Platos Parmenides

(1st draft)

Parallel Translations
Oxford Greek, Balboas, Loeb, Thomas Taylor, Morrow & Dillon, Jowett

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Oxford Greek

&

PLATO

PARMENIDES
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

[Or Concerning Ideas : Dialectical]
[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ : ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE
ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ

CEPHALOS , ADEIMANTOS , ANTIPHON , GLAUKON , PYTHODOROS
ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ , ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ , ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ , ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ , ΠΥΘΟΔΩΠΟΣ

SOCRATES , ZENO , PARMENIDES , ARISTOTELES
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ , ΖΗΝΟΝ , ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ , ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

Translated by Juan and Maria Balboa , following The Lead of Dr Pierre Grimes 11 26 16
Loeb’s

**Parmenides**

Cephalus

Adeimantus

Antiphon

Glaucon

Pythodorus

Socrates

Zeno

Parmenides

Aristoteles

Thomas Taylor’s

**THE PARMENIDES**

persons of the dialogue

Cephalus     Pythodorus

Adeimantus   Socrates

Antiphon      Zeno

Glauco       Parmenides

scene, the Ceramicus
Oxford Greek

Κέφαλος ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναξε οἶκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ’ ἄγοραν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκωνι: καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδειμάντος, Χαῖρ’, ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε,
καὶ εἰ τοῦ δέ ἡ τῆς ἡμείς δυνατοὶ, φράξε.
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ἐπιτὸν ἑγὼ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.

λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, τὴν δεήσιν.

Balboas

Cephalos: 1 Immediately after we arrived at Athens from Clazomenae, the place of our abode,
we happened to meet with Adeimantos and Glaucon at the place of assembly (the agora);
and Adeimantos, taking me by the hand said …

Adeimantos: Welcome, O Cephalos, and if there is anything you need, of those things that
we have here, of which we are able to provide, please ask.

Cephalos: Then on the one hand, I am certainly here indeed, for this very purpose,
as being in need of your help.

Adeimantos: Please tell us, your need.
Loeb

Cephalus: When we came from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the market-place. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said,

“Welcome, Cephalus if there is anything we can do for you here, let us know.”

“Why,” said I, “that is just why I am here, to ask a favour of you.”

“Tell us,” said he, “what it is.”

Thomas Taylor

Cephalus: When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand,

I am glad to see you (says he), Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to assist you, I beg you would inform me.

Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpose, as being indigent of your assistance.

Tell me, then (says he), what you are in want of.

Morrow and Dillon

Cephalus: When we arrived in Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we encountered Adeimantus and Gloucon in the agora.

And taking me by the hand Adeimantus said, “Good cheer, Cephalus. If you wish anything of us here which we can do for you, tell us.”

“But that is exactly what I am here for,” I replied, “to make a request of you.”

“Tell me your request,” he said.
καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: τὸ ἀδελφὸ όμων τῷ ὀμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δὲ που ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμημα διότι ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν: πολὺς δὲ ἦδη χρόνος ἐξ ἑκείνου: τῷ μὲν γάρ πατρὶ, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα. πάνυ γε, ἐφὶ.

αὐτῷ δὲ γε;
Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνη;

Balboas

Cephalos: What was your maternal brother’s name? For I do not remember.

For at that time he was just a child when I came here before to the assembly from Clazomenaea; but since that time, a great length of time has already taken place. But, his father’s name was, Pyrilampes, I believe.

Adeimantos: Quite so. (Πανυ γε.)

Cephalos: To be sure, but what was his name?

Adeimantos: Antiphon. But what is it that you need most to enquire after?

Aντιφων. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει;
Loeb

And I said, “What was your half-brother's name? I don't remember. He was only a boy when I came here from Clazomenae before and that is now a long time ago. His father's name, I believe, was Pyrilampes.”

“Yes,” said he.

“And what is his own name?”

“Antiphon. Why do you ask?”

Thomas Taylor

And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almost a child when I first came here from Clazomenia; and, since that circumstance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pyrilampes.

Entirely so (says he) and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after?

Morrow and Dillon

And I replied, “Your maternal brother, what was his name? For I don't remember. He was a child when I was here from Clazomenae before, and it has been a long time since then. The name of his father, I think, was Pyrilampes.”

“Quite Right,” he said, “and his is Antiphon. But what is it you particularly want to know?”
Oxford Greek

οἶδε, εἶπον ἐγώ, πολίται τ’ ἐμοὶ εἰσί, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκοασί τε ὑπ’ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν
Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἐταίρῳ πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ
Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέξθησαν, πολλὰς ἀκούσας τοῖς Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

τούτων τοῖς, εἶπον, δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι.

ἀλλὰ οὗ χαλέπον, ἔφη: μειράκιον γὰρ οὖν αὐτοὺς ἐν μάλα διεμελέσθησαν, ἐπεὶ νὲν γε κατὰ τὸν
πᾶππον τε καὶ ὀμώνυμον πρὸς ἵππη τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ’ εἰ δεῖ, ἵωμεν παρ’ αὐτὸν: ἄρτι
γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.

Balboas

Cephalos: You are aware, that these fellow-citizens of mine, are quite philosophical,

Oιδ’, τ’ πολίται εἰμι, εἰς μᾶλα φιλοσοφοὶ, and have heard that this very Antiphon, was frequently present with one Pythodoros,

τε ακηκοασί οτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφων πολλὰ ἐντετυχῆκε τινί Πυθοδώρῳ the companion of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory The Discourses/Logos which

126C ἐταίρῳ Ζήνωνος, καὶ ἀπομνημονεύει τοὺς λόγους οὓς Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other at that time, having been often heard

Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέξθησαν ποτε, πολλὰς ἀκουσάς from Pythodoros.

του Πυθοδώρου.

Adaimantos: You speak the truth. (λεγεις Ἀληθῆ.)

Cephalos: Accordingly then, we are in need of hearing these discourses.

τοινυν δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι, Τουτων.

Adaimantos: But this is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made Them

Ἀλλ’ οὐ χαλέπον, γαρ μειράκιον οὖν αὐτοὺς the subject of quite focused attention, and indeed after that, he now applies himself very

ἐν μᾶλα διεμελέσθησαν, γε επεὶ νὲν διατρίβει πολλά closely to equestrian affairs with his grandfather who also has the same name. Then if we must,

προς τα ὑπάκη κατὰ τὸν πᾶππον τε καὶ ὀμώνυμον. ἀλλ’ εἰ δεῖ, let us go to him; for he just now went home from here; for he lives very near, in Melita.

ιὼμεν παρ’ αὐτὸν: γαρ αρτι οἰχεῖται οἰκαδε ενθένδε, δε οἰκεὶ εγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.
“These gentlemen,” I said, “are fellow-citizens of mine, who are very fond of philosophy. They have heard that this Antiphon had a good deal to do with a friend of Zeno’s named Pythodorus, that Pythodorus often repeated to him the conversation which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once had together, and that he remembers it.”

“That is true,” said he.

“Well,” I said, “we should like to hear it.”

“There is no difficulty about that,” said he “for when he was a youth he studied it with great care though now he devotes most of his time to horses, like his grandfather Antiphon. If that is what you want, let us go to him. He has just gone home from here, and he lives close by in Melite.”

I replied, These my fellow-citizens are very philosophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently present with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory the discourses which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus.

You speak the truth (says he).

These discourses, therefore (says I), we are desirous to hear.

But this (says he) is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made them the subject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the same name as himself, very much applies himself to equestrian affairs.

But if it is necessary, we will go to him: for he just now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita.
ταύτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἀντιφώντα ὁικόν, χαλινὸν τινα χαλκεὶ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι: ἐπειδή δὲ ἐκείνον ἀπηλλάγη τοῖς λόγοις, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥκνει—πολὺ γὰρ ἐηρὸν εἶναι—ἐπεὶτα μέντοι διηγέτο. Ἐφὶ δὲ ὃ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα

Balboas

Cephalos: After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and we found him at home, handing a bridle to a coppersmith to be prepared in a certain way; but as soon as the smith was gone, and his brother had told him the reason for which we had arrived, he also recognized me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and he greeted us kindly; and upon our pleading with him to relate The Discourses/Logos, at first, he hesitated—γαρ εφὶ εἰναι πολὺ ἐργὸν—ἐπεὶτα μέντοι διηγείτο. Therefore, Antiphon said indeed, that Pythodoros spoke to say …
Loeb

Thereupon we started, and we found Antiphon at home, giving a smith an order to make a bridle. When he had got rid of the smith and his brother told him what we were there for, he remembered me from my former visit and greeted me cordially, and when we asked him to repeat the conversation, he was at first unwilling—for he said it was a good deal of trouble—but afterwards he did so. Antiphon, then, said that Pythodorus told him that

Thomas Taylor

After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a coppersmith, to be furnished in a proper manner. But as soon as the smith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cause of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly saluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the discourses, at first he seemed unwilling to comply (for he said it was a very operose undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our request. Antiphon, therefore, said that

Morrow and Dillon

“Having said this, we set out to walk there. We found Antiphon at home, giving a bridal to a smith to be fitted. And when he was free of him, his brothers told him why we had come. He recognized me from my former visit and bade me welcome. When we asked him to repeat the conversation, he at first was reluctant, saying that it was a very difficult task; but he then gave a full rehearsal it. According to Antiphon, Pythodorus said that
Balboas

Antiphon: At that time, Zeno and Parmenides arrived to celebrate The Great Panathenaea.

Thus, on the one hand, Parmenides was already quite well advanced in years, very gray-haired, but of a beautiful and good appearance, most nearly about sixty-five years of age; but that on the other hand, at that time, Zeno was nearly forty years old, but very tall and graceful to see; and he was said to have come to be the dear friend of Parmenides.

καὶ αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι γεγονέναι παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου:
Loeb

Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea; that Parmenides was already quite elderly, about sixty-five years old, very white-haired, and of handsome and noble countenance; Zeno was at that time about forty years of age; he was tall and good-looking, and there was a story that Parmenides had been in love with him.

Thomas Taylor

related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aspect, and about sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the bosom friend of Parmenides.

Morrow and Dillon

on one occasion Zeno and Parmenides came to the Great Panathenæa. Parmenides was already quite an elderly man with very grey hair, but handsome and good to look upon. His age was probably about five and sixty. And Zeno was nearing forty at the time, tall and graceful in appearance; and it is said he had been the favorite of Parmenides.
Then Pythodoros said that they lodged with him, in the Ceramicus, outside the walls; where indeed Socrates also arrived, and many certain others with him, who had set their heart upon hearing the written discourses of Zeno; for at that time, they first began to pay attention to his writings; since Socrates was very young at that time. Therefore, Zeno himself read to them selves, while Parmenides happened to be outside: 

**Balboas**

beginning
He said that they lodged with Pythodorus outside of the wall, in Cerameicus, and that Socrates and many others with him went there because they wanted to hear Zeno's writings, which had been brought to Athens for the first time by them. Socrates was then very young. So Zeno himself read aloud to them, and Parmenides was not in the house.

Thomas Taylor

He likewise said that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where also Socrates came, and many others with him, desiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the first time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in consequence of this, Zeno himself read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out;

Morrow and Dillon

He said they lodged with Pythodorus outside the city wall in the Cerameicus. Socrates and many others with him came there desiring to hear the work of Zeno, for these visitors had brought it to Athens for the first time. Socrates was quite young. Zeno himself read it to them (Parmenides happened to be out),
Oxford Greek

καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἐτὶ λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, ἢνικα αὐτὸς τε ἐπεισελθείν ἐφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἐξῴθηκεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ’ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ’ ἄττα ἐτὶ ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων: οὐ μὴν αὐτὸς γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκόαν τοῖς Ζήνωνοις.

τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκοῦσαν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνώσαναί, καὶ ἀναγιγνωσθείσης,

so that only a small part of the discourses still remained to be read, καὶ εἴναι πανῦ βραχὺ τῶν λόγων ἐτὶ λοιπὸν ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, when Pythodors him self, together with Parmenides came in from outside, and also 127D ἢνικα ο Πυθόδωρος αὐτὸς τε μετ’ τον Παρμενιδην ἐπεισελθειν εξώθηκεν καὶ Aristotle who he him self said became one of the thirty tyrants. So that they still had to hear Ἀριστοτέλες αὐτοῦ εφη γενομενον τοις τριακοντα, καὶ ετι επακουσαί some small part of the discourses; not however Pythodoros him self, since he had indeed heard αττα σμικρ’ των γραμματων: ου μην αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ γε ακηκοαν the discourses of Zeno before.

τοὺς Ζήνωνος προτερον.

2 Therefore, Socrates having listened, he then urged him to read again the first hypothesis τοῦ πρώτου λόγου, καὶ ἀναγιγνωσθείσης: φαναι.
Pythodorus said the reading of the treatises was nearly finished when he came in himself with Parmenides and Aristoteles (the one who was afterwards one of the thirty), so they heard only a little that remained of the written works. He himself, however, had heard Zeno read them before. Socrates listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said:

Thomas Taylor

and that but a small part of the discourse remained unfinished, when he himself entered, together with Parmenides and Aristotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in consequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole discourse from Zeno. He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's discourse, entreated him to repeat the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates said -

Morrow and Dillon

and had almost completed the reading of the arguments when Pythodorus, as he said, came in and joined them, accompanied by Parmenides and Aristotle, the man who later was one of the Thirty; and they listened to the remaining part of the composition, though Pythodorus had himself heard Zeno read it before. When Socrates had heard it all he asked that the first hypothesis of the first argument be read again; and when it had been read, said,
Socrates: In what way do you mean this, O Zeno? If The Beings are Many, is it then necessary that They be both Like and Unlike? But this is certainly impossible.

For it is not possible for The Unlike to be Like nor for The Like to be Unlike?

You do not mean it in this way, do you?

Zeno: Yes, in this way.

Socrates: Is it not the case then, that if it is indeed impossible that both The Unlike be Like and The Like be Unlike, it is certainly impossible that many should also exist. For if many were to exist, then they would undergo impossibilities.

Ouκουν ει δη αδύνατον τε τα ανομια ειναι ομοια και ανομια και τα ομοια ανομια και ειναι: γαρ ει πολλα

Balboas

Socrates: If The Beings are Many, is it then necessary that They be both Like and Unlike? But this is certainly impossible.

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Loeb

“Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is not that your meaning?”

“Yes,” said Zeno.

“Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible.

Thomas Taylor

How is it you assert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this what you assert?

Zeno answered, It is.

If, therefore, it is impossible that dissimilars should be similar, and similars dissimilar, is it not impossible that many things should have a subsistence? For, if there were many, they would suffer impossibilities.

Morrow and Dillon

“Zeno, what do you mean by this? If beings are many, they must be both like and unlike; but this is clearly impossible; for it is impossible that unlike should be like or like unlike. Is this not what you say?”

“It is,” said Zeno.

“Therefore if it is impossible for unlike to be like and like things to be unlike, it is impossible that being is many; for if it is many it would have impossible characteristics.
Oxford Greek

Is this then, the intention of your Discourses, and no other one, than to struggle through all arguments, to show that many do not exist? And do you consider each of your Discourses to be a positive proof in support of your hypothesis; so that you are also led to think that you have produced as many positive proofs, as you have composed Discourses, to show that many do not exist? Do you mean it in this way, or do I not understand you correctly?

Balboas

127c λέγεις ουτω, η εγω ουκ καταμαθανω ορθως;
Loeb

Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many? And you think each of your treatises is a proof of this very thing, and therefore you believe that the proofs you offer that existences are not many are as many as the treatises you have written? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood?"

Thomas Taylor

Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince, by contesting through all things, that the many has no subsistence? And do you not consider each of your discourses as an argument in support of this opinion; and so think that you have produced as many arguments as you have composed discourses, to show that the many is not? Is not this what you say, or do I not rightly understand you?

Morrow and Dillon

Then is this the aim of your arguments, none other than to maintain valiantly, against everything that is said, that things are not many? And you think that each of your arguments is a proof of this, so that you consider you have as many proofs that things are not many as the number of the arguments in your book? Is this what you say, or have I misunderstood you?”
Oxford Greek

οὐκ, ἄλλα, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὄλον τὸ γράμμα ὁ βουλεῖται.

μανθάνο, εἴπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὁ Παρμενίδη, ὃτι Ζήνων ὃδε ὁ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βουλεῖται ὑκεισθαι, ἄλλα καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τίνα ὑπερ σὺ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἐτερόν τι λέγων, σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φίς εἶναι τὸ πάν, καὶ τοῦτον τεκμήρια παρέχῃ καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ:

Balboas

Zeno: No other way. You have understood quite well the intent of the whole work.

Socrates: I understand, O Parmenides, that Zeno does not only wish to be situated in the other close bonds of friendship with you, but also to agree with you in the following writings. For he has written in the very same direction as you, although, by changing certain particulars, he endeavors to deceive us that he asserts something other. For on the one hand, you assert in your poems that The All is One, and you produce sound proofs in a beautiful and good way in support of these hypotheses:

καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τουτών:
“No,” said Zeno, “you have grasped perfectly the general intent of the work.”

“I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here wishes to be very close to you not only in his friendship, but also in his writing. For he has written much the same thing as you, but by reversing the process he tries to cheat us into the belief that he is saying something new. For you, in your poems, say that the all is one, and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion;

Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book. That Socrates then said, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wish to connect himself in the bands of friendship with you, but to agree with you likewise in sentiments concerning the doctrines of the present discourse. For Zeno, in a certain respect, has written the same as yourself; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you in your poems assert that the universe is one; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion:

“No,” said Zeno, “you have correctly understood the aim of the entire composition.”

“I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here aspires to be one with you not only in personal affection, but also in writing; for in a sense he has written the same thing as you, but he has changed it and is trying to deceive us into thinking he is saying something different. For you say in your poems that the All is One and for this you advance proofs in beautiful and goodly fashion;
but on the other hand, he says
in turn, the following: that many is not, and then he produced very-many and very-mighty
positive proofs. Therefore, on the one hand, you affirm that The All is One, but on the other
hand, he denies that The All is many; and in this way, almost saying the same thing, each one
speaks, so as to appear not to have said the same things. Thus the latter discourses are revealed
to us to be said in a way that is above and beyond our way of speaking/understanding.

Zeno: Yes, O Socrates. So it is, but you have not perfectly perceived The Truth of my words;
although, just as Spartan hounds, you have indeed well pursued and tracked their intent.

beginning
and he, on the other hand, says it is not many, and he also furnishes very numerous and weighty proofs. That one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each of you expresses himself so that although you say much the same you seem not to have said the same things at all, appears to the rest of us a feat of expression quite beyond our power.”

“Yes, Socrates,” said Zeno, “but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings. You follow the arguments with a scent as keen as a Laconian hound’s,

Thomas Taylor

but Zeno says that the many is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this assertion. As, therefore, you assert that The One is, and he, that the many has no subsistence; and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension.

That Zeno said -Indeed, Socrates, so it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently pursue and trace the meaning of the assertions.

Morrow and Dillon

but he on the other hand says it is not many, and himself brings forward many and lengthy proofs. For one of you to say it is one, and the other that it is not many, and for each of you to speak so as to seem not to be saying the same things, although what you say is almost the same, this way of speaking of yours appears to be above us hearers.”

“Yes, Socrate,” said Zeno; “but you have not altogether sensed the truth about this composition. Although you are as keen as a Laconian dog in picking up the sent and following the track of my arguments,
Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι ὦ παντάπασιν ὦτῳ σεμνίνεται τὸ γράμμα, ἓτε ἀπερ σὸν λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφήματι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὡς τὸ μέγα διαπραττόμενον: ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γε ἀληθὲς βοηθεία τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας

Balboas

But in the first place, this, remains unnoticed by you, that the written words are not in every respect so venerable, so that it was composed, as you say then, with the intention of concealing from men, as if I was doing something of great importance; but on the one hand, you have spoken something of those things which happen to be the case, but on the other hand, you eipes τι των συμβεβηκότων, de

The Truth of the matter is indeed that these writings were composed for the purpose of providing a certain assistance to The Logos of Parmenides, against those who try their hand at beginning
but you do not observe that my treatise is not by any means so pretentious that it could have been written with the intention you ascribe to it, of disguising itself as a great performance in the eyes of men. What you mentioned is a mere accident, but in truth these writings are meant to support the argument of Parmenides against those who attempt to

Thomas Taylor

But this in the first place is concealed from you, that this discourse is not in every respect so venerable, that it was composed, as you say, for the purpose of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have spoken something of that which happens to be the case. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: These writings were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides, against those who endeavour to

Morrow and Dillon

nevertheless you are first of all mistaken in thinking that my writing, whose purpose was exactly what you say it was, made any lofty pretension of deceiving the public into thinking that something great was being worked out. What you mentioned is one of the incidental consequences. It is indeed true that these writings are a kind of aid to Parmenides’ discourse against those who try to
Oxford Greek

αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἐν ἑστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοία συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἑνάντια αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταύτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δήλουν, ὡς ἐτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις.

Balboas

comically representing Self; by asserting that if One Is, many ridiculous and opposite results happen to The Self Logos.

πάσχειν τῷ αὐτῶν λόγῳ.

 Truly then, this writing, contradicts the advocates of the many, and opposes this and many other such opinions; by being willing to make clear that the hypothesis that asserts that many is, will undergo/suffer even more absurd consequences, than that which asserts that The One Is; if anyone of them is sufficiently gone through in detail. 

τοῦ εἰ ἐν εἶναι, εἰ τίς αὐτῶν ἰκανῶς επεξεῖμι.
Loeb

jeer at him and assert that if the all is one many absurd results follow which contradict his theory. Now this treatise opposes the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one.

Thomas Taylor

defame it by attempting to show that if The One is many, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion; and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing, therefore, contradicts those who say that the many is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is desirous to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of the many is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of The One, if both are sufficiently examined.

Morrow and Dillon

make fun of it by saying that if it is One, many ridiculous and self-contradictory consequences follow for his doctrine. This writing is directed against those who affirm the many, and it more than repays their attacks; its purpose is to show that the hypothesis of the many has ever more ridiculous consequences than the hypothesis of the one, if we examine it thoroughly.
Therefore, it has escaped your notice, O Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when I was a youth, through such a thing indeed as the love of contention, and the writing itself was stolen by someone, so that I was not able to consult whether Self should be brought out or Led into The Light or not. It has escaped your notice, I say, that it was not composed through that Love of Honor, which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile love of contention; although, just as I have said indeed, you do not conjecture amiss.
Loeb

It was in such a spirit of controversy that I wrote it when I was young, and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not. So, Socrates, you are not aware of this and you think that the cause of its composition was not the controversial spirit of a young man, but the ambition of an old one. In other respects, as I said, you guessed its meaning pretty well.”

Thomas Taylor

You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, so that I was not able to consult whether or not it should be issued into the light - you are ignorant, I say, that it was not written through that desire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile desire of contention: though, as I have said, you do not conjecture amiss.

Morrow and Dillon

In this controversial spirit I wrote it when a young man; and someone stole a copy of it, so that it was no longer open to me to consider whether or not it should be published. This is where you are mistaken, Socrates: you did not see that it was written in a youthful spirit of controversy, not in the emulous ambition of an older man. And yet, as I said, your likening of it (to Parmenides’ discourse) is not ill-taken.”
Oxford Greek

ἀλλ’ ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἤγοημαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δὲ μοι εἰπέ: οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ εἰδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὐτῷ ἄλλῳ τι ἑνάντιον, ὦ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον: τούτων δὲ δυνῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλα ὧ ὀ ἀ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅρμαι γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἄμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἑνάντιαν ὄντων ἄμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει,

Balboas

Socrates:  3 I admit it then, and I am Led to believe that the case is just as you have stated it. But explain to me about the following particulars: Do you not consider that there is a certain Idea/Species of Likeness, Self According to Self, and another one such as this but opposite, that is in turn, an Unlike Idea/Species. But that you and me, and all the other things which we surely call many, have a Share of These Two Beings? And that on the one hand, a ἂν καὶ κατὰ αὐτόν ὅμοιον ἄλλον τοιοῦτον ὅμοιον, καὶ μὲν things that Share of Likeness become like, and according that the degree that such things may μεταλαμβάνοντα τῆς ὁμοιότητος γίγνεσθαι ὅμοια, καὶ κατὰ ὃς ἄν αὐτῶν ἂν Share in This; but those that Share of Unlikeness become unlike; but that those that Share of Both become both? Therefore, if all things also Share of both opposite Beings, ἀμφότερων ἀμφότερα; ἐκ τούτων καὶ μεταλαμβάνει ἀμφότερον ἑνάντιον ὄντων,
“I see,” said Socrates, “and I accept your explanation. But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, and those which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation? And even if all things partake of both opposites,

I admit it (says Socrates); and I think the case is just as you have stated it. But satisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, itself subsisting from itself? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is dissimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of these two? And that such things as participate of similitude become similar, so far as they participate? But those which participate of dissimilitude become dissimilar? And that those which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other,

“I accept your explanation,” said Socrates, “and believe that it is as you say. But tell me this. Do you not think there exists a form, Likeness, itself by itself, and another form contrary to it which is Unlikeness? And that of these two Forms you and I and the other things which we call “many” partake? Also that things which partake of Likeness come to be alike in that respect and just in so far as they partake of it, and those that partake of Unlikeness come to be unlike, while those that partake of both become both? Even if all things partake of both, contrary as they are,
Oxford Greek

and are both like and unlike their Selves by Participating in both; then, what is wonderful? For if, on the one hand, anyone brings to Light that The Like Selves become Unlike, then I think, that it would be monstrously absurd; but if one were to show, that such things that Participate of Both of These Ideas, undergo both of these conditions, then as far as I’m concerned, O Zeno, it does not appear to be out of the ordinary; nor indeed, if anyone would show that all things are one, through their Participation of The One, and that these Same Selves are many, in turn, through their Participation of Plurality. But if someone were to show, that This Self which Is One, is many, and in turn that the many are indeed One; I shall immediately wonder at this.  

Balboas

beginning
and are enabled by their participation to be both like and unlike themselves, what is there wonderful about that? For if anyone showed that the absolute like becomes unlike, or the unlike like, that would, in my opinion, be a wonder; but if he shows that things which partake of both become both like and unlike, that seems to me, Zeno, not at all strange, not even if he shows that all things are one by participation in unity and that the same are also many by participation in multitude; but if he shows that absolute unity is also many and the absolute many again are one, then I shall be amazed.

Loeb

and become similar and dissimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the case? For, if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that such things as participate both these suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should evince that all things are one, through their participating of The One, and at the same time many, through their participating multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should show that that which is one is many, and that the many is one;

Thomas Taylor

and by having a share in both are at once like and unlike one another, what is there surprising in that? If someone were proving that like things themselves become unlike, or unlike things themselves like, that, I think, would be a monstrosity; but if things which partake of both are shown to have both characters, it does not seem to me strange, Zeno, nor if somebody should prove that all things are one because partaking of unity and the same things many because partaking of plurality. But if he could show that the one itself is many and the many themselves one, at this I should be amazed.”

Morrow and Dillon
καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως: εἰ μὲν αὐτά τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τάναντα ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμαζεῖν: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν τις ὀνταντια πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:

Balboas

And similarly in All the other cases; if on the one hand, someone could bring to Light an argument worthy of admiration; by showing that both the Generic and Ideal Selves undergo these opposite experiences Them Selves. But if on the other hand, someone demonstrates that ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:
εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη καὶ εἴδη εἰπώμενοι ἀποφαίνει· ὡσαύτως: εἰ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐν ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν:

beginning
Loeb

The same applies to all other things. If he shows that the kinds and ideas in and by themselves possess these opposite qualities, it is marvellous but if he shows that I am both one and many, what marvel is there in that? He will say, when he wishes to show that I am many, that there are my right parts and my left parts, my front parts and my back parts, likewise upper and lower, all different; for I do, I suppose, partake of multitude;

Thomas Taylor

and in a similar manner concerning all the rest: for, doubtless, he would produce a proper subject of admiration, who should evince that both genera and species suffer these contrary affections. But what occasion of wonder would there be, should any one show that I myself am both one and many? and should prove his assertion by saying, when he wishes to assert that I am many, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the anterior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude):

Morrow and Dillon

“And likewise in all other cases. If he shows that genera and species themselves have in them these contrary attributes, that would be worthy of admiration; but what is there astonishing in showing that I am both one and many? When he wants to show I am many, he would say my right side is different from my left, that my front is other than my back, and so also my upper and lower parts; for I do partake of plurality, I think.
Oxford Greek

—ὅταν δὲ ἐν, ἐρεῖ ός ἐπτά ἡμῶν οὖντων εἰς ἑγώ εἰμι ἀνθρώπος μετέχων καὶ τοὐδὲ ἕνος; ὡστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἔάν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρήσει πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ταὐτόν ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τι φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ οἶδε τὰ πολλὰ ἐν, οἶδε τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ ἀπερ ἀν πάντες ὀμολογοῦμεν:

Balboas

But on the other hand, when he desires to show that I am one,

he should say that since there are seven of us, I am one man and Participate of The One,

so that in this way he would bring to Light The Truth of both these assertions. Thus, if anyone,

should endeavor to show that stones and wood and such particulars, are both many and one,

eπεστειρησε ἀποφαίνειν λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ έν,

we would say that he exhibits to our view such things as are many and one, but that he does not

αν φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἀποδεικνύναι ταὐτα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ καὶ έν,

show that The One is Many, nor The Many, One; nor speak of anything wonderful, but we

το εν πολλὰ ουδε τα πολλὰ εν, ουδε λέγειν τι θαυμαστον, ἀλλ᾽ would agree to that which is affirmed by all.

ομολογουμεν απερ παντες.
and when he wishes to show that I am one, he will say that we here are seven persons, of whom I am one, a man, partaking also of unity and so he shows that both assertions are true. If anyone then undertakes to show that the same things are both many and one—I mean such things as stones, sticks, and the like—we shall say that he shows that they are many and one, but not that the one is many or the many one; he says nothing wonderful, but only what we should all accept.

Thomas Taylor

but when he desires to show that I am one, should say, that as we are seven in number, I am one man, and participate of The One? so that he would by this means evince the truth of both these assertions. If any one, therefore, should endeavour to show that stones, wood, and all such particulars, are both many and one, we should say that he exhibits to our view such things as are many and one, but that he does not assert that The One is many, nor the many one; nor speak of any thing wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men.

Morrow and Dillon

And when he wants to show that I am one, he will say that I, as one person among the seven of us, also partake of unity; and so he shows that both statements are true. Consequently, if someone undertakes to prove that things like these—stones and sticks and the like—are many and one, we shall say that he is showing that such things are many and one, but not that one is many nor that many is one; and that he is not saying anything remarkable, but only what we would all agree to be true.”
Oxford Greek

But if on the one hand, anyone would first divide/separate The Ideas apart/separate, Those of which I have just now been speaking, The Ideas according to Selves, such as In Likeness and Unlikeness and Plurality and The One, αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτά, ὲς αὐτοῖς, αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, συγκεράννυσθαι ἡγοῦμαι ἓν πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, άγασθείην εἰ τίς ἡγοῦν τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρισμένοις διῆλθεν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις εἰπεῖται.

Balboas

beginning
If, however, as I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should,” said he, “be filled with amazement, Zeno. Now I think this has been very manfully discussed by you; but I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects.”

But if any one should, in the first place, distribute the forms of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them essentially apart from each other, such as similitude and dissimilitude, multitude and The One, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show himself able to mingle and separate them in themselves, I should be astonished (says he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we should strenuously labour in the investigation of these particulars: yet I should be much astonished if any one could solve this doubt, which is so profoundly involved in species; so as to be able no less clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reasoning power, than in those belonging to visible objects, and which you have already discussed.

“But if someone of those I was talking of just now would first distinguish Ideas as they are by themselves—such as Likeness and Unlikeness, Plurality and Unity, Rest and Motion, and all the like—and then would show that these Ideas in themselves are capable of blending and separating, that, Zeno,” he said, “I should remarkably admire. You have dealt with this subject very valiantly, I think; but as I say, my admiration would be much greater if anyone could show that these same perplexities are everywhere involved in the Forms themselves, among the objects we apprehend by reasoning, just as you have shown them to be involved in the things we see.”
Pythodorus said, that on the one hand, when Socrates had said these particulars,
one believed that, both Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at each one of them, whereas on
the other hand, They Themselves Offered-up Their Mind entirely to what he said,
de (Sym 174D-210E-217B, Rep 432B) prosecuein ton vouv panv tous autow and frequently looked at each other, smiling, as if in admiration of Socrates.
to kai thamai blepoantai eis allhlos meiianous as ahamenous ton Socratati. And that once Socrates ceased to speak, Parmenides then spoke, saying . . .
and ope autou paoiamedon eipiein ton Parmenidh σου φαναι.
Loeb

Pythodorus said that he thought at every word, while Socrates was saying this, Parmenides and Zeno would be angry, but they paid close attention to him and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates, and when he stopped speaking Parmenides expressed their approval.

Thomas Taylor

Pythodorus said, that when Socrates had thus spoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno seemed to be indignant at the several particulars of Socrates's discourse; but that they bestowed the greatest attention on what he said, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in consequence of his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said -

Morrow and Dillon

While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus said he was expecting that Parmenides and Zeno would both of them be annoyed; but, he says, they gave him their close attention and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of Socrates. And this indeed is what Parmenides said when Socrates had finished.
Oxford Greek

Ω Σωκράτες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἰ ἀγαθαῖ οὐτής ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἰπὶ τοὺς λόγους, καὶ μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ ὀφεῖ διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρίς μὲν εἰδὴ αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρίς δὲ τὰ τοιῶν αὐτῷ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης χωρίς ἣς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλά καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν Ζήνωνος ἢκουες;

ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

ὅ καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα, εἰπέν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἶον δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸ καὶ ἄγαθο δικαίου καὶ άγαθον καὶ πάντων αὐ τῶν τοιοῦτων;

ναί, φάναι.

Balboas

Parmenides: O Socrates, how worthy of admiration is Your Impulse in Your Pursuit of The Logos! And tell me, have You Yourself thus Separated certain Ideas apart from Selves, of which you have just now heard of from Zeno? As you say, on the one hand, and in turn on the other hand, in the same way, Set apart those that Participate of These? And does there appear to you, to be a certain likeness that is to μετέχοντα τοιουτα; καὶ δοκεῖ οἴφει εἶναι τε ὁμοιότητος Separate from Self Likeness, and indeed a certain One/Unity and Many/Plurality and all other χωρίς αὐτὴ ὁμοιότητος καὶ δῆ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα such particulars, which we possess, and of which, you have just now heard of from Zeno?

οὐκ ἦς ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν, δὴ νῦν ἢκουες Ζήνωνος;

Socrates: It does to me indeed. (Εμοιγε.)

