

\textit{τι εἰκὼν ην εἰκὼν, οὐδ᾿ αὖ τι ἑλεγετο αὐτῷ,}

if **It** neither **Participated of Some** nor **of Those Others**.

\textit{εἰ μήτε μετήν τοῦ τίνος μήτε τῶν τοιτῶν ἄλλων.}

Ari: Rightly said. (ὀρθῶς.)

καὶ ἐτεροιότης ἀρὰ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἐτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἑτέρον τῶν ἄλλων λέγη, ἄλλα τὴν εἰκὼν.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε εἰκὼν καὶ τοῦ τίνος καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἑλεγετο οὐδ᾿ ἂν τὸ ἑνὸς ἑτέρα, οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνῳ ἂν τὶ ἢν οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνῳ, οὐδ᾿ ἂν τι ἑλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τίνος αὐτῷ μετήν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τοιτῶν.

ὀρθῶς.
“It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, [161a] but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor 'that,' is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of 'that' and of many other attributes.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind.”

“Yes.”

“And-are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?”

“Of course.”

“And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?”

[161b] “Yes, they are unlike.”
Par: Surely then on the one hand, it Is not Possible for to be, to be Present with The One, if indeed It does not exist; but on the other hand, nothing prevents it to Participate of many, ειπερ γε μη εστι, δε ουδεν κωλυει μετεχειν πολλων, But it Must even do so, if indeed The One Is not, and Is not something else than that. αλλα αναγκη και, ειπερ γε το εν εστιν μη και μη αλλο εκεινο. Certainly then, if neither The One nor that exists, then nothing will exist. But if The Logos is about something else, then there is nothing that can be spoken of. But if non-existence underlies That One and Is not something else, then it Is also Necessary for Self to also have a Share of that non-existence and of many others. αυτω μετειναι του εκεινο και πολλων αλλων.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, Unlikeness Is also Present with Self in relation to the others. αρα αναοιοιοιτης εστιν Και αυτω προς τα αλλα. For the others, by being other than The One, will also be of a different kind/genus. γαρ τα αλλα αντα ετερα του ενος αν και ειη ετεροια.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But are not those of another kind, various?

δ' ουκ τα ετεροια αλλουα;

Ari: How then could they not be? (πως δ' ου ;)

Par: But are not the various, Unlike?

δ' ουκ τα αλλοια ανομοιοια;

Ari: They are indeed unlike. (μεν ουν ανομοιοια.)

ειναι μεν δη τω ενι οιχ οιων τε, ειπερ γε μη εστι, μετεχειν δε πολλων οδον κωλυει, άλλα και αναγκη, ειπερ το γε εν εκεινο και μη άλλο μη εστιν. ει μεντοι μητε το εν μητ' εκεινο μη εσται, άλλα περι άλλου του το λογος, οδο δε φθεgementsαι δει οδον: ει δε το εν εκεινο και μη άλλο εποκειται μη ειναι, και τον εκεινου και άλλων πολλων αναγκη αυτω μετειναι. και πανε γε.

και ανομοιοτης άρα εστιν αυτω προς τα άλλα: τα γαρ άλλα του ενος ετερα οντα ετεροια και ειη αν. ναι.

tα δ' ετεροια ουκ άλλοια;

πως δ' οδ;
tα δ' άλλοια ουκ ανομοια;

ανομοια μεν ουν.
“Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it.”

“Evidently.”

“Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike.”

“So it appears.”

“But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?”

“How is that?”

“If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one.” [161c]

“Certainly.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that if indeed they are unlike The One, it is evident that they will indeed be unlike That which Is Unlike.

Ari: It is evident. (δηλον.)

Par: Certainly then, Unlikeness will also Be in The One, according to which, The Others will Be Unlike in relation to Self.

Ari: So it is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)

Par: But certainly, if It is Unlike The Others, then must not Self Be The Likeness of It-Self?

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: If Unity were Unlike The One, then The Logos, would somehow not Be Possible about The One, nor about That which is Like It; nor would there Be the hypothesis about One, but about something other than One.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
“But that is inadmissible.”

“It certainly is.”

“Then the one must possess likeness to itself.”

“It must.”

“And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist.”

“Yes, they are impossible.”
Par: But that must not indeed be the case.

161C δὲ δεῖ οὐ γε.

Ari: Without a doubt. (οὐ δῆτα.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Likeness to The One to It-Self Must Be of Self.

αρ’ ὁμοιότητα τῷ ενὶ εαυτῷ δεῖ εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

Ari: It must. (δεῖ.)

Par: And most certainly in turn, The One Is not Equal to Others. For if It Were Equal,

Καὶ γε μὴν αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδ’ εστί οἷον τοῖς ἀλλῶις. γαρ εἰ εἰμισον,

then It would already Be and It would also Be Like Them-Selves, according to Equality;

ἀν ηδὴ εἰη τε αν καὶ εἰη οἷον αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἱσότητα;

but both of these conditions Are Impossible, if indeed One Is not.

δ’ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, εἰπερ εν εστιν μὴ.

Ari: Impossible. (ἀδύνατα.)
“And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they?”

“Certainly not.”