Parmenides: And how about the following ones; is there a Certain Idea, like that of Justice, (Eternally)Self by Self; and also of Beauty and of Good and all such Ideas (by Them-Selves)? αὐτο καθ᾽ αὐτό καὶ αὐ καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθο καὶ πάντων τοιοῦτων;

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)

beginning
“Socrates,” he said, “what an admirable talent for argument you have! Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?”

“Yes, I do,” said Socrates.

“And also,” said Parmenides, “abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good, and all such conceptions?”

“Yes,” he replied.

Thomas Taylor

How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the pursuit of liberal disciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise the participants of these species apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain similitude separate from that similitude which we possess, and a certain one and many, and all such other particulars, which you have just now heard mentioned by Zeno?

That Socrates said, So it appears to me.

And (that Parmenides said) does it also appear to you, that there is a certain species or form of justice, itself subsisting by itself; likewise of beauty and the good, and every thing of this kind?

That Socrates said, It does.

Morrow and Dillon

“Socrates,” he said, “your urge for discussion is worthy of admiration. Tell me. Do you yourself make this distinction you mention and separate the Forms themselves from the things that participate in them? And do you think that there is a Likeness itself separate from the Likeness which we have, and a One and a Many and all the other things in Zeno’s argument that you have just been listening to?”

“I think so,” said Socrates.

“And of things like these,” said Parmenides, “is there a form of Justice in and by itself, and of Beauty and Goodness and all such things?”

“Yes,” said Socrates.
Oxford Greek

tί δ’, ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρίς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οίνοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἡ πυρὸς ἦ καὶ ἐδατος;

ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλάκις δή, ὥς Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρή φάναι ὡσπερ περὶ ἑκάστου ἡ ἀλλως.

ἡ καὶ περὶ τοῦνδε, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἤ καὶ γελοί τῶν δόξεων διὰς ἐν εἶναι, οἷον θρίς καὶ πηλος καὶ ῥυπος ἢ ἀλλο τι ἀτιμωτικαὶ ἐν καὶ τοῦτων ἑκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὁν ἀλλο λί ἦ ἦν τι ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζομέθα, εἰτε καὶ μῆς;

Balboas

Parmenides: What next then ? Is there also an Idea of Man and of All the Elements such as we are composed of ; and a certain Ideal Human Self and One of Fire and One of Water that is Separate from us ? (χωρίς ἡμων ;)

Socrates: I have certainly often been in dire-straight/puzzled/at-a-loss , O Parmenides , concerning whether it is necessary to speak of Selves , just as we did about Those Ideas , or in another way . ἡ ἀλλος .

Parmenides: And are you also at-a-loss/puzzled , about the following particulars , O Socrates ? Whether it is necessary to affirm that there is a Separate Idea/Form/Species of each one of these which may also appear to be ridiculous , such as of hair and clay and dust , or of anything else of those particulars with which we are familiar , or whether it is not necessary ?
“And is there an abstract idea of man, apart from us and all others such as we are, or of fire or water?”

“I have often,” he replied, “been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not.”

“And are you undecided about certain other things, which you might think rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else particularly vile and worthless? Would you say that there is an idea of each of these distinct and different from the things with which we have to do, or not?”

Thomas Taylor

And likewise of all such things as we are composed from: so that there is a certain form of man, or of fire, or water?

That Socrates answered - I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning these; whether it is necessary to speak of them in the same manner as of the former particular, or in a different manner.

And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that there is a certain form of every such particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair, clay, and mud, or any thing else which is vile and abject; and that these forms are different from the particulars with which we are conversant?

Morrow and Dillon

“And a form of Man separate from us and from all beings like us—a separate form of Man, and of Fire, and of Water?”

“I have often been in doubt, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “whether or not we should say the same of them as of the others.”

“And of things that might seem ridiculous, Socrates, such as hair, mud, and dirt, or some other unseemly or trivial thing, are you in doubt whether or not we ought to say there is an Idea of each of these, separate and other than the things that we handle?”
Oxford Greek

οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε ἀπερ ὄρωμεν, ταῦτα καὶ ἐίναι: εἶδος δὲ τι αὐτῶν οὐθένια εἶναι μὴ λιαν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μὲντοι ποτὲ μὲ καὶ ἑθραξζε μὴ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταῦταν: ἐπειτα ὅταν ταῦτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσαις μὴ ποτὲ εἰς τίνα βεθῶν φλογίας ἐμπεσόν διαφθαρῶ: ἐκείνη δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἅ νυν ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκείνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.

Balboas

Socrates: On the one hand, I do not affirm that these exist in any other way from these which we do indeed also see; whereas on the other hand, is it not the height of absurdity, insofar as one imagines that there is a certain Idea of these selves? Nevertheless at times it also actually troubles me; in regards to whether or not the very same thing, can be affirmed of everything. But thereafter, having been fixed in this opinion, I then run-away fleeing, in fear of falling and utterly perish. But then, I reach up from those considerations, and again I seriously apply myself to those considerations, concerning which, we have just now asserted, whether such Ideas/Forms/Species have to exist. α δη νυν ελεγομεν ειδη εχειν.
“By no means,” said Socrates. “No, I think these things are such as they appear to us, and it would be quite absurd to believe that there is an idea of them; and yet I am sometimes disturbed by the thought that perhaps what is true of one thing is true of all. Then when I have taken up this position, I run away for fear of falling into some abyss of nonsense and perishing; so when I come to those things which we were just saying do have ideas, I stay and busy myself with them.”

That Socrates said, I do not by any means think that the forms of these can be different from those which are the objects of our inspection: but is it not vehemently absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? For this has formerly disturbed me, whether or not something of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for some time in this opinion, I have hastily withdrawn myself and fled away; fearing lest, falling into a certain abyss of trifles, I should utterly perish and be lost; but, returning from thence, I have seriously applied myself to consider those particulars, to which, as we have just now asserted, forms belong.

“By no means,” replied Socrates, “these things are exactly what we see them to be. To think there is any Idea of them would, I fear, be altogether ridiculous. And yet sometimes I have been seized by the disturbing thought that the same thing may be true of them as of the others. Then when I reach this point I retreat in haste, fearing that I may fall into bottomless nonsense and perish; and so, coming back to the things which we said just now to have Ideas, I spend my time working with them.”
Oxford Greek

vēos γὰρ ἐπὶ, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ οὕτω σου ἀντεἰλήπται φιλοσοφία ώς ἐπὶ ἀντληθῇ κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις, νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, τόδε δ’ οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι εἶδὴ ἄττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνύμιας αὐτῶν ἱσχεν, οἰον ὅροιστήτος μὲν μεταλαμβάντα δροια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δικαία τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι;

πάντως, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Balboas

Parthenides: That is because you are still a young man, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not
130E ἔτει ἐπὶ. Νεος, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ φιλοσοφία ὦσποι
as of yet, received you into Her Embraces. For in my opinion, when you are received by Her,
130E ἔτει, σου ἀντεἰλήπται κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὧν καὶ ἱσχεν, οἴον ὅροιστήτος μὲν
you will not dishonor any of these selves; but now since you are still young, you give heed,
130e οὐδὲν ἄτιμασθεὶς αὐτῶν, δέν διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀποβλέπεις
to the opinions of men.

proς δοχαῖς αὐτῶιν.

~~Are The Ideas Related to Wholes/Parts and Genera/Species?~~

Tell me then, the following. Does it appear to you, as you say, that there exist certain
εἶπε μοί οὖν ἔτει. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῆς, εἶναι αὐτῶιν Ideas/Forms/Species, of which the other things have a Share, thus retaining Their Names;
εἰπή νων τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τάδε ἱσχεν αὐτῶν τὰς ἐπωνύμιᾳσ,
such as, on the one hand, those that have a Share of Likeness are like; therefore, those that
131A οἴοιοι μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα οἰοῖστήτος ομοίωσι,
have a Share of Greatness/Magnanimity/Generosity/Magnitude are great/generous/big, whereas
μεγεθοὶς μεγάλα,
on the other hand, those that Share of Righteousness and Beauty become just and beautiful?

δικαιοσύνης καὶ κάλλους γίγνεσθαι δικαία τε καὶ καλὰ;

Socrates: Entirely so indeed. (Παντως χειρ.)
“Yes, for you are still young,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not yet taken hold upon you, Socrates, as I think it will later. Then you will not despise them; but now you still consider people’s opinions, on account of your youth. Well, tell me do you think that, as you say, there are ideas, and that these other things which partake of them are named from them, as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”

“That Parmenides then said, You are as yet but a young man, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not despise any of these particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men. Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating retain the appellations; as, for instance, that such things as partake of similitude are similars; of magnitude, great; and that the participants of beauty and justice are beautiful and just?

That Socrates replied, Entirely so.

“That is because you are still young, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not taken hold of you as it will, in my opinion, when you have learned not to despise any of these things. As it is, your youth still causes you to defer to the opinions of men. Then tell me this: you say you think there exists certain Forms in which these other things here participate and so carry their designations? For example, things become like by partaking of Likeness, and great by partaking of Greatness, and just or beautiful by partaking of Justice or Beauty?”

“Exactly,” said Socrates.
Oxford Greek

οὐκ ητοί ὅλον τοῦ ἑἰδοῦς ἢ μέρους ἐκαστὸν τὸ μεταλαμβάνων μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἀν μετάληψις χωρίς τοῦτον γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἂν; εἴπεν. πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ ἑἰδος ἢ ἄλλη ἄλλη τις ἀν μετάληψις χωρὶς τοῦτον γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἂν; εἴπεν.

Parmenides: Now surely , is it not the case then , that each thing which has a Share , either has a Share of The Whole (Genera) Idea or of only a Part (Species) of It ? Or , can there be some other way of Participation/Transference/Succession apart from these Two ways ?

Socrates: And how could there be ? (Καὶ ποὺς αὖ ;)

Parmenides: Therefore , does it appear to you , that The Whole Idea , Being One , exists in each of the many , or in what way ?

Socrates: What is there to prevent The Whole Idea , O Parmenides , to exist in each of them ?

Parmenides: Then the Socrates is right to say: The Whole Idea of the Many.
“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?”

“How could there be?” said he.

“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?”

“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there be any other mode of participation besides these?

That Socrates said, How can there be?

Does it then appear to you that the whole form is one in each individual of many things? Or what other opinion have you on this subject?

That then Socrates said, What hinders, O Parmenides, but that it should be one?

Morrow and Dillon

“Therefore does not every thing that participates participate in either the whole or a part of the Form? Or could there be some way of participation other than these?”

“How could there be?” he replied.

“Then do you think that the Form, being one, is as a whole in each of its many particulars, or what?”

“What is to prevent it from being in them, Parmenides?” said Socrates.
Oxford Greek

ён ἁρὰ ὁν καὶ ταύτον ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὕσιν ὅλον ἁμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἢν εἶτη.

οὐκ ἐν, εἰ γε, φάναι, οἷον εἴ ἡμέρα εἶπη μία καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ οὕσα πολλαχὸν ἁμα ἐστι καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἢστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἐκαστον τῶν εἰδών ἐν ἐν πάσιν ἁμα ταύτον εἶτη.

ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταύτον ἁμα πολλαχόν ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἰστιῳ καταπετάσασας πολλοῦς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἰναι ὅλον; ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢγη λέγειν; ἴσως, φάναι.

Parmenides: Accordingly then , by Being One and The Same in many separate existents , then The Whole is in each at the same time , and in this way The Self will be separate from The Self .

οἶν ἑν ἐνεσται αἵμα, καὶ οὐτως αὐτὸ ἐν εἴῃ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ .

Socrates: It cannot be in this way ; but if This Idea were indeed such as The Self of Day , by Being One . It is at-once present in many places and yet Self is in no way more separate from The Self ; if then in this way , every Idea may also be At-Once One and The Same in all .

αὕτης , εἰ οὕτω ἐκαστον τῶν εἰδών καὶ εἴῃ ἁμα εν ταύτον εν πάσιν .

Parmenides: You have made , O Socrates , One and The Same aspect present at the same time , in many places , in a very pleasant way ; just as if you covered-over many humans with a sail .

πολλαχόν , γε Ηδέως , οἷον εἰ καταπετάσασας πολλοῦς ἀνθρώπους ἰστιω .

Thus you say , that there is One Whole , over many .

φαίης , εἴναι εν ὅλον επὶ πολλοῖς .

Or is it not something such as this that you are Led to say ?

131C η οὐ το τοιοῦτον ἤγη λέγειν ;

Socrates: Perhaps . (Ισως .)
Loeb

“Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.”

“No,” he replied, “for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.”

“That,” said he, “is very neat, Socrates you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over may. Is not that about what you mean?”

“Perhaps it is,” said Socrates.

Thomas Taylor

As it is, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself.

That Socrates said, It would not be so: but just as if this form was day, this being one and the same, is collectively present in many places, and yet is not any thing the more separate from itself; in the same manner, every form may be at once one and the same in all.

That Parmenides then said, You have made, O Socrates, one and the same thing to be collectively present in many places, in a very pleasant manner; just as if, covering many men with a veil, you should say that there is one whole, together with the many. Do you not think that you would make an assertion of this kind?

That Socrates said, Perhaps so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Then, while remaining one and the same, it will be, as a whole, in many separate things at the same time, and thus will be separate from itself.”

“No,” he said, “at least if it is like day, which being one and the same, is in many places at once, but is not for that reason separated from itself—if, I say, it is like this, then each Form is the same and simultaneously present to all things.”

“How readily, Socrates,” he said, “You make one and the same thing present in many places at the same time. It is as if you spread a sail over a number of men and say that it is a single whole over many. Is not this the sort of thing you are saying?”

“Perhaps,” said Socrates.
Ὀδυσσεία

מעלה: Θεον ἃν καὶ ἠλώθησις, ὦ Σωκράτες, τὸ ἑν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.

Σωκράτης: Παρηγορεί οὖν, ὦ Σωκράτε, οὐδε συμβαίνει τὸ ἑνεκαστὸ ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι οὐδαμῶς. Θεον ἃν καὶ ἠλώθησις, ὦ Σωκράτες, τὸ ἑν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.
“Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?”

“A part over each.”

“Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.”

“So it appears.”

“Are you, then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?”

“By no means,” he replied.

Will, therefore, the whole veil subsist together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual?

A different part only.

That Parmenides said, These forms then, O Socrates, are divisible, and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form.

So indeed it seems.

Are you then willing to assert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one?

That Socrates said, By no means.

“Then would the whole sail be over each man, or a part of it over him and another part over another?”

“A part.”

“Consequently, Socrates,” he said, “the Forms themselves are divided, and the things that participate in them will participate in a part of them. No longer will the whole of a Form be in each thing, but a part of it.”

“So it appears.”

“Then, Socrates,” he said, “will you allow that our one Form is really divided? And will it still be one?”

“By no means,” Socrates replied.
Oxford Greek

ὅρα γάρ, φάναι: εἰ αὐτό τὸ μέγεθος μερεῖς καὶ ἑκατοστὸν τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μερεῖς μέρει σιμικρότερομ αὐτὸν τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται;

πάντα γ', ἐφῆ.

tί δὲ; τοῦ ἵσσου μέρος ἑκατοστὸν σιμικρόν ἀπολαβόν τι ἔξει ἤ ἐλάττον οὔτι αὐτὸ τοῦ ἵσσου τὸ ἔξον ἴσον τῷ ἑσται;

ἄδυνατον.

καὶ τοῦ σιμικροῦ μέρους τις ἤμισον ἔξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ σιμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἄτε μέρους ἐκαστον ὅντος, καὶ οὗτῳ δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σιμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται: ὥ δ’ ἄν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τούτῳ σιμικρότερον ἔσται ἄλλ’ οὐ μεῖζον ἦ πρὶν.

οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο, φάναι, τούτο γε.

Balboas

Parmenides: For See, that if you attempt to divide The Great Self, then in that case
131D γαρ ὃς εἰ μερεῖς το μεγέθος αυτο αρα would it not be shown to be irrational, and that each of The Many that are Great, will then be
ουκ φανεῖται ἀλογον , καὶ εκαστον των πολλῶν μεγάλων ἔσται
great/big by a “part” (like The Day/sail) of “greatness” that is less than The Greatness of Self?

Socrates: Most irrational indeed .((Πανο γ').)

Parmenides: What then? Will each thing, by possessing some “small part” of “equality”

τί δὲ; εσται εκαστον τω ἔξει τι σιμικροῦ μερος του ισου
which is less than The Equality of Self, be equal to another thing by having the part received?

ωντι ελαττον του ισου αυτου ισου το εχων απολαβον ;

Socrates: Impossible .(Αδυνατον .)

Parmenides: Then if one of us has a “part of the small”, then in that case The Small of Self

Ἀλλα τις ημων ἔχει μερος του σιμικρου , δε το σιμικρον αυτου will be “bigger” than this, since it is a part of Itself, and thus The Small Self will then be

εσται μειζον τουτου , ἀτε οντος μερους εαυτου καὶ ουτω το σιμικρον αυτο δη εσται
that which is “bigger”; but then on the other hand, this to which the part of The Small will be

μειζον : δ’ τουτο νω αν
added and then subtracted, will be smaller, but not greater, than before .

Socrates: This most certainly cannot come to pass .

tou tou γε αν ουκ γενοιτο .

131b οὐκ, ωντι, ὅτι, οὐ, ὅτι
131c αὐτο, αὐτά, αὐτόν
131d αὐτό, αὐτού, αὐτού, ἐκαστον, αὐτό
132a αὐτό, αὐτό
132b αὐτό, αὐτόν, αὐτά
133a μικρό
133b πολλός, πολλοίς, πολλοί
134d πολλόν
134b πολλά, πολλοίν, πολλά
135b μέγα
130e μεγάλα
131d μεγάλον, μέγα, μεῖζον, μεῖζον, μεῖζον
132a μεγάλα, μέγα, μεγαλά, μέγα, μεγάλα
132b μεγάλο
“No,” said Parmenides, “for if you divide absolute greatness, and each of the many great things is 
great by a part of greatness smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Or again, will anything by taking away a particular small part of equality possess something by 
means of which, when it is less than absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else?”

“That is impossible.”

“Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small will be greater than this, since this is a part of 
it, and therefore the absolute small will be greater; but that to which the part of the small is added 
will be smaller, not greater, than before.”

“That,” said he, “is impossible.”

For see (said Parmenides), whether upon dividing magnitude itself, it would not be absurd that each 
of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude 
itself?

Entirely so, said Socrates.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal itself, be equal to any thing by this its 
part of equality, which is less than equal itself?

It is impossible.

But some one of us must possess a part of this small quantity; and that which is small itself will be 
greater than this, this small quantity being a part of small itself; and thus small itself will be that 
which is greater: but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become smaller, 
and not greater than it was before.

That Socrates said - This cannot take place.

“For consider,” he said, “if you divide Greatness itself, and if each of the many great things is 
great by a part of Greatness smaller than Greatness itself, does that not appear illogical?”

“Very much so;” Socrates replied.

“Or again, if each thing that participates in Equality will take off a small part of it, will it, by 
having something less than Equality itself, be equal to anything?”

“Impossible.”

“But suppose one of us has a portion of Smallness. Smallness itself will be greater than this, since 
this is a part of it, and so Smallness itself will be greater; and when this part that is taken off is 
added to anything, that thing will be smaller, not greater, than it was before.”

“That certainly cannot be,” said Socrates.
Oxford Greek

tína oûn tròpon, eîpeîn, ó Sôkrates, tôn eîðôn sou thà allà metalîfetai, mîte katà mèrhn mîte katà òla metalambânèin dynámèna;
oû mâ tôn Día, fânaî, oû moi dôkeî eîkolon einai tô toioûton oûdamôs diorîsasthai.
ti de ði; prós tôde poûs êxeis;
tô poîon;

Balboas

Parmenides: To you then, O Socrates, in what way are the other existents able to have a Share of The Ideas, since they are unable to do so according to Parts, nor according to Wholes?
tôn eîðôn, mîte katà mèrhn mîte katà òla;
Socrates: No by Zeus, it does not appear to me to be in any way an easy matter to define something such as this.

Parmenides: What next then? What do you say to this?
ti de ði; poûs êxeis prós tôde;
Socrates: To what? (To poîon ;)

beginning
“How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of
them either as parts or as wholes?”
“By Zeus,” he replied, “I think that is a very hard question to determine.”
“Well, what do you think of this?”
“Of what?”

But after what manner then, O Socrates, can individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able
to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes?
That Socrates said, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any respect an easy matter to define
a circumstance of this kind.
But what will you say to this?
To what?

“In what way, then, Socrates,” he said, “will other things participate in your Forms if they can
participate in them neither in part nor as wholes?”
“In the name of Zeus,” he said, “there is no easy way that I see of determining such a question.”
“Well, what do you say of the following problem?”
“What is it?”
Oxford Greek

οἴμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτον εἰδὸς οἴεσθαι εἶναι: ὅταν πόλλ᾽ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἵδεα ἢ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, δὴν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἤγη εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

τί δ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἔπειτα ἡ δοξή ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδῆς, οὐχὶ ἐν τι αὖ μέγα φανεῖται, ὥ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;

ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Parmenides: I suspect that your reason for believing that each Idea is One arises from something such as this. When a multitude of particulars appear to you to be great, you may think, that by looking at all of them, One Certain (Common) Ideal Self is found to be Equally in their case, from whence you are Led to believe that The Great/Big is One. (Inferred concept, not Idea. PG)

Socrates: You speak The Truth.

Parmenides: What then if when you See with The Soul, The Great Self, and All

Tί δ᾽ εαν ἴδης επὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μέγα αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα

The Other Ideas that are Great in a similar way. Then in turn, will not a Certain Great One, necessarily come to Light, through which, All These come to Light as Great/Big?

Socrates: It seems so. (Εοικέν.)
Loeb

“I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this; when there is a number of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one.”

“That is true,” he said.

“But if with your mind's eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?”

“So it seems.”

Thomas Taylor

I think that you consider every form as one, on this account; because, since a certain multitude of particulars seems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who surveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think them to be one great thing.

That then Socrates said, You speak the truth.

But what if you consider the great itself, and other things which are great, in the same manner, with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is great appear to you, through which all these necessarily seem to be great?

It seems so.

Morrow and Dillon

“I believe your reason for thinking each Form is one is the following. When you observe that several things are large, then no doubt you conjecture a single character that is the same when you look at them all; hence you consider largeness to be a single thing.”

“That’s true,” he replied.

“But now take Largeness itself and the many large particulars. Suppose you contemplate all these in the same way in your soul, will not yet another unity make its appearance, by virtue of which all these appear large?”

“So it would seem.”
Oxford Greek

άλλο ἂρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ’ αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονός καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν: καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτῷ πάσιν ἔτερον, ὃ ταύτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται: καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκαστὸν σοι τῶν εἰδών ἔσται, ἄλλα ἀπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.

άλλα, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἀπ’ τούτοις νόημα, καὶ σαφῶς αὐτῶ προσήκη ἑγγίγνεσθαι ἀλλοθεὶ ἢ ἐν φυχαῖς: οὐτὶ γάρ ἄν ἐν γε ἑκαστὸν ἕη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐντεύχῃ οὐ νυν οὕτω ἐλέγετο.

τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἔστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἄλλ᾽ αὐναντον, εἰπεῖν.

ἄλλα τινός:


Balboas

Parmenides: Accordingly then, another offspring idea of Greatness will appear, besides ἀρα ἂν ἄλλα γεγονός εἰδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ’ The Great Self, and also of those that partake of The Self: and besides all these, yet another το μεγέθος αὐτὸ τε καὶ τα μετέχοντα αὐτῶν: καὶ εἰπαν τοὺς ἐτερον in turn, through which, all these will appear to be great/big. And surely then, each of 132B οὖν ὡς παντα ταυτα ἐσται μεγαλα: καὶ δὴ ἑκαστὸν your “ideas”, will no longer be One, but an infinite multitude.

σοι των εἰδων οὐκετι ἔσται ἐν, ἄλλ᾽ το απειρα πλῆθος.

~~Socrates the empiricist !?~~

Socrates: 6 Then, O Parmenides, each one of these ideas is nothing more than a conception, Ἀλλὰ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἑκαστὸν τούτων των εἰδών μὴ η νοημα, and will not subsist in any place other than in the proper Self in Souls; for in this way, each καὶ εὐγγίγνεσθαι οὐδαμὸν αὐλοθεὶ η ἐν προσήκη αὐτῷ φυχαῖς: γαρ οὐτω ἑκαστὸν will indeed be one; and that which was just now mentioned will not still happen.

αν γε ειν εν καὶ α δὴ νυν ἐλέγετο αν οὐκ ετι πασχοι.

Parmenides: What then? Is each of these conceptions One, ἴν οὖν; ἐστι ἑκαστὸν των νοηματων εν but on the other hand, a conception of nothing?

δε νοημα ουδενος;

Socrates: But this is impossible. (Ἀλλα’ αὐναντον.)

Parmenides: Hence, it is a conception of something? (Ἀλλα τινος ;)

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)
“That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it; and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great; and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite.”

“But, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned.”

“But,” he said, “is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?”

“That is impossible,” he replied.

“But of something?”

“Yes.”

Hence, another form of magnitude will become apparent, besides magnitude itself and its participants: and besides all these another magnitude, through which all these become great; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of these forms is nothing more than an intellectual conception, which ought not to subsist any where but in the soul; and if this be the case, each will be one: and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue.

That Parmenides said, What then? is each of these conceptions one, but at the same time a conception of nothing?

That Socrates said, This is impossible.

It is a conception, therefore, of something?

Certainly.

If so, a third form of Largeness will present itself, over and above Largeness itself and the things that share in it; and again, covering both of these yet another, which will make all of them large. So each of your Forms will no longer be one, but infinite in number.”

“But Parmenides,” said Socrates, “may it not be that each of these Forms is a thought, which cannot properly come into being anywhere but in souls. In that way each of them would be one, and would thus not be liable to the difficulties which have just been described.”

“Then, is each Form one of these thoughts, and yet a thought of nothing?”

“No, that is impossible.”

“So it is a thought of something?”

“Yes.”
Parmenides: Of Being or of non-being?

Socrates: Of being. (On to)

Parmenides: Will it not be of One Certain Entity, which that conception Intellects

Socrates: Yes. (Na)

Parmenides: Then will not This Idea that is Being Intellected be One, by Always Being The Self in every case?

Socrates: This again, has come to Light as Necessary.

Parmenides: But what then? Or does it not appear Necessary, for you to say that inasmuch as other things Participate of The Ideas/Species, that each one of Them must be composed of Thoughts/Intellections and that All of Them in turn, must be Able to Intellect/Think?

Or will you say that although by Being Intellections, yet They are without Intelligence/Mind?
“Of something that is, or that is not?”

“Of something that is.”

“A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?”

“Yes.”

“Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?”

“That, again, seems inevitable.”

“Well then,” said Parmenides, “does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?”

Of being or of non-being?

Of being.

Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception understands as one certain idea in all things?

Undoubtedly.

But now will not that which is understood to be one, be a form always the same in all things?

This seems to be necessary.

That Parmenides then said, But what, is it not necessary, since other things participate of forms, that each should be composed from intellectual conceptions; and thus all of them be endued with intellection? Or will you assert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they understand nothing?

“Of something that is, or of something that is not?”

“Of something that is.”

“In fact, of some one thing which that thought understands to preside over all the cases, as being some one single idea?”

“Yes.”

“Then will not this thing that is thought of as being one and always the same in all cases be a form?”

“That again seems necessary.”

“And besides,” said Parmenides, “according to the way in which you assert that the other things have a share in the Forms, must you not hold either that each of those things consists of thoughts, so that all things think, or else that they are thoughts which nevertheless do not think?”
Socrates: But this has to be in no way Rational. But, O Parmenides, it seems to me indeed, to be clearly seen especially, as follows: On the one hand, These Ideas/Species are Set-Up in Their Very Nature, just as Paradigms/Models, whereas on the other hand, the others are Assimilated to These Models, and are Their likenesses; and The Self Participation, by the Assimilated to The Selves of The Ideas/Species. 

Parmenides: Therefore, if anything becomes Like The Idea/Species, can it be possible that on the side of eide, τω εἴδει, it seems to me indeed, that which becomes assimilated, and by as much as the assimilated nature is rendered Like The Self? Or is there any reason why, the like not be like The Like? καθ᾽ αυτῶν; ή ἐστι τοις μηχανῆ τὸ όρμον μὴ όροιν όροιν εἶναι; οὐκ ἐστι.

Oxford Greek

άλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον, ἄλλ᾽, ο Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιχε καταφαίνεται ὡθε ἔχειν: τά μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα ὄσπερ παραδέχεται ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φώσει, τά δὲ ἄλλα τούτων ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὀμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μεθέξις αὐτῆς τοίς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἶδῶν οὐχ ἄλλη τις ἡ εἰκασθήναι αὐτοῖς.

εἰ οὖν τι, ἐφη, ἐοικέν τῷ εἴδει, οὔν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ όροιν εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ᾽ ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἐστι τοις μηχανῆ τὸ όρμον μὴ όροιν όροιν εἶναι; οὐκ ἐστι.

Balboas

Socrates: There is not.
Loeb

“That is quite unreasonable, too,” he said, “but Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing else.”

“Then if anything,” he said, “resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?”

“No, there is none.”

Thomas Taylor

But that Socrates said, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to be to take place, in the most eminent degree, as follows: that these forms are established paradigms, as it were, in nature; but that other things are assimilated to these, and are their resemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms.

If any thing, therefore, becomes similar to a form, can it be possible that the form should not be similar to the assimilated, so far as the assimilated nature is rendered similar to the form? Or can any reason be assigned why similar should not be similar to similar?

There cannot.

Morrow and Dillon

“That too is unreasonable, said Socrates. But, Parmenides, it appears to me very likely that the case is as follows: that these Forms stand fixed as patterns, as it were, in the nature of things; the other things are made in their image and are likenesses; and this participation they come to have in the Forms is nothing but their being made in their image.”

“Well, if a thing is made in the image of the Form, can that Form fail to be like the image of it, in so far as the image was made in its likeness? Or is there any way that what is like can avoid being like what is like it?”

“No way.”
Oxford Greek

tὸ δὲ ὁμοιὸν τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀρ’ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἐνόσ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη.

οὐ δ᾿ ἂν τὰ ὁμοια μετέχοντα ὁμοια η, οὐκ ἐκείνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκ ἀρα οἶνον τε τῷ εἰδει ὁμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἴδος ἄλλοι: εἰ δὲ μὴ, παρὰ τὸ εἴδος ἄει ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἴδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκείνο τῷ ὁμοιον η, ἔτερον αὐ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἂει καὶνὸν εἴδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἴδος τῷ ἑαυτῷ μετέχοντι ὁμοιον γίγνηται.

ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Balboas

Parmenides: Accordingly then , is there not a Great Necessity , that The Relationship of like to Like should Participate of One Idea/Species/Paradigm of The Self ?

Socrates: Necessarily . ( Ἀναγκὴ .)

Parmenides: But will not That through The Participation of which , likes are like be The Ideal Self ?

Socrates: Yes , entirely so .

μὲν Παντάπασι οὖν .

Parmenides: Hence , neither can a (partible) thing Be Like The (Impartible) Idea/Species , nor ἂν τῷ ὁμοιον τῷ εἰδει , οὐδὲ The Species Be Like the thing . For if this were not the case , another species will always appear to εἴδος ἄλλοι : δὲ εἰ μὴ , ἄλλο εἴδος ἂει ἀναφανήσεται besides that species ; and that species will again become like another ; and so a new species would never cease to always come to be , as long as any species becomes like its participant .

καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἂει γιγνόμενον , ἐὰν τὸ εἴδος γιγνηται ὁμοιον τῷ ἑαυτῷ μετέχοντι .

Socrates: You speak most truly . ( λέγεις Ἀληθέστατα .)

beginning
Loeb

“And must not necessarily the like partake of the same idea as its like?”

“It must.”

“That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then it is impossible that anything be like the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they are alike, some further idea, in addition to the first, will always appear, and if that is like anything, still another, and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

Is there not, therefore, a mighty necessity that the similar to similar should participate of one and the same form?

It is necessary.

But will not that through the participation of which similars become similars be form itself?

Entirely so.

Nothing, therefore, can be similar to a form, nor a form to any other. For in this case another form will always appear besides some particular form: and if this again should become similar to another, another would be required; and a new form would never cease to take place, as long as any form becomes similar to its participant.

You speak most truly.

Morrow and Dillon

“And must not the thing which is like share with the thing that is like it in one and the same Form?”

“It must.”

“And will not that in which the like things share, so as to be alike, be just that Form? itself?”

“Certainly.”

“If so, nothing can be like the Form, nor can the Form be like anything. Otherwise a second Form will always make its appearance over and above the first Form; and if that second Form is like anything, yet a third; and there will be no end to this emergence of fresh Forms; if the Form is to be like the thing that partakes of it.”

“Quite true.”
οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τάλλα τῶν εἴδων μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τί ἁλὸ δεὶ ζητεῖν ὁ μεταλαμβάνει.

ἐσοκεν.

όρθς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σωκρατές, ὡς ἡ ἀπορία ἐὰν τις ὡς εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζεται; καὶ μάλα.

εἴ τοῖνυν ἢσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπτῃ αὐτῆς ὡς ἑστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἴδος ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄντων ἅν τι αἱ ἀφορίζομενος θήσεις.

πῶς δή; εἰπέν.

Socrates: So it seems .

Parmenides: Do you see then, O Socrates,

ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐὰν τις ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν ὑπάτη αὐτῆς ὡς ἑστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἴδος ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄντων ἅν τι ἀφορίζομενος θήσεις.

εἰπεῖν .

Socrates: I do, very much so.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, know well that you do not yet grasp how great is the difficulty

τοῖνυν ἢσθι. Εὐ τίνι οὐδέπω αἱτίετ αὐτὰ ὡς ἑστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, αἰτία ἑκαστὸν εἰν εἴδος τῶν ὄντων as always being something that is separate/set-apart .

Socrates: What do you mean then? (Πῶς δή ;)
“Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas we must seek some other method of participation.”

“So it seems.”

“Do you see, then, Socrates, how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?”

“Yes, certainly.”

“You may be sure,” he said, “that you do not yet, if I may say so, grasp the greatness of the difficulty involved in your assumption that each idea is one and is something distinct from concrete things.”

“How is that?” said he.

Hence, then, other things do not participate of forms through similitude; but it is necessary to seek after something else through which they participate.

So it seems.

That Parmenides then said, Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises, if any one defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves?

I do very much so.

Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious consequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings separate from its participants.

But that Socrates said, How do you mean?

“It follows that the other things do not partake of Forms in virtue of likeness; we must look for some other means by which they partake.”

“So it seems.”

“You see, then, Socrates,” he said, “what great difficulties there are in asserting their existence as Forms just by themselves?”