“And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?”

“Yes.”

“And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them?”

“Of course.”

“Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it?” [161d]

“Yes, it does.”
Par: Then since, The One Is not Equal to the others, then must it not Be Necessary that the others Must also not Be Equal to That (One)?
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: But are not those that Are not-Equal, unequal?
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: But are not those that are unequal, unequal to That which Is Unequal?
Ari: How could they not be? (πως ου δ’;) Par: And surely then, The One will Participate of Inequality, because of which, the others are unequal to Self.
Ari: It will so participate. (μετέχει.)

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἦστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσοι, ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰλλα ἐκεῖνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη.
τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἀνίσα;
ναὶ.
τὰ δὲ ἀνίσα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἀνίσα;
πώς δ’ οὖν;
καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἐν, πρὸς ἵν τὰλλα αὐτῷ ἦστιν ἄνισα; μετέχει.
“But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?”

“So it appears.”

“Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another.”

“Certainly.”

“Then there is always something between them.”

“There is.”

“Can you think of anything between them except equality?”

“No, only equality.”

“Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two.”

“That is clear.”
Par: But certainly, **Bigness** and **Smallness** do indeed **belong** to **Inequality**.

161D ἀλλὰ μὲντοι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης γ’ ἐστὶ ανισότητος.

Ari: They do indeed. (**γαρ** ἐστιν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Bigness** and **Smallness** and such as these, **belong** to **The One**?

Ari: It appears likely. (**κινδυνεύει**.)

Par: Certainly then, **Bigness** and **Smallness** always **stand-apart** from each other.

Ari: Entirely so. (**πάνυ γε.**)

Par: Accordingly then, something always **exists** between **Them-Selves**.

Ari: It is so. (**ἔστιν.**)

Par: Therefore, can you assign anything else between **Them-Selves**, except **Equality**?

Ari: Nothing else but this. (**οὐκ, αλλὰ τούτο.**)

Par: Accordingly then, in whatsoever, there **Is Bigness** and **Smallness**, except the **Equality** is also **Present**, by **Being Between These**.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (**φαίνεται.**)
“Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness.”

“So it appears.”

“And it must also, in a way, partake of existence.”

“How is that?”

“It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?”

“You are.”
**Par**: Surely then, as it is Reasonable, **The One** that \textit{does not Truly exist},
will also have a **Share** of \textit{Equality, Bigness and Smallness}.

**Ari**: So it is Reasonable. (\textit{εοικεν}.)

**Par**: And certainly, **Self Must** also **Participate** of \textit{Ousia in a Definite way}.

**Ari**: How so? (\textit{πως δή};)

**Par**: **Self Must Possess Ousia in This way** that we have described. For otherwise, we shall not speak \textit{Truly} when we say, **The One is not;** but if we do speak \textit{Truly}, then it is clear that we have affirmed that **Selves Are Beings:** or is it not in this way?

**Ari**: It is indeed thus. (\textit{μὲν οὖν ουτω}.)

\[
\text{τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἐοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἄν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.}
\]

\[
\text{ἐοικεν.}
\]

\[
	ext{kαὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη.}
\]

\[
	ext{πώς δή;}
\]

\[
	ext{ἐγέρν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῇ λέγοιμεν ἵμαρτι λέγοντες τὸ ἑν μὴ εἶναι: εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δήλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐ όὕτως;}
\]

\[
	ext{oὕτω μὲν οὖν.}
\]
“Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, [162a] we necessarily assert that we say that which is.”

“Necessarily.”

“Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, then it will be existent.”

“Certainly.”

“Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, [162b] thus assuring its own perfect existence,
Par: Then since, we affirm that we speak The Truth, then it Is also Necessary to affirm that we speak of Beings.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκηκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, as it is Reasonable, The One which Has no Being, exists. Let something go to non-Being, and it (non-Being) would immediately be Being. Accordingly then, as it is Reasonable, The One which Has no Being, exists.

Ari: Altogether so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, Self Must Possess The Bond of That which Is not, in order to be non-Being, if It is going to not Be; just as, in a similar way, The Being Must Possess The Bond to not Be-non-Being, in order that It may in turn Perfectly Be such as It Is. For in this way, especially, both, The Being will Be, and the non-Being will not Be; on the one hand, The Being Participates of Ousia in order that The Being Be; but on the other hand, The Being Participates of non-Ousia, in order that It may be, non-Being, if It is going to Perfectly Be.

επειδή δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ήμιν φάναι καί ὄντα λέγειν.

ἀνάγκη.

ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς εἰπε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ πὴ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

δεὶ ἄρα ἀυτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τὸν μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μελλεῖ μὴ εἶναι, ὡμοίως ὡσπέρ ομοίως τὸ ὄν ἔχειν.

ει μελλει τελεως ειναι,
and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being
existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-
existent also secures its perfect non-existence.”

“Very true.”

“Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-
existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily
partakes of existence to attain non-existence.”

“Yes, necessarily.”

“Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence.”

“Clearly.”

“And non-existence also, if it does not exist.”

“Of course.”

“Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that
condition without changing from it?”

“No, it cannot.”
Furthermore, on the one hand, the non-Being Participates δε μεν το μη ον 
non-Ousia, in order that it may be non-Being; whereas on the other hand, non-Being μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον δε Participates of Ousia, in order that it may be, non-Being, if in turn, ουσιας του ειναι μη ον, ει αυ it will also Perfectly not Be, the non-Being.

και τελεως μη εσται το μη ον.

Ari: Most truly. (αληθεστατα.)
Par: Is it not the case then, seeing that both non-Being is present with Real-Being, 
ουκουν επειπερ τε του μη ειναι μετεστι τω οντι 
and That which Is, is present with non-Real-Being, is it not also the case that The One, και του ειναι μη τω οντι, και τω ενι, since indeed It Is not, Must Necessarily Share of existence, in order that It may not Be. 
επειδη εστι ουκ αναγκη μετειναι του ειναι εις το μη ειναι.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: Certainly then, Ousia will also Manifestly Be with The One, if It Is not. 
δη ουσια και φαινεται τω ενι, ει εστιν μη.

Ari: It will so appear. 
φαινεται.
Par: Accordingly then, so also the non-Ousia, if indeed She Is not. 
αρα και μη ουσια, ειπερ εστιν μη.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ ου;) 
Par: Therefore, is it also Possible that that which is maintained/kept in some way, 
ουν τε οιον το εχουν πως is not so maintained, when it is not changed from this condition (passive) by habit? 
μη ουτω εχειν, μη μεταβαλλον εκ ταυτης της εξεως;

Ari: It cannot. (τε οιον ουχ.) 
δν, ει μελλει τελεως ειναι, το δε μη ον μη ουσιας μεν τοι μη ειναι μη ον, ουσιας δε τοι ειναι μη ον, ει και το μη ον αυ τελεως μη έσται. 

αληθεστατα. 
οικον επειπερ το τε οντι τοι μη ειναι και τω μη οντι τοι ειναι μετεςτι, και τω ενι, επειδη ουκ εστι, τοι ειναι αναγκη μετειναι εις το μη ειναι. 

αναγκη. 
και ουσια δη φαινει το ενι, ει μη εστιν. 
φαινεται. 
και μη ουσια αρα, ειπερ μη εστιν. 
πως δ’ αυ; 

οιον τε οιον το εχουν πως μη εχειν ουτω, μη μεταβαλλον εκ ταυτης της εξεως; 
οιχ οιον τε.
“Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change.” [162c]

“Of course.”

“But change is motion; we agree to that?”

“It is motion.”

“And did we not see that the one is and is not?”

“Yes.”

“Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition.”

“So it appears.”
Par: Accordingly then, everything which *can be kept in this way*, and in turn
not kept in this *(indefinite)* way, signifies, *that* which *can be changed in such a way.*

Ari: How could it not? (*πως δ’ οὐ;*)

Par: But *is Alteration* a *Motion;* or what else should we call *It?*

Ari: It is a motion. (*κίνησις.*)

Par: Is it not the case, that *The One has been shown to be* both *Being* and *non-Being?*

Ari: Yes. (*ναι.*)

Par: Accordingly then, *It has been shown to be kept in this way* and *not kept in this way.*

Ari: It has so appeared. (*εοικεν.*)

πάν ἀρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὁ ἂν οὐτω τε καὶ μὴ οὗτος ἔχῃ.
πῶς δ’ οὐ;
μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις: ἢ τί φησομεν;
κίνησις.
οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἄν, καὶ οὗκ ἄν ἐφάνη;
ναι.
οὗτος ἀρα καὶ οὗκ ὁὗτος ἔχον φαίνεται.
εοικεν.
"And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being."

"There is not much doubt of that."

"But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another."

"Of course not."

"Then its motion cannot be change of place."

"No, it cannot."
Par: Accordingly then, has not The One Being also been shown to be in Motion, seeing that It also has to be altered from Being into non-Being.

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνεύει.)

Par: But certainly, if indeed It in no way Is among The Real Beings, since It Is not, then if indeed It Is not, It will not alternate from one place to another.

Ari: How is that the case? (πως γαρ;)  
Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not be moved by Alteration.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου.)
“Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing.”

“No, it is impossible.”

“Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not.”

“No.”

“And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else.”

“Quite right.”
Par: Certainly then, neither will It Turn-about in The Self;
for It will not Grasp The Self/Same in any way. For The Being Is The Self/Same.
Therefore it Is Impossible for non-Being to Reside in any of The Real Beings.

Ari: For it is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, cannot Turn-about in That in which It Is not.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ οὐν ου.)

Par: Certainly then, The One, whether The One that Is, or The One that Is not,
cannot in any way be altered into something other than It-Self. For then The Logos would no longer be about The One, but about something else, if indeed It was altered from It-Self.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθώς.)
“But if it neither changes into something else, [162e] nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?”

“No how can it?”

“But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest.”

“Yes, it must.”

“Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion.”

“So it appears.”
Par: But if it does not alter, nor turn-about in The Same, nor undergoes transition, is there any way in which it can still be moved?

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ;

Par: Most certainly then, That which is Immovable must necessarily be kept at Rest;

but That which is at Rest/Peace/Quiet must Abide/Stand-still.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then The One that is not, as it was shown, both stands-still and is moved.