“I do indeed.”

“I assure you, then, you have as yet hardly grasped how great they will be, if you are going to set up a single Form for every distinction you make among things.”

“How so?”
Oxford Greek

πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τὸδε. εἰ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτά γιγνώσκεσθαι Ἰντα τοιαῦτα οἷα φαμεν δειν εἶναι τὰ εἰδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἕνδειξεν ὧν ὁ ἀμφιβολός καὶ μὴ ἄφιης, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάντως πολλά καὶ πάρομοι πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἰς ο άγνωστα ἀναγκάζουν αὐτά εἶναι.

πῇ δὴ, ὁ Παρμενίδης; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Balboas

Parmenides: On the one hand, there are many other doubts indeed, but on the other hand, the following one, is the greatest. If anyone should say that The Ideal Selves cannot even be properly known, being Such as we have said They Must Be. It could not even be proven to anyone, that he is mistaken, if it were not the case, on the one hand, that he who argues that πολλῶν τύχοι ἐμπειρὸς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἔπεσθαι, ἀλλʻ ἀπίθανος εἴη ο άγνωστα ἀναγκάζον αὐτά εἶναι.

Socrates: In what way then, O Parmenides? (Πη δὴ, ὁ Παρμενίδη;)
“There are many reasons,” he said, “but the greatest is this: if anyone should say that the ideas cannot even be known if they are such as we say they must be, no one could prove to him that he was wrong, unless he who argued that they could be known were a man of wide education and ability and were willing to follow the proof through many long and elaborate details; he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.”

“Why is that, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

That Parmenides answered, There are many other doubts, indeed, but this is the greatest: if any one should assert that it is not proper forms should be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, it is impossible to demonstrate that he who asserts this is deceived, unless he who doubts is skilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good disposition. But he should be willing to pursue him closely who endeavours to support his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he who contends that forms cannot be known will remain unpersuaded.

That Socrates said, In what respect, O Parmenides?

“The worst difficulty will be this, though there are plenty more. Suppose someone should say that the Forms, if they are such as we are saying they must be, cannot be know. One could not convince him that he was mistaken in that objection, unless he chanced to be a man of wide experience and natural ability, and were willing to follow one through a long and remote train of argument. Otherwise there would be no way of convincing a man who maintained that the Forms were unknowable.”

“Why so, Parmenides?” said Socrates.
Oxford Greek

ὅτι, ὦ Σωκρατεῖ, οἴμαι ἄν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὡστις ἀντίθν τινα καθ’ ἀντίθν ἔκαστον οὐσίαν
tίθεται εἴναι, ὁμολογήσαι ἄν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν ἀντίθν εἴναι ἐν ἐμὶ.
πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἀντίθν καθ’ ἀντίθν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπέτιν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἄλληλας εἰσίν αἱ εἰσίν, αὖταὶ πρὸς
αὐτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν

Balboas

Parmenides: In a way that I think both you and any other person, O Socrates, who would
τινα ὅτι οἴμαι καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὦ Σωκρατεῖ, ὡστις αὐτὴν τιθεται εἶναι, ἀντίθν
set-up The Ousia of each Idea as Subsisting Herself by Herself; you must agree
τιθεται οὐσίαν εκαστον εἴναι αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν, εἰς τοις ὁμολογησαι
in the first place, that None of The Ideal Selves, Exist in us.

Socrates: For if They did, then how could Their Ousia still Subsist Herself by Herself?

Parmenides: You speak Well. Is it not also the case, that of The Ideas that exist in relation to
λεγεῖς Καλῶς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν εἰσίν πρὸς Each Other, however many They Are, They Maintain Their Own Ousia in relation to Their
αὐτὰς, αὐτὰς, αὐτὰς, αὐτὰς, αὐτὰς, αὐτὰς

Selves.

133Ă αὐτὰς, αὐτας
“Because, Socrates, I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.”

“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said Socrates.

“You are right,” he said. “Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves,

Thomas Taylor

Because, O Socrates, I think that both you and any other, who establishes the essence of each form as subsisting by itself, must allow, in the first place, that no one of these subsists in us.

For (that Socrates said) how if it did, could it any longer subsist itself by itself?

That Parmenides replied, You speak well. But will you not admit that such ideas as are, with relation to each other, such as they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves,

Morrow and Dillon

“Because, Socrates, I imagine that you or anyone else who asserts that each of them has a real being ‘just by itself,’ would admit, to begin with, that no such real being exists in us.”

“True; for how could it then exist by itself?”

“Very good.” Said Parmenides. “And further, those of the Ideas which are what they are with reference to one another, have their being in such references among themselves,
Oxford Greek

ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἴμιν εἴτε ὀμοιώματα εἴτε ὑπὲρ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὅν ἴμιες μετέχοντες εἶναι ἐκαστὰ ἐπονομαζόμεθα: τὰ δὲ παρ’ ἴμιν ταῦτα ὀμοιώματα ὄντα ἐκεῖνοι αὐτὰ αὐτὸ ἴπτιν ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἑπτῶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνον ὁ σα αὐ ὄνομαζεται οἴδως.

πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

Balboas

but not in relation to those existing among us; whether in relation to some likeness, αλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τα ἴμιν εἴτε ὀμοιώματα or in whatever way one may then set selves up; and we do Participate of each relationship, εἴτε ὑπὲρ τις τοῦ ἄντα τίθεται, ἴμεν εἰς μετέχοντες ἐκαστὰ to which we apply by some particular name; but on the other hand, that those relations that exist ὄντα among us bear the same name as Those, and again our selves also exist in relation to our selves, παρ’ ἴμιν ταῦτα ὀμοιώματα αὐτὰ εἰς ἐπονομαζόμεθα: ἓν τα ὄντα but not in relation to Those Ideas; and again selves exist in relation to them selves, but not αἱ’ οὖν πρὸς εἴδειν τα εἴδη, αὐτὰ ἑπτῶν, αἰ’ οὐκ in relation to Those with whom they thus only Share Their Name.

Socrates: How do you mean this? (Πῶς λέγεις;)
and not in relation to the likenesses, or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and, belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.”

“What do you mean?” said Socrates.

and not with reference to things subsisting among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner you may establish such things; each of which, while we participate, we distinguish by some peculiar appellation? But that the things subsisting among us, and which are synonymous to these, subsist also with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive with them a common appellation.

That then Socrates said, How do you mean?

not with reference to those likenesses (or whatever we are to call them) in our world, which we participate in and so come to be called by their several names. And, on the other hand, these things in our world which are homonymous with the Forms are related among themselves, not to the Forms; and all the names of that sort that they bear have reference to one another, not to the Forms.”

“How do you mean?” asked Socrates.
οἶνον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενῖδην, ἐὰν τὶς ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δούλος ἔστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δήπον, ὃ ἐστι δεσπότης, ἐκεῖνον δούλος ἔστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δοῦλον, ὃ ἐστι δοῦλος. δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ′ ἀνθρώπος ὃν ἀνθρώπον ἀμφότερα ταύτ᾽ ἔστιν: αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστίν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ δουλεία ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπως αὐτῆ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς;

Balboas

Parmenides: Such as, if one of us were The Lord or the servant of any one; then, the one who is a servant, is certainly not in any way, the servant of That Selfhood of The Lordship of The Lord, nor is The One who is Lord, The Lord of The Selfhood of the servant; whereas by being human, they Share in both these human relations. On the other hand, Self Mastership is That which It Is, from Its Relation to Self Stewardship; and Self Stewardship, being none of Their Power in relation to Those Ideas nor Those in relation to us.

Exercise none of Their Power in relation to Those Ideas nor Those in relation to us.
“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, nor is the master the master of slave in the abstract; each is a man and is master or slave of a man but mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract, but our slaves and masters are not relative to them, nor they to us;

Thomas Taylor

As if, Parmenides answered, some one of us should be the master or servant of any one; he who is master is not the master of servant, nor is he who is servant, servant of master; but he sustains both these relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, dominion itself is that which it is from its relation to servitude; and servitude, in a similar manner, is servitude with reference to dominion. But the ideas with which we are conversant possess no power over the ideas which subsist by themselves, nor have they any authority over us:

Morrow and Dillon

"Suppose, for instance, one of us is master or slave of another, he is not, of course, the slave of Master itself, the essential Master, nor, if he is a master, is he master of Slave itself, the essential Slave, but, being a man, is master or slave of another man; whereas Mastership itself is what it is of Slavery itself; and Slavery itself is slavery to Mastership itself The significance of things in our world is not with reference to things in that other world, nor have these their significance with reference to us;
Oxford Greek

ἐλλ' ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα τὲ ἔστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὁμαλῶς πρὸς αὐτὰ. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

πάντα γ', εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω.

οὐκόνοι καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὕτη μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἄν ἐκεῖνης εἰή ἐπιστήμη;

πάντα γε.

ἐκάστη δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν, ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἰή ἄν ἐπιστήμη, ἢ οὐ; ναί.

Balboas

Thus I say that They both Subsist by Them Selves and also Selves in Relation to Selves; and in a similar way, Those in us in relation to Them Selves. Or do you not understand what I say?

Socrates: I understand quite well indeed.

Mastership : Stewardship : : Self Mastership : Self Stewardship

Parmenides: 7 On the one hand, is it not also the case, that if Self Knowledge is the Knowledge of That which Is True, then Knowledge would be of That Self?

Socrates: Perfectly so. (Πανυ γε.)

Parmenides: But on the other hand, will every Knowledge, which Is, then in turn, Be The Knowledge of Each-one of The Real Beings that Exist; or not?

Socrates: Yes, it will. (Ναι.)

beginning
they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves. You understand what I mean, do you not?”

“Certainly,” said Socrates, “I understand.”

“Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth?”

“Certainly.”

“And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

but I assert that they subsist from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and ours, in a similar manner, with relation to themselves. Do you understand what I say?

That Socrates replied, Entirely so.

That Parmenides then said, Is not science itself, so far as it is such, the science of truth itself?

Perfectly so.

But will each of the sciences which is, be the science of each of the things which are?

Certainly it will.

Morrow and Dillon

but, as I say, the things in that world are what they are with reference to one another and towards one another; and so likewise are the things in our world. You see what I Mean?”

“Certainly I do,” said Socrates.

And similarly Knowledge itself, the essence of Knowledge, will be knowledge of Truth itself, the essentially real?”

“Certainly.”

“And again any given branch of Knowledge in itself will be knowledge of some department of real things as it is in itself, will it not?”

"Yes."
Oxford Greek

ἡ δὲ παρ’ ἦμιν ἑπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ’ ἦμιν ἀληθείας εἶναι, καὶ αὐτό ἑκάστη ἠ παρ’ ἦμιν ἑπιστήμη τῶν παρ’ ἦμιν ἄνων ἑκάστου ἀληθινοὶ εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ’ ἦμιν οἷόν τε εἶναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Parmenides: But will not The Knowledge among us, be The Truth which exists among us?

Socrates: Necessarily so. (Ἀναγκη.)

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

nor can They exist As Such among us.

Socrates: Certainly not then. (Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.)
“And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and each kind of our knowledge be the knowledge of each kind of truth that exists among us?”

“Yes, that is inevitable.”

“But the ideas themselves, as you, agree, we have not, neither can they be among us.”

“No, they cannot.”

But will not our science be conversant with the truth which subsists among us? And will not each of our sciences be the science of that being which happens to reside with us?

It is necessary that it should be so.

But you have granted that we do not possess forms, and that they are not things with which we are conversant?

Certainly not.

While the knowledge in our world will be knowledge of the truth in our world? And again it would follow that each branch of knowledge in our world must be knowledge of a class of beings in our world?”

“Necessarily.”

“But, as you admit, we do not possess the Forms themselves, nor can they exist in our world.”

“No.”
Oxford Greek

γιγνώσκεται δὲ γέ που όπ’ αυτοῦ του εἴδους τού τής ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη α ἔστιν ἐκαστα;

ναι.

δὲ γε ἡμείς οὐκ ἔχομεν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκ ἀρα ὑπὸ γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τὼν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπείδη αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.

οὐκ ἐοικεν.

Balboas

Parmenides: But Every Genus/Class/Whole of Self is somehow Recognized to be/Known to be That which It Is indeed, by means of The Idea of The Knowledge of The Self?

α εστιν γε, υπ’ του ειδους της επιστηµης του αυτου ;

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι .)

Parmenides: Which Ideal Real Being, we do not indeed possess.

Ο ηµεις ουκ γε εχοµεν .

Socrates: We do not. (Ου γαρ .)

Parmenides: Accordingly then, not a Single One of The Ideas are Recognized/Known by us,

seeing that we do not Participate of Self Knowledge!

επειδη ου μετεχοµεν αυτης επιστηµης .

Socrates: It does not seem likely. (Ουκ εοικεν .)

beginning
Loeb

“And the various classes of ideas are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?”

“Yes.”

“Which we do not possess.”

“No, we do not.”

“Then none of the ideas is known by us, since we do not partake of absolute knowledge.”

“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

Is each genus of beings known to be what it is, through the form itself of science?

Undoubtedly.

But this form we do not possess?

By no means.

No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of science itself?

It does not appear it can.

Morrow and Dillon

“And presumably the classes of being, just as they are in themselves, are known by the Form of Knowledge itself?”

“Yes.”

“The Form which we do not possess.”

“True.”

“The none of the Forms is known by us, since we do not partake of Knowledge itself.”

“Apparently not.”
Oxford Greek

ἀγνωστον ἡν καὶ αὐτό τὸ καλὸν ὅ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἂ δὴ ὡς ἵδεας αὐτὰς οἰσις ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

κινδυνεύειν.

οὐκ ἐπει τοῦτο δεινότερον τὸδε.

φαίνεις ἄν ποιον, εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτό ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ᾽ ἢμιν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὀδύτω.

οἰκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μάλλον ἢ θεῶν φαίνεις ἂνη τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;

ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Parmenides: Therefore , The Beautiful Self , which is also The Good Self and All The Selves which we have surely taken-up as Being Ideas , are also Un-Known by us ?
134C α δὴ υπολαμβάνομεν ὡς οὐσίας ἱδεας ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀγνωστον ἡμιν .

Socrates: I am afraid they are . ( Κινδυνεύει )

Parmenides: Behold then , this even more fearful consequence .

Όρα δὴ τούτου ετε, δεινότερον τὸδε .

Socrates: What is it ? (Τὸ ποιον ;)

Parmenides: You will say perhaps, that if indeed there is a Certain Genus/Class of Knowledge , αν Φαίης ποιον εἴπερ εστὶν τι γένος ἐπιστήμης then It is much more-Perfect than the knowledge which exists among us ; and the same goes αὐτὸ εἶναι πολὺ ἀκριβεστέρον η τὴν ἐπιστήμην παρ᾽ ἡμίν , οὔτως for Beauty , and all the other Genera/Classes/Kinds/Wholes . καὶ κάλλος καὶ πάντα τάλλα .

Socrates: Yes . (Ναι .)

Parmenides: Is it not the case , that if indeed anyone else Partakes of Self Knowledge , ὑποκούει εἴπερ τι ἄλλο μετέχει αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης then you will not affirm that anyone Possesses That Most Perfect Knowledge more than God ?

αν οὐκ φαίης τινὰ ἂνη τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν ;

Socrates: Necessarily not . (Ἀναγκῇ .)
“Then the absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.”

“I am afraid they are.”

“Now we come to a still more fearful consequence.”

“What is it?”

“You would say, no doubt, that if there is an absolute kind of knowledge, it is far more accurate than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and all the rest?”

“Yes.”

“And if anything partakes of absolute knowledge, you would say that there is no one more likely than God to possess this most accurate knowledge?”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

The beautiful itself, therefore, and the good itself, and all such things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us?

So it seems.

But survey this, which is yet still more dire.

What?

You will say, perhaps, that if there is any certain genus of science, it is much more accurate than the science which resides with us; and that this is likewise true of beauty, and every thing else?

Certainly.

If, therefore, any one possesses science itself, will you not assert that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a God?

It is necessary so to assert.

Morrow and Dillon

“So Beauty itself or Goodness itself and all the things we take as Forms in themselves, are unknowable to us.”

“That may be so.”

“Then here is a still more dreadful consequence for you to consider.”

“What is that?”

“You will grant, I suppose, that there is such a thing as a Form of Knowledge, it is much more exact than the knowledge in our world; and so with Beauty and all the rest.”

“Yes.”

“And if anything has part in this Knowledge itself, you would agree that a god has a better title than anyone else to possess the most perfect knowledge?”

“Undoubtedly.”
Oxford Greek

ἆρ᾽ οὖν οἷός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; τί γάρ οὖς;

ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ παρὰ ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν ἡμῖν, μήτε τὰ παρὰ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἑκατέρα, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκατέρα.

ὑμιλόγηται γάρ.

Balboas

Parthenides: Take notice then; is it possible in turn, that God, can Know of our affairs, by Possessing Self Knowledge? (εχων αυτην επιστημην ;)

Socrates: Why would He not? (Τι γαρ ου ;)

Parthenides: Since it has been agreed by us, O Socrates, that neither do Those Ideas Have The Power which They Possess, in relation to those among us, nor those among us, in relation to Those, but that Selves exist in relation to Selves in each realm.

Socrates: It was so agreed. (γαρ Ομολογηται .)
Loeb

“Then will it be possible for God to know human things, if he has absolute knowledge?”

“Why not?”

“But,” said Parmenides, “we have agreed that those ideas are not relative to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to themselves.”

“Yes, we have agreed to that.”

Thomas Taylor

But can a God, being such as he is, know our affairs through possessing science itself?

Why should he not?

That Parmenides said, Because it has been confessed by us, O Socrates, that neither do those forms possess the power which is peculiar to them, through relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each division are referred to themselves.

It was admitted by us.

Morrow and Dillon

“Then will the god, who possesses Knowledge itself, be able to know the things in our world?”

"Why not?"

"Because," said Parmenides, we have agreed that those forms have no significance with reference to things in our world, nor have things in our world any significance with reference to them. Each set has it only among themselves."

"Yes, we did agree on that.”
Parmenides: Is it not so, that if there is The Most Perfect Mastership among Divinity, and The Most Perfect Self Knowledge, then neither will The Mastership of Those Gods Rule  
her akribestatē autē epistēmē, ouτ' aut' an  

οὐκουν εἰςτιν  

κατα  

their knowledge know of us, nor of any other of our concerns,  

καὶ  

those gods rule, nor can we Know/Recognize  

That which Is Divine, in any way, through the assistance of our knowledge. And again,  

according to The Self/Same Logos, They will neither, be our (Immediate- JEB, Sym 202e-203a)  

Rulers (Apology 31a, Phaedo 62b) nor have any Cognition of human affairs (by Self-Knowledge).  

despolou  

Socrates: But then would not The Logos, be wondrous in the extreme,  

Alla μη ο λόγος Αλλα θαυματος λιαν  

insofar as one were to deprive Divinity of knowing?  

η  

tiς ei apostherēsei ton theon tou eidēnai.

beginning
Loeb

“Then if this most perfect mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, his mastership can never rule us, nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs.”

“But surely this,” said he, “is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, there is the most accurate dominion with Divinity, and the most accurate science, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor will their science take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a similar manner, we shall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the assistance of our science. And again, in consequence of the same reasoning, they will neither, though Gods, be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns.

But would not the discourse be wonderful in the extreme, which should deprive Divinity of knowledge?

Morrow and Dillon

“Then, if this most perfect Mastership and most perfect Knowledge are in Gods world, the gods’ Mastership can never be exercised over us, nor their Knowledge know us or anything in our world. Just as we do not rule over them by virtue of rule as it exists in our world, and we know nothing that is divine by our knowledge, so they, on the same principle, being gods, are not our masters, nor do they know anything of human concerns.”

“But surely,” said Socrates, “an argument which would deprive the gods of knowledge would be too strange.”
Oxford Greek

tάυτα μέντοι, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἐφίβ ο Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἐτὶ ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνιν πολλὰ ἀναγκαίον ἔχειν τὰ εἰδή, εἰ εἰσίν αὐταί ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτὸ τι ἐκαστὸν εἰδός; ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τὸν ἄκουόντα καὶ ἀμφισβήτηειν ὡς ὦτε ἔστι ταύτα, εἶ τε ὦτι μάλιστα εἰπ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπινῇ φύσῃ ἄγνωστα, καὶ ταύτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τῷ τῇ λέγειν καὶ, ὁ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς διεσανάπειστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνιν μὲν εὐφυοῖς τοῦ δενήμοιν μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἐκαστὸν καὶ οὐσία αὕτῃ καθ’ αὕτην.

Balboas

Parmenides: Nevertheless, O Socrates, these and very many other consequences besides these, must be so in relation to The Ideas, if The Ideal Selves of The Real Beings Exist, and if one determines that Each One is a Certain Ideal Self; so that one who hears these words is puzzled and questions whether Selves do exist; or if They do Exist, that They Exist in The Highest Degree, so that it appears abundantly necessary that Selves must be unknown by human nature.

And whosoever speaks in this way, may appear to say something important; and, which we just now said, may be thought of as being an extraordinary statement, by remaining unable to be persuaded. And yet on the one hand, as it falls to The Ability of an Individual of a Very Good Natural Disposition, to be able to learn that there is a certain Genus of Each Idea, and that of The Self of Ousia by Her Self.

...
“And yet, Socrates,” said Parmenides, “these difficulties and many more besides are inseparable from the ideas, if these ideas of things exist and we declare that each of them is an absolute idea. Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the ideas do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and, as I was saying just now, he is amazingly hard to convince. Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence,

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides said, These, O Socrates, and many other consequences besides these, must necessarily happen to forms, if they are the ideas of things, and if any one separates each form apart from other things; so that any one who hears these assertions, may doubt and hesitate whether such forms have any subsistence; or if they do subsist in a most eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly necessary that they should be unknown by the human nature. Hence he who thus speaks may seem to say something to the purpose; and as we just now said, it may be considered as a wonderful thing, on account of the difficulty of being persuaded, and as the province of a man of a very naturally good disposition, to be able to perceive that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an essence itself subsisting by itself:

Morrow and Dillon

“And yet Socrates,” said Parmenides, “these difficulties and many more besides are inevitably involved in the forms if these ideas belong to things and one is going to distinguish each form as a thing just by itself. The result is that the hearer is in doubt and in two minds whether to question their existence, or to contend that, if they do exist, they must certainly be unknowable by our human nature. Moreover, there seems to be some weight in these objections, and as we were saying, it is extraordinarily difficult to convert the objector. Only a man of exceptional gifts will be able to see that a genus, or essence, just by itself, does exist in each case;
ἐν δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εἰρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἵκανος διευκρινησάμενον.

συγχωρῶ σοι, ἢφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὦ Σωκράτης: πάνω γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἰ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σωκράτες, αὐτῇ ἡ δέ εἶδη τῶν ὀντῶν εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδή καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέφας, μηδὲ τι ὁριεῖται εἴδος ἕνος ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει,

Balboas

so on the other hand, they will deserve - even
greater admiration, who having made this discovery, shall be able to teach yet another person
how to thoroughly-well-distinguish all these particulars, in a Sufficiently-Efficient Way.

Socrates: I agree with you entirely, O Parmenides, for you speak According to my Mind.

Parmenides: But nevertheless in turn, O Socrates, if anyone indeed, does not permit The
Ideas of Real-Beings to be, by not Keeping their Mind Fixed upon all these recent objections
and others like them, and does not Define One of Each Particular Idea/Genus/Paradigm,
surely then, they will have no where to turn their understanding,

beginning
and only a still more wonderful man can find out all these facts and teach anyone else to analyze them properly and understand them.”

“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “for what you say is very much to my mind.”

“But on the other hand,” said Parmenides, “if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of ideas of things, and does not assume an idea under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss,

Thomas Taylor

but he will deserve still greater admiration, who, after having made this discovery, shall be able to teach another how to discern and distinguish all these in a becoming manner.

That then Socrates said, I assent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely speak agreeably to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been said, and other things of the same kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic part,

Morrow and Dillon

and it will require someone still more remarkable to discover it and to instruct another who has thoroughly examined all these difficulties.”

“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “what you are saying is very much to my mind.”

“But on the other hand,” said Parmenides, “if, in view of all these difficulties and others like them, Socrates, a man refuses to admit that Forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite Form in every case, he will have no direction in which to turn his thought,
μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστων τῆν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθείβεσθi. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν ὦν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡσθῆσθαι. αἀληθὴ λέγεις. φάναι.

τὶ οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρi; τῇ τρέψη ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; οὐ πάνω μοι δοκώ καθορᾶν ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι.

Oxford Greek

while they do not allow that

The Idea of Each One of The Real Beings Is Always of The Self, and in this way, entirely destroy The Power of Dialectics.

Therefore, in such a way, you also appear to perceive much According to my Mind.

Socrates: You speak The Truth.

Parmenides: 8 What then will you do in relation to Philosophy?

In what way will you Turn your Mind, if you are ignorant of these particulars?

Socrates: At the present time, I do indeed appear, not to see in what way at all.

beginning
Loeb

since he denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy
the power of carrying on discussion. You seem to have been well aware of this.”

“Quite true,” he said.

“Then what will become of philosophy? To what can you turn, if these things are unknown?”

“I do not see at all, at least not at present.”

Thomas Taylor

while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exists to be always the same, and by this
means entirely destroys the dialectic power of the soul: but you also seem in this respect to perceive
perfectly the same with myself.

That Socrates answered, You speak the truth.

What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself, being ignorant of
these?

Indeed I do not seem to myself to know at present.

Morrow and Dillon

so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same; and in so
doing he will completely destroy the significance of all discourse. But that consequence I think you
perceive only too well.”

“Quite right,” he said.

“What are you going to do about philosophy, then? Where will you turn while the answers to these
questions remain unknown?”

“I can see no way out at the present moment.”
Oxford Greek

πρὶν γὰρ, εἰσεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλὸν τὲ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν εἴδῶν. ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρ𝒪νην σου ἀκοῦσαν διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τρόδε. καλὴ μὲν και θεία, εὗ ἤρμη ἢ ὄρμη ᾧ τοῖς λόγοις: ἐλκύσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἐως ἐτε νέος εἰ: εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἤ ἀλῆθεια.

τῆς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;

Balboas

Parmenides: That is because, you exercise yourself too early in this manner, O Socrates.

You should endeavor beforehand to Define what is Beautiful and Just and Good, and Each of The Ideas. For I also just recently mentally noted this, while hearing you discoursing with Aristotle here. Thus on the one hand, that Impulse, by which you are impelled towards discourse, is Beautiful and Divine—you may be sure of that—but on the other hand, 

you must collect Your Self together, by exercising more in that way; which appears to be useless to the multitude, and is called by them empty talk; while you are still young, 

for if you do not, The Truth will utterly-elude you. 

Socrates: What then, O Parmenides, is this manner of exercise?

Τίς οὖν, ὦ Παρμενιδή, ο τρόπος τῆς γυμνασίας;

beginning
“No, Socrates,” he said, “for you try too soon, before you are properly trained, to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all the other ideas. You see I noticed it when I heard you talking yesterday with Aristoteles here. Your impulse towards dialectic is noble and divine, you may be assured of that; but exercise and train yourself while you are still young in an art which seems to be useless and is called by most people mere loquacity; otherwise the truth will escape you.”

“What, then, Parmenides,” he said, “is the method of training?”

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides said, Before you exercise yourself in this affair, O Socrates, you should endeavour to define what the beautiful, the just, and the good are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the necessity of your accomplishing this, when I heard you discoursing with Aristotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to disputation, is both beautiful and divine; but collect yourself together, and while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

That Socrates then said, What method of exercise is this, O Parmenides?

Morrow and Dillon

“That is because you are undertaking to define the ‘beautiful’, ‘just’, ‘good’, and each one of the Forms too soon, before you have had a preliminary training. I noticed that the other day when I heard you talking here with Aristotle. Believe me, there is something beautiful and divine in your impulse for argument; but you must make an effort and exercise yourself more, while you are still young, in that activity which seems to be useless and which the many call “idle talk.” Otherwise, the truth will escape you.”

“What form, then, Parmenides,” he said, “shall this exercise take?”
Oxford Greek

οὗτος, ἐπεν, ὃν περ ἱκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τούτῳ γε σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἶας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνα ἰ μάλιστα τις ἄν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἴηκε σοι εἰναι.

dokei γάρ μοι, ἐφι, ταυτη γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἴναι καὶ δροια καὶ ἀνόρια καὶ ἀλλο ὅπιον τὰ ὅντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.

καὶ καλὼς γ’, ἐφι. χρη δε καὶ τόδε ἐτι πρὸς τοῦτο

Balboas

Parmenides: The Way is just That which you heard Zeno practicing. Except that I was also quite pleased with what you said to him, because you would not allow him to look upon the wandering that exists among the objects of sight nor upon the wandering that exists in relation to them, but to consider according to That which one can grasp especially by Logos and in this way, one would thus be led to See The Ideas.

Socrates: For it appears to me, that in this way it may indeed be shown without difficulty, that The Beings experience both Like and Unlike, and anything else that exists.

Parmenides: Quite rightly indeed. But it is also necessary that, besides this, γ’ καλὼς καὶ . δε καὶ χρη προς τουτω
“That which you heard Zeno practising,” said he. “However, even when you were speaking to him I was pleased with you, because you would not discuss the doubtful question in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to what we conceive most entirely by the intellect and may call ideas.”

“Yes,” he said, “that is because I think that in that way it is quite easy to show that things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.”

“Quite right,” said he, “but if you wish to get better training, you must do something more than that;

Thomas Taylor

And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the wandering which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place in such things as are especially apprehended by reason, and which some one may consider as having a real subsistence.

For it appears to me (said Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both similars and dissimilars, or any thing else which it is the province of beings to suffer.

That Parmenides replied, You speak well: but it is necessary that, besides this,

Morrow and Dillon

“The Form,” he said, “which you heard Zeno employing with this exception: there was one thing you said to him that impressed me very much; you would not allow the survey to be confined to visible things or to range only over the field; it was to extend to those objects which are specially apprehended by rational discourse and can be regarded as Forms.”

“Yes,” he said, “because in the former field there seems to be no difficulty about showing that things are both like and unlike and have any other character you please.”

“You are right. But there is one more thing that you must do.
you should still

also suppose the following; to consider not only the consequences resulting from the hypothesis, and to suppose the following; to consider in turn, what will result both in this same hypothesis, which Zeno hypothesized; (1) that if Many (Beings 127c) Exist, what must result both to The Many and in turn, both in relation to The Selves and in relation to The One, and again if Many (Beings) Exist, what must result for The One in relation to The Self and in relation to The Many; and in turn, if The Many do not Exist, to consider in turn, what will result both in relation to The One and to The Many, both in relation to The Selves and in relation to Each-Other.
you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.”

“What do you mean?” he said.

“Take, for instance,” he replied, “that hypothesis of Zeno's if the many exist, you should inquire what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and to the many, and also what will happen to the one and the many in relation to themselves and to each other, if the many do not exist.

Thomas Taylor

you should not only consider if each of the things supposed is, what will be the consequences from the hypothesis, but likewise what will result from supposing that it is not, if you wish to be more exercised in this affair.

How do you mean (said Socrates)?

As if (said Parmenides) you should wish to exercise yourself in this hypothesis of Zeno, if there are many things, what ought to happen both to the many with reference to themselves, and to The One; and to The One with respect to itself, and to the many: and again, if many are not, to consider what will happen both to The One and to the many, as well to them-selves as to each other.

Morrow and Dillon

If you want to be thoroughly exercised, you must not merely make the supposition that such and such a thing is, and then consider the consequences; you must also make the supposition that the same thing is not.”

“How do you mean?” he said.

"Take," he said, "if you like, this hypothesis which Zeno made: ‘If there are many things, what consequences must follow both for those many things with reference to themselves and to the One, and also for the One with reference to itself and to the many; and again, if there are not many, to consider in turn what will follow both for the One and for the many, with reference to themselves and to each other.”
And again in turn (2), one should hypothesize, if Likeness Exists, or if It does not exist, 
and to The Others, both in relation to The Selves and to Each-Other.

And (3) The Self/Same Logos must also be applied to The Unlike, to Motion and Rest, 
and to generation and Dissolution and to The Self that Is and to The Self that Is not, and in One 
perι γενέσεως καὶ φθοράς καὶ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εϊναι καὶ του εϊναι μη ; καὶ ενι Logos, concerning That which should be hypothesized as Always-Being and as not-Being and 
λόγο (Pro-Tim 168ε), περὶ στασεως αὐτὸν τοις ἐν τοις ἄλλοις ὡς αὐτὲν καὶ ως αὐτὸν ὡς anything else that undergoes any experience whatsoever, one must consider the consequences 
πάσχοντος πάθος στασεως, δεὶ σκοπεῖν τα ἑξιμβαίνοντα in relation to The Self and in relation to each one of The Others being considered, which anyone 
προς αὑτὸ καὶ προς ἐκαστὸν ἐν τοις ἄλλοις, τι may set-up for this purpose, and in relation to Many, and similarly in relation to Everything.

beginning
And likewise if you suppose the existence or non-existence of likeness, what will happen to the things supposed and to other things in relation to themselves and to each other under each of the two hypotheses. The same applies to unlikeness and to motion and rest, creation and destruction, and even to being and not being. In brief, whatever the subject of your hypothesis, if you suppose that it is or is not, or that it experiences any other affection, you must consider what happens to it and to any other particular things you may choose, and to a greater number and to all in the same way;

And again, if he should suppose *if similitude is, or if it is not*, what will happen from each hypothesis, both to the things supposed and to others, and to themselves and to each other; and the same method of proceeding must take place concerning *the dissimilar, motion and permanency, generation and corruption, being and non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every thing which is supposed either to be or not to be, or influenced in any manner by any other passion, it is necessary to consider the consequences both to itself and to each individual of other things, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner;

Or, once more, if you suppose that Likeness exists or does not exist, what will follow on either supposition both for the terms supposed for other things, with reference to themselves and to each other; and the same story with Unlikeness. And with Motion and Rest, and with Generation and Corruption, and with Being and Not-Being themselves. And in a word, whenever you suppose that anything whatsoever exists or does not exist or has any other attribute, you ought to consider the consequences with reference to itself and to each one of the other things that you may select, and several of them, and all of them together;
καὶ τάλλα αὐτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅτι ἃν προαρή ἀεί, ἑάντε ώς ὃν ὑποθῇ ὁ ὑπετίθεσο, ἑάντε ώς μὴ ὃν, εἰ μέλλεις τελεώς γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διοφεσθαι τὸ ἀληθὲς.

άμηχανόν γ᾽ ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Παρμενίδης, πραγματείαν, καὶ ὃς σφόδρα μανθάνω, ἄλλα μοι τί ὃν διήλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τι, ἵνα μάλλον καταμάθω.