Ari: as it is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)
“And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; [163a] 6.55 for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one.”

“True.”

“Then in moving, the one changes in nature.” 6.56

“Yes.”

“And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way.”

“No.”

“Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change.” 6.58

“True.”

“Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.”  6.59

“So it appears.”
Par: And most certainly, if indeed it were moved, there is a Great Necessity that Self

must be altered. For in so far as anything may be moved, it is no longer kept in the same way

such as it was before, but in another way.

καὶ γέ μην εἰπὲρ κινεῖται μεγάλη αναγκή αυτῷ

Ari: In this way. (οὕτως.)

Par: Surely then, since The One moves, It is also altered.

δη τὸ ἐν κινοῦμενον καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And most certainly, by Being in no way moved, It will Be in no way altered.

καὶ γέ μην μηδαμὴ κινοῦμενον αὐν οὐδαμὴ ἀλλοιοῖτο.

Ari: It will not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, in so far as The One that Is not moves,

αρα μὲν η ἐν οὐκ κινεῖται.

It is altered, but on the other hand, in so far as It Is not moved, It Is not altered.

αλλοιοῦται, δὲ η μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ αλλοιοῦται.

Ari: It is not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, is both altered and not altered.

αρα τὸ ἐν οὐκ τε αλλοιοῦται καὶ οὐκ αλλοιοῦται.

Ari: Apparently. (φαίνεται.)

καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀναγκὴ αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: ὡσπὲρ γὰρ ἄν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ᾿ ὡσαυτὸς ἐχεί ὡς εἰχεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐτέρως.

οὕτως.

κινοῦμενον δὴ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.

ναὶ.

καὶ μὴν μηδαμὴ γε κινοῦμενον οὐδαμὴ ἄν ἀλλοιοῖτο.

οὐ γάρ.

ὃ μὲν ἀρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὡς ἐν, ἀλλοιοῦται: ὃ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

οὐ γάρ.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὡς ἀλλοιοῦται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

φαίνεται.
“And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; [163b] whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?”

“That is inevitable.”

“Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.”

“Quite true.”
Par: Thus on the one hand, is it not Necessary that That which is altered must become other than before, and on the other hand, that It Must undergo a dissolution from Its former habit/condition; but That which Is not altered, can neither come-to-be generated nor dissolved?

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, The One which Is not, by being altered, will be generated and dissolved; but on the other hand, by not undergoing alteration, will not be subject to either generation nor dissolution. And thus, The One that Is not, will be generated and dissolved, and will not be generated nor dissolved.

Ari: For thus it will not.
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The Absence of Ousia
“Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.”
“Yes, we should do that.”
The Seventh Hypothesis

Parmenides: 25 Surely then, let us again return to The Beginning, to See if these conclusions will come to Light for us just as they do now, or otherwise.

Ari: Then we must do so. (αλλα χρη.)
“We ask, then, if the one is not, [163c] what will be the consequences in regard to it?”

“Yes.”

“Does the expression 'is not' denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?”

“No, nothing else.”

“And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression 'is not' mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?”

“Without any qualifications whatsoever.”
Par: Is it not the case then, that we have already said,

163C οὐκοῦν, φαμεν,

what must result in relation to Self, if One Is not?

τι χρη ἐξιμβαίνειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ εν εστι μη;

Ari: Yes. (ναι)

Par: But when we say That which Is not, do we not then signify anything else,

δε οταν λέγομεν το εστιν μη, αν μη αρα σημαίνει τι αλλο

than the absence of Ousia from That which we say, Is not? (The Principle of The 7th)

η απουσιαν ουσιας τουτω ο φωμεν ειναι μη;

Ari: Nothing else. (ουδεν αλλο.)

Par: Therefore, when we say that anything is not, do we say that Self is not

ουν οταν φωμεν τι ειναι μη, ποτερον φωμεν αυτο ειναι ουκ

in some way, but that in some way It is? Or does the term ‘is not’, simply signify this;

πως, δε πως ειναι; η το λεγομενον εστι μη απλωσ σημαινει touto

that It is in no way, anywhere, since It does not Participate in a certain definite way

οτι εστιν ουδαμως ουδαι, ουδε μετεχει πη

of Ousia since indeed It is, the non Being (162A-B)?

ουσιας γε το μη ον;

Ari: It signifies this, most simply. (μεν ουν απλουστατα.)
“Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.” [163d]

“No.”

“But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence.”

“No, nothing else.”

“But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it.”

“Of course not.”

“Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all.”

“That is reasonable.”

“Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence.”

“No; that is clear.”
Par: Accordingly then, neither will the non Being, Be Able to Be, nor ever Participate in any other way of Ousia.

Ari: For it cannot. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But that which becomes and that which dissolves, are not anything else than the one to have a Share of Ousia, but the other to lose Ousia?

Ari: Nothing else. (ουδεν αλλο.)

Par: Then that which has indeed no Share of This, can neither receive nor lose Self.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Accordingly then, The One in no way Is, if indeed It in no way Participates of Ousia.

Ari: That is reasonable. (εικος.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, can neither be dissolved nor generated, if indeed It in no way Participates of Ousia.

Ari: It does not appear that it will. (ου φαινεται.)
“Then it is not changed in nature at all; [163e] for such change involves coming into being and perishing.”

“True.”

“And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?”

“Certainly not.”

“And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.”

“Yes, of course, the same place.”

“Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion.”

“No, neither.”

“Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.” [164a]

“That is plain.”
Par: Accordingly then, It can not be altered in any way; for if It were 

to experience This Participation, then It would already Be generated and dissolved.

Ari: This is true. (αληθη.)

Par: But if It is not altered, then Is it not Necessary that It can not be moved?

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Certainly then, The Being which exists in no way at all, we shall say, can not

Stand-still. For That which Is-At-Rest, must Always Be, in a Certain way in The Self.

Par: Surely then, we must say in turn, that in this way, the non Being,

Can Never, stand-still nor be moved.

Par: But clearly, nothing of The Real Beings Is indeed Present with Self;

for this, by Participating of Being, would Already Participate of Ousia.

Ari: Clearly. (δηλον.)

Ari: For it cannot do so. (γαρ μη ουν.)

Par: But clearly, nothing of The Real Beings Is indeed Present with Self;

for this, by Participating of Being, would Already Participate of Ousia.

Ari: Clearly. (δηλον.)
“Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it.”

“No.”

“Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things.”

“Clearly not.”

“And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?”

“Impossible.”

“Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different.”

“No.”
Par: Accordingly then, neither Bigness nor Smallness, nor Equality, Belongs to Self.

Ari: It does not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Most certainly then, neither Likeness nor Unlikeness,

γε μην ουδε ομοιοτης ουδε ετεροιοτης

neither in relation to Self nor in relation to the others, will Be with Self.

Ari: It does not appear that it will. (ου φαινεται.)

Par: What follows then? Can The Other Beings Be in any way Present with Self,

τι δε; αν ταλλα ειη οπως εσθ’ αυτω,

if None Can Be Present with Self?

Ari: They cannot. (εστιν ουκ.)

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike,

αρα τα αλλα ουτε ομοια ουτε ανομοια

nor The Same/Selves nor Other, from Self.

Ari: They are not. (γαρ ου.)

ουτε αρα μεγεθος ουτε σμικροτης ουτε ισοτης αυτω εστιν.
οδ γαρ.

ουδε μην ομοιοτης γε ουδε ετεροιοτης ουτε προς αυτο ουτε προς ταλλα ειη άν αυτω.
οδ φαινεται.

τι δε; ταλλα εσθ’ οπως άν ειη αυτω, ει μηδεν αυτω δει ειναι;
ουκ εστιν.

ουτε αρα ομοια ουτε άνομοια ουτε ταυτα οθ’ ετερα εστιν αυτω τα άλλα.
οδ γαρ.
“Well, then, will the notions 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some,' or 'this' or 'of this' [164b] or 'of another' or 'to another' or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?”

“No.”

“Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever.”

“It appears to have none whatsoever.”
Par: What then? **Can anything be** of That, or with That, or with anything, or of another, or with another, or **at some time Past**, or **at some time** in the **Future**, or **Now**.

164B η ἀλλω η ποτε η επείτα η νυν

Or Can there be knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or Logos, or name, or anything else whatsoever of The Real Beings, where the non Being is concerned?

Ari: There can not. (ἐσται οὐκ.)

Par: Surely then, in this way, **One Being Is not, not can exist in any way at all.**

Ari: Surely then, it is indeed not likely to be the case, that it can exist anywhere.

---

tί δε; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τούτο ἢ τὸ τούτων ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἰσθήσις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁποῖον τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μή ὃν ἔσται; οὐκ ἔσται.

οὐτω δὴ ἐν οὐκ ὃν ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ.

οὐκοιν δὴ ἔσται γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν.
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“Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist.”
“Let us do so.”
“Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others.”
“True.”

“But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?” [164c]

“Yes, I do.”
The Eighth Hypothesis

Par: 26 Now then, let us yet declare, what must happen to the others, if One Is not.

δὴ Ἐτι λέγωμεν τι χρη πεπονθέναι ταλλα ει εν έστι μη.

Aristotle: For we say so. (γαρ λεγομεν.)

Par: Then, on the one hand, selves must exist in some (indefinite) way: (The Principle αλλα μεν αυτα δει ειναι που : of The 8th PG)

for if others do not at all exist, we could not discourse about the others.

γαρ ει αλλα μηδε εστιν, αν ουκ λεγοιτο περι των αλλων.

Ari: So it is. (ουτω).

Par: But if The Logos is about the others, then the others are indeed other.

δε ει ο λογος περι των αλλων, τα αλλα εστιν γε ετερα.

Or do you not require that both another and the other be applied to the self?