And in turn (4), how The Others are related to The Selves and to any Other which one may select, whether you hypothesize as the subject of your hypothesis That which Always Is, or as that which Is-not; if you care about being Perfectly exercised to Thoroughly-Behold The Truth, in a Masterful Way.

Socrates: You speak, O Parmenides, of an extraordinary undertaking, and I do not quite understand. But why do you not hypothesize in detail a Certain/Definite Self for me, in order that I may be more able to understand?

Balloas

beginning
Loeb

and you must consider other things in relation to themselves and to anything else you may choose in any instance, whether you suppose that the subject of your hypothesis exists or does not exist, if you are to train yourself completely to see the truth perfectly.”

“Parmenides,” he said, “it is a stupendous amount of study which you propose, and I do not understand very well. Why do you not yourself frame an hypothesis and discuss it, to make me understand better?”

Thomas Taylor

and again, how other things are related to themselves, and to another which you establish, whether you consider that which is the subject of your hypothesis as having a subsistence or as not subsisting; if, being perfectly exercised, you design through proper media to perceive the truth.

That Socrates then said, You speak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impossible to accomplish, nor do I very much understand what you mean; but why do you not establish a certain hypothesis yourself, and enter on its discussion, that I may be the better instructed in this affair?

Morrow & Dillon

and again you must study these others with reference both to themselves and to any one thing you may select, whether you have assumed the thing to exist or not to exist, if you are really going to win through to a sight of the truth after a complete course of discipline.”

“It is an unmanageable task, Parmenides, of which you speak, and I don't altogether understand. Why not postulate some proposition and go through it yourself, that I may grasp this more clearly?”
Oxford Greek

πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὁ Ὁσκράτες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε.

ἀλλὰ σὺ, εἰπὲν τὸν Ὁσκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὖ διήλθές ἦρν;

καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἐφή γελάσαντα φάναι: αὐτὸ, ὁ Ὁσκράτες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου: μὴ γὰρ οὖ φαύλον ἢ ὁ λέγει, ἢ οὐχ ὀρφής ὡςον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἢν δεῖσθαι: αὕτε γὰρ τα τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλος τε καὶ τηλικῶδω.

Balboas

Parthenides: You assign, O Socrates, much work, for one as old as me.

Socrates: Then in that case, Zeno, why don’t you unfold it in detail for us?

Antiphon: Then Zeno, laughing, said:

Zeno: We must ask Parmenides himself, O Socrates. For, as it has been said, it is indeed, no trifling matter. Or do you not see the magnitude of the work you are assigning? If, then, on the one hand, more of us were present, it would not be appropriate to make such a request; for it is unsuitable, and especially for a man of his age, to speak of matters such as these in the presence of many people.

beginning
Loeb

“That is a great task, Socrates,” he said, “to impose upon a man of my age.”

“But you, Zeno,” said Socrates, “why do not you do it for us?”

Pythodorus said that Zeno answered with a smile: “Let us ask it of Parmenides himself, Socrates; for there is a great deal in what he says, and perhaps you do not see how heavy a task you are imposing upon him. If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him; for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age;

Thomas Taylor

That Parmenides replied, You assign, O Socrates, a mighty labour to a man so old as myself!
Will you, then, O Zeno (said Socrates), discuss something for us?
And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, said - We must request Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking; for, as he says, it is no trifling matter; or do you not see the prodigious labour of such a discussion? If, therefore, many were present, it would not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for an old man, to discourse about things of this kind before many witnesses.

Morrow and Dillon

“That is a heavy task, Socrates,” he said, “to lay on a man of such an age.”

“But you, Zeno,” said Socrates, “why don't you give us the illustration?”
He said that Zeno laughed and replied: “Let us beg Parmenides himself to do it, Socrates. What he means is no light matter, I’m afraid. Or do you not see what a task you are setting? If we were a greater multitude than we are, it would not be fair to ask him. Such a discourse would be unsuitable before a large audience, particularly in a man of his age;
όγνωσιν γάρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἄληθεί νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου.

ταύτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτὸν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Αριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς άλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὁ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν.

Balboas

For the many are ignorant that, without This Discursive Procession and Wandering through All Beings/Cities (Poem-Frag1), it happens to be impossible for The Mind to hold-on to The Truth. Therefore, O Parmenides, I ask in conjunction with Socrates, that you yourself undertake the discussion, in order that I may also hear to the end, that which I heard some time ago.

Antiphon: 9 Then when Zeno asked this, Pythodorus said, that he also, and Aristotle, and the others asked Parmenides, to demonstrate that which he spoke of and not do otherwise, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου, ἐνδείξασθαι ὁ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἄλλῳς.
for the many do not know that except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain to the truth. So I, Parmenides, join Socrates in his request, that I myself may hear the method, which I have not heard for a long time."

Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when Zeno said this he himself and Antisthenes and the rest begged Parmenides to show his meaning by an example and not to refuse.

Thomas Taylor

For the many are ignorant that, without this discursive progression and wandering through all things, it is impossible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the possession of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a discussion, which I have not heard for a long time.

But Zeno having made this request, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he also, and Aristotle, and the rest who were present, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he spoke of, and not to deny their request.

Morrow and Dillon

because most people are unaware that you cannot hit upon truth and gain understanding without this discursive wandering over the whole field. So, Parmenides, I join with Socrates in his request, in the hope of being an auditor of yours once again after all this time."

When Zeno had said this, Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that he himself begged Parmenides and so did Aristotle and the others, not to disappoint them but to indicate what he has been describing.
Oxford Greek

tὸν Οἰδυπούδην: ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι, καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου
πεπονθέναι, ὦ ἐκείνος ἀθλητή ὡς καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ώφ' ἀρματὶ μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἐαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβύτερῳ, ὑφ' αἵματι μέλλοντι ἄγων ὑπεραιροῦντα τὸν ἐρωτα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ἡναι: καίγω μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὑπεραιροῦντα τοιούτων και τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων:

Balboas

Parmenides: It is necessary to comply with your request. And yet, I appear to myself to sympathize with the fate of the horse of Ibycus, which being a race-horse, and being advanced in years, when being about to contend in the chariot races, and by knowing the experience, trembled with fear at the forthcoming event, and to whom, Ibycus, comparing himself, said - Thus also, I that am so old, am involuntarily compelled to return to The Object of My Love - and I also, being as old as I am, appear to myself to exceedingly dread the present undertaking, remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great a sea of discourse.
And Parmenides said: “I must perforce do as you ask. And yet I feel very much like the horse in the poem of Ibycus—an old race-horse who was entered for a chariot race and was trembling with fear of what was before him, because he knew it by experience. Ibycus says he is compelled to fall in love against his will in his old age, and compares himself to the horse. So I am filled with terror when I remember through what a fearful ocean of words I must swim, old man that I am.

Thomas Taylor

That then Parmenides said, It is necessary to comply with your entreaties, though I should seem to myself to meet with the fate of Ibycean horse, to whom as a courser, and advanced in years, when about to content in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himself, said - Thus also I that am so old, am compelled to return to the subjects of my love; in like manner, I appear to myself to dread vehemently the present undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requisite to swim over such, and so great a sea of discourse:

Morrow and Dillon

Parmenides replied, “I must obey; although I feel like the old race-horse in Ibycus, who trembles at the start of a chariot-race, knowing from long experience what is in store for him, to whom the poet compares his own reluctance on finding himself so late in life forced into the fists of love. And my memories too make me frightened of setting out, at my age, to traverse so vast and various a multiplicity of arguments.
For thus it is necessary to take this task in hand, seeing that, it is at the request of Zeno,
and in any case, we are by ourselves.
Therefore, from whence then, shall we begin, and what shall we hypothesize first?
Or are you willing, seeing that it certainly appears that we must play a very laborious game, I should begin from my Self and the hypothesis of my Self; by hypothesizing about The One Self, whether One Is, or whether One Is not, what must the result be?
Zeno: By all means.
Parmenides: Who then, will answer to me? Or will it be the youngest among you?
For the labor will be very much less, should he answer what he thinks; and his answer, at the same time, will afford me a time for resting from that arduous investigation.
However, I will do it, for I must be obliging, especially since we are, as Zeno says, alone. Well, how shall we begin? What shall be our first hypothesis? Or, since you are determined that I must engage in a laborious pastime, shall I begin with myself, taking my own hypothesis and discussing the consequences of the supposition that the one exists or that it does not exist?"

“By all means,” said Zeno.

“Who then,” said he, “to answer my questions? Shall we say the youngest? He would be least likely to be over-curious and most likely to say what he thinks and moreover his replies would give me a chance to rest.”

but yet it is necessary to comply, especially as it is the request of Zeno, for we are one and the same. Whence then shall we begin; and what shall we first of all suppose? Are you willing, since it seems we must play a very serious game, that I should begin from myself, and my own hypothesis, supposing concerning The One Itself, whether The One is, or whether it is not, what ought to be the consequence?

That Zeno said, By all means.

Who then (said Parmenides) will answer to me? Will the youngest among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to answer what he thinks; and his answer will at the same time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous investigation.

“However, I must gratify your request; for after all, as Zeno says, we are just among ourselves here. Whence shall I begin, then? And what hypothesis shall I propound first? Would you like me, since we have decided to play out this laborious game, to begin from myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing about the One itself, that is, what must follow if one assumes that the One is, or that it is not?”

“By all means,” said Zeno.

“Then who will answer the questions I shall put? Shall it be the youngest? He will be likely to give the least trouble, and to be the most ready to say what he thinks; and I shall get a moment’s rest while he is answering.”
Oxford Greek

έτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη: ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἄλλα ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.

Balboas

Aristotle: I will attend to you in this, O Parmenides, for you may call upon me

137C Ἐτοιμὸς σοι τούτῳ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, γαρ λέγεις ἐμὲ as calling upon the youngest. Ask me, then, as one who will answer you.

λέγοι τον νεώτατον ἐρωτᾷ ἀλλὰ ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.

IBYCUS

6th Century B.C.

Eros,
Even now
Looks at me,
From Under Dark Eyelids
With Tenderness
And Casts me
Spellbound
Into Aphrodite’s Nets
Where I lie
Inextricably Caught,
For I Swear
His Mere Approach
Makes me tremble

EROS : Ibycus : Like : Race : Chariot-horse

An Old Champion Chariot Horse
As he draws
A swift cart
Unwillingly
To The Race.

Translated by Willis Barnstone
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“I am ready, Parmenides, to do that,” said Aristoteles, “for I am the youngest, so you mean me. Ask your questions and I will answer.”

That then Aristotle said, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngest. Ask me, therefore, as one who will answer you.

“I am ready at your service, Parmenides,” said Aristoteles, “for you mean me when you say ‘the youngest.’ So ask away, and I will answer.”

[Loeb] That it is not many, that it is neither a whole nor a part, that it has neither beginning nor middle nor end, that it has no limit, that it is without shape, that it is neither in place anything else nor in itself that it is neither at rest nor in motion, that it is neither the same as itself nor different, that it is neither like nor unlike, that it is neither equal nor greater nor less than itself that it is neither older nor younger than itself, that, since it does not participate in time, it in no way participates in generation, that it does not even participate in being, that it is neither nameable nor expressible, that it is neither opinable nor knowable. These, then, are what are denied of it, in summary.
εἶν δή, φάναι: εἰ ἐν ἑστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἑν; πῶς γάρ ἂν;
οὐτέ ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.
tί δή;
tὸ μέρος ποὺ ὅλον μέρος ἑστίν.
ναί.
tί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὔχι οὔ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἂπῃ ὅλον ἂν εἴη;
πάνο γε.
ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα ὅρως τὸ ἑν πολλὰ εἴη ἂλλ᾽ οὐχ ἂν.
ἀληθῆ.

Balboas
1st

Parmenides: 10 Well then, if One Is, could not The One Be Many in Some Other Way?
Εἰ εἶν δή, εἰ ἐν ἑστιν, ἂν οὐκ τὸ ἑν εἴη πολλὰ τι ἄλλο;
Aristotle: How could it be many? (πως αὖ γὰρ;
Par: Accordingly then, neither Can any Part Belong to The Self nor Can Self Be a Whole.
Ari: Why not then? (τι δὴ ;)
Par: Because The Part Is in some way a Part of a Whole.
Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)
Par: What then about The Whole? Would not That from which no Part Is absent Be Whole?
Tί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; ἂν οὔχι οὔ ἂν μέρος αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη;
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: Accordingly then, from both these consequences The One would Be Composed of Parts,
by Being a Whole and by Possessing Parts.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
“Well then,” said he, “if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?”
“No, of course not.”
“Then there can be no parts of it, nor can it be a whole.”
“How is that?”
“The part surely is part of a whole.”
“Yes.”
“And what is the whole? Is not a whole that of which no part is wanting?”
“Certainly.”
“Then in both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole and having parts.”
“Inevitably.”

That Parmenides said, Let us then begin. If one is, is it not true that The One will not be many?
For how can it be?
It is necessary, therefore, that there should neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it should be a whole.
Why?
Is not a part a part of a whole?
Certainly.
But what is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole?
Entirely so.
From both these consequences, therefore The One would be composed of parts, being a whole and possessing parts?
It is necessary it should be so.
Oxford Greek

ἀμφοτέρως ἃρα τὸ ἐν ἐκ μερῶν ἄν εἰη, ὅλον τε ὅν καὶ μέρη ἔχον. ἀνάγκη.

δεὶ δὲ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἄλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι.

δεῖ.

οὐτ᾽ ἃρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἰ ἐν ἔσται τὸ ἐν.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, in both ways, The One will Be Many, but Not-One.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: But It Must indeed, not Be Many, but One Self. (See 142A)

Ari: It must. (δεῖ.)

Par: Hence It will neither Be a Whole, nor Possess Parts, if The One Is to Be One.

Ari: It will not. (οὐ γάρ.)
Loeb

“Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.”

“True.”

“Yet it must be not many, but one.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

And so both ways *The One* will be many, and not one.

True.

But it is necessary that it should not be many, but one.

It is necessary.

Hence, it will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if *The One* is one.

It will not.

Morrow and Dillon

“In either case, then, the One would be Many, and not One.”

“True.”

“But it has to be not Many, but One.”

“Yes it must.”

“So then, the One will neither be a whole nor have parts, if it is to be One.”

“No indeed.”
Oxford Greek

οὐκ οὖν εἰ μὴν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ’ ἄν ἄρχην οὔτε τελευτήν οὔτε μέσον ἔχει: μέρη γάρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη.

όρθως,

καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἄρχη πέρας ἐκάστου.

πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ἀπειρον ἃρα τό ἐν, εἰ μὴτε ἄρχην μὴτε τελευτὴν ἔχει.

ἀπειρον.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that if It Can have No Part, then neither Can It have a Beginning

Οὐκ οὖν εἰ εἴη μὴδὲν μέρος, οὔτ’ αὐτὸν ἄρχην

nor Middle nor End; for those such as these would already Be Parts of The Self?

Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθῶς.)

Par: And certainly The Beginning and End Are indeed The Limit of Each Part?

καὶ μὴν ἄρχη καὶ τελευτὴ γε πέρας ἐκάστου.

Ari: How could they not? (πῶς δ’ οὖ;)

Par: Accordingly then, The One is Unlimited, if It has either Beginning or End?

ἀρά τὸ ἐν ἀπειρον, εἰ εἴη μὴτε ἄρχην μὴτε τελευτήν.

Ari: Unlimited. (ἀπειρον.)
“And if it has no parts, it can have no beginning, or middle, or end, for those would be parts of it?”
“Quite right.”
“Beginning and end are, however, the limits of everything.”
“Of course.”
“Then the one, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited.”

If, therefore, it has no part, it neither possesses beginning, middle, nor end; for such as these would be its parts?
Right.
But end and beginning are the bounds of every thing?
How should they not?
The One, therefore, is infinite, if it has neither beginning nor end?
Infinite.

"So then, if it has no parts, it has neither a beginning nor an end, nor a middle, for such things would already be parts of it.”
“Quite right.”
And further, the end and the beginning are the limits of each thing.”
“Obviously.”
“So then the One is unlimited, it has neither beginning nor end.”
“It is unlimited.”
καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα: οὔτε γάρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει.
πῶς;

στρογγύλον γέ ποῦ ἔσται τοῦτο οὗ ἄν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἵνα οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει. ναί.

καὶ μὴν εὐθὺ γε, οὗ ἄν τὸ μέσον ἀμφότεροι τοῖς ἔσχατοις ἐπίπροσθεν ἢ.

οὔτως.

οὔτως.

οὐκ οὖν μέρη ἄν ἔχοι τὸ ἑν καὶ πολλὰ ἄν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦσα μετέχοι.

πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, It Must also “Be” without Figure/Form/Shape,

for It Can neither Partake of The Circular nor of The Straight/Rectilinear.

Ari: How is this the case? (πώς ;)

Par: For The Circular Is indeed that in which The Extremities Must Be

in every way Equally distant from The Middle.

Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: And The Straight Is indeed that in which The Middle

Is situated in line with both The Extremes?

Ari: It is so. (οὔτως .)

Par: It is not the case then, that The One will then Possess Parts and Be Many,

by Partaking of either a Straight or of a Round Figure?

Ari: Entirely so. (παντὸς μὲν οὖν.)
“And it is without form, for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight.”
“How so?”
“The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center.”
“Yes.”
“And the straight, again, is that of which the middle is in the nearest line between the two extremes.”
“It is.”
“Then the one would have parts and would be many, whether it partook of straight or of round form.”
“Certainly.”

And without figure, therefore, for it neither participates of the round figure nor the straight.
Why not?
For the round figure is that, the extremities of which are equally distant from the middle.
Certainly.
And the straight figure is that, the middle part of which is situated before, or in the view of both the extremes?
It is so.
Will not, therefore, The One consist of parts, and be many, whether it participates of a straight or round figure?
Entirely so.

“The and it will be without shape, then, for it would not participate either in the curved or in the straight.”
“How would it?”
“Round is that whose extremity is everywhere equidistant from its centre?”
“Yes.”
“And straight is that of which the middle is in front of both extremities.”
“So it is.”
“So then, the One would have parts and would be Many if it partook of either straight shape or round?”
“Indeed it would.”
138α

Oxford Greek

οὔτε ἄρα εὖθος οὔτε περιφερές ἡστιν, ἐπείπερ οὔδε μέρη ἔχειν.

όρθως,

καὶ μὴν τοιούτον γε ὃν οὐδαμὸν ἔχειν: οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν.

πῶς δή;

ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὃν κύκλω που ἄν περιέχοιτο ἐν ὃ ἔχεποι ὡς ἑνείῃ, καὶ πολλαχοῦ δὲν ἑαυτὸν ἀπτεσθαί τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἁμέρος καὶ κύκλω μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῆ κύκλω ἀπτεσθαί.

ἀδύνατον.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, It is neither Straight nor Round, seeing that It has No Part.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

Par: And certainly, by “Being” Such, It will indeed exist in-no-way-whatsoever, seeing that It has No Part, and will neither exist In-Another, nor In-It-Self.

Ari: How so? (πῶς δή;)  

Par: For on the one hand, by Being In-Another, It would somehow Be Circularly Comprehended by That in which It Is, and would Be touched by The Self in many places. Thus on the other hand, it is also Impossible, that The One which “Is” also Partless, and which does not Participate of The Circle, to Be touched in a circular way, in many places.

Ari: Impossible. (ἀδύνατον.)
Loeb

“Then it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts.”

“Right.”

“Moreover, being of such a nature, it cannot be anywhere, for it could not be either in anything else or in itself.”

“How is that?”

“If it were in something else, it would be encircled by that in which it would be and would be touched in many places by many parts of it; but that which is one and without parts and does not partake of the circular nature cannot be touched by a circle in many places.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

It is, therefore, neither straight nor circular, since it is without parts.

Right.

And indeed, being such, it will be no where; for it will neither be in another, nor in itself.

How so?

For, being in another, it would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and would be touched by it in many places: but it is impossible that The One which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle, should be touched by a circle in many places.

Impossible.

Morrow and Dillon

“Therefore, it is neither straight nor round, inasmuch as it has no parts.”

“Quite right.”

“Further, being such as we have described, it cannot any longer be anywhere; for it cannot be either in another or in itself.”

“How so?”

“If it were in another, it would be encircled all round by that in which it was contained, and would have many contacts with it at many points, but it is impossible for there to be contact at many points all round in a circle with a thing which is One and has not parts and is not round.”

“It is indeed impossible.”
Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅ ὁ κἂν ἑαυτῶ εἰτὶ περιέχον οὐκ ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὖν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἴη: ἐν τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι αὖδνατον.

αὖδνατον γὰρ.

οὖκ ἄλλον ἑτέρον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτῷ τὸ περιέχον, ἑτέρον δὲ τὸ περιέχομενον: οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἀμα πειστεί καὶ ποιήσει καὶ οὖτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: But surely, if The Self were indeed In-It-Self, then The Self would also Contain

138β αὐτὸ μὴν αὐτῷ εἰη γε ἐν εαυτῷ κἂν περιέχον

It-Self, and if indeed, by Being no other than The Self, It would Subsist In-It-Self; 

εαυτῷ καὶ εἰπέρ οὐκ ἄλλον ἡ αὐτῷ, εἰη ἐν εαυτῷ:

for it is Impossible that anything not be Contained by That in which it is.

γαρ αὖδνατον τι μή περιέχοντι τω εν ειναι.

Ari: For it is impossible.

γαρ αὖδνατον.

Par: Is it not so then, that on the one hand, The Self that Contains Is One Certain Aspect, 

138β αὐτῷ μὴν αὐτῷ εἰη γε ἐν εαυτῷ κἂν περιέχον

while on the other hand, That which is Being Contained is Another? For The Same Whole 

dε τὸ περιεχομενον ετέρον: γαρ ταὐτὸν ὅλον can indeed not, be both acted upon (Passive) and also be The Creative Principle (Active), 

γε ὅλον αὐτῷ πειστεί καὶ ποιήσει

and in this way, The One would no longer be One, but Two At-Once.

καὶ οὖτω τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ αὐτῷ ἐτι ἐν ἀλλα δύο αμα.

Ari: For then it would not. (γαρ οὖν οὖν.)
Loeb

“But, furthermore, being in itself it would also be surrounding with itself naught other than itself, if it were in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not surround it.”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then that which surrounds would be other than that which is surrounded; for a whole cannot be both active and passive in the same action; and thus one would be no longer one, but two.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it were in itself it would also contain itself, since it is no other than itself which subsists in itself: for it is impossible that any thing should not be comprehended by that in which it is.

It is impossible.

Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the same whole cannot at the same time suffer and do both these: and thus The One would no longer be one, but two.

It certainly would not.

Morrow and Dillon

“On the other hand, if it were in itself, it would have to encompass it, none other than itself, since it would actually be in itself; and nothing can be within something without being encompassed by that thing.”

“Indeed it cannot.”

“Thus the encompassing thing would be one thing, the encompassed another; for the same thing cannot as a whole both be acted upon and act in the same way at the same time; and so, in that case, the One would no longer be one, but two.”

“No indeed.”
Oxford Greek

οὐκ ἀρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἔν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.

οὐκ ἐστίν.

ὅρα δή, οὖτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τε ἐστιν ἐστάναι ἡ κινεῖσθαι.

τί δὴ γὰρ οὗ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly, The One Is Not Anywhere, by Being Neither In-It-Self nor In-Another.

Ari: It is not.

Parmenides: 11 Observe then, if It Has to Be Understood in such a way as this;

then It Is either Remaining-Stationary or Being-Moved.

Aristotle: Why then could it not? (τι δή γὰρ οὐ ;)

138β—<

138b ἐστάναι
138d ἑστάναι
138f ἑστηκεν
138g κίνησιν
138h κινεῖσθαι
139a ἑστάναι
139b κινούμενον, κινήσεις, κινεῖται
139c κινήσεi
139d αὑτῷ
140e ἑστηκεν
141a κίνηται
141b ἑστήκε, ἑστήκε
144b αὐτῷ
145e ἑστάναι
145f κινούμενον, κινήσεις, κινεῖται
145g κινήσει
145h κινεῖσθαι
145i κινήσει
146a ἑστήκε, ἑστήκε
146b κίνηται
147a κινεῖσθαι
147b κινήσεις, κινούμενον
147c κινήται
147d κινήσεις
148a ἑστήκε, ἑστήκε
148b κίνησιν
148c κινούμενον, κινήσεις, κινεῖται
148d κινούμενον
149a κίνησιν
149b κινεῖσθαι
149c κινούμενον, κινήσεις, 150a κινεῖσθαι
150b κινούμενον
150c κινήσεις
150d κινεῖσθαι
150e κινούμενον
151a κέφαλα
151b κεφαλῆς
152a κεφαλὴ
Loeb

“Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in something else.”
“No, it is not.”
“This being the case, see whether it can be either at rest or in motion.”
“Why not?”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, is not anywhere, since it is neither in itself nor in another.
It is not.
But consider whether thus circumstanced it can either stand or be moved.
Why can it not?

Morrow and Dillon

“So then, the One is not anywhere, being neither in itself nor in another?”
“No, it is not.”
“Consider then, whether, such being the case, it is possible for it to be at rest or in motion.”
“Why not?”
Oxford Greek

ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἡ φέροιτο ἡ ἄλλοιοίτο ἀν: αὖται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.

ναὶ.

ἄλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἔν ἐαυτοῦ ἀδύνατον που ἐν ἐτι εἶναι.

ἄδυνατον.

οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἄλλοιοσίν γε κινεῖται.

οὐ φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Because indeed That which is Moving, will either Move-in-place or change-from-place-to-place; for these alone, are the types of Motion.

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

Par: But if The One were to in any way undergo alteration of-or-from-It-Self, it is Impossible that It could still Remain One.

Ari: Impossible. (ἀδύνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not Be Moved according to alteration.

Ari: It has come to Light that it will not. (φαίνεται οὐ .)
Loeb

“Because if in motion it would be either moving in place or changing; for those are the only kinds of motion.”
“Yes.”
“But the one, if changing to something other than itself, cannot any longer be one.”
“It cannot.”
“Then it is not in motion by the method of change.”
“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

Because whatever is moved is either locally moved, or suffers alteration; for these alone are the genera of motion.
Certainly.
But if The One should be altered from itself, it is impossible that it should remain in any respect the one.
Impossible.
It will not therefore be moved according to alteration?
It appears that it will not.

Morrow and Dillon

“Because if it were in motion, it would have to be either moving in place or undergoing alteration; for these are the only types of motion.”
“Yes.”
“Now if the One alters from itself, it is presumably impossible for it still to be One?”
“Impossible.”
“Therefore it does not move in the sense of alteration.”
“It seems not.”
ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι;
ισως.
καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ αὑτῷ ἀν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἐτέραν εἰς ἑτέρας.
ἀνάγκη.
οὔκον κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἐχεῖν ἑαυτοῦ:

Balboas

Par: But will It then Be Moved in-place ?

Ari: Perhaps . (ισως .)

Par: But certainly , if The One Is Moved in-place , then Self will either
καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ ἐν φέροιτο , αὑτῷ αὐτῷ ἀν ἦτοι
Be Carried around in-a-circle , or It will Change from-one-place-to-another .
περιφερότατο ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι ἐξ ἑτέρων χώρας ἑτέρας .
Ari: Necessarily so . (αναγκη .)

Par: So then on the one hand , That which is Being Carried around in-a-circle , must
οὔκον μὲν περιφερόμενον κύκλῳ αναγκη
Stand-firm in The Middle , and have the other Parts of It-Self Carried around The Middle .
βεβηκέναι ἐπὶ μέσου , καὶ ἐχεῖν τα ἄλλα μέρη ἑαυτοῦ φερόμενα τὸ μέσον .
Loeb

“But by moving in place?”

“Perhaps.”

“But if the one moved in place, it would either revolve in the same spot or pass from one place to another.”

“Yes, it must do so.”

“And that which revolves must rest upon a center and have other parts which turn about the center;
Oxford Greek

δι μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανή τούτο κύκλῳ ποτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι;
οὐδὲμία.

ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἀλλοτ᾽ ἀλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;
εἰπέρ γε δή.

Balboas

But on the other hand , by what device would it Be fitting for That which has neither Middle
nor Parts to ever Be Carried in-a-circle about The Middle ?

μήτε μερῶν ποτ᾽ἐνεχθῆναι κύκλῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ;

Ari: By none at all . (οὐδεμία .)

Par: But surely then , by changing place , It would become situated elsewhere ,

καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται ;

Ari: In this case it would most certainly indeed . (εἰπέρ γε δή.)
Loeb

but what possible way is there for that which has no center and no parts to revolve upon a center?”

“There is none.”

“But does it change its place by coming into one place at one time and another at another, and move in that way?”

“Yes, if it moves at all.”

Thomas Taylor

And can any method be devised by which it is possible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle?

There cannot be any.

But if it changes its place, would it not become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved?

In this case it would.

Morrow and Dillon

But in the case of a thing which cannot have a center or parts, in what way could this ever be carried round on its center?

“In no way.”

“It must move, then, by changing its place, and coming to be in different places at different times.”

“Yes, if it moves at all.”
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἐν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἔφανη;
ναὶ.
ἄρ’ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ ἀδυνατώτερον;
οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ.
εἰ ἐν τῷ γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ εἶναι ἐπὶ ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ’ ἐπὶ ἔξω ἐκεῖνου παντάπασιν, εἰπέρ ἢδη ἐγγίγνεται;
ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that it has been declared Impossible , on the one hand ,
οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη αδύνατον μὲν
for The Self , to Be , in-anything at all (138B) ?
Ἀρτω ἐνιαλ ἐν τίνι ποὺ ;
Ari: Yes . (ναὶ .)
Par: Take notice then , is it not still even more Impossible that It become in-anything ?
Ἀρ’ οὖν εἰτι ἀδυνατώτερον γίγνεσθαι ;
Ari: I do not grasp in what way , you mean this . (οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ .)
Par: If anything comes to Be in-anything , is it not Necessary
εἰ τι γίγνεται ἐν τῷ , οὐκ ἀναγκη
that it should neither yet Be in-that , since it is still coming to Be ;
μήτε πω ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ εἶναι ἐπὶ ἐγγιγνόμενον ,
nor yet can it Be entirely out-of-that , since then , it would already have come to Be ?
μήτε ἐπὶ παντάπασιν ἔξω ἐκεῖνου , εἰπέρ ἢδη ἐγγίγνεται ;
Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη.)
Loeb

“Did we not find that it could not be in anything?”

“Yes.”

“And is it not still more impossible for it to come into anything?”

“I do not understand why.”

“If anything comes into anything, it must be not yet in it, while it is still coming in, nor still entirely outside of it, if it is already coming in, must it not?”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

Has it not appeared to be impossible that The One should be in any thing?

It has.

Is it not much more impossible that it should become situated in any thing?

I do not understand how you mean.

If any thing is becoming to be in any thing, is it not necessary that it should not yet be in it, since it is becoming to be; nor yet entirely out of it, since it has already become?

It is necessary.

Morrow and Dillon

“But we say that it could not be anywhere in anything.”

“Yes.”

“Is it not then even more impossible for it to come to be there?”

“I don't quite understand how you mean.”

“If a thing is coming to be in something, is it not necessary that it cannot be in that thing so long as it is still coming to be in it, nor yet can it be altogether outside it, since it is already coming to be in it.”

“It is necessary.”
ei ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἤκείνο ἄν μόνον πάσχοι ὑπὸ μέρη εἰη; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτόδο

ηπὶ ἐν ἢκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐξω εἰη ἁμα: τὸ δὲ µὴ ἢχον µέρη οὐχ οἰον τε που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδὲν ὁλὸν

ἀμα µήτε ἐντὸς εἰναι τῖνος µήτε ἐξω.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐ δὲ µήτε µέρη εἰσὶ µήτε ὁλὸν τυγχάνει ὁν, οὐ πολὺ ἄτε ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαι που, µήτε

κατὰ µέρη µήτε κατὰ ὁλὸν ἐγγίγνομενον;

φαῦνεται.

Balboas

Par: Then if this can take place in something else, then it Must Only happen to That which

138ε ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο σὰν πείσεται τι ἄλλο, µόνον πάσχοι εκείνῳ οὐ has Parts; for One Part of The Self will already Be in-That Whole, but Another Part will Be

εἰη µὲρη: γαρ το µὲν αὐτοῦ ἀν ἦη ἐν εκείνῳ τι, δὲ το εἰη

At-Once, out-of-That Whole, whereas That which has No Parts Cannot in any way Be

αμα ἐξο δὲ το εχον µη µἐρη οιον οὐχ που τροπῳ ἔσται

Wholly-within, nor again, Wholly-without anything, at the same time.

ὁλὸν µήτε εντὸς µήτε τε ἐξω οὐδὲν τινος ἁμα.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: But is it not even much more Impossible that That which has neither Parts nor

ὥστε µὲν αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατωτερον οὐ εἰς µήτε µέρη µήθ’

happens to Be a Whole to become in any way; since It can neither exist

τυγχάνειν ὁν ὁλὸν ἐγγίγνεσθαι που, µήτε

in a state of becoming according to Parts, nor according to a Whole?

εγγίγνομενον κατὰ µέρη µήτε κατὰ ὁλὸν;

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαῦνεται .)
Loeb

“Now if anything goes through this process, it can be only that which has parts; for a part of it could be already in the other, and the rest outside; but that which has no parts cannot by any possibility be entirely neither inside nor outside of anything at the same time.”

“True.”

“But is it not still more impossible for that which has no parts and is not a whole to come into anything, since it comes in neither in parts nor as a whole?”

“Clearly.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it must certainly happen to that which possesses parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing.

It is true.

But is it not much more impossible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be becoming to be in any thing; since it can neither subsist is becoming to be according to parts, nor according to a whole?

So it appears.

Morrow and Dillon

“If, then, something else should experience this, only that thing would experience it of which there would be parts; for part of it will be already in the other thing and part of it outside it at the same time, and a thing which has no part surely cannot possibly be at the same time neither wholly inside nor wholly outside something.”

“True.”

“Is it not still more impossible that a thing which has no parts and is not a whole should come to be in anything, since it cannot do so either part by part nor as a whole?”

“It would appear so.”
Oxford Greek

to γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὔτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον οὔτε ἀλλοιώμενον. οὐκ ἠοίκη.

κατὰ πᾶσαν ἁρα κίνησιν ἔν τῷ ἀκίνητον.

ἀκίνητον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ φαμὲν ἐν τινὶ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον.

φαμὲν γὰρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One does not Change place by going Anywhere and by becoming in-anything, nor by Being Carried around in-that which Is The Self, nor by undergoing any Alteration. (οὔτε ἀλλοιώμενον .)

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One “Is” Immoveable according to every kind of Motion.

Ari: Immoveable. (ακινητον.)

Par: But we have certainly indeed also said that it is Impossible for The Self to Be in-anything (138b).