η ουκ καλεις τε το αλλο και το ετερον επι τω αυτω;

Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε.)

ti de; to ekeinou he to ekeinw he to ti he to touto he to touto he allow he allow he poto he peita he ven he estimh he doxa he aisthesis he logos he onoma he allo optoyn tov ointov peri to mi on estai;
ouk estai.

oudw de en ouk on ouk exei pou oudamh.
oukou dei esokhen ge oudamh exein.
eti dei legomev, ev ei mē esti, talla ti chrē pepontēnavai.

legomev gar.

allα men pou deι auta einai: ei gar mēde alla estin, ouk an peri tov allon legoito.

oudw.

ei de peri tov allon o logos, ta ge alla eteρa estin. ή ουκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τό έτερον;

εγωγε.
“And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other?”

“Yes.”

“Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others.”

“Yes, there must be.”

“Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist.”

“No.”

“Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing.”

“True.”

“They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist."
Par: But do we indeed say that the other is in some (indefinite) way other from the other, and certainly that which is other is other than another?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, if they are also about to be other, to the others, then there is something from which they will be other.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Certainly then, what will this be? For they will indeed not be other than The One, by non Being.

Ari: They will not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, they are other from each other; for this still remains for selves; or else to be other from nothing. (η ειναι αλλοις μηδενος.)

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Accordingly then, each is other from the others, according to multitude.

For they cannot be so according to One, and by the non Being of One.

γαρ αν ουκ ειη οια κατα εν, τε ενος μη οντος:

ετερον δε γε ποι φαινεν το ετερον ειναι ετερον δαι το αλλο διη αλλο ειναι αλλο;

ναι.
και τοις αλλοις αρα, ει μελλει αλλα ειναι, εστι τι oδ̄ αλλα εσται.

ανιγκη.
τι δη ουν αν ειη; τοι μεν γαρ ενος αυκ εσται αλλα, μη δντος γε.

οδ̄ γαρ.
αλληλων αρα εστι; τοτο γαρ αυτοις ητι λειπεται, η μηδενος ειναι αλλοις.

ορθως.
κατα πληθη αρα εκαστα αλληλων αλλα εστι; κατα έν γαρ αυκ αν οια τε ειη, μη δντος ενος.
[164d] But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it.”

“Very true.”

“Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist.”

“Certainly.”

“There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?”

“Yes.”
But each mass of selves, as it appears, is infinite multitude; and even if anyone should take that which appears to be the smallest piece, just as a dream in sleep, it then suddenly appears to be opposite to that which appeared to be one, and instead of that which appeared to be the smallest, it would now be many; that is, an immensely great mass, in relation to the minute fragments of self.

Ari: Most rightly. (ορθοτατα.)

Par: Surely then, among such masses, the others will be other from one another, if One has no Being and others exist.

Ari: Perfectly so. (μεν κομιδή ουν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that there will be many masses/heaps, each of which, will appear to be one, but which is not so, if indeed One will not be at all?

Ari: It will be so. (ουτω.)
[164e] “And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many.”

“Certainly.”

“And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist.”

“True.”

“And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.” [165a]

“Of course.”
**Par:** Thus, there will also appear to be a number of selves, if indeed each of these heaps, being many, also appear to be one.

**Ari:** Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

**Par:** And certainly, some which are among the selves will appear to be even and others odd, although not truly, if indeed One will not exist at all.

dε τα περιττα συκ άληθως, ειπερ εν εσται μη.

**Ari:** They will not be so. (γαρ ου ουν.)

**Par:** And most certainly, that which is smallest, as we have said,

και γε μην ομικροτατον , φαμεν,

will also appear to be in selves, but this will appear to be many and big,

και δοξει ειναι εν αυτοις, δε τουτο φαινεται πολλα και μεγαλα

in relation to each of the many, since they are small.

**Ari:** How could it not? (πως δ’ ου;)
“And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality.”

“That is reasonable.”

“Although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?”

“Why is that?”
**Par:** And certainly each mass will seem to the eye of opinion to be equal to the many and small masses. For it will not appear to change from a more into a lesser quantity, before it appears to arrive at something between; but this will be a phantasm of equality.

**Ari:** It is likely. (εικός.)

**Par:** Is it not the case, that although it appears to have a limit, in relation to another mass, and self in relation to self, it neither has a Beginning nor End nor Middle?

**Ari:** In what way then? (πη δη.)

καὶ ἵσος μήν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἐκαστὸς ὁγκὸς δοξασθῆσεται εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ ἄν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μεῖζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος ψηφίζοντος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δοξασθῆναι ἐλθὲν, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος. εἰκός.

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὁγκὸν πέρας ἔχων, αὐτὸς γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐτε ἄρχην οὐτε πέρας οὐτε μέσον ἔχων; πῇ δὴ;
“Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, [165b] another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist.”

“Very true.”

“So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one.”

“Certainly.”
Par: For when anyone grasps something of These through the empirical mind, as if it were existing, then another “beginning” will also always appear to be prior to ‘the beginning’, and after the end, another “end” will always still remain; and in “the middle” there will always be, others more inward than “the middle”; but smaller, because each of the selves is not capable of receiving The One, and inasmuch as by The One not Being, I think, must necessarily be broken-up into minute pieces. For the masses will, in some way always be apprehended without One/Unity.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανύ μὲν οὖν.)

οτι οταν τις λαβη τι τουτων τη διανοια ως ον , αλλη αρχη τε αει φαινεται προ της αρχης, αλλα μεσατερα του μεσου, δε σμικροτερα, δια εκαστου αυτων μη δυνασθαι λαμβανεσθαι το ενος, ατε του ενος ουκ οντος.

αληθεστα.

Αρι: Το αληθεστατα.

αληθεστατα.

Par: Surely then, all The Being, which anyone may grasp through the empirical mind, implying, αναγκη θρυπτεσθαι κερματιζομενον, γαρ ογκος αν που always be apprehended without One/Unity.

Ari: This is most true.

αληθεστατα.

Par: I think, must necessarily be broken-up into minute pieces. For the masses will, in some way they must be broken up into small pieces. For each of the selves is not capable of receiving The One, and inasmuch as by The One not Being, I think, must necessarily be broken up into minute pieces. For the masses will, in some way always be apprehended without One/Unity.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)
“Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, [165c] but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?”

“That is perfectly conclusive.”

“Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not.”

“Yes, they must.”

“And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?”

“Why?”

“Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.” [165d]

“Certainly.”
Par: Is it not indeed the case then, that such a mass, on the one hand, *to those who* 

**γε οὐκουν τοιουτον μὲν το** *behold it from afar and with a dull eye*, it will necessarily appear to be one; whereas on the other hand, to those who *See it with an Intellectual Eye*, closely and acutely, then in that case will not each “one” be revealed to be infinite in multitude, if indeed each “one” is deprived of everything appears to be one, as in a shadow painting, by appearing to have experienced *everything appears to be one, as in a shadow painting, by appearing to have experienced* 

The Same and by appearing to be like.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Ari: In what way, then? (πη δη;) 

Par: On the one hand, in such a way as, *to those who behold others from afar*, 

μεν οιον αποσταστι* 

by appearing to have experienced φαινεσθαι εν εσκιαγραφημενα φαινομενα πεποθεναι* 

Ari: It must be so. (γαρ δει.)

Ari: Most necessarily so. (μεν αναγκαιοτατον ουν.)

Par: Surely then, in this way *each of the others must appear to be Unlimited* and δη οιον εκαστα ταλλα δεi φαινεσθαι απειρον πληθει, ειπερ στερεται* 

Limited, and One and many, if One is not at all, but those other than The One exist.

περας και εν και πολλα, ει εν μη, δε ταλλα του ενος εστιν.

Ari: It must be so. (γαρ δει.) 

Par: Is it not the case then, that they will appear to be both like and unlike? 

ουκουν δοξει ειναι και ομοια τε και ανομοια; 

δεi φαινεσθαι εν εσκιαγραφημενα φαινομενα πεποθεναι* 

Ari: In what way, then? (πη δη;)

Par: On the one hand, in such a way as, *to those who behold others from afar,* 

μεν οιον αποσταστι* 

by appearing to have experienced φαινεσθαι εν εσκιαγραφημενα φαινομενα πεποθεναι* 

The Same and by appearing to be like.

ταυτον και ειναι ομοια. 

Ari: It must be so. (πανυ γε.)

οικουν το γε τοιουτον πορρωθεν μεν ύρωντι και άμβλω εν φαινεσθαι ανάγκη, εγγύθεν δε και οξυ νοούντι πλήθει απειρον εν έκαστον φανήναι, ειπερ στερεται του ένος μη οντος; 

αναγκαιοτατον μεν ουν. 

οιτω δη άπειρα τε και πέρας έχοντα και εν και πολλα έκαστα τάλλα δεi φαινεσθαι, εν ει μη έστιν, τάλλα δε του ένος. 

δεi γάρ. 

οικουν και ομοια τε και άνομοια δοξεi ειναι; 

πη δη; 

οιον εσκιαγραφημενα αποσταστι μεν εν πάντα φαινόμενα ταυτον φαίνεσθαι πεποθθεναι και ομοια ειναι. 

πανυ γε.
“But when you come close to them they appear to be many and
different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in
kind and unlike each other.”

“Yes.”

“And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and
unlike themselves and each other.”

“Certainly.”

“And also the same and different, and in contact with one another
and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest,
and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and
all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, [165e]
if the many exist and the one does not.”

“Very true.”
Par:  But on the other hand, as they approach closely, *they will appear to be many and
diverse from and unlike themselves, through the phantom appearance of the other.*

Ari:  It is so. (οὐτώ.)

Par:  Certainly then, the massive selves will necessarily *appear to be*

dη τοὺς ογκοὺς αὐτοὺς αναγκή φαίνεσθαι

both like and unlike themselves, and to each other.

Ari:  Entirely so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)

Par:  Is it not so then, that these *are both selves and others from each other,*

οὐκοῦν τοὺς καὶ αυτοὺς καὶ ετεροὺς ἀλλήλων,

and have contact and are separate from themselves, and are moved with every possible motion,
καὶ απομενούσος καὶ χωρίς εαυτον, καὶ κινουμένους πᾶσας κινήσεις

and *are stationary in every way,* and are generated and dissolved, and are neither of these,
καὶ εστῶτας παντὶ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα,

and all such things possible, which we can at this time easily go through in detail, that is
καὶ πάντα τα τοιαῦτα που, α ἡμιν ἡδη εὐπετεῖς διελθεῖν,

of course, if *One has no Being and many exist?*

165E  εἰ ενὸς μὴ οντος πολλα ἐστιν.