Ari: We have said so. (γαρ φαμὲν .)
Loeb

“Then it does not change its place by going anywhere or into anything, nor does it revolve in a circle, nor change.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then the one is without any kind of motion.”

“It is motionless.”

“Furthermore, we say that it cannot be in anything.”

“We do.”

Thomas Taylor

Hence it will neither change its place by going anywhere, nor that it may become situated in anything; nor, through being carried round in that which is the same, will it suffer any alteration.

It does not appear that it can.

The One therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion.

Immovable.

But we have likewise asserted that it is impossible for The One to be in any thing.

We have said so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Hence it does not change its place either by traveling anywhere and coming to be in something, or by revolving in the same place, or by changing.”

“It seems not.”

“Therefore the One is unmoving in respect of every kind of motion.”

“It is unmoving.”

“On the other hand, we also assert that it cannot actually be in something.”

“we do.”
Oxford Greek

οὔτε ἄρα ποι ἵν καὶ ἐν οὖθε ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν. 
tί δή; 
ὅτι ήδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰη ἐν ψῷ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν. 
πάνω μὲν οὖν. 
ἀλλ’ οὗτε ἐν αὐτῷ οὗτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι. 
οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 
οὐδὲποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. 
οὐκ ἐοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, It cannot ever Be in-That which Is The Self.

Ari: Why then? (τί δή;) 
Par: Because then Self would immediately Be in-That, in which The Self Is.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανύ μὲν οὖν.) 
Par: But Self was also found to Be such that It Can neither Be in-It-Self nor in-Another. 

Ari: It cannot. (οὐ γὰρ οὖν.) 
Par: Accordingly then, The One Is never in The Self. 

Ari: It does not seem likely. (οὐκ ἐοικεν.)
“Then it is never in the same.”
“Why is that?”
“Because it would then be in that with which the same is identical.”
“Certainly.”
“But we saw that it cannot be either in itself or in anything else.”
“No, it cannot.”
“Then the one is never in the same.”
“Apparently not.”

It can never therefore be in same.
Why?
Because it would now be in that in which same is.
Entirely so.
But the one can neither be in itself nor in another.
It cannot.
The one therefore is never in same.
It does not appear that it is.
Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἂγει οὐθὲ ἔστηκεν.
οὗ γὰρ οἶδον τε.
tὸ ἐν ᾗρᾳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.
οἰκουν δὴ φαίνεται γε.
οἴδε μὴν ταυτόν γε οὔτε ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἐσταὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτόν οὔτε ἐτέρου ἂν εἰη.
πῇ δῆ:
ἔτερον μὲν ποὺ ἑαυτὸν ὁν ἕνως ἔτερον ἂν εἰη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰη ἡν.
ἀληθή.

Balboas

Par: But most certainly, since It can never Be in The Self, then

It will never Be At-Rest/At-Peace nor Be Led to Stand still.

Ari: For it is not such that it can be. (γὰρ τε οὐ οἷον.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, as it is likely, neither Stands-still nor Is Moved.

Ari: It certainly does not appear to be the case.

Par: It will certainly not indeed Be The Same, neither with-The Other, μὴν ὅτι θαυμάσω ταυτόν οὐθὲ ἐτέρῳ

nor with It-Self, nor in turn will It Be Other, neither from-The Self nor from-The Other.

Ari: In what way then? (πῇ δῆ;) 

Par: For if on the one hand, by Being in any way Other than It-Self, then

It would Be Other than One, and so It would Be Not-One.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)
Loeb

“But that which is never in the same is neither motionless nor at rest.”
“No, it cannot be so.”
“The one, then, it appears, is neither in motion nor at rest.”
“No, apparently not.”
“Neither, surely, can it be the same with another or with itself; nor again other than itself or another.”
“Why not?”
“If it were other than itself, it would be other than one and would not be one.”
“True.”

Thomas Taylor

But as it is never in same, it can neither be at rest nor stand still.
In this case it cannot.
The One, therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is moved.
It does not appear that it can.
Nor will it be the same either with another, or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from another.
How so?
For, if different from itself, it would be different from The One, and so would not be The One.
True.

Morrow and Dillon

“But what is never in the same is not at rest or stationary.”
“No, it could not be.”
“The One, then, as it would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion.”
“No, it would seem not.”
“Further, the One cannot be either the same as another or the same as itself, nor yet other than itself or other than another.”
“Why is that?”
“Were it other than itself it would be other than One, and so would not be One.”
“True.”
καὶ μὴν ταῦτόν γε ἐτέρῳ ὃν ἔκεινο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δ᾽ οὖκ ἂν εἴη; ὡσεὶ οὖδ᾽ ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἐν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτέρον ἑνός.

οὐ γάρ οὖν.

ταῦτον μὲν ἂρα ἐτέρῳ ἢ ἐτέρον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται.

οὐ γάρ.

ἐτέρον δὲ γε ἐτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἂν: οὐ γάρ ἂν προσήκει ἐτέρῳ τίνος εἴναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἐτέρῳ ἐτέρου, ἁλλὰ δὲ οὖδενι.

ὁρθῶς,

tῷ μὲν ἂρα ἂν εἴναι οὐκ ἔσται ἐτέρον: ἢ οἰεὶ;

οὐ δήτα.

Balboas

Par: And most certainly by Being The Same with-The Other , It would Be That :

139C καὶ γε μὴν ὢν ταύτων ἐτέρω ἂν εἴη εἰκεῖνο ,

thus It could not Be The Self ; so that neither in this way could It “Be” just as It “Is” , One ,

δ᾽ αὐτὸ εἰκεῖ χατο : ὡστε οὐδ᾽ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ὅπερ ἐστὶν , ἐν ,

but The Other One . (αλλ᾽ ἐτέρον ενος .)

Ari: It could not . (οὐ γὰρ οὐν .)

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , It will not Be The Same with-The Other , or

αρὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ταὐτων ἐτερω̣ ἡ

Other than It-Self .

Ari: For It could not . (γὰρ οὐν .)

Par: But on the other hand , surely It will not Be Other from-Another , so long as

δὲ γε ὢν εἰκεῖ ἂν εἴη ἄτομον ἔτερου , ἑν .

and in so far as It “Is” One . For it is not Proper for The One to Be Other than anything ,

ἡ ἐν . γὰρ οὐ προσήκει ἑνι εἰναι ἐτερω̣ τίνος ,

but Simply Other , but not in any way another from-The Other .

αλλὰ μονοὶ ἐτερῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἀλλῳ ἐτερῳ .

Ari: Properly so . (ορθως .)

Par: Thus , on the one hand , It will not Be Other since It “Is” One ; or what do you think ?

αρὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἐτερον τω εἰναι ἐν : ἡ οἰεὶ ;

Ari: Not in any way at all . (οὐ δήτα .)
Loeb

“And, surely, if it were the same with another, it would be that other, and would not be itself; therefore in this case also it would not be that which it is, namely one, but other than one.”

“Quite so.”

“Then it will not be the same as another, nor other than itself.”

“No.”

“But it will not be other than another, so long as it is one. For one cannot be other than anything; only other, and nothing else, can be other than another.”

“Right.”

“Then it will not be other by reason of being one, will it?”

“Certainly not.”

Thomas Taylor

And if it should be the same with another, it would be that thing and would not be itself; so that neither could it thus be The One, but it would be something different from The One. It could not indeed.

But, if it is the same with another, must it not be different from itself?

It must.

But it will not be different from another while it is The One. For it does not belong to The One to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other.

Right.

In consequence, therefore, of its being The One, it will not be another; or do you think that it can?

Certainly not.

Morrow and Dillon

“And if it were the same as another, it would be that other, and not be itself; so that in this case, again, it would not be just what it is, one, but other than one.”

“In no way.”

“Therefore the One will not be the same as another, or other than itself.”

“No indeed.”

“Nor can it be other than another, so long as it is one. To be other than something properly belongs, not to ‘One,’ but only to an ‘Other than another,’ and to nothing else.”

“Correct.”

“So in so far as it is One it will not be Other; or do you think so?”

“No indeed.”
Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἐαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ: αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὄν ἄλλον ὀυδὲνὸς ἔσται ἄλλον.

Balboas

Par: But surely if not by reason of this, then It will not Be Other from-It-Self; but if Self is not at all Other from-Self, then by Being in no way Other, Self will Be Other than-Nothing.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

Par: Nor yet will It Be The Same with-It Self.

Ari: Why not then? (πῶς δὲ;) 

Par: For surely The Nature of The One is not in the same way as Her Self and The Same.

Ari: Why then? (τί δή;)
Loeb

“And if not for this reason, not by reason of itself; and if not by reason of itself, not itself; but since itself is not other at all, it will not be other than anything.”

“Right.”

“And yet one will not be the same with itself.”

“Why not?”

“The nature of one is surely not the same as that of the same.”

“Why?”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itself. But if not different from itself, it will not be that which is different; and being in no respect that which is different, it will be different from nothing.

Right.

Nor yet will it be the same with itself.

Why not?

Is the nature of The One the same with that of same?

Why?

Morrow and Dillon

“But if not in this way, then not in virtue of being itself; and if not in virtue of being itself then not as itself; and if as itself it is not in any sense other, it cannot be other than anything.”

“Correct.”

“Nor yet can it be the same as itself.”

“Why not?”

“That which the nature of the One is, such will surely not be the nature of the same?”

“Why not?”
Oxford Greek

ὅτι οὐκ ἑπειδὰν ταῦτὸν γένηται τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται.

ἀλλὰ τί μὴν;

τοῖς πολλοῖς ταῦτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκῃ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ’ οἶχ ἕν.

ἀληθῆ.

ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ταῦτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταῦτὸν ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἕν, ταῦτὸν.

πάνω γε.

Balboas

Par: Since whenever anything Comes to Be The Same with-anything it does not Become One.

Ari: But what then indeed? (αλλα τι μην ;)

Par: That which Becomes The Same with-The Many, Must Come to Be Many, but not One.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: But if The One and The Same Differ in no way, then when anything Becomes The Same

Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανυ γε.)
Loeb

“Because when a thing becomes the same as anything, it does not thereby become one.”
“But why not?”
“That which becomes the same as many, becomes necessarily many, not one.”
“True.”
“But if the one and the same were identical, whenever anything became the same it would always become one, and when it became one, the same.”
“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not on this account become one. But what then?
That which becomes the same with many things must necessarily become many, and not one.
True.
But if The One and same differ in no respect, whenever any thing becomes same it will always become The One, and whenever it becomes The One it will be same.
Entirely so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Because when a thing becomes the same as something, it does not become one.”
“But why?”
“For instance, if it becomes the same as the many, it must become many, not one.”
“True.”
“Whereas if there were no difference whatever between unity and sameness, whenever a thing became the same it would always become one, and whenever one, the same.”
“Certainly.”
Oxford Greek

ei ára tò en éautô tautôn ëstai, oîch ën éautô ëstai: kai oúto ën ën oîch ën ëstai. àllâ mîn toûtí ge adenatov: adenatov ára kai tò ën ën ën térou ëteron éiân ën ën éautô tautôn.

ódenatov.

cüto dh ëteron ge ën tautôn tò en oût' ën autû ën oût' ën ëterô eëh.

cü gár ën.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, if The One Is to Be The Same with-It-Self, then It will Be,

139E   ára eì to en ëstai tauton eaxw, ëstai

That which is Not-One with-It-Self. And in this way One Being will Be Not-One;

ouç en eaxw. kai ouç ën ën eaxw ouç en:

but certainly, this is indeed Impossible. Accordingly then, it is also Impossible for The One

alà ëmên tauton ge adenatov: ára kai adenatov to ën ën
to Be either, Other from-The Other or The Same with-It-Self.

eiân ëh ëteron eperou ëh tauton eaxw.

Ari: Impossible. (adenatov.)

Par: So in this way The One will not Be Other or The Same with-Self nor with- Other .

dë hout ën ën eaxw an ge out' eëh ëteron ëh tauton óut' ën ëterw.

Ari: For thus it could not.

cëp ouv ou .
Loeb

“Then if the one is the same with itself, it will not be one with itself; and thus, being one, it will not be one; this, however, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for one to be either the other of other or the same with itself.”

“Impossible.”

“Thus the one cannot be either other or the same to itself or another.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, The One should be the same with itself, it would be to itself that which is not one; and so that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for The One to be either different from another, or the same with itself.

Impossible.

And thus The One will neither be different nor the same, either with respect to itself or another.

It will not.

Morrow and Dillon

“So if the One is to be the same as itself, it will not be one with itself; and thus it will be one and not one. But this is impossible. Consequently it is equally impossible for the One to be either other than another or the same as itself.”

“It is impossible.”

“Thus the One cannot be other than, or the same as, either itself or another.”

“No indeed.”
Oxford Greek

ǒδε μὴν ὡμοίον τινι ἑσται ὡδ᾽ ἄνομοιον οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἕτέρῳ.

τί δή;

ὅτι τὸ ταὐτὸν που πεπονθὸς ὡμοίον.

ναί.

τὸ δὲ γε ἐνὸς χωρὶς ἑαυτῷ τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταὐτὸν.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike anything, neither in relation to It-Self nor in relation to The Other.

Ari: Why not then. (τί δὴ ;)

Par: Because The Like Is That which Is affected in some way by The Same.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But it was shown that The Nature of The Same Is indeed Separate from The One.

Ari: It was so shown. (γαρ ἐφάνη .)
Loeb

“And again it will not be like or unlike anything, either itself or another.”

“Why not?”

“Because the like is that which is affected in the same way.”

“Yes.”

“But we saw that the same was of a nature distinct from that of the one.”

“Yes, so we did.”

Thomas Taylor

But neither will it be similar to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to another.

Why not?
Because the similar is that which is a certain respect suffers same.

Certainly.

But it has appeared that same is naturally separate from The One.

It has appeared so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Nor can the One be like or unlike anything, whether itself or another.”

“Why ever not?”

“Because a like thing is a thing which has an identical character.”

“Yes.”

“But we have seen that the character ‘same’ is distinct from the character ‘one’.

“We have.”
Oxford Greek

αλλα μην ει τι πεπονθε χωρις τοι έν ειναι το έν, πλειω αν ειναι πεπονθοι η έν, τουτο δε αδυνατον.

ναι.

οδημως εστιν αρα ταυτον πεπονθος ειναι το έν ουτε άλλο ουτε έαυτο.

οιδ φαινεται.

οιδε όριον αρα δυνατον αυτο ειναι ουτε άλλο ουτε έαυτο.

οιδ εικεν.

οιδε μην έτερον γε πεπονθεν ειναι το έν: και γαρ ουτω πλειω αν πεπονθοι ειναι η έν. πλειω γαρ.

Balboas

Par: But certainly , if The One would experience anything Apart from Being One ,
140A αλλα μην ει το εν πεπονθε τι χωρις του ειναι εν,
then It would experience to Be More than One , but this , is Impossible.
εν αν πεπονθοι ειναι πλειω η έν, δε τουτο αδυνατον.

Ari: Yes . (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then , it is not in any way possible for The One to experience
 αρα εστιν ουδαμος το εν πεπονθος
Being The Same ; neither with-Another nor with-It-Self .
eιναι ταυτον , ουτε αλλω ουθ’ εαυτω.

Ari: It has not come to Light . (ου φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then , it Is Not Possible for Self to be Like , neither to-Another nor to-It-Self .
 αρα ουδε δυνατον αυτο ειναι ομοιον ουτε αλλω ουθ’ εαυτω.

Ari: It does not seem likely . (ουκ εικεν.)

Par: Most certainly then , neither can The One experience Being Other ;
 γε μην ουδε το εν πεπονθεν ειναι ετερον :
for in this way , It would also experience to Be More than One .

γαρ ουτω αν και πεπονθοι ειναι πλειω η έν .

Ari: For then It would be more . (γαρ πλειω .)

150: πνεύμα, πνευμα
139: πεπονθος
140a πεπονθε, πεπονθοί, πεπονθός, πεπονθήν, πεπονθοί
140b πεπονθες, πεπονθήκας, πεπονθήκη
150b πεπονθέν
150a χωρις, χωρις, χωρις
139a χωρις
140a χωρις
140b χωρις
135a φιλο
135a αδημως
140a οδημως
140b οδημος, οδημως
141a οδημως
139d πνευματος, πνευματος, πνευματος, πνευματος, πνευματος
139e πνευματοσ, πνευματοσ, πνευματοσ, πνευματοσ, πνευματοσ
140a πνευματον
140b πνευματον
142b πνευματον
135c οριον
139c οριον, οριον
140a οριον
140b οριον, οριον
140c οριον
139d ουθ, ουθ, ουθ, ουθ, ουθ
139e ουθ, ουθ, ουθ, ουθ, ουθ, ουθ
140a ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε
140b ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθ
142a ουθε
142b ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθ
139c ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε
139d ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε
140a ουθε
140b ουθε, ουθε, ουθε, ουθε
140c ουθε
Loeb

“But if the one were affected in any way apart from being one, it would be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one cannot possibly be affected in the same way as another or as itself.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then it cannot be like another or itself.”

“No, so it appears.”

“Nor can the one be so affected as to be other; for in that case it would be so affected as to be more than one.”

“Yes, it would be more.”

Thomas Taylor

But if The One should suffer any thing except being The One which is, it would become more than The One: but this is impossible.

Certainly.

In no respect, therefore, can The One suffer to be the same, either with another or with itself.

It does not appear that it can.

It cannot, therefore, be similar either to another or to itself.

So it seems.

Nor yet can The One suffer to be another; for thus it would suffer to be more than The One.

More, indeed.

Morrow and Dillon

“Now if the One has any character distinct from being One, it must have the character of being more things than One; and this is impossible.”

“Yes.”

“So it is quite impossible that the One should be a thing ‘having the same character’ as either another or itself.”

“It seems not.”

“Therefore the One cannot be like another or like itself.”

“It seems not.”

“But neither is it true that the One has the characteristic of being other; for in that case again, the One would have more characteristics than being one.”

“More, indeed.”
Oxford Greek

tὸ γε μὴν ἐτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἀνόμοιον ἢν εἰ ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἰπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅροιον.

ὁρθῶς.
tὸ δὲ γε ἐν, ὡς ἐοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἐτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἐστιν οὐτε αὐτῷ οὐτε ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἑαυτῷ, εἰπερ τὸ πεπονθὸς ταὐτὸν ὅμοιον.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Most certainly then that which undergoes Being Other than-It-Self or Another, will Be Unlike either It-Self or Another, if indeed That which experiences The Same Is Like.

ανομοίον ἢ εαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ αὑτῷ, εἰπερ τὸ πεπονθὸς ταὐτὸν ὅμοιον.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθῶς.)

Par: But The One, as it is indeed likely, by not experiencing in any way Being Other, “Is” neither Unlike It-Self nor The Other.

ετερον εστιν οὐθ’ ανομοίον εαυτῷ οὐθ’ ετερῳ.

Ari: For thus it cannot. (γὰρ οὖν οὐ.)
Loeb

“But that which is affected in a way other than itself or other, would be unlike itself or other, if that which is affected in the same way is like.”

“Right.”

“But the one, as it appears, being never affected in a way other than itself or other, is never unlike either itself or other.”

“Evidently not.”

Thomas Taylor

But that which suffers to be different, either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers same is similar.

Right.

But The One, as it appears, since it in no respect suffers different, can in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another.

It certainly cannot.

Morrow and Dillon

“But that which has the characteristic of otherness either than itself or than another would be unlike either itself or another, if it is the case that that which has the characteristic of sameness is like.”

“Correct.”

“So the One, as it seems, through in no way having the character of otherness, is in no way unlike either itself or another.”

“No indeed.”
Oxford Greek

οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοίον οὔτε ἄνωμοιον οὔθ’ ἐτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἑν. οὔ φαίνεται.
καὶ μήν τοιοῦτον γε ὅν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ οὔθ᾽ ἂν ἴσον ἕν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike, neither to-The Other nor to-It-Self.

Ari: It has not come to Light.

Par: And most certainly then, by “Being” Such, It will neither Be Equal nor Unequal, neither to-It-Self nor to-Another. (Οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.)

Ari: In what way? (πιθ.)

Par: For on the one hand, if It were Equal, It would Be of The Same/Self Measures with-that-to-which It Is Being Equal.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Loeb

“Then the one will be neither like nor unlike either other or itself.”
“So it seems.”
“Since, then, it is of such a nature, it can be neither equal nor unequal to itself or other.”
“Why not?”
“If it is equal, it is of the same measures as that to which it is equal.”
“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, will neither be similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself.
It does not appear that it can.
But since it is such, it will neither be equal nor unequal, either to itself or to another.
How so?
If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same measures with that to which it is equal.
Certainly.

Morrow and Dillon

“Therefore the One cannot be either like or unlike either another or itself.”
“It seems not.”
“Further, the One, being such as we have described, will not be either equal or unequal either to itself or to another.”
“How is that?”
“If it is equal, it will have the same number of measures as anything to which it is equal.”
“Yes.”
οἷς δὲ ἀν μὴ συμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἐσται.

οὔκ οὖν μὲν ἄρα οὔτε ἀν ἐαυτῷ ὑπεντὸς ἔλαττον ἡ μή τῶν ἀυτῶν μέτρων ἐνείποι οἷς δ᾽ ἂν μὴ συμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἐσται.

οὕτως φαίνεται γε.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand, by Being in some way Greater or Lesser than that-to-which

It Is Commensurate, It will have more Measures than the lesser, but fewer than the greater. Before it, ancient, and a mean is measured, in the form among the lesser, and of the measure exceeds the fewer of the greater.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Thus to those-to-which It would not be Commensurable, on the one hand, It will have δ’ οἷς αὐτῶν τέτρον, μὲν ἔξεις πλείω μέτρα τῶν ἑαυτῶν, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω. The Self participates, and without anything else to either Be of The Same/Self Measures, or of anything else of The Same/Selves?

Ari: How could it not. (πως γὰρ οὐ;) It does not participate of The Measure of The Self on the one hand, or with anything else of The Self Measures. Accordingly then, on the one hand, It will neither Be Equal to-It-Self, nor to-Another, by not Being of The Same/Self Measures.

Ari: It does indeed not appear to be so. (οὐκοῦν γε ἐφαίνεται.)
“And if it is greater or less than things with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the things which are less and less measures than the things which are greater.”

“Yes.”

“And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will have smaller measures than some and greater measures than others.”

“Of course.”

“Is it not impossible for that which does not participate in sameness to have either the same measures or anything else the same?”

“Impossible.”

“Then not having the same measures, it cannot be equal either to itself or to anything else.”

“No, apparently not.”

But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater.

Certainly.

But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures.

How should it not?

Is it not, therefore, impossible that that which does not participate of same should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same?

It is impossible.

It will, therefore, neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures.

It does not appear that it will.

“If greater or less, it will have more or fewer measures than things, less or greater than itself, which are commensurate with it.”

“Yes.”

“Or, if they are incommensurate with it, it will have had smaller measures in the one case, and greater in the other.”

“Inevitably.”

“Now a thing which does not partake in sameness cannot have the same number of measures or of anything else.”

“It cannot.”

“Therefore the One, not having the same number of measures, cannot be equal to itself or to another.”

“It would seem not, at any rate.”
Oxford Greek

άλλα µήν πλείονον γε µέτρων ὃν η ἐλαττόνων, ὀσονπέρ µέτρων, τοσοῦτων καὶ µερῶν ἂν εἴη: καὶ οὕτω αὐθεντικον ἐν ἑσταν ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτα ὀσοπερ καὶ τὰ µέτρα.

Orphosis.

ei δὲ γε ἐνός µέτρου εἰη, ἵσον ἃν γίγνοιτο τῷ µέτρῳ: τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἵσον τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι.

ἔφανεν γάρ.

οὕτω ἃρα ἐνός µέτρου µετέχον οὕτω πολλῶν οὕτω δλίγων, οὕτω τὸ παράπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ µετέχον, οὕτω ἐμαύτῳ ποτε, ὡς οἰκεῖν, ἐσται ἵσον οὕτω ἀλλὰ: οὕτω αὐθεντικον οὐδὲ ἐλαττόν οὕτω ἐμαύτῳ οὐδὲ ἐτέρου.

παντάπασι µὲν οὐν οὕτω.

Balboas

Par: But most certainly then, by Being of more or fewer Measures It will also Be
dει εἰ µὴν αὐθεντικα τα µέτραν εἰς τὸ πολλὰς ποτε µέτραν, αὐθεντικα. εἰς τὴν µεταφρασθήσεως; in this way it will again, no longer “Be” One,
but Be as many as there are also Measures.

Ari: Rightly so. (Orphosis.)

Par: But if indeed It would Be of One Measure, It would Become Equal to That Measure.

But This has come to Light that it is Impossible; that The Self Be Equal to anything.

Ari: It has so come to Light. (γαρ εφανη.)

Par: Accordingly then, It will neither Participate of One Measure, nor of Many, nor of a
οὐτε μετέχονεν ἐνὸς µέτρου οὐτε πολλῶν οὐτε few; for That which in no way Participates of The Self, Can Ever Be Equal, as it is likely,
οὐτε πολλῶν οὐτε µετέχον οὐτε αὐτοῦ ποτε εἴη. ἀλλὰ εἰ σεικαι, το-It-Self nor to-Another, nor in turn Be greater or lesser than-It-Self nor than-The Other.

Ari: It is thus so in every way.

µεν οὐν οὐσίαν παντάπασι.
Loeb

“But whether it have more measures or less, it will have as many parts as measures and thus one will be no longer one, but will be as many as are its measures.”

“Right.”

“But if it were of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; but we have seen that it cannot be equal to anything.”

“Yes, so we have.”

“Then it will partake neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor will it partake at all of the same, nor will it ever, apparently, be equal to itself or to anything else; nor will it be greater or less than itself or another.”

“Perfectly true.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and so again it will no longer be The One, but as many as there are measures.

Right.

But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure: but it has appeared that The One cannot be equal to any thing.

It has appeared so.

The One, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of same) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another.

It is in every respect so.

Morrow and Dillon

“On the other hand, if it had more or fewer measures, it would have as many parts as measures; and thus, once more, it would no longer be one, but as many as its measures.”

“Correct.”

“And if it were of one measure it would be equal to that measure; but this we saw to be impossible, that it should be equal to anything.”

“We did indeed.”

“Therefore, since it partakes neither in one measure nor in many nor in few, nor does it partake in sameness at all, it appears that it can never be equal to itself or to another, nor yet greater or less than itself or another.”

“Absolutely so.”
Oxford Greek

140e

tί δὲ; προσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι; τί δὴ γὰρ τοι; ὃτι ποῦ ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἴσοτητος χρόνου καὶ ὀμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὅν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετείναι τῷ ἐν, οὔτε ὀμοιότητος οὔτε ἴσοτητος.

ἔλεγομεν γὰρ οὖν.

καὶ μήν καὶ ὃτι ἀνομοιότητος τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν.

πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Parmenides : 12 What next then ? Do you believe that The One Has to Possess The Power to Be Older or Younger or of The Self/Same Age ? εἰναι τοι προσβύτερον ἡ νεώτερον ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν)

Aristotle : Is there any reason why not ? (δὴ γὰρ τι οὐ ;)

Par: Since on the one hand , if It somehow Has The Same Age as The Self , or as Another , ὃτι μὲν που εἶχον τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἡ αὐτώ , ἡ ἁλλὰ then , It will Participate of the Equality and Likeness of Time ; of which we said , μεθέξει ἰσοτητος καὶ ὀμοιότητος χρόνου , ὅν ἐλέγομεν

The One , did not Participate ; that is , of neither Likeness nor Equality το ἐνι οὐ μετείναι οὔτε ὀμοιότητος οὔτε ἴσοτητος .

Ari : Yes , we said that . (οὖν γὰρ ἐλέγομεν .)

Par: We also said , that It certainly does not Participate of Unlikeness nor Inequality . καὶ ἐλέγομεν καὶ μήν καὶ ὃτι τούτῳ οὐ μετέχει ανομοιότητος τε καὶ ανισότητος .

Ari : By all means . (πάνω μὲν οὖν .)
Loeb

“Well, does anyone believe that the one can be older or younger or of the same age?”

“Why not?”

“Because if it has the same age as itself or as anything else, it will partake of equality and likeness of time, and we said the one had no part in likeness or equality.”

“Yes, we said that.”

“And we said also that it does not partake of unlikeness or inequality.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But what? Does it appear that The One can be either older or younger, or be of the same age?

What should hinder?

If it had in any respect the same age, either with itself or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted The One does not participate.

We have asserted so.

And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality.

Entirely so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Well then, can it be held that the One can be older or younger than anything, or as the same age as anything?”

“Why not?”

“If it is of the same age with itself or another it will partake in equality of time and likeness; and we have said that the One does not partake of either likeness or equality.”

“We did indeed.”

“And that it does not participate in unlikeness and inequality, this also we said.”

“Indeed we did.”
πῶς οὖν οἴον τε ἐστιν τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἃν; οὐδεμιῶς.

οὖκ ἂρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερον γε οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχων τὸ ἐν οὐτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.

οὐ φαίνεται.

ἀρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράστην δύνατο ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἂν τι ἦ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; αὐτῇν.

οὖκον γε το πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον;

tί μήν;

Balboas

Par: How then, by “Being” of Such a Nature, can It be either Older or Younger or of The Self/Same Age as such a thing that has to Be? η νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἔχειν ;

Ari : In no way, whatsoever! (οὐδαμος . )

Par: Accordingly then, The One, could not indeed Be Younger nor Older : το εν αν οὐκ γε εἴη νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον αὐτῷ εν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι ;

Ari: It has not come to Light. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

Par: Take notice then, Neither Can it Be Possible for The One to Be in Time, at all , αὐτῷ οὖν οὔτε καθά πάντως ἀποκριθεὶ τὸ εν οὐκ εν χρόνῳ τὸ παράστην ἢ τοιοῦτον εἶναι .

if It “Must Be Such as This” ? For if Some Entity were to Be in Time , then in that case , εἰ εἰτὶ τοιοῦτον ; εὖν τί ἢ ἐν χρόνῳ .

Must not The Self, Necessarily, for All Time Be growing Older than The Self .

Ari : Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.;)

Par: Is it not so then, that the Older Is indeed Always growing Older than the Younger ? οὐκον το πρεσβύτερον γε αὐτῷ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον ;

Ari: Certainly. What next? (μήν τι: )
“How, then, being of such a nature, can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything?”

“In no way.”

“Then the one cannot be younger or older or of the same age as anything.”

“No, evidently not.”

“And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself?”

“It must.”

“And the older is always older than something younger?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

How, therefore, being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing?

It can in no respect.

The One, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another.

It does not appear that it will.

Will it not, therefore, be impossible that The One should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself?

It is necessary.

But is not that which is older, always older than the younger?

What then?

Morrow and Dillon

“How then will it, being such as it is, be able to be either older or younger than, or of the same age with, anything.”

“In no way.”

“Therefore the One cannot be younger or older than, or of the same age with, either itself or another.”

“It would seem not.”

“Would it not be the case, then, that the One could not even be in time at all, if it were such as I have described? Or is it not necessary that, if something is in time, it must be always becoming older than itself?”

“Necessarily.”

“Does not, then, ‘older’ always mean older than something younger?”

“Obviously.”
Accordingly then, That which Is growing Older than It Self, Is also at The Same Time growing Younger than It Self, if indeed It Must Possess That which It grows Older Than. γεγονέναι νεώτερον εαυτοῦ, εἰπέρ μελλεί εχεῖν ὅτων πρεσβυτέρων γίγνεσθαι.

Ari: Necessarily so. (ἀναγκῇ γὰρ δὴ.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is growing Older than It Self, Is also at The Same Time to Become Different, by Being already Different. Thus on the one hand, by Being already γιγνεσθαί οντὸς ἤδη διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ μὲν οντὸς ἤδη Different from that which Is already Different. Whereas, on the other hand, it will have τοῦ εἶναι ἤδη, δὲ γε—Become Different from that which has Become Different, and furthermore it Is going to Be—γιγνέσθαι τοῦ γεγονότος δὲ μελλόντος Different from that which will come to Be Different; whereas that which Is in the process of τοῦ μελέων δὲ τοῦ γε—Coming to Be Different, can neither have Become Different, nor Be about to Be Different, —νομεύον δὲ γεγονότος δὲ μελέων nor Be at all Different, but it must simply Come to Be Different, and not Be in another way. οὔτε εἰσὶ ποι διαφόρον, ἀλλὰ γιγνεσθαί οὐκ εἶναι ἄλλως .

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκῇ γὰρ δὴ.)
Loeb

“Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows older.”

“What do you mean?”

“This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does not have to become different from that which is already different, but it must be different from that which is already different, it must have become different from that which has become so, it will have to be different from that which will be so, but from that which is becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be, nor can it already be different: it must become different, and that is all.”

“There is no denying that.”

Thomas Taylor

That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older.

How do you say?

Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in becoming to be different from another, when it is already different, but that it should be now different from that which is different, have been from that which was, and will be from that which is to be hereafter: but from that which is becoming to be different, it ought neither to have been, nor to be hereafter, nor to be, but to subsist in becoming to be different, and no otherwise.

It is necessary.

Morrow and Dillon

“Well then, whatever is becoming older than itself, must also be at the same time becoming younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it is becoming older.”

“What do you mean?”

“This. If one thing is already different from another, there is no question of its becoming different: either they both already are now, or they both have been, or they both will be, different. But if one is in the process of becoming different, you cannot say that the other has been, or will be, or as yet is, different; it can only be in process of becoming different.”

“Necessarily.”
όλλα μὴν τὸ γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεώτερον ἐστίν καὶ οὖδενὸς ἄλλοι.

τὸ ἀρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μὴ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἵσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἐσεσθαι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα.

Balboas

Par: But certainly, That which Is Older Is simply a Difference/Distinction in relation to the Younger, and to nothing else. (νεώτερον καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλοι.)

Ari: So it is. (γαρ εστὶ.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Becoming Older than It-Self, Must Necessarily, at the same time, also Become Younger than It-Self.

Ari: It seems likely. (εοικεν.)

Par: But surely, neither can It also Come to Be in more nor less Time than It-Self; whereas It Must Be and Become and have Become and Be about to Be for an Equal Time with It-Self. εἶναι καὶ γιγνέσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἐσεσθαι τὸν ἵσον χρόνον εαυτῷ.

Ari: For this is also necessarily the case.

γαρ ταῦτα καὶ αναγκὴ οὖν.
Loeb

“But surely the notion 'older' is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else.”

“Yes, so it is.”

“But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself.”

“So it appears.”

“But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself.”

“That also is inevitable.”

Thomas Taylor

But the older differs from the younger, and no other.

Certainly.

Hence, that which is becoming to be older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in becoming to be younger than itself.

It seems so.

But likewise it ought not to subsist in becoming to be in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in becoming to be, should be, have been, and be hereafter.

For these are necessary.

Morrow and Dillon

“Now the difference signified by ‘older’ is always a difference from something younger and from nothing else.”

“It is.”

“Consequently, what is becoming older than itself must also at the same time be becoming younger that itself.”

“It would seem so.”

“Now, in the process of becoming it cannot take a longer or shorter time than itself, but must take the same time with itself, whether it is becoming, or it is, or has been, or will be.”

“Certainly, this too is necessary.”
Oxford Greek

ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ως ἔοικεν, ὡς γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν τε αὐτῷ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ προσβύτερον τε αὐτοῦ ἄμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι.

κινδυνεύει.

οὐδὲν ἄρα χρόνον αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ.

οὐδὲν δὴ, ως ἢ τὸ λόγος αἴρει.

τί οὖν; τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ἐγίνετο οὐ χρόνον μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτε γεγονότος:

καὶ μᾶλα.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, it Is Necessary, as it is Reasonable, that Each Self that Exists in Time and which indeed Participates of such an Existence, has to Be of The Self/Same Age as The Self, and at the same time, also comes to Be Older and Younger than The Self.

Ari: That is likely to be the case. (κινδυνεύει.)

Par: But surely, The One, Cannot indeed, Participate of such experiences.

ἄλλα μὴν τῷ εἰς οὐδὲν γε μετήν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων.

Ari: It cannot so participate. (οὐ γὰρ μετήν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Self does not Participate in Time, nor does It Exist in any Time.

οὐδὲν χρόνον μετέστιν, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ.

Ari: Surely then, such cannot be the case, as The Logos surely proves.

ἵπτε οὐκούν ὡς τὸ λόγος γε αἴρει.

Par: What then? Does it appear that “Was” and “has Become” and “Was Becoming”, Ti σου; δοκεῖ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ εὐερετεῖν signify the Participation of Time at some period that has come to Be in The Past?

σημαίνειν μεθεξίν τοῦ χρόνου ποτε γεγονότος;

Ari: Indeed it does. (μαλὰ καὶ ἄλλα.)
Loeb

“Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself.”

“I see no escape from that.”

“But the one had nothing to do with such affections.”

“No, it had not.”

“It has nothing to do with time, and does not exist in time.”

“No, that is the result of the argument.”

“Well, and do not the words ‘was,’ ‘has become,’ and ‘was becoming’ appear to denote participation in past time?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself.

It seems so.

But no one of these passions belongs to The One.

None.

Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time.

It does not, indeed, according to the decisions of reason.

What then? Do not the terms it was, it has been, it did become, seem to signify the participation of the time past?

Certainly.

Morrow and Dillon

“So, it seems, any one of the things that occupy time and have temporal character must be of the same age as itself and also be becoming at once both older and younger than itself.”

“It may be so.”

“But we saw that none of these characters can attach to the One.”

“No, they do not.”

“Therefore the One has nothing to do with time, nor does it occupy any stretch of time.”

“No indeed, at least as far as the argument goes.”

“Well now, the words ‘was,’ ‘has become,’ ‘was becoming,’ are understood to mean connection with past time, are they not?”

“Yes indeed.”
Oxford Greek

tί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ μέλλοντος;

ναι.

tὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;

πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ei ἀρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενός μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ’ ἐγίγνετο οὔτ’ ἦν

ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ’ ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται

οὔτε ἔσται.

ἀληθέστατα.

Balboas

Par: What then ? Does “Will Be” and “Will come to Be” and “Will Be coming to Be” ,

not signify Time hereafter , at some period in The Future ?

Par: But surely then , does not That which “Is” and That which “Is Becoming” signify

Time which Is Now , in The Present ?

Par: Accordingly then , if The One , does not Ever Participate of Time in any way at all ,

then neither has It ever come to Be , nor was coming to Be , nor was ,

neither has It ever come to Be , nor Become , nor Is in The Now ,

neither will It ever come to Be , nor will have come to Be , nor will It ever Be .

Ari: Most True ! (αληθέστατα .)
Loeb

“And ’will be,’ ’will become,’ and ’will be made to become,’ in future time?”

“Yes.”

“And ’is’ and ’is becoming’ in the present?”

“Certainly.”

“Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

And do not the terms it will be, it may become, and it will be generated, signify that which is about to be hereafter?

Certainly.

But are not the terms it is, and it is becoming to be, marks of the present time?

 Entirely so.

If then The One participates in no respect of any time, it neither ever was, nor has been, nor did become: nor is it now generated, nor is becoming to be, nor is, nor may become hereafter, nor will be generated, nor will be.

It is most true.

Morrow and Dillon

“Again, ‘will be,’ ’will be becoming,’ and ‘will become’ are connected with future time."

“Yes.”

“And ’is’ and ’is becoming,’ with time now present.”

“Certainly.”

“Consequently, if the One has nothing to do with any time, it never has become nor was becoming nor was ever, nor can you say it has become now or is becoming or is; or that it will become, or will have become or will be hereafter.”

“Very true.”
Oxford Greek

ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατά τούτων τι; 
οὐκ ἔστιν.
οὐδαμῶς ἃρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει.
οὐκ ἔοικεν.
οὐδαμῶς ἃρα ἔστιν τὸ ἐν.
οὐκ φαίνεται.
οὐδεμιᾷν ἃρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὡς ἂν εἶναι: εἰ ἄπαν ἢ ἡ ἢ καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον: ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ ἐν οὐτὲ ἐν ἔστιν οὐπερ ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.
κινδυνεῖει.

Balboas

Par: Therefore , is it possible for It to Participate of Ousia ,

in any other way other than according to any one of those ways ?

Ari: It is not possible . (εστιν οὐκ.)

Par: Accordingly then , The One in no way whatsoever Participates of Ousia .

Ari: It is not likely . (ουκ έοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then , The One, in no way whatsoever, Is .

Ari: It has not come to Light . (ουκ φαίνεται .)

Par: Accordingly then , neither Is It , in such a way , so as “To Be” One ,

for It would already Be , by Being and by Participating of Ousia ; whereas According

Ari: I dare say so . (κινδυνεῖει.)
Loeb

“Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?”

“It cannot.”

“Then the one has no share in being at all.”

“Apparently not.”

“Then the one is not at all.”

”Evidently not.”

“Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted.”

“That seems to be true.”

Thomas Taylor

Is it possible, therefore, that any thing can participate of essence, except according to some one of these?

It is not.

In no respect, therefore, does The One participate of essence.

It does not appear that it can.

The One, therefore, is in no respect.

So it seems.

Hence, it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be being, and participate of essence: but, as it appears, the one neither is one nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind.

It appears so.

Morrow and Dillon

“Now, can anything participate in existence except according to one of these modes?”

“No.”

“So the One does not participate in existence in any way.”

“Evidently not.”

“So the One does not exist at all.”

“Evidently not.”

“It cannot then be even to the extent of being one, for then it would be a thing that is and participates in being; but it seems that the One neither is one nor exists at all if one is to believe such an argument as this.”

“There seems to be no way out of it.”
Oxford Greek

ο δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τοῦτω τῷ μῷ ὄντι οἷς ἄν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτῷ;
καὶ πόκει
οὔδ᾽ ἄρα ὄνομα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἰσθήσις οὐδὲ δόξα.
οὐ διάνοιαν.
οὔδ᾽ ὄνομα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη ο网首页 αἰσθήσις ο网首页 δόξα.
οὔτε δοξαζόταται
οὔδ᾽ ἄρα ὄνομα λέγεται ο网首页 δοξάζοταται ο网首页 γιγνώσκεται, ο网首页 τι τῶν ὄντων
αὐτῷ αἰσθάνεται.
οῦκ ἔστιν.
ἵ δυνατόν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦτα οὗτως ἔχειν;
οὗκουν ἐμοίῳ δοκεῖ.

Balboas

Par: But, could any non-Being **Be of The Self**, of The One which **Is Not**,
142A δὲ, ἅν τι μὴ ὄντι, εἶσῃ αὐτῷ, ὁ ἐστὶ μὴ ,
or could any non-Being **Belong to This Self**? (Not According to 137D : Pierre Grimes
142A ὕπο τοῦτῳ αὐτῷ; “The Self must Be One”)
Ari: And how could it? (καὶ πῶς ;)

Par: Accordingly then, there **Is** neither **Name**, nor **Logos**, nor any **Knowledge**
αἰσθήσις ο网首页 ὄνομα ο网首页 λόγος ο网首页 τις ἐπιστήμη
nor perception, nor opinion, that can be **attributed to The Self**.
ο网首页 αἰσθήσις ο网首页 δόξα αὐτῷ.
Ari: It has not come to **Light**. (οwództι διάνοιαν .)

Par: Accordingly then, neither can **It** **Be** named, nor **Be** spoken of, nor **Be** opined of
α网首页 σοῦ ὄνομαλαζόταται, ο网首页 λέγεται οNgModule δοξάζεται
nor **Be The Object of Knowledge**, nor do (The Real Beings) have a perception of **The Self**.
οNgModule δοξαζόταται οNgModule τῶν ὄντων τι αἰσθάνεται αὐτῷ.
Ari: It is not likely. (οὐκ εἰκεῖν .)

Par: Therefore **Is it Possible** that these conclusions **have to Be** in this way about **The One**?
ουν δυνατόν ταῦτα ἔχειν ο섰ως περὶ τὸ ἐν ;
Ari: To me at least, it certainly does not appear to be in this way .

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141e : ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτὸς, ἑαυτῷ, ἑαυτῇ
141d : αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
142a ἀὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
142b : αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
143 : στήμα, στήσα
128d : δοξα, δόξαι
133d : ὄνομα, ὄνομα
142a : ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα
145d : ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα
143d : ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα, ὄνομα
141d : δόξαι
141e : λόγος
142a : λόγος
142e : λόγον
142b : λόγου
143d : ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα
143e : ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα
134d : ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα
155d : ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα
142a : ἑκατάρα, ἑκατάρα
142e : δόξαι, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα
145d : δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα
143d : δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα
141d : δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα, δόξα
“But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?”
“Of course not.”
“Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”
“Evidently not.”
“And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.”
“Apparently not.”
“Is it possible that all this is true about the one?”
“I do not think so.”

Thomas Taylor

But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not?
How can it?
Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion.
It does not appear that there can.
Hence, it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being.
So it seems.
Is it possible, therefore, that these things can thus take place about The One?
It does not appear to me that they can.

Morrow and Dillon [translation ends]

“And if a thing does not exist, can this non-existent have anything that either belongs to it or is of it?”
“How could it?”
“Therefore no name or description or knowledge or sensation or opinion applies to it.”
“Apparently not.”
“Therefore it is not named or spoken or judged or known, and nothing perceives it.”
“Apparently not.”
“Is it possible that all this holds true of the One?”
“I should say not.”
οὐκοῦν οὐχ ὅρα ναί διομολογητέα οὐκοῦν πάνυ φανῇ βούλει
οὐχ οἶον τε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνὸς εἶναν ὃν ὁ ταὐτὸν οὔσα τῷ ἐνί: οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἐκείνη τὴν ἐκείνου οὐσία,

Oxford Greek
2nd

Parmenides: 13 Do you wish then, that we Return again to The Hypothesis from The Beginning, to See if anything of Another Kind may come to Light for us who are Returning?

Aristotle: By all means then, I do so wish.

Par: Is it not the case then, that if we say “One Is”, then we must go through The Same Logos about these following conclusions about The Self, whatever they happen to Be; or is it not so? Is it not the case then, that if we say “One Is”, then we must go through The Same Logos about these following conclusions about The Self, whatever they happen to Be; or is it not so?

Ari: It could not be so. (Ναι.)

Par: See then, from The Beginning. Accordingly then, on the one hand, if One Is, then Can The Self Be such as It Is, while on the other hand, It does not Participate of Ousia?

Ari: Yes it is so. (Ναι.)

Par: And is it not the case then, that The Ousia of The One Could Not Be The Same Being as The One; for if That Were Not The Ousia of That One, then we must go through The Same Logos about these following conclusions about The Self, whatever they happen to Be; or is it not so?

καὶ ὁ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνος ἂν ὑπὲρ ταὐτὸν οὔσα, τῷ ἐνι: γάρ εἰκείνη αὐτὴν ὑπὸ οὐσίας εἰκείνου,
“Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?”

“By all means.”

“We say, then, that if the one exists, we must come to an agreement about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not?”

“Yes.”

“Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being?”

“No, it cannot.”

“Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it,

Thomas Taylor
2nd

Are you therefore willing that we should return again to the hypothesis from the beginning, and see whether or not by this means anything shall appear to us different from what it did before?

I am entirely willing.

Have we not therefore declared if The One is, what circumstances ought to happen to it? Is it not so?

Certainly.

But consider from the beginning, if The One is, can it be possible that it should be, and yet not participate of essence?

It cannot.

Will not essence therefore be the essence of The One, but not the same with The One? for, if it were the same, it would not be the essence of The One, nor would The One participate of essence;

Jowett  [translation begins]
2nd

Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning:-If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being,
Oxford Greek

οδέ ὁν ἐκείνον, τὸ ἐν, ἐκείνης μετέχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅριον ἂν ἂν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νὲν δὲ ὁμ οὔτε ἐστίν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐν ἔστιν: οὔχ οὔτω; πάνω μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαίνων τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν; ἀνάγκη.

ἀρα ὁμ ἄλλο ἢ ὡς οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν, τούτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴ τις τὰς συλλήβδην εἶπῃ ὅτι ἐν ἔστιν;

πάνω γε.

πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἴ ἔστιν, τί συμβάλλεται. σκόπει οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἄναγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὅτι τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν, οἶον μέρη ἔχειν; πώς;

Balboas

then neither Could This One

ουδ᾽ ἂν εκείνον τὸ ἐν

Participate of That , for then to say One “Is” would also be like saying “One One” ,

Whereas our Present Hypothesis is not This (First) One ; that is ; “What Must “Be” the result
de νυν η ὑπόθεσις εστίν οὐχ αὐτή τι χρῆ ξυμβαίνειν

if One One ?” but “What Must Be the result , if One Is” . Is it not so ?
eι εν εν , ἀλλ᾽ ει εν εστιν , ουχ οὔτω ?

Ari: It certainly is so . (πανυ μεν ουν .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that That which Is , signifies Something Different than The One?

ουκουν ὡς το εστι σημαινον τι αλλο του εν ;

Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη .)

Par: Take notice then , that whenever anyone says that One Is , that another way ερα ουν στε πεπειν τις ειπῃ στι εν εστιν , αλλο η to say this concisely , would be ; “The One Participates of Ousia” 

tο λεγομενον τουτ’ συλληβδην αν ειη το εν μετεχει ουσιας .

Ari: By all means indeed , (πανυ γε .)

Par: Surely then , let us say again , what will happen “If One Is” . Consider then , δη λεγομεν παλιν τι συμβαλεται , ει εν εστι . σκοπει ουν if it is not Necessarily the case , that This Hypothesis signifies The One Being , ει ουκ αναγκη ταυτην την υποθεσιν σημαινειν το εν ον in such a way , as to Possess/Contain Parts/Members

tοιουτον οιον εξειν μερη ;

Ari: How ? (πως ;)
but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree?”

“Certainly.”

“In the belief that one and being differ in meaning?”

“Most assuredly.”

“Then if we say concisely 'one is,' it is equivalent to saying that one partakes of being?”

“Certainly.”

“Let us again say what will follow if one is and consider whether this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a nature as to have parts.”

“How does that come about?”

but it would be all one to say The One is, and one one. But now our hypothesis is not if one, what ought to happen, but if The One is - Is it not so?

Entirely so.

Does it not signify that the term is is something different from The One?

Necessarily.

If, therefore, any one should summarily assert that The One is, this would no other one than that which participates of essence.

Certainly.

Again, therefore, let us say, if The One is, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a one as possesses parts?

How?

for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:-am I not right?

Quite right.

We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?

Of course.

And when we put them together shortly, and say "One is," that is equivalent to saying, "partakes of being"?

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

How so?
Oxford Greek

ὡς: εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἔνος ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὐ ὑπηθέμεθα, τοῦ ἔνος ὄντος, ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἐν ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦτοι δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; ἀνάγκη.

ποτέρον οὖν ἐκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσερομένην, ἥ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τὸ γε μόριον προσριπτέον;

τοῦ ὅλου.

καὶ ὅλον ἀρα ἔστι, ὅ ἐν ἐν ἦ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.

πάνω γε.

Balboas

Par: In the following way. If That which Is, is said to Belong to The One Being, it will also mean that, The One Belongs to The Being of The One. Whereas, it is not the case that both The Ousia and The One Are The Self, since both Belong to That Self which we hypothesized; such as The One Being. Accordingly then, on the one hand, Must not be called, at the very least, a Member/Part of This Whole?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then shall we call Each of These Parts, simply a piece, or Must The Part be called, at the very least, a Member/Part of The Whole?

Ari: Of The Whole. (του ὅλου.)

“Snatch All The Wine-Members, and Lead Them to Me!” -Orpheus-

Par: And since It Is One which Is also a Whole, It will Contain a Part.

Ari: By all means indeed. (πανυ γε.)

142D-9 καὶ αρα ἐστιν ἐν, ὅ ἐν καὶ ὅλον ἂν ἔχει μοριόν.
Loeb

“In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?”

“Inevitably.”

“And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?”

“A part of the whole.”

“Whatsoever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Thus. If the term it is is spoken of one being, and The One, of being which is one, and essence is not the same with The One, but each belongs to that same one being which we have supposed, is it not necessary that the whole of it should be one being, but that its parts should be The One and to be?

It is necessary.

Whether, therefore, should we call each of these parts a part along, or a part of the whole?

Each should be called a part of the whole.

That which is one, therefore, is a whole, and possesses a part.

Entirely so.

Jowett

In this way:-If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Certainly.

And is each of these parts-one and being to be simply called a part, or must the word "part" be relative to the word "whole"?

The latter.

Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀρὰ ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἐν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐνός μορίου; οὐκ ἄν εἴη.

πάλιν ἀρὰ καὶ τῶν μορίων ἐκάτερον τὸ τε ἐν ἵσχε καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δύον αὐτὸν λόγον ὀδύως αἱ, ὡσπερ ἄν μορίου γένηται, τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ ἂεὶ ἵσχε: τὸ τε γὰρ ἐν τὸ ὄν ἂεὶ ἵσχε καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἐν:

Balboas

Par: What then? Can each of These Parts of The One Being; both The One and The Being abandon each other, so that neither The One be a Part of The Being, nor The Being be a Part of The One?

Ari: That could not be. (οὐκ αὐτῷ εἰη.)

Par: Accordingly then, once again, Each of These Members, Maintains/Has both The One and The Being so that the least (mud, hair, dirt) part in turn becomes a part composed of The Two, and The Sell/Same Logos Is Always According to This Way, so that whenever a Part comes to Be, This Relationship Is Always Maintained with The Part: For it Is Always the case that both, The One will Maintain/Keep The Being and The Being Keep The One.
Loeb

“Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity?”

“No.”

“And again each of the parts possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts; for always unity has being and being has unity;

Thomas Taylor

What then? Can each of these parts of one being, viz. The One and being, desert each other, so that The One shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of The One?

It cannot be.

Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both one and being, and each part will at least be composed from two parts; and, on the same account, whatever part takes place will always possess these two parts: for The One will always contain being, and being The One;

Jowett

Again, of the parts of the one, if it is—I mean being and one—does either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?

Impossible.

Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves one, and one being;
So that it is Necessary that The Two Members Always Come to Be, but Never only one.

Ari: By all means, it is so! (πανταπασι μέν οὖν.)

(The 3rd Intelligible Triad, 1248 (P12) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Is it not the case then, that in This Way The One Being will be Unlimited Multitude?

Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

Par: Surely then, let us proceed again in the following way, even further.

Ari: In what way? (πη;)
Loeb

and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one.”
“Certainly.”
“Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number?”
“Apparently.”
“Let us make another fresh start.”
“In what direction?”

Thomas Taylor

so that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be one.

Entirely so.
Will not, therefore, one being thus become an infinite multitude?
So it seems.
But proceed, and still further consider this.
What?

Jowett

so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.

Certainly.
And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
Clearly.
Let us take another direction.
What direction?
Oxford Greek

οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἑν, διὸ ἐστὶν;
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἑν ὑπὸ πολλὰ ἐφάνη.

τί δὲ: αὐτό τὸ ἑν, ὁ δὴ φαμὲν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἕαν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ’ αὐτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τοῦτον οὐ φαμὲν μετέχειν, ἀρά γε ἑν μόνον φανύστηκεν ἥ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
ἐν, οἴμαι ἐγώγε.

Balboas

Par: We say that The One Participates of Ousia, on which account, One Is?
φαμὲν τὸ ἑν μετέχειν οὐσίας, διὸ ἐστὶν;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And because of this, it was indeed brought to Light that The One Being is Many.
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἐφανῆ τὸ ἑν οὐσίαν πολλὰ.

Ari: It is so. (οὔτως.)

Par: What next? What of The One Self, which we surely say Participates of Ousia.
τί δὲ; τὸ ἑν αὐτὸ, ὁ δὴ φαμὲν μετέχειν οὐσίας;

What if we grasp Self According to Self by The Understanding, Alone, Without This Ousia, which we say It Participates, would One Alone, indeed come to Light, or is This Self also Many?
ἡ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πολλὰ;

Ari: One, at least, I think. (ἐν ἐγώγε οἴμαι)
Loeb

“We say that the one partakes of being, because it is?”
“Yes.”
“And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be many.”
“Yes.”
“Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many?”
“One, I should say.”

Thomas Taylor

We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being.
We have said so.
And on this account one being appears to be many.
It does so.
But what then? If we receive dianoetically that one which we said participates of essence, and apprehend it alone by itself without that which we have said it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this also be many?
I think it will be one.

Jowett

We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
Yes.
And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
True.
But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes-will this abstract one be one only or many?
One, I think.
Oxford Greek

143β

143b ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον
143c ἔτερον, ἔτερον, καὶ ἔτερον, ἔτερον
143d ἔτερον
143e ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον, ἕτερον
143h ἔτερον

143β ἔτερον ἀλλο τι ἐτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐτερον δὲ ἀυτό, εἰπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἐν, ἀλλὰ ώς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.

ανάγκη.

οὔκοιν εἰ ἐτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν, οὐτε τῷ ἐν τῷ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσίᾳ εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐν ὅλον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἐτερα ἀλλήλων.

πάνω μὲν οὔν.

ὡςτε οὖ ταύτων ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἐν ὅλο οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἐτερον.

πως γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Let us See then . On the one hand , must not The Ousia of The Self Be/Exist
143β ἱδομεν δὴ : μὲν αναγκή μή την ουσίαν αυτου εἰναι
In-One-Certain-Way , whereas on the other hand , The Self Is Different , if indeed
143b ἐτερον τὸν ἐν τῷ μὲν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εν μετέσχεν ουσίας.

Ari: Necessarily ..

Par: Is it not the case then , that if on the one hand , The Ousia Is Different ,
143b οὐκούν εἰ μὲν η οὐσία ετερον, while on the other hand , The One Is Different ; then in that case ,
143c οὐτε τῷ ἐν ετερον, it is neither by The One of The Ousia that The One Is Different ,
143d ἐν τῷ οὐσίας τοῦ ἐντὸς εἰναι η οὐσία ἀλλα ,
143h οὐτε τῷ οὐσία του ἐντὸς εἰναι η οὐσία ἀλλα ,

but by That which is Different and also Other , that They are Different from Each Other .

Ari: By all means so .

Par: So that That which Is Different Is not The Same with either The One nor The Ousia .

Ari: How is this the case ?
Loeb

“Just let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being?”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being,

but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different.”

“Certainly.”

“Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being.”

“Certainly not.”

Thomas Taylor

But let us consider another certain circumstance. It is necessary that its essence should be one thing, and itself another thing, if The One does not participate of essence; but as essence it participates of The One.

It is necessary.

If, therefore, essence is one thing, and The One another thing, neither is The One, so far as The One, difference from essence, nor essence, so far as essence, different from The One;

but they are different from each other through that which is different and another.

Entirely so.

So that different is neither the same with The One nor with essence.

How can it?

Jowett

Let us see:-Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?

Certainly.

If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference.

Certainly.

So that the other is not the same either with the one or with being?

Certainly not.
143ξ—>

Oxford Greek

τι οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐτέρον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἴτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐτέρον, ἢρ’ οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθα τίνε ὁ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;

πώς;

όδε: ἐστὶν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν;

ἔστιν.

καὶ αὕθες εἰπεῖν ἐν;

καὶ τοῦτο.

Balboas

Par: How then you ask ? If you wish that we make a Selection of Selves ; such as either

The Self of The Ousia and The Different , or , of The Ousia and The One , or

The One and The Different , accordingly then , is it not the case , that in either way that

we may choose , we are choosing a certain Duality , which can Correctly be called , Both ?

Ari: How ? (πως ;)

Par: In the following way . Is it possible to say Ousia ? (ὁδὲ : ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν οὐσιάν ;)

Ari: It is . (ἐστιν .)

Par: And in turn , is it possible to say One ? (καὶ αὕθες εἰπεῖν ἐν ;)

Ari: This also . (τοῦτο καὶ .)
“Well, then, if we make a selection among them, whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both?”

“What do you mean?”

“I will explain. We can speak of being?”

“Yes.”

“And we can also speak of one?”

“Yes, that too.”

What, then, if we should select from them, whether if you will essence and different, or essence and The One, or The One and different, should we not, in each assumption, select certain things which might very properly be denominated both these?

How do you mean?

After this manner: Is there not that which we call essence?

There is.

And again, that which we denominate The One?

And this also.

And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.

How so.

In this way-you may speak of being?

Yes.

And also of one?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

ἀρ’ οὖν οὐχ ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἴρηται;
ναι.
tί δ’ ὅταν εἶπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἕν, ἃρα οὐκ ἀμφιτέρω;
πάντο γε.
oἴκοδον καὶ εἶν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἡ ἕτερον τε καὶ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ’ ἐκάστοιν ἀμφω λέγω;
ναι.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then, have we not spoken of Each One of The Two Selves?

Ari: Yes .

Par: What about when I say Ousia and One, have I not accordingly mentioned Both?

Ari: By all means indeed .

Par: Is it not the case then, that if there is Both Ousia and Different, or Both

Different and One, then in this way, I speak of Each Pair, in every way, as Both?

Ari: Yes .
Loeb

“Then have we not spoken of each of them?”
“Yes.”
“And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both?”
“Certainly.”
“And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both?”
“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

Is not, therefore, each of them denominated?
Each.
But what, when I say essence and The One, do I not pronounce both these?
Entirely so.
And if I should say essence and different, or different and The One, should I not perfectly, in each of these, pronounce both.
Certainly.

Jowett

Then now we have spoken of either of them?
Yes.
Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
Certainly.
And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other-in any such case do I not speak of both?
Yes.
Oxford Greek

ὁ δ’ ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἀρα οἶον τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτῶ εἶναι, δέο δὲ μή; οὐχ οἶον τε.

ὁ δ’ ἂν δέο ἦτον, ἐστι τις μηχανή μή οὐχ ἔκατερον αὐτοῖς ἐν εἶναι; οὐδεμία.

Balboas

Par: If Both of which have been Named Correctly; then on the one hand, can it possibly be the case, for The Self to be Both, and on the other hand, not be Two? Oion τε αὐτῶ εἶναι αμφῶ, δέ μη δυο;

Ari: It cannot exist in such a way. (οὐχ οἶον τε ὑπὸ)

Par: Concerning which then, if Two should exist [ητον-subj.dual for εἴμα], then could Each ω δ′ δυο αὐτὸ ἔτι δυο, μη εκατον αὐτοῖν εστι τις μηχανή οὐχ εἶναι εν;

[The Metaphysical Creative Process that First Produces The Multiplying Power of Number. Pierre Grimes]

[[The LS Lexicon shows that Herodotus used This word to bring to Light The Arts of Zeus]]

Ari: Not in any way! (οὐδεμία.)
“If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two?”
“They cannot.”
“And if things are two, must not each of them be one?”
“Certainly.”

But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two?
They cannot.
And can any reason be assigned why of two things each of them should not be one?
There cannot.

And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
Undoubtedly.
And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
It cannot.
Oxford Greek

tούτων ἀρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἐκαστα συμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἀν εἰθ ἐκαστον. φαίνεται.
eι δὲ ἐν ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἕστι, συντεθέντος ἐνὸς ὀποιουοῦν συζυγία οὐ τρία γίγνεται τα πάντα;

τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἁρτία;

πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, seeing that Each of These Pairs turns out to be a Couple, αρα επείπερ εκαστα τουτων ξυμβαίνει ειναι συνδυο, so that Each Pair would also be One Couple, (ἐκαστον αν και ειη εν.)

Ari: It has so come to Light, (φαίνεται.)

Par: But if Each of The Selves, Is One, by Adding-together [from συντεθήμα] whatsoever δε ει εκαστον αυτον εστι εν, συντεθέντος ὀποιουοῦν Yoked-Pair (Phaedo 71c) to any One, would not All The Yoked-Pairs Become Three?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.) (End of 1st Intellectual Triad)

Par: But is not Three an Odd Number and Two an Even Number?

dε ου τρια περιττα και δυο αρτια;

Ari: How could they not be; (πως δ’ ου ;)

1st Intellectual Triad

143b συμβαίνει
143c συμβαίνειν
143d συμβαίνει
143e συμβαίνει

143a δύο
143b δε
143c δεν, δεν, δεν
143d δεν, δεν, δεν, δεν, δεν, δεν
144a δεν

143d συντεθέντος
143d ὀποιουοῦν

143d συζυγία
143d τρία, τρία
143d τριῶν, τριῶν, τριῶν, τριῶν, τριῶν
143a τριῶν
143a γίγνεται, γένοιτο
143b γίγνεται, γίγνεται
143d γίγνεται
144a γίγνεται
144e γόνατο

143d περιττὰ
144a περιττα, περιττα
144e περιττα

143d ἁρτία
144a ἁρτι, ἁρτιν
145a ἁρτιν
Loeb

“Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one.”

“That is clear.”

“But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three?”

“Yes.”

“And three is an odd number, and two is even?”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

As, therefore, these two subsist together, each of them will be one.

It appears so.

But if each of them is one, and The One is placed together with them by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three?

Certainly.

But are not three odd, and two even?

How should they not?

Jowett

Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?

Clearly.

And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?

Yes.

And three are odd, and two are even?

Of course.
Oxford Greek

tί δέ: δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δις, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ἑπάρχει τῷ τὸ δῦο τὸ δἰς ἐν καὶ τῷ τρίᾳ τὸ τρὶς ἐν;

ἀνάγκη.

δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δις οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὺο δἰς εἶναι;
καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τρίᾳ τριῶν εἶναι;

πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;

τι δὲ; ὄντωιν δυοῖν καὶ δἰς οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δὺο τριῶν;

πολλὴ γε.

Balboas

Par: What next then? By Being Two, (Beginning of 2nd Intellectual Triad)
143E τι δὲ ; ὀντοῖν δυοῖν is it not Necessary, that Twice, also Exists,

ουκ αναγκη δις καὶ ειναι and by Being Three, Thrice, if indeed Two, First-Arises from Twice The One
καὶ ὀντοῖν τριῶν τριῶς εὑπερ τῷ δυὸ υπαρχεῖ τῇ δἰς τῷ εν
καὶ τῷ τριῳ τριῶς from Thrice The One?

καὶ τῷ τριῳ τριῶς τῷ εν ;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then, by Being Two and Twice, is it not also Necessary that Twice-Two Exist?

δὲ ὀντοῖν δυοῖν καὶ δις οὐκ αναγκη δις δυο ειναι ;
and in turn by Being Three and Thrice, is it not Necessary that Thrice-Three also Exist?
καὶ αὐτῷ τριῳν καὶ τριῳν οὐκ αναγκη τριῳν τριῳν ειναι ;

Ari: How could they not? (πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;)  

Par: What next then? By Being Three and Twice and by Being Two and Thrice,  

τι δὲ ; ὀντοῖν τριῳν καὶ οντοῖν δις καὶ οντοῖν δυοῖν καὶ οντοῖν τριῳν;

is it not Necessary, that Twice-Three and Thrice-Two Exist;

ουκ αναγκη δις τριῳν τῇ καὶ τριῳν τριῳν ειναι ;

Ari: It is altogether so indeed. (πολλὴ γε.)
Loeb

“Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is thrice one?”

“There must.”

“But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two? And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice three?”

“Of course.”

“Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two?”

“Inevitably.”

Thomas Taylor

But what then? Being two, is it not necessary that twice should be present? And being three, thrice; since twice one subsists in two, and thrice one in three?

It is necessary.

But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, then there should be thrice three?

How should it not?

But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be thrice two and twice three?

Entirely so.

Jowett

And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?

Certainly.

There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?

Of course.

If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?

Undoubtedly.
Oxford Greek

ἄρτια τε ἄρα ἄρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττά περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττά ἄρτιακις.

ἐστιν οὖτω.

εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὖτος ἔχει, οἶει τινὰ ἄριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν οἷς ἁνάγκη εἶναι;

οὐδαμῶς γε.

εἰ ἄρα ἐστιν ἔν, ἁνάγκη καὶ ἁριθμὸν εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, there would also Exist Even-Times Even and Odd-Times Odd

yperleipon , which does not Necessarily Exist? (Beginning of 3rd Intellectual Triad)

Ari: Not in any way indeed. (οὐδαμῶς γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, if One Is, then also, Number has to Necessarily Exist.

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκῇ.)
Loeb

“Then there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd.”

“Yes.”

“Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left out, which does not necessarily exist?”

“By no means.”

“Then if one exists, number must also exist.”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd.

It will be so.

If, therefore, this be the case, do you think that any numbers will be left which is not necessarily there?

But no means.

If, therefore, The One is, it is also necessary that there should be number.

It is necessary.

Jowett

Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.

True.

And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?

None whatever.

Then if one is, number must also be?

It must.
Oxford Greek

άλλα μὴν ἀριθμὸν γε ὄντος πολλά ἀν εἰς καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων: ἡ οὖκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλῆθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται;
καὶ πάνω γε,
oὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἐκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς;
ναὶ.

Balboas

Par: Then certainly, if Number Is, then Many would also Exist,
cάλλα μὴν ἀριθμὸν οντος πολλ' αν καὶ εἰς and indeed An Unlimited Multitude of Beings; or is not Unlimited Number καὶ γε ἄπειρον πληθος των οντων: η οὐκ ἄπειρος αριθμος Quantity/Multitude Arising into Existence while Participating of Ousia?
πλῆθει γίγνεται μετέχων οὐσίας;
Ari: By all means indeed! (καὶ πανυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if All Number Participates of Ousia, οὐκουν εἰ πας αριθμος μετεχει then, Each Part of Number, would also Participate of Her Self?
tο εκαστον μοριον του αριθμου αν καὶ μετεχει αυτης;

Ari: Yes! (ναι.)
Loeb

“But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude, of existences; or is not number infinite in multitude and participant of existence?”

“Certainly it is.”

“Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number will partake of it?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

But if number is, it is necessary that the many should subsist, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will also participate of essence?

But all means I think so.

If, therefore, every number participates of essence, will not each part also of number participate of essence?

Certainly.

Jowett

But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of being: am I not right?

Certainly.

And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?

Yes.
Accordingly then, The Ousia has been Distributed to All Beings which are Many, and will not abandon a Single One of The Real-Beings, neither The Least nor The Greatest? Rather, is it not irrational to even ask this question? For surely then, how can Ousia indeed abandon Any of The Real-Beings?

It has to be so.

Oxford Greek

ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλά ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σιμκρότατος οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου: ἡ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἀλογον ἔρεσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἄν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων τοῦ ἀποστατοῦ; οὐδαμώς.

κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἷόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἐστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας.

It has to be so.

Balboas

Ari: Not in any way. (οὐδαμῶς.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Ousia, as Such, has been thoroughly and in-every-way cut-up-in-pieces; into both The Least and The Greatest Beings, and so She is The Most divided of All Beings, and thus She Contains Unlimited/Inexterminable Parts/pieces.

Ari: It has to be so. (ἐχει οὕτω.)
Loeb

“Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the smallest? Indeed, is it not absurd even to ask that question? For how can existence be wanting in any existing thing?”

“It cannot by any means.”

“Then it is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existences nothing else is so much divided, and in short the parts of existence are infinite.”

“That is true.”

Thomas Taylor

Essence, therefore, will be distributed through all things which are many, and will not desert any being, whether the least or the greatest: for how can essence be absent from any being?

In no respect.

Essence, therefore, is distributed as much as possible into the least and the greatest, and into all things every way, and is divided the most of all things, and possesses infinite parts.

It is so.

Jowett

Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

In no way.

And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.

True.
πλείστα ἀρα ἐστὶ τά μέρη αὐτῆς.
πλείστα μέντοι.
τι ὀὖν; ἐστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἐστι μέν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος;
καὶ πώς ἀν τοι τοῦτο γένοιτο;
ἀλλ’ εἶπερ γε οἵμαι ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεί, ἐωσπέρ ἀν ἦν ἢ, ἐν γε τί εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη.
πρός ἀπαντάν ἦρα ἕκαστῳ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστιν τό ἐν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικρότερον οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἀλλού οὐδενός.
οὔτω.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The Parts/pieces of Her Self Are very Many.
Ari: Very many indeed. (πλείοστα μεντοι.)
Par: What follows then? Is there any one of These Selves which Exists, on the one hand, μέρος της ουσιας, μεντοι ουδεν μερος; on the other hand, It Is, It Must Indeed Be a Certain One; and so It cannot be nothing, εωσπέρ αυτο η αν γε ειναι τι εν, δε αδυνατουν μηδεν.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One, Is Present with Each and Every Part/piece of The Ousia by not abandoning any Part/piece, neither small nor Great, nor any other Singular Part.
Ari: It is so. (οὔτω.)
Loeb

“Its parts are the most numerous of all.”
“Yes, they are the most numerous.”
“Well, is there any one of them which is a part of existence, but is no part?”
“How could that be?”
“But if there is, it must, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.”
“That is inevitable.”
“Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.”
“True.”

Thomas Taylor

Very many, therefore, are its parts.
Very many, indeed.
But what, is there any one of these which is a part of essence, and yet is not one part?
But how can this be?
But if it is, I think it must always be necessary, as long as it is, that it should be a certain one; but that it cannot possibly be nothing.
It is necessary.
The One, therefore, is present with every part of essence, deserting no part, whether small or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected.
It is so.

Jowett

Then it has the greatest number of parts?
Yes, the greatest number.
Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
Impossible.
But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?
Certainly.
Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?
True.
Oxford Greek

Ἀρα οὖν ἐν ὑν πολλαχοῖ ἡμαὶ ὀλον ἐστι; τοῦτο ἀθρεῖ.

ἄλλ᾽ ἀθρώ καὶ ὑρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

μεμερισμένον ἀτρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὀλον: ἀλλος γὰρ ποι ὀὐδαμως ἡμαὶ ἀπαι τοῖς τῆς ὀυσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἵ μεμερισμένον.

ναι.

καὶ μὴ τὸ γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαυτὰ δισεπερ μέρη.

Ἀρα ὡς ἠλέγομεν ἠλέγοντες ὅς πλείστα μέρη ἢ ὀυσία νενεμημένη εἶν.

Balboas

Par: Therefore, can One Being Be a Whole that Exists in Many Ways/Places At-Once?

Consider this.

Ari: But I do consider it and I “see” that it is impossible.

Par: Accordingly then, One Being has been cut-up in pieces, if indeed It Is not Whole

οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ μέρεσιν μεμερισμένον ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα

for in no other way at all, can It Be Present with All The Parts/pieces of The Ousia

γὰρ ὀυδαμως ἀλλος ποι παρεστὶ ἀπαι τοῖς μερεσιν τῆς ὀυσίας

other than by existing in a cut-up/scattered state (At-Once like The Harmonic Inter-dependant)

οὐσίας ἀληθῆ

Part in a Homogeneous Whole and in the pieces of

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

~~ Indivisible Beings/Parts as opposed to divisible pieces~~

Par: And most certainly then, that which is partible Must Be as many as its pieces.

καὶ γε μὴ τὸ μεριστὸν ἀναγκὴ εἰναι σαπερ πολλῇ τοσαυτὰ μέρῃ.

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then we did not just now speak The Truth, when we said that The Ousia was

οὐσίας ἀλήθη ἠλέγοντες ἦθη ἠλέγοινεν ὡς ἡ ὀυσία

Distributed into very many Parts.

144Ε εἰς νενεμημένη πλείστα μέρῃ.
Loeb

“Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole? Consider that question.”
“I am considering and I see that it is impossible.”
“Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole; for it cannot be attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided.”
“I agree.”
“And that which is divided into parts must certainly be as numerous as its parts.”
“It must.”
“Then what we said just now—that existence was divided into the greatest number of parts—was not true for it is not divided, you see, into any more parts than one,

Thomas Taylor

Can one being, therefore, be a whole, subsisting in many places at once? Consider this diligently.
I do consider it, and I see that it is impossible.
It is divided, therefore, since it is not a whole; for it can no otherwise be present with all the parts of essence, than in a divided state.
Certainly.
But that which is divisible ought necessarily to be so many as its parts.
It ought.
We did not, therefore, just now speak truly, when we said that essence was distributed into very many parts; since it is not divided into more parts than The One,

Jowett

But reflect:-an one in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?
No; I see the impossibility of that.
And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.
True.
And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
Certainly.
Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one,
Oxford Greek

οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἐνὸς νενεμηται ἀλλ᾽ ἓσα, ὡς ἑοικε, τῷ ἐνὶ: οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὁν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀπολειπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ εξισοδοθιον δῦο ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα.

παντάπασι οὗτο φαίνεται.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλὰ τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος ἐστὶν.

φαίνεται.

οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὁν πολλά ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανεμημένον πολλά ἀνάγχη εἶναι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἀλλον τὰ μόρια μόρια,

Balboas

For She is not Distributed into more Parts than The One is,

but as it is likely, She Is Equal to The One. For The Being does not abandon The One, nor

Accordingly then, not only Is The One Being, Many, but it is also Necessary

that The One Self which is Distributed by The Being to Be Many.

Kαι μὴν ὅτι τὰ μορία γε μορία ὄλον

For Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, has been Distributed by The Ousia

which is both Many and also Unlimited Multitude.

Ari: It has come to Light entirely in this way. (φαίνεται παντάπασιν οὖμω.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

Ari: Entirely so .(παντάπασι μεν οὖν.) (End of The 3rd Intellectual Triad)

Parmenides: 15 And certainly, since The Parts Are indeed Parts of a Whole, in that case

143d ὅν οὐτε, ὅν
143e διον, διον, διον
144a διον, διον, διον, διον
144b διον, διον
144c διον
144d πολλά, πολλά, πολλά
144e πολλά
145a πολλά
145b πολλά
145c ἀπειρον, ἀπειρο
146a ἀπειρα
146b ἀπειρον
146c ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρο
146d ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον, ἀπειρον
but, as it seems, into the same number as one for existence is not wanting to the one, nor the one to existence, but being two they are equal throughout.”

“That is perfectly clear.”

“The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in number.”

“Clearly.”

“Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one divided by existence, must be many.”

“Certainly.”

“And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole;

Thomas Taylor

but into parts equal to those of The One: for neither does being desert The One, nor The One, being: but these two always subsist, equalized through all things.

It appears to be entirely so.
The One, therefore, which is distributed by essence is many and an infinite multitude.

So it appears.
One being, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary the The One which is distributed by essence should be many.

Entirely so.
And, indeed, in consequence of the parts being parts of a whole, The One will be defined according to a whole:

Jowett

into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and coextensive.

Certainly that is true.
The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.

Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited;
The One will Be Limited by The Whole; or are not The Parts Contained by The Whole? Aristotle: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then certainly, That which Contains will indeed Be The Limit.

Ari: How could it not be? (πως δ’ οὐ;) Connective

Par: Accordingly then, The One Being, Is in some way, both One and Many, Triad

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)—Beginning of The Perfection-Preservative Order—
or are not the parts included by the whole?"
"They must be so."
"But surely that which includes is a limit."
"Of course."
"Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number."
“So it appears.”

or are not the parts comprehended by the whole?
Necessarily so.
But that which contains will be a bound.
How should it not?
One being, therefore, is in a certain respect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude.
It appears so.

for are not the parts contained the whole?
Certainly.
And that which contains, is a limit?
Of course.
Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?
Clearly.
Oxford Greek

ἀρ’ οὖν οὖκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; ἀνάγκη.

τί δὲ; εἰ ὄλον, οὐ καὶ ἄρχὴν ἄν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ ὁ οἶν τῇ ὦν ὄλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἂν τού ἐν ὅπιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει εἰτὶ ὄλον εἶναι; οὖκ ἐθελήσει.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then, if It Has indeed Been Limited, then Must It not also Possess Extremes?

Ari: It must. (ἀναγκη .)

Par: What then? If The One Being Is a Whole, then will It not also Possess a Beginning, a Middle and an End? Or is it possible for any Whole to Exist without These Three? And if any one of These Selves is absent, then will It be Disposed to Exist any longer as a Whole?

Ari: It will not be so disposed. (ουκ ἐθελήσει.)
Loeb

“Then if limited it has also extremes?”

“Certainly.”

“Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole?”

“It will not.”

Thomas Taylor

As it is bounded, therefore, must it not also have extremes?

It is necessary.

But what, if it be a whole, must it not also have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole?

It cannot.

Jowett

And because having limits, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.
καὶ ἄρχὴν δῆ, ὡς εἰοικεν, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἄν τὸ ἐν. ἔχοι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε μέσον ἰσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει: οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλως μέσον εἰπ.

οὐ γὰρ.

καὶ σχῆματος δή τινος, ὡς εἰοικε, τοιοῦτον ὅν μετέχοι ἄν τὸ ἐν, ἢτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τινος μεικτοῦ εἰς ἄμφοι.

μετέχοι γὰρ ἄν.

ἄρ’ ὀν ὁυτος ἔχον οὐκ αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἐαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλω; ποὺς.

τῶν μερῶν που ἐκαστὸν ἐν τῷ ὀλῳ ἔστι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτός τοῦ ὀλου.

οὐτως.

Balboas

Par: And thus, The One, as it is Reasonable, will Possess a Beginning, an End and a Middle.

Ari: It will possess these, (ἐχοι .) (Inherent Overall Symmetry)

Par: Then The Middle will most certainly Be Equally Distant from The Extremes:

Kαὶ δὴ το ἐν, ως εἰοικεν, αὐτὸν εὑρίσκει καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.

for It could not be The Middle in any other way. (Parmenides Poem, Fragment 8 42-44) γὰρ οὐ εἰπ μέσον ἀλλος.

Ari: It could not. (γὰρ οὖν .)

Par: And certainly, as it is Reasonable, by Being So Disposed, The One will Participate of a Certain Figure, whether Straight or Round, or of a Certain Mixture from both.

Ari: It will so participate. (αὐτὸ μετέχοι .)~End of The Perfective-Preservative Order~

Par: Take notice then, by Being Maintained in this way, will The Self not Subsist both In-It-Self and In-Another?

Ari: How? (πῶς ;)

Par: For Each One of The (Beginning-Middle-End/Future-Present-Past) Parts Is, in some way, En the Whole, and is not in any way Outside of The Whole, ἐν τῷ ὀλῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὀλου.

Ari: It is so. (οὔτως .)
Loeb

“Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end.”

“It will.”

“But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle.”

“No.”

“And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two.”

“Yes, it will.”

“This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other?”

“How is that?”

“Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, as it appears, will possess a beginning, end, and middle.

It will.

But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it could not otherwise be the middle.

It could not.

And, as it appears, The One being such, will participate of a certain figure, whether straight or round, or a certain mixture from both.

It will so.

Will it, therefore, being such, subsist in itself and in another?

How?

For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole.

It is so.

Jowett

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?

Yes.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.
και μὴ τα μέρη τα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα.
οὖ γὰρ.
οὐσκόν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἐν ἐστιν;
πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;
εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυχάνει οὔτα, ἐστὶ δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνός ἀν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἐν, καὶ οὔτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐν ἐαυτῷ εἰη.
φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Thus All The Parts Are Comprehended/Contained by The Whole ?
145c ἰκε πᾶντα τα μερη περιεχεται ὑπο τον ὅλον ;

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: And certainly , The One Is indeed All The Parts of The Self ;
καὶ μὴ το ἐν εστι γε πάντα τα μερη αυτου ,
and is neither any more , nor any less than All .
καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ή πάντα .

Ari: How could it not be . (γὰρ οὐ .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that The One , Is also The Whole ?
ουκουν το εν εστιν και το ὅλον ;

Ari: How could it not be so ? (πως δ᾽ οὐ ;)

Par: Accordingly then , if All The Parts happen to Be In The Whole , since All
αρα εἰ πάντα τα μερη τυχανει εν ὅλῳ , δε πάντα
The Parts Are both The One and It Is The Whole Self , then since All The Parts
τα οὔτα τε το εν και εστι το ὅλον αυτο , δε πάντα τα
Are Comprehended by The Whole , then The One will Be Comprehended by The One ,
περιεχεται υπο του ὅλου ; το εν αν περιεχοιτο υπο του ενος ,
and in this way , The One Self will already Be In-It-Self .
και ουτως το εν αυτο αν ήδη ειη εν εαυτω .

Ari: It has so come to Light .

φαίνεται .

144d μέρης, μέρη, μέρη
145b μέρον
145c μέρη, μέρη, μέρη
145d μέρεσιν, μέρον, μέρος
146a μέρος
146b ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
145a ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
145c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
145d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
145e ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
146b ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
146c ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
146d ἐλάττων, ἐλάττων
146e ἐλάττων
145c ἐλάττων
145d ἐλάττων
145e ἐλάττων
138b τυχάνει
142b τυχάνει
145c τυχάνει
145e τυχάνει
145g ἄλλο
145a ἄλλο
145b ἄλλο, ἄλλο
145c ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο
145d ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο
145e ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο, ἄλλο
Loeb

“And all the parts are included in the whole?”
“Yes.”
“And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all.”
“Certainly.”
“But the whole is the one, is it not?”
“Of course.”
“Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself.”
“Evidently.”

Thomas Taylor

But all the parts are comprehended by the whole.
Certainly.
But The One is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all.
Certainly.
Is not The One, therefore, a whole?
How should it not?
If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and The One is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, The One will be comprehended by The One, and so The One will be in itself.
It appears so.

Jowett

And all the parts are contained by the whole?
Yes.
And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
No.
And the one is the whole?
Of course.
But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.
That is true.
Oxford Greek

αλλὰ μέντοι τὸ γεῖ δόλον αὐτός ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ἐστὶν, οὔπερ ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινὶ. εἰ γάρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἕνι ἐν τινὶ γάρ ἐν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτων ἐστὶ. τὸ δὲ δόλον ἐν τοιοῦτο οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτων ἐνέσται; οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισι τῶν μερῶν: εἰ γάρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ δόλον εἰη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττων τινὶ, δὲ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς τοιούτων ἐνέσται; ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: But certainly in turn, The Whole, Is indeed not In The Parts; neither In All, nor In a Certain One. For if It Were In All, then It would Necessarily also Be In One: for if oûτε ἐν τινὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀναγκη καὶ ἐν εἴη: γὰρ It Were not In a Certain One, then It would indeed not still Be Able to Be, somehow, In All; μὴ ἐν τινὶ εἰνὶ αὖ γε οὐκ ἐτι ὅπως ἐν εἴῃ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς; but if on the one hand, This One Is The One of All The Parts, whereas on the other hand, δὲ εἰ μὲν τοις ἐτι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, δὲ The Whole Is not In This One, then how can It still indeed Be In All The Parts?

Ari: In no way at all. (οὐδαμῶς.)

Par: Surely then, It cannot Be In Any of The Parts. For if The Whole Were In Any μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν τισί τῶν μερῶν, γὰρ εἰ τὸ ὅλον εἰη ἐν τισὶ of The Parts, then The Greater would Be In The Less, which is Impossible.

Ari: It is impossible. (γὰρ ἀδύνατον.)

Par: Then by not Being In Many, nor In One, nor In All of The Parts, then Must not δὲ μὴ ἐν πλεοσι μὴ ἐν εἴῃ μὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μερεσι οὐκ The Whole Necessarily Be, In some other way, or cease to Be in any way at all?

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)
Loeb

“But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?”

“It cannot in any way.”

“Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.”

“Yes, it is impossible.”

“But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in something else or cease to be anywhere at all?”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts?

In no respect.

Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole should be in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible.

Impossible.

But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it should either be in some other, or that it should be nowhere?

It is necessary.

Jowett

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν μὴ διαμοῦ μὲν ὅν οὐδὲν ἂν εἶ, ὡς ὃν, ἑπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ ἑστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι;

πάντως γε.

ἡ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ὡς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑστιν: ἡ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ἄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.

άνάγκηι.

οὕτω δὴ πεφυκός τὸ ἐν ἅρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκα καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑσταναι;

πη;  

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, by Being in no way at all, It would be nothing, but on the other hand, by Being Whole, if indeed It Is not In The Self, it must necessarily be In-Another?

Ari: By all means indeed. (παντε γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, inasmuch as The One Is Whole, It Is In-Another, whereas on the other hand, by Self Being In-It-Self, It happens to Be All The Parts, and in this way The One Self Must Necessarily Be both In-It-Self and In-Another.

Ari: It must be so. (ἀναγκή.)

Par: Surely then, since The One Disposition Is-Established in this way, is it not then Necessary that It should also Be Moved (In-Another) and Remain-Still (In-It-Self)?

Ari: In what way? (πη;)
Loeb

“And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other.”

“It must.”

“This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?”

“How is that?”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it should be in another?

Entirely so.

So far, therefore, as The One is a whole, it is in another: but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself: and so The One will necessarily be in itself and in another.

Necessarily.

But as The One is naturally such, is it not necessary that it should both be moved and stand still?

How?

Jowett

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.

Certainly.

The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

How?
On the one hand, it must somehow stand-still, if indeed Self is In-It-Self. For by µν ἐστὶν, esti, it is, esti, is, esti, is, esti, is. γὰρ, gar, for, gar, for, for. Being In One and by not departing from This, it will be In-The Self; that is, In-It-Self. 146α γὰρ οὐκ ἔτερον καὶ μηδὲ πανῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, estin, estin, estin, estin, estin, estin, estin. Accordingly then, by the Self, always being both In-It-Self and In-Another, αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. For by the Self, always being both In-It-Self and In-Another, αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. then neither can it stand-still. But if it cannot stand-still, then it must be in-motion. Μὴ ἔσται, estin, estin, estin, estin, estin, estin, estin. For by the Self, always being both In-It-Self and In-Another, αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. then the One must necessarily always be in-motion, and also always be standing-still. ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. For by the Self, always being both In-It-Self and In-Another, αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. then the One must necessarily always be in-motion, and also always be standing-still. ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. For by the Self, always being both In-It-Self and In-Another, αὐτῷ ἐν τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. then the One must necessarily always be in-motion, and also always be standing-still. ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς.
“It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself.”
“It is.”
“But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest.”
“Certainly.”
“Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?”
“True.”
“Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest.”
“That is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

It must stand still, indeed, if it be in itself. For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *same*, through being in itself.
It will.
But that which is always in the same must necessarily without doubt always stand still.
Entirely so.
But what, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily never be in *same*: But if it be never in *same*, can it stand still? And if it does not stand still, must it not be moved?
Certainly.
It is necessary, therefore, that *The One*, since it is always in itself and in another, must always be moved and stand still.
It appears so.

Jowett

The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.
True.
And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
Certainly.
Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?
True.
Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?
Clearly.
Oxford Greek

καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταὐτὸν τε καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν.

πῶς;

πάντων πρὸς ὅποια ὁδε ἔχει, ἦ ταὐτὸν ἐστίν ἢ ἕτερον: ἦ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸν ἢ μηδ’ ἕτερον, μέρος ἐάν εἴῃ τοῦτο πρὸς ὅ οὕτως ἔχει, ἦ ως πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἀν εἴῃ.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: And The Self Must certainly Be The Same With-It-Self and Other Than-It-Self ;
and similarly Be The Same and also Other Than-The Others , if indeed It also Experiences
και ωςαυτως ειναι ταυτον τε και ετερον τοις αλλοις , ειπερ και πεπονθεν
The Prior Relationships/Dispositions . (τα προσθεν .)

Ari: How ? (ποις ;)

Par: In some way , Everything Has to Be in this way in Relation to Everything . For Everything
που παν εχει ωδε προς ατιν ;
Is either The Self/Some with or Other than something : or if It Is not The Same nor Other ,
ειναι η ταυτον η ετερον : η εαν μη ταυτον μηδ’ η ετερον
then It will have The Same Dynamic that a Part Has to a Whole or that a Whole Has to a Part .

αν ειν αυτως μερος εχει προς τοιν , η ως ολον αν ειν προς μερος .

Ari: It has so come to Light . (φαίνεται .)
Loeb

“And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true.”

“How is that?”

“Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part.”

“Obviously.”

Thomas Taylor

But, likewise, it ought to be the same with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with, and different from, others, if it suffers what we have related above.

How?

Every thing, in a certain respect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the same with it or different: or if it is neither same nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is so related, or with respect to a part it will be a whole.

It appears so.

Jowett

And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous affections.

How so?

Every thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

Clearly.
Oxford Greek

ἀρ’ οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ ἀὑτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν;
οὐδαμῶς.
οὖδ’ ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ ἀὑτοῦ ὡλον ᾃν εἰη, πρὸς ἐαυτὸ μέρος ὡν.
οὐ γάρ οἰόν τε.
ἀλλ’ ἄρα ἐτερὸν ἐστὶν ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν;
οὐ δήτα.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then, Is The One Self a Part of The Self?
αρ’ οὖν εστὶν τὸ ἐν αὑτὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ;
Ari: Not at all. (οὐδαμῶς .)

Par: Accordingly then, The Self will not Have a Whole to Part Relationship with It-Self,
ως εν τῷ μερῶν αὐτοῦ.
Ari: That is not possible. (γάρ οὐ οἰόν τε.)

Par: But accordingly then, Oneness/Unity is Other than The One?
αλλ’ ἄρα ἐνὸς (Genitive of ἑις) εστὶν ετερὸν τὸ ἐν;
Ari: Without a doubt. (οὐ δήτα.)
“Now is the one a part of itself?”
“By no means.”
“Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself.”
“No, that is impossible.”

Is therefore *The One* a part of itself?
By no means.
It will not therefore be a whole, with respect to itself, as if itself were a part.
For it cannot.
But is The One, therefore, different from The One?
By no means.

And is the one a part of itself?
Certainly not.
Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?
It cannot.
But is the one other than one?
No.
oúde ἄρα ἑαυτὸν γε ἑτερον ἄν εἰη.

οὐ μέντοι.

ei ὃν μήτε ἑτερον μήτε ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὑτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ ὅτι ταυτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ:

ἀνάγκη.

tί δέ; τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὅν αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ αὑτῷ ὅντος ἑαυτῷ ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸν ἑτερον εἶναι, εἶπερ καὶ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται;

ἐξοφυγε δοκεί.

οὕτω μὴν ἑφάνη ἑχον τὸ ἐν, αὑτὸ τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅν ἄρμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.

ἑφάνη γάρ.

ἑτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἑοικεν, εἰη ταυτῇ ἄν ἑαυτὸν τὸ ἐν.

ἑοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, nor can Unity/Oneness indeed be Other than It-Self.

Ari: Certainly not. (μεντοι ου.)

Par: Therefore, if Self Is neither Other nor a Whole nor a Part in Relation to It-Self, then Self Must Necessarily not already Be, The Same with It-Self?

Ari: It must. (ἀναγκῇ.)

Par: What then? By Self Being In The Self, is not That which Is elsewhere than with It-Self necessarily Be Other than It-Self, if indeed Self will also Be elsewhere than with It-Self?

Ari: It so appears to me at least. (δοκεί εξοφυγε.)

Par: In this way, as it has come to Light, The One Being certainly Has to Be At-Once, both In-It-Self and In-Another?

Ari: For it has come to Light. (γαρ εφανη.)

Par: Accordingly then, as it is likely, from this account The One will Be Other than It-Self.

Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)
“Nor can it be other than itself.”
“Certainly not.”
“Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?”
“It must.”
“Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?”
“I think so.”
“Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time.”
“Yes, we saw that it was so.”
“Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself.”
“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

It will not therefore be different from itself.
Certainly not.
If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with respect to itself, is it not necessary that it should be the same with itself?
It is necessary.
But what, that which is elsewhere than itself, subsisting in same in itself, must it not necessarily be different from itself, since it has a subsistence elsewhere?
It appears so to me.
And in this manner The One appears to subsist, being at the same time both in itself and in another.
So it seems.
Through this, therefore, it appears that The One is different from itself.
It does so.

Jowett

And therefore not other than itself?
Certainly not.
If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?
Certainly.
But then, again, a thing which is in another place from "itself," if this "itself" remains in the same place with itself, must be other than "itself," for it will be in another place?
True.
Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
Yes.
Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
True.
Oxford Greek

ti oiv; ei tov ti etepon estin, oiv' eterpov ontos etepon estai; anavgka.
oikouv oiv mi ev estin, apanv' etepa tov evos, kai to ev tov mi ev;
piv s' oiv;
etepov arva avn eiv to ev tov allwv.
etepov.
dra dh: auto te tauton kai to etepov ar' oiv' evantia allhlois;
piv s' oiv;
h oiv evthlisei tauton ev tov etepov n to etepov ev tautw pot eivnai;
oiv evthlisei.

Balboas
Par: What follows then? If Anything Is Other from Another, 146D ti oivn; el ti eostin etepon tou. will It not Be Other from That to which It Is Being Other? estoai oiv' eterpov ontos etepov.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Parmenides: 16 Is it not the case then, that As many as Are Not-One, OUKOUN OOSA EOSTHN ETERON TOU, So many Are Other than The One; and is not The One Other from Those that are Not-One? apanv' etepa tou evos, kai to ev tov tov mi ev;
Aristotle: How could it not be? (πονδ' ouv;)
Par: Accordingly then, The One will be Other than The Others.
Ari: It is other. (ετερον.)
Par: See then; are not both The Self/Same and The Other Opposite to each other? ora dh: ar' ouk te tauton kai to etepon evantia allhlois;
Ari: How could they not be? (πονδ' ouv;)
Par: Therefore, will The Self/Same ever Be Truly Disposed In The Other, or The Other in The Self/Same?
ev tautw;
Ari: They will not be so disposed. (ουκ ειθελησει.)
Loeb

“Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?”
“Certainly.”
“Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?”
“Of course.”
“Then the one would be other than the others.”
“Yes, it is other.”
“Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?”
“Of course.”
“Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?”
“No.”

Thomas Taylor

But what if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different?
Necessarily so.
But are not all such things as are not one different from The One? And is not The One different
from such things as are not one?
How should it not?
The One therefore will be different from other things.
Different.
But see whether different and same are not contrary to each other.
How should they not?
Do you think, therefore, that same can ever be in different, or different in same?
I do not.

Jowett

Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?
Certainly.
And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one?
Of course.
Then the one will be other than the others?
True.
But, consider:- Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?
Of course.
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
They will not.
Oxford Greek

ei ἃρα τὸ ἔτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἐσται, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐν ὁ ἐστίν τὸ ἔτερον χρόνον οὐδένα: ei γὰρ ὄντινον εἰπὶ ἐν τῷ, ἐκείνων ἃν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταύτῳ εἰπῃ τὸ ἔτερον. οὐχ οὕτως;

οὐτως.

ἐπειδή δ’ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἐν τινί τῶν ὄντων ἃν εἰπῃ τὸ ἔτερον.

ἄληθη.

οὐτ’ ἃρα ἐν τοῖς μῆ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐν ἑνείη ἃν τὸ ἔτερον.

οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, if The Other will Never Be In The Self/Same, then there Are None of 
αρι...εν τῷ ταυτῷ 

The Beings In which The Other Ever Subsists. For if It Were in any Being at any time at all, 

146E τῶν ὄντων εν ὁ τῷ ἔτερον οὐδένα χρόνον ἐστιν. γαρ εἰ εἰπὶ ἐν τῷ οὐντίουν 

then at that time, The Other would also Be In The Self/Same. Or is it not so?

tον εκείνων χρόνον, τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῷ εἰπὶ ἐν ταὐτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

Ari: If it would be so. (οὐτως.)

Par: But since It Is never In The Self/Same, The Other will never Be In any of The Beings.

δ’ επειδή εστιν οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῷ οὐδέποτε εἰπῃ εν τινὶ τῶν ὄντων.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Other will not Be In Those that Are Not-One, nor In The One.

αρι...εν τῷ ταυτῷ 

Ari: It will not be so. (γαρ οὐ οὐν.)
"Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?"

“Yes, it would.”

“But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.”

“True.”

“Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one.”

“No, it cannot.”

If therefore different is never in same, there is no being in which for any time different subsists; for, if it subsisted in it during any time whatever, in that time different would be in same. Would it not be so?

It would.

But since it is never in same, different will never subsist in any being.

True.

Neither therefore will different be in things which are not one, nor in The One.

It will not.

If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?

Yes.

And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.

True.

Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?

Certainly not
Oxford Greek

οὐκ ἀρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ’ ἄν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν μή ἐν οὐδὲ τὰ μή ἐν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἑτέρα.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἑτέραι ἄν εἴη ἄλληλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου.

πώς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One, will indeed not Be Other from Those that Are Not-One nor The Beings which Are Not-One Be Other than The One by That which is Other.

Ari: Indeed not. (γαρ ου .)

Par: Then They will not Be Other than Each Other by not Participating of The Other.

Ari: How can they? (πως γαρ ;)

2nd
Loeb

“Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one.”
“No.”
“And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.”
“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

*The One*, therefore, will not through *different*, be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *The One*.
Not, indeed.
Nor likewise will they be different from each other, since they do not participate of *different*.
For how can they?

Jowett

Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.
No.
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.
How can they be?
Oxford Greek

ei de μήτε αὐτοῖς ἐτερά ἐστι µήτε τῷ ἑτερῷ, οὐ πάντη ἥδη ἀν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ µή ἑτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων;

ἐκφεύγοι.

ἀλλὰ µήν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνός γε μετέχει τὰ µή ἐν: οὐ γὰρ οὐ τῇ ἐν ᾧ, ἀλλὰ πῃ ἀν ἐν ᾧ.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδ’ ἀν ἀριθμός εἰῃ ἁρα τὰ µή ἐν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν οὐτω µή ἐν παντάπασιν, ἄριθμον γε ἔχοντα. οὐ γὰρ ὡν.

τί δὲ: τὰ µή ἐν τοῦ ἐνός ἁρα μόρια ἐστιν; η κὰν οὐτω μετέχε τοῦ ἐνός τὰ µή ἐν; μετείχεν.

Balboas

Par: But if They are neither Other from-Them Selves , nor from The Other , then Must
They not Already Entirely Flee from (Phaedo 104c) That which Is Other from Each Other ?

Ari: They must flee . (ἐκφεύγοι .)

Par: Most certainly then , neither will Those that are Not-One Participate of The One ;

γε µὴν ἀλλα οὐδὲ τὰ µὴ ἐν μετέχε του ἐνος :

for if They did , then They would no longer Be Not-One , but in a certain way Be One .

Ari: True . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Accordingly then , Those that are Not-One will not Be Number ; for in this way ,

ἀρα τα µὴ ἐν αν οὐδ’ εἰῃ ἁριθμὸς : γαρ οὐτω

by indeed Possessing Number , They could not entirely Be , Not-One .

Ari: Certainly not . (γαρ οὐν οὐ .)

Par: What follows then ? Are Those that are Not-One , Parts of The One ? Or would Those

τι δὲ ; εστιν τα µὴ ἐν μορια του ἐνος ; η κὰν τα

that are Not-One , by Possessing Number in this (Negative) way , Partake of The One ?

Ari: They would so participate . (µετείχεν .)
Loeb

“But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?”

“Quite impossible.”

“But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.”

“True.”

“Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.”

“No, they would not.”

“Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?”

“Yes, they would partake of it.”

Thomas Taylor

But if they are neither different from themselves, nor from different, must they not entirely escape from being different from each other?

They must escape.

But neither will things which are not one participate of The One: for if they did they would no longer be not one, but in a certain respect one.

True.

Hence things which are not one will not be number; for they would not be entirely not one in consequence of possessing number.

Certainly not.

But what, can things which are not one be parts of one? Or would not things which are not one by this means participate of The One?

They would participate.

Jowett

But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

They will.

Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.

True.

Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.

It would not.

Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

It would.
Oxford Greek

ei ἀρα πάντη τὸ μὲν ἐν ἑστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν, οὔτ' ἄν μορίον τῶν μὴ ἐν τὸ ἐν εἰὴ οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων: οὔτε αὐ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνός μορία, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἐνι.

οὐ γάρ.

αὖτα μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ἑνὲστι ἐνταῦτα ἐσεσθαι ἄλληλοις.

ἔφαμεν γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, if the (Positive) One Is entirely One, then in relation to Those that are Not-One; The One will not Be a Part of Those that are Not-One, nor could The One Be a Whole in relation to Them, as if They were Parts; nor in turn, will Those that are Not-One Be Parts of The One, nor Wholes, just as if The One Were a Part.

Ari: They will not. (γαρ οὐ)

Par: But we have certainly said that Those that Are neither Parts nor Wholes, nor Other from Each Other, will have to Be The Same with Each Other.

Ari: We have said so.
Loeb

“If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.”

“No.”

“But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.”

“Yes, we did.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, this is entirely The One, but those not one, neither will The One be a part of things which are not one, nor a whole with respect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are not one be parts of The One, nor yet wholes, as if The One were a part.

They will not.

But we have said that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, must be the same with each other.

We have said so.

Jowett

If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No.

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another: -so we said?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἐν οὐποῖς ἔχον τὸ αὑτὸ ἐἶναι αὑτοῖς;

φῶμεν.

tὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερον τε τῶν ἄλλων ἑστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταύτων ἑκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ.

κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , shall we also say that The One Has The Relationship to

Those that Are Not-One , in the same way as The Self Has to Be to Selves ?

tα μὴ ἐν οὐτῶς το αὑτὸ εἶναι αὑτοῖς ;

Ari: We must say so. (φῶμεν .)

Par: Accordingly then , The One , as it is Reasonable , Is both Different from The Others

and from It Self and The Self/Same as Those and with It Self .

Ari: It has indeed come to Light from this Logos to venture saying it .

147C γε φαίνεσθαι εκ τοῦ λόγου κινδυνεύει .
Loeb

“Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?”

“Yes, let us say that.”

“The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.”

“That appears to be the result of our argument.”

Thomas Taylor

Must we not therefore assert that The One, since it subsists in this manner with respect to things which are not one, is the same with them?

We must.

The One, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself.

It appears from this reasoning to be so.

Jowett

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.

Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference.
Oxford Greek

ἆρ’ ὦν καὶ ἰόμοιον τε καὶ ἰόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;

ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἑφάνη, καὶ τὰλλά που ἑτερα ἁν ἐκεῖνον εἰη.

τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἁτέρον τῶν ἄλλων, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰλλα ἐκεῖνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἤττον;

τί γὰρ ἄν;

Balboas

Par: Take notice then, Is It also Like and Unlike It Self and also The Others?

Ari: Perhaps. (ἰσωξ.)

Par: Seeing that The One Has come to Light Different from The Others,

Ari: What next then? (τι μήν ;)

Par: In the same way, will not The One Be Different from The Others, just as

The Others Are also Different from It, and It is neither more nor less (in this Difference)?

Ari: How could it not be so? (τι ἀν γαρ ;)
Loeb

“Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?”

“Perhaps.”

“At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it.”

“Of course.”

“Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But is it also similar and dissimilar to itself and others?

Perhaps so.

Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others also will be different from it.

But what then?

Will it not be different from others, in the same manner as others from it? And this neither more nor less?

How should it not?

Jowett

And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.

Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.

Yes.

And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

True.
ei ára mête màllon mête ἤττον, ὀμοίως.

ναι.

οὐκοῦν ἡ ἐτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τάλλα ἐκείνου ὑσαύτως, ταυτῇ ταυτόν ἄν πεπονθότα εἶεν τὸ τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τάλλα τῷ ἐνι.

πῶς λέγεις:

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, if It is neither more nor less, They Are Different in a similar way.

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

Par: Is it not so then, that inasmuch as The One experiences Being Different than The Others, or in this way The One will also experience Being and The Others also than The One, then in this way The One will also experience Being and The Others in relation to The One .

Ari: What do you mean? (πως λέγεις ;)
Loeb

“And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?”

“Yes.”

“In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.”

“What do you mean?”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, neither more nor less, it must be different in a similar manner.

Certainly.

Will not that through which The One becomes different from others, and others in a similar manner from it, be also that through which both The One becomes the same with others, and others with The One?

How do you say?

Jowett

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.

How do you mean?
Oxford Greek

ὦδε ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινὶ καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἀπαξ;

ἔγωγε.

πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἢ ἀπαξ εἴπεις, εκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις ἀντὶ τού ὄνομα, εἶναι δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐὰν ἢ ἀπαξ ἢ ἀπαξ πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθεγξῆ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεὶ;

τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τινὶ;

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: The following. Do you not assign every Name to something?

ὦδε . οὐκ καλεῖς ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄνοματων εἴπῃ τινὶ .

Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε .)

Par: What follows then? Can you pronounce The Self/Same Name either often or once?

τί οὖν; αὖ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀυτοῖς ὄνομα πλεονάκις ἢ ἀπαξ .

Aris: I can at least. (εγωγε .)

Par: Therefore on the one hand, do you Name That to which the name belongs, when you say It once; but not on the other hand, when you say that Name often? Or rather, you say always The Same Name whether you utter The Same Name once or often?

οὐκοῦν τὸ ετερον ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τινὶ .

Ari: Of course, what follows then?

πάνυ γε .

Par: Is it not the case then, that Another Name also belongs to some particular?

οὐκοῦν τὸ ετερον ὄνομα καὶ εἰσὶν εἴπῃ τινὶ .

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)
Loeb

“I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?"
“Yes."
“Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?”
“Yes."
“And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?”
“The same thing, of course.”
“The word other is the name of something, is it not?”
“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Thus: Do not you call every name the name of something?
I do:
but what then? Do you pronounce the same name often or once?
I pronounce it once.
When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs; but if often, not the same? Or, whether you pronounce the same name once or often, do you not necessarily always signify the same thing?
But what then?
Does not a different name belong to some certain thing?
Entirely so.

Jowett

I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?
Yes.
And you may say the name once or oftener?
Yes.
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?
Of course it is the same.
And is not "other" a name given to a thing?
Certainly.
Oxford Greek

ὅταν ἄρα ἀυτό φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἀπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὄνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐσερ ἢν ὄνομα.

ἀνάγκη.

ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἔτερον μὲν τᾶλα τοῦ ἔνος, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, δις τὸ ἔτερον εἰπόντες οὐδὲν τι λέγειν ἢν, ἂλλο ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνη τῇ φύσει ἂντι πρὸς ἂντι ἔτερον ἢν τούνομα.

πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, when you utter Self whether once or often, you do not apply the Name 147E αρα ὅταν φθέγγῃ σαυτο, εάντε εάντε εάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ὄνομάζεις to nothing else, nor mean anything else, than That to which the Name belongs.

επ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τι ἡ εκεῖνο οὐσερ οὐσερ ὄνομα ἢν.

Ari: Necessarily so. (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: Surely then when we say, on the one hand, that The Others Are Other from The One, δὴ ὅταν λέγωμεν μὲν ὅτι τᾶλα ἔτερον τοῦ ἐνος, and on the other hand, that The One Is Other from The Others, by saying Other Twice, δὲ τὸ ἐν ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων, εἰπόντες τὸ ἔτερον δις we still signify nothing else, but That Nature of which This Name is Always The Self/Same. μὲλλον λέγομεν οὐδὲν τι επ᾽ ἄλλῃ, ἂλλ᾽ τῇ φύσει οὐσερ επ᾽ ἐκεῖνῃ τούνομα ἢν αὐτο.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνω μὲν οὖν .)

147a ἄρα
147b ἄρα
147c ἀυτό, ἀυτό
147d ἀυτό, αὐτό
148a ἀυτό, αὐτό, αὐτό
148b ἄτατο, ἄνοικον, εἰκαστι, εἰκαστὶ
142a ὄνομα, διδόμεθα
147d ὄνομα, διδόμεθα, ὄνομα, διδόμεθα
147e ὄνομα, ὄνομα, τούνομα
149d ὄνομα
150d ὄνομα, ὄνομα, διδόμεθα
143e δή
147d λέγω
147e λέγωμεν, λέγομεν
148c λέγει
152c λέγει, λέγει
147d ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἔτερον
147e ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἕτερον
148e ἔτερον, ἔτερον, ἕτερον, ἔτερον
148d ἔτερον, ἄρα, ἄρα, ἄρα
148b ἄρα, ἄρα, ἄρα, ἄρα, ἄρα
143e δή, δή, δή, δή, δή, δή
147e δή
"Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name."

"Assuredly."

"Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name."

"Certainly."

When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not assign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs.

It is necessary it should be so.

But when we say that other things are different from The One, and that The One is different from others, twice pronouncing the name different, we yet signify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name.

Entirely so.

Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?

True.

Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?

Quite true.
Oxford Greek

ἡ ἄρα ἐτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός, κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἄλλα τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλοις τὸ ἐτερον ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; τὸ δὲ που ταύτων πεπονθός ὁμοιόν: οὐχὶ;

ναι.

ἡ δὴ τὸ ἐν ἐτερον πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄπαν ἰδιαίτερα ὁμοιόν ἂν εἴη: ἄπαν γὰρ ἄπαντων ἐτερόν ἐστιν.

ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, inasmuch as The One Is Other from The Others, and The Others
from The One, by having experienced The Other Self, otherwise, The One will not
experience Being Other, but Be The Self/Same as The Others. But Is not That which
experiences The Self/Same in some way Similar?

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)

Par: Surely then inasmuch as The One experiences That which Is Other from All The Others,
then Absolutely All The Others will Be Similar to This Self; for All Are Other from All .

Ari: It is Reasonable . (εοίκεν .)
Loeb

“In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?”

“Yes.”

“Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore The One be different from others, and others from The One, in consequence of suffering the same different, The One will not suffer that which is different from others, but the same with others: but is not that which in a certain respect suffers the same similar?

Certainly.

But, in the same manner, as The One becomes different from others, every thing becomes similar to every thing: for every thing is different from all things.

It appears so.

Jowett

Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?

Yes.

Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing.

True.
The Like Is indeed contrary to The Unlike.

Par: Is it not also the case, that The Other Is contrary to The Self/Same?

Ari: And this also.

Par: But certainly this was indeed also shown; that in an according way,

The One Is The Self/Same with The Others.

Ari: For it has come to Light.
Loeb

“But the like is opposed to the unlike.”
“Yes.”
“And the other to the same.”
“That is also true.”
“But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others.”
“Yes, it was.”

Thomas Taylor

But is the similar contrary to the dissimilar?
It is.
And is not different contrary to same?
And this also.
But this likewise is apparent, that The One is both the same with and different from others.
It is apparent.

Jowett

Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
Yes.
And the other to the same?
True again.
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
Yes.
Oxford Greek

tοῦ ναντίον δὲ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.

πάνυ γε.

ἐνὴ γε μὴν ἕτερον, ἄνὸμοιον ἐφάνη.

ναὶ.

ἐνὴ ἄρα ταὐτὸν, ἄνὸμοιον ἐσται κατὰ τοῦ ναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοίουντι πάθει. ὁμοίου δὲ ποῦ τὸ ἕτερον;

ναὶ.

ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταὐτὸν, ἢ οὐκ ἕναντίον ἐσται τῷ ἕτερῳ.

ἐόικεν.

Balboas

Par: But to Be The Self/Same with The Others is indeed the opposite experience from that to Be Other from The Others.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)

Par: Most certainly, insofar as The One Is Other, It has come to Light to Be Like.

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

Par: Accordingly then, insofar as It Is The Self/Same, It will Be Unlike, by experiencing the experience that Is opposite to That which makes It Like.

Whereas on the other hand, The Other in some way made It Like?

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is The Self/Same will make It Unlike;

otherwise The Same will not Be opposite to The Other.

Ari: It is reasonable.

ἐόικεν.
Loeb

“And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.”

“Certainly.”

“In so far as it was other it was shown to be like.”

“Yes.”

“Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.”

“Yes.”

“Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

But to be the same with others is a contrary passion to the being different from others.

 Entirely so.

 But The One appears to be similar, so far as different.

 Certainly.

 So far therefore as it is same, it will be dissimilar on account of its suffering a passion contrary to that which produces the similar: or was it not the similar which produced the different?

 Certainly.

 It will therefore render that which is dissimilar the same; or it would not be contrary to different.

 So it appears.

Jowett

And to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?

Certainly.

And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Yes.

But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of otherness.

Yes.

The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.

True.
Oxford Greek

"ομοιον εκατερον, ομοιον εκεινη και αλλοιον πεπονθεναι, μη αλλοιον επενθεναι μη αλλοιον δε πεπονθες μη ανομιον μη ανομιον δε ομοιον ειναι: δη άλλο ομοιον, αλλοιον αλλοιον δε άνομιον ειναι.

άληθε λεγεις.

ταυτον τε αρα ον το εν ευς αλλος και οτι ομοιον εστι κατ άμφοτερα και κατα έκατερον, ομοιον τε αν ειη και ανομιον τοις αλλοις.

πάνω γε.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One will Be both Like and Unlike The Others. On the one hand, insofar as It Is Other, It will Be Like; but on the other hand, insofar as It Is Same, Unlike.

Ari: As it is reasonable, and according to This Logos, it surely has to be so.

Par: For The One also has to Be in the following way.

Ari: In what way? (τινα ;)

Par: Insofar as It experiences Being The Same, It does not experience alteration; whereas if η πεπονθει ταυτον, μη πεπονθεναι αλλοιον, δε It does not experience alteration, It Cannot Be Unlike; but if It Is not Unlike, It Is Like; μη πεπονθος αλλοιον μη ανομιον, δε μη ανομιον: ειναι ομοιον: but insofar as It experiences Being Other, then It experiences alteration, thus by Being δη η πεπονθεν αλλο αλλοιον, δε ον altered It Is Unlike.

αλλοιον ειναι ανομιον.

Ari: You speak The Truth. (λεγεις αληθη .)

Par: Accordingly then, since The One Being Is both The Same and Other from The Others, αρα οτι το εν ον εστι τε ταυτον και ετερον τοις αλλοις, according to both and according to each, thus, It will Be both Like and Unlike The Others.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
“Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same.”

“Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable.”

“But there is another besides.”

“What is it?”

“In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike.”

“True.”

“Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

The One therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to others: and so far as different it will be similar; but so far as the same dissimilar.

The case appears to be so.

And it is likewise thus affected.

How?

So far as it suffers same it does not suffer that which is various; but not suffering that which is various, it cannot be dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it will be similar: but so far as it suffers different it will be various; and being various it will be dissimilar.

You speak the truth.

Since, therefore, The One is both the same with and different from others, according to both and according to each of these, it will be similar and dissimilar to others.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.

Yes, that argument may be used.

And there is another argument.

What?

In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.

True.

Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

οὐκὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὑστατουσὶ, ἐπείτερ ἔτερον τε ἑαυτόν καὶ ταύτον ἑαυτῷ ἑφάνη, κατ’ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἐκάτερον ὁμοίων τε καὶ ἄνόμουν φανήσεται; 

ναί ὁμοίως ἀντίκεν ἑαυτῷ τε ἐπεὶ πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει.

σκοπῶ.

αὐτὸ γὰρ πού ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοίως τὸ ἐν ἑφάνη ὁμοίως.

ὁμοίως.

οὐκὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἐν;

ναί.

Balboas

Par: And in a similar way, is This not the case, in relation to-Itsself, Seeing that The One 

καὶ ὁμοιώτατος οὐκουν ἑαυτὸς ἐπείτερ 

Being has come to Light both Other from-Its-ey and The Same with-Its-ey;

εφανη τε ετερον εαυτου καὶ ταυτον εαυτου, according to both and according to each, thus, It will come to Light both Like and Unlike?

καὶ τούτων ταὐτά καὶ ταῦτα ἐκατερον φανήσεται τε ομοίων καὶ ἄνομοιον;

Ari: Necessarily so. (ἀναγκή.)

Par: What then? Consider how The One Has to Be in relation to Grasping/Touching,

Τῇ δὲ δὲ; σκοπεῖ πως τὸ εἱν εχεῖ περὶ απεσθαί 

according to The Self and to The Others, and then in relation to not Grasping/Touching.

περὶ του αυτου και των αλλων και του μη απεσθαί.

Ari: I so consider. (σκοπω.)

Par: For The One Being has come to Light in some way In The Whole It-eySelf.

γαρ το ενων εφανη ποιν εν ολω εαυτω.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Is also In The Others?

οὐκουν το εν και εν τοις ἄλλοις;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Loeb

“And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself.”

“That is inevitable.”

“Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things.”

“I am considering.”

“The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself.”

“Right.”

“And the one is also in other things?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

And will not this in a similar manner be the case with relation to itself, since it has appeared to be both different from and the same with itself; so that, according to both these, and according to each, it will appear to be similar and dissimilar?

Necessarily so.

But consider now how The One subsists with respect to touching itself and others, and not touching.

I consider.

For The One appears in a certain respect to be in the whole of itself.

Right.

But is The One also in others?

Certainly.

Jowett

And in the same way as being other than itself, and the same with itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself.

Of course.

Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?-Consider.

I am considering.

The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?

True.

And also in other things?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτοιτο ἂν: ἦ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἄπειργοιο ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἂν.

φαίνεται.

οὖ δὲν δὴ ἄπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἄπτοιτο.

τί δὲ τιθὲ; ἄρ’ οὗ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄφεσθαι τίνος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι,

ταύτην τὴν ἑδραν κατέχον ἦ ἂν μετ’ ἐκείνην ἦ ἑδρα ἦ ἂν κείται, ἄπτεσθαι;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἃρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄφεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὖθύς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χωρὰν κατέχον ἑκείνης ἐν ἂν ἑαυτὸ ἂστιν.

deι γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Thus on the one hand insofar as The One Is In Others , It will Grasp The Others ;

but insofar as Self Is In It-Self , on the one hand , It will be kept from Grasping The Others,

whereas on the other hand , Self will Grasp The Self , by Being In It-Self .

Ari: So it has come to Light .

φαίνεται .

Par: In this way then , on the one hand , The One will Grasp both The Self and The Others .

οὖτω δὴ μὲν το ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων .

Ari: It will so grasp . (ἀπτοιτο .)

Par: But on the other hand , what about the following ? Must not Everything which is about to Grasp Anything , be situated next to That which It is about to Grasp , by Filling-up the Self that is about to be grasped , by Filling-up That Same Place , which lies Besides That , so as to Grasp It ?

tην ταυτην εδραν ην αν κειται μετ’ ην εκεινην , ην απειργοιτο ;

Ari: It must . (ἀναγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then , if The One Self were also about to Grasp The Self , must It be situated Immediately Next to It-Self ; by Filling-up That Neighboring Place , In-which , The Self Is .

εὖθυς μεθ’ εαυτο , κατεχον εκεινης χωραν την εχομενην εν ην αυτο εστιν .

Ari: It must do so . (γαρ δει ουν .)
Loeb

“Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it
would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.”

“That is clear.”

“Thus the one would touch itself and the other things.”

“It would.”

“But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to
touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it?”

“It must.”

“Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in
which it is.”

“Yes, it must.”

Thomas Taylor

So far therefore as The One is in others it will touch others; but so far as it is in itself it will be
hindered from touching others, but it will touch itself because it subsists in itself.

So it appears.

And thus, indeed, The One will both touch itself and others.

It will so.

But what will you say to this? Must not every thing which is about to touch any thing be situated in
a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when situated it touches?

It is necessary.

_The One_, therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to be situated immediately after itself,
occupying the place proximate to that in which it is.

It ought so.

Jowett

In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be
debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.

Clearly.

Then the inference is that it would touch both?

It would.

But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which
it is to touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?

True.

Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in
which itself is?

It ought.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ἄν τὸ ἐν ποιήσειεν ἄν ταῦτα καὶ ἄν δυοῖν χῶραιν ἄρα γένοιτο: ἐως δ᾽ ἄν ἦ ἐν, οὔκ ἔθελησει;
οὔ γὰρ οὖν.
ἡ αὐτὴ ἃρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐν μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἀπεσθαί αὐτῷ αὐτῶν.
ἡ αὐτή.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, if The One Being were made Two; then These Two Selves could also come-to-Be in Two Places at the same time; but on the other hand, as long as and inasmuch as It Is One, It will not Be so Disposed?

Ari: It will not do so. (γαρ οὔ οὖν .)

Par: Accordingly then, The Self/Same Necessity Applies to The One; so that It can neither Be Two, nor can The Self Be Grasped by The Self.

Ari: The same necessity. (ἡ αὐτή .)
Loeb

“The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not?”
“No, it will not.”
“The one can no more touch itself than it can be two.”
“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Would not this be the case with The One if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the case while it is The One?
It cannot.
The same necessity therefore belongs to The One, neither to be two nor to touch itself.
The same.

Jowett

And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.
No.
Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?
It cannot.
Oxford Greek

ἀλλ’ οὔδε μήν τῶν ἄλλων ἄφεται.

τί δή;

ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄφεσθαι χωρὶς ὅν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκεῖνο εἶναι οὔ μέλλει ἄφεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδέν εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ.

δόο ἀρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι.

dei.

Balboas

Par: Certainly then, It will not Grasp The Others.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη;)  

Par: For we say that, That which is about to Grasp, must be Separate from That, by Being next to That which It Is about to Grasp; thus there Is no Third Term Between Them Selves.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ;)  

Par: Accordingly then, at the very least Two Terms Are Necessary, if Contact is about to be.

Ari: It is necessary. (δεί;)
Loeb

“Nor, again, will it touch the others.”

“Why not?”

“Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next it, and there must be no third between them.”

“True.”

“Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact.”

“There must.”

Thomas Taylor

But neither will it touch others.

Why?

Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is separate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them.

True.

Two things, therefore, at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take place.

Certainly.

Jowett

Neither can it touch others.

Why not?

The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be between them.

True.

Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

They are.
Oxford Greek

ἔαν δὲ τὸν δυὸν ὅρον τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄφεις δύο.

καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἕνεκ’ ἑνὸς προσγιγνομένου μιὰ καὶ ἄφις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄφεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιὰ ἔλαττους εἶναι. οἳ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησαν τῶν ἀριθμῶν εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑνὸς ἄφεις, τῷ ἵπτῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἐπείτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν πλεονεκτεῖ:

Balboas

Par: But if on the one hand, a Third Term is added right after The Two, then (Their) Selves will be Three, but Their Contacts (Relationships) will Be Two.

Ari: Yes . (ναι.) (Nicomachus Book I Chap 8, Introduction to Arithmetic)

Par: And surely then in this way, whenever One Term is added , One Contact is also added , and the amount of all the Contacts will Always Be One less than The Number of Terms. For every succeeding Number of Terms exceeds the amount of all Contacts, by just as much as, the Number of their Contacts was exceeded by The Number of the first Two Terms. The Number of their Contacts was exceeded by The Number of the first Two Terms.
And if to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts."

"Yes."

“And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts.

But if a third thing succeeds to the two terms, these will now be three, but the contacts two.

Certainly.

And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to pass that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two first numbers surpassed the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by so much will all the following number surpass the multitude of the contacts.

And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Yes.

And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner;
Oxford Greek

ἤδη γάρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἂμα ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἁφὶς ταῖς ἁφεῖσιν.

Contact Is immediately added to The Contacts. (τοις ἁφεῖσιν .)

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς .)

Par: Accordingly then, whatever The Number of Terms there Are of The Selves ,

Their Contacts will Always Be less, by One .

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Then, if indeed Only One Term Exists , but Two Are not , then there can Be no Contact .

Ari: How could there be? (πώς γὰρ ;)

For the rest, One Term Is immediately added to both The Number of Terms and at the same time One

Contact Is immediately added, to The Contacts. (τοις αἵφεσιν .)

Contact Is immediately added to The Contacts. (τοις ἁφεῖσιν .)

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς .)

Par: Accordingly then, whatever The Number of Terms there Are of The Selves ,

Their Contacts will Always Be less, by One .

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Then, if indeed Only One Term Exists , but Two Are not , then there can Be no Contact .

Ari: How could there be? (πώς γὰρ ;)
Loeb

For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts."
“Right.”
“Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less.”
“True.”
“But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact.”
“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts.
Right.
The contacts, therefore, less by one will always be as many in number as the things themselves.
True.
If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact.
How can there?

Jowett

and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.
True.
Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.
True.
But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
How can there be?
Have we not said that, Those that Are Other than The One Are Not-One, nor do They Participate of The Self, if indeed They Are Other? 

neither (γαρ οὐ).

Accordingly then, there Is no Number that Is Inherent In The Others, since One/Unity Is not Inherent In Them.

How could it? (πώς γάρ ;)
Loeb

“We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other.”

“They do not.”

“Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

Have we not said that such things as are different from The One are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different?

We have.

The One, therefore is not number in others, as The One is not contained in them.

How can it?

Jowett

And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True.

Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?

Of course not.
οὐτ’ ἄρα ἐν ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀρίθμου ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν.

οὐ.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἔστιν ἐν, καὶ δύος οὐκ ἄν εἴη.

οὔ φαίνεται.

ἄφις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν δύοιν μὴ ὄντοιν.

οὐκ ἔστιν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The Others Are neither One nor Two, nor do They Possess The Name of any other Number.

Ari: They do not. (οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is One, Alone, and It will not Be Two.

Ari: It will not so come to Light. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no Contact; since there are no Two Terms/Beings/Selves.

Ari: There are not. (εστὶν οὐκ.)
Loeb

“Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have they the name of any other number.”

“No.”

“The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two.”

“That is clear.”

“There is no contact if there are no two terms.”

“No, there is none.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor any thing possessing the name of another number.

It is not.

The One, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two.

It will not, as it appears.

There is no contact, therefore, two not subsisting.

There is not.

Jowett

Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?

No.

One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?

Clearly not.

And if there are not two, there is no contact?

There is not.
Oxford Greek

οὔτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἑπείπερ ἄφις οὔκ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
oēτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἕαυτὸ ἄπτεται τε καὶ οὐχ ἄπτεται. ἐόικεν.

Αρ' οὖν καὶ ἵσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνίσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; πῶς;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One will neither Grasp The Others, nor will The Others Grasp The One, if indeed there Is no Contact.

Ari: Certainly not. (γὰρ οὖν οὐν.)

Par: Surely then in this way, according to all these statements, The One will both Grasp and not Grasp The Others and It-Self.

Ari: So it appears. (ἐόικεν.)

Parmenides: 18 Take notice then, Is The One Equal and Unequal to Self and to The Others? Αρ' οὖν ἐστι ἵσον καὶ ἀνίσον καὶ αὐτῶ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;

Aristotle: How? (πῶς;)
Loeb

“Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact.”
“No, certainly not.”
“Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others.”
“So it appears.”
“And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?”
“How is that?”

Thomas Taylor

The One therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch The One, as there is no contact.
Certainly not.
On all these accounts, therefore, The One will both touch and not touch others and itself.
So it appears.
Is it therefore equal and unequal to itself and others?
How?

Jowett

Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?
Certainly not.
For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?
True.
Further-is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
How do you mean?
Ari: εναντιω

Par: If The One were bigger or smaller than The Others, or in turn if The Others were bigger or smaller than The One, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither The One by Being nor The Others by Being Other than The One would Be something bigger nor something smaller than each other, by virtue of the selfhood of their ousias. But if each one, ελαττων αλληλων γε τα ταυταις ταυτας ousias ; αλληλων εικατερα μεν besides Being Such as They Are, would also Possess Equality, then they would be equal to each other. But if, the others possessed bigness but the one smallness, or the one αλληλα : δε ει τα μεν μεγεθος δε το σμικρωτια, η το εν bigness but the others smallness, then on the one hand, wherever the idea of bigness would be bigness δε ταυταις ταυτας ousias ; μεν ὁσερω τω ειδε μεγεθος oppose each other and they would never have come to be among the real beings. Ari: How could they? (πως αν γαρ πως γαρ αν;)

Oxford Greek

ei μειζων ειη το εν ει ταυταις ousias μειζων ειτην τοις αντιων, η αυ τα ταυταις ταυτας ousias, δε δε τοις αντιων, ειτην τοις αντιων μειζων αντιων που ειτην τοις αντιων αντιων.

Ari: εναντιω

Par: If The One were bigger or smaller than The Others, or in turn if The Others were bigger or smaller than The One, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither The One by Being nor The Others by Being Other than The One would Be something bigger nor something smaller than each other, by virtue of the selfhood of their ousias. But if each one, ελαττων αλληλων γε τα ταυτας ταυτας ousias ; αλληλων εικατερα μεν besides Being Such as They Are, would also Possess Equality, then they would be equal to each other. But if, the others possessed bigness but the one smallness, or the one αλληλα : δε ει τα μεν μεγεθος δε το σμικρωτια, η το εν bigness but the others smallness, then on the one hand, wherever the idea of bigness would be bigness δε ταυταις ταυτας ousias ; μεν ὁσερω τω ειδε μεγεθος oppose each other and they would never have come to be among the real beings. Ari: How could they? (πως αν γαρ πως γαρ αν;)

Oxford Greek

ei μειζων ειη το εν ει ταυταις ousias μειζων ειτην τοις αντιων, η αυ τα ταυταις ταυτας ousias, δε δε τοις αντιων, ειτην τοις αντιων αντιων.

Ari: εναντιω

Par: If The One were bigger or smaller than The Others, or in turn if The Others were bigger or smaller than The One, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither The One by Being nor The Others by Being Other than The One would Be something bigger nor something smaller than each other, by virtue of the selfhood of their ousias. But if each one, ελαττων αλληλων γε τα ταυτας ταυτας ousias ; αλληλων εικατερα μεν besides Being Such as They Are, would also Possess Equality, then they would be equal to each other. But if, the others possessed bigness but the one smallness, or the one αλληλα : δε ει τα μεν μεγεθος δε το σμικρωτια, η το εν bigness but the others smallness, then on the one hand, wherever the idea of bigness would be bigness δε ταυταις ταυτας ousias ; μεν ὁσερω τω ειδε μεγεθος oppose each other and they would never have come to be among the real beings. Ari: How could they? (πως αν γαρ πως γαρ αν;)

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that both these certain ideas: bigness and smallness, do indeed exist? For if they did not subsist in some way, then they would certainly never be present. One would be bigger; but the one in which smallness exists would be smaller. Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that both these certain ideas: bigness and smallness, do indeed exist? For if they did not subsist in some way, then they would certainly never be present. One would be bigger; but the one in which smallness exists would be smaller. Ari: How could they? (πως αν γαρ πως γαρ αν;)

Oxford Greek

ei μειζων ειη το εν ει ταυταις ousias μειζων ειτην τοις αντιων, η αυ τα ταυταις ταυτας ousias, δε δε τοις αντιων, ειτην τοις αντιων αντιων.
Loeb

“If the one were greater or less than the others, or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?”

“Certainly.”

“These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.”

“That is obvious.”

Thomas Taylor

If The One were greater or lesser than others, or others greater or lesser than The One, would it not follow that neither The One, because one, nor others, because different from The One, would be greater or lesser than each other from their own essences? But if each, besides being such as they are, should possess equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one should possess magnitude, and the other parvitude, or The One magnitude but others parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever species magnitude was present, that species would be greater; but that the species would be lesser with which parvitude was present?

Necessarily so.

Are there not, therefore, two certain species of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no subsistence they could never be contrary to each other, and be present with beings.

How should they?

Jowett

If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness-whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly.

Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.

How could they?
Oxford Greek

eί ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνι σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἢτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἄν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη.

ἀνάγκη.

tά δ’ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἵσου ἄν τῷ ἐνι δ’ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμενή εἰ ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό;

dήλον δή.

ἀρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἔξ ἵσου μέν οὔσα ἢ σμικρότης τῷ ἐνι ἵση ἢν αὐτῷ εἰ, περιέχουσα δὲ μεῖζων;

πῶς δ’ οὖ; δοκανότον οὖν σμικρότητα ἵσην τῷ εἶναι ἢ μεῖζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἐαυτῆς;

ἀδύνατον.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , if Smallness Comes to Be In The One , then It will either Be Present

150A ἀρα εἰ σμικρότης εγγίγνεται εν τῷ ενι, ἂν ἢτοι ενείη

In The Whole of The Self or In a Part of The Self.

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: What then , if Smallness would Come to Be In The Whole ? Will It not either Be

τά δ’ εἰ εγγίγνοιτο εν ὅλῳ; ἂν οὐ η ἐνείη

extended Equally throughout The Whole of The One Self or Encompass/Contain The Self?

Ari: Manifestly so. (δήλον δή.)

Par: Take notice then , if on the one hand , Smallness Is extended Equally to The One , then

εξ τεταμήν ισού δι’ ὅλου τα ενι αυτου ἡ περιέχουσα αυτο;

Ari: How could it not be so? (πῶς οὖ δ’;) ἂν ενείη ἢση αυτῷ, δὲ περιέχουσα μεῖζον;

Par: Therefore , Is it indeed Possible for Smallness to Be Equal or bigger than anything , and to

151α οὖν ἢ De dυνατον σμικρότητα εἶναι ἢση τῷ μεῖζῳ τῶν τινών, καὶ

do the functions of Bigness/Magnitude and Equality , but not perform the functions of It-Self?

Ari: Impossible. (ἀδυνατον.)
Loeb

“Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.”

“Necessarily.”

“What if it be in the whole of one? Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?”

“Clearly.”

“And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?”

“Of course.”

“But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in The One, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it.
It is necessary.

But if it should be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of The One or comprehend The One?
Plainly so.

If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in *The One*, will it not be equal to *The One*; but if it comprehends *The One* will it not be greater?

How should it not?

Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own?
It is impossible.

Jowett

If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?
Certainly.

Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?
Clearly.

If it be co-extensive with the one it will be coequal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?
Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?
Impossible.
Oxford Greek

ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἐνι, ὅτι ἐν οὐκ ἔη σμικρότησιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.
ναί.

οὐδὲ γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει: εἰ δὲ μή, ταυτά ποιήσει ἀπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον: ἵστη ἔσται ἡ μεῖζων
tοῦ μέρους ἐν ϑ ἂν ἂει ἐνη.

άναγκη.

οὐδὲν ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὀντων σμικρότησι, μήτ᾽ ἐν μέρει μήτ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένῃ: οὐδὲ τι ἐς
tαι σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος.

οὐδ᾽ ἐστιν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, Smallness will not Be extended throughout
the Whole of The One, but in a Part, if indeed at all.

οὐδὲν τοῦ ἐν μέρει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μέρει εἴπερ.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Nor indeed in turn, In The Whole Part; for if It did, then would not these Be functions
of The Whole Part, just as it happened in relation to The Whole; in which case, It will
Always Be either Equal or bigger than that in which Smallness happens to Be extended.

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, Smallness will never Exist in any of The Real Beings, since It cannot
Exist in a Part nor in a Whole; nor will there Be anything small except The Smallness of Self.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (οὐκ ἐοίκεν.)
Loeb

“Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.”

“Yes.”

“And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.”

“Inevitably.”

“Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of The One, but if at all, in a part.

Certainly.

Nor yet again in the whole part; as the same consequences would ensue in the whole part of The One, as in the whole of The One: for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent.

It is necessary.

Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, since it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself.

It does not appear that there will.

Jowett

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.
Oxford Greek

οὐδὲ ἀρα μέγεθος ἔνεσται ἐν αὐτῷ: μεῖζον γὰρ ἐν