Ari:  Most true then. (ἀληθεστάτα μὲν οὖν.)

Προσελθόντι δὲ γε πολλά καὶ έτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἐτέρου φαντάσματι έτεροι καὶ ἀνόμια ἐαυτοῖς.

οὕτω.

καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὅγκους αὐτοίς τε αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλως.

πάνι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐτέρους ἄλληλων, καὶ ἀπομενούς καὶ χωρίς εαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πᾶσας

κινήσεις καὶ ἐστῶτας πάντη, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα ποι τὰ

τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετές ἡδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἐνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἐστιν.

ἀληθεστάτα μὲν οὖν.
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Nothing
9th

“Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not.”

“Let us do so.”

“Well, the others will not be one?”

“Of course not.”

“Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many.”

“True.”

“If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.” [166a]

“No.”
The Ninth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 27 Surely then, let us return again to The Beginning one more time, δὴ Ἐτι πάλιν ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ τὴν αρχὴν αποξ, and relate what must then be, to those other than The One, if One Is not. εἰπομεν, τι χρη δε ειναι, ταλλα του ενος, ει εν εστι μη.

Aristotle: Let us so relate. (γαρ εἰπομεν οὖν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, the others will not be one. οὐκον μεν ταλλα ουκ εσται εν.

Ari: How could they? (πως γαρ.)

Par: Nor indeed will they be many; for one would also be present in many. ουδε μην γε πολλα: γαρ εν αν και ουσιν ενειη εν πολλοις.

For if none of them are one, then all of them are nothing; so that neither can many exist. γαρ ει μηδεν αυτων εστιν εν, απαντα εστιν ουδεν, ωστε ουδεν ει εν πολλα ειη.

Ari: True. (ἀληθη.)

Par: Then, by One not being present in the others, neither are others many nor one. δε ενος μη ενοντος εν τοις αλλοις, ουτε εστι ταλλα πολλα ουτε εν.

Ari: They are not. (γαρ ου.)
“And they do not even appear to be one or many.”

“Why is that?”

“Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts.”

“True.”

“Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connection with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others.”

“No.”
Par: *Nor will they indeed appear to be one nor many.*

Ari: *Why then? (τί δή;)*

Par: Since *the others cannot in any way ever have any Communion* with *The Real Beings,*

*οτι ταλλα μη ουδαμη ουδαμως εχει ουδενι κοινωνιαν των οντων*

nor *can any Part* of *The Beings be Present* with *the others;* for *no Part* exists with *non-Beings.*

*ουδε μη τι τω των οντων εστιν παρα των αλλων γαρ ουδεν μερος εστι μη τοις ουσιν.*

Ari: *True. (αληθη.*)*

Par: So then, *neither is there any opinion about that which is not present in others,* nor

*αρα ουδε εστιν δοξα του οντος μη παρα τοις αλλοις ουδε any phantasm; nor can that which is not in any way whatsoever be opined about the others.*

*τι φαντασμα, ουδε το ον μη ουδαμως ουδαμη δοξαζεται επι των αλλων.*

Ari: *It cannot. (γαρ ουν ου.*)*
“Then if one does not exist, [166b] none of the others will be conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is impossible to conceive of many without one.”

“True, it is impossible.”

“Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”

“No so it seems.”

“Nor like nor unlike.”

“No.”

“Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not exist.” [166c]

“True.”
Par: Accordingly then, if One is not, then it cannot be opined to be any one particular aspect of the others, nor yet of many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without One.

Ari: It is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, if One is not, then neither will the others exist; nor can one, nor many, be opined.

Ari: It is not likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither do like nor unlike exist.

Ari: They do not. (γαρ ou.)

Par: Most certainly then, nor the same nor the other, nor those who grasp, nor those that are separate, nor others such as those we have before described in detail as having an appearance of existing; for no particular of these will exist, nor will the others appear to be if One is not.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)
“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the one is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”

“Most assuredly.”

“Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear.”

“Very true.”
Par: Is it not the case then, if we must summarily say, that

166C οὐκοῦν εἰ συλληβδὴν εἰπομεν

if One Is not, and nothing exists; then will our assertion be Correctly stated?

εἰ εν εστὶν μη, καὶ οὐδὲν εστὶν, αὐν εἰπομεν ορθῶς;

Ari: Altogether so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Now then, let this then be affirmed by you and me; and we may add this also:

τοινυν ειρησθω τε τοῦτο καὶ

That if One Is, or Is not, then as it is likely/reasonable, both in relation to Self

εἰτ’ εν εστὶν εἰτε εστὶν μη, ως εοικεν, τε αυτο

and in relation to the others, and also in relation to them-selves and to each other,

καὶ ταλλα καὶ προς αυτα καὶ προς αλληλα

that All exist in every way, and also, All do not exist in every way,

παντα εστι παντως τε και ουκ εστι

and appear to be, and also, do not appear to be.

και φαινεται τε και ου φαινεται.

Ari: Most true. (αληθεστατα.)
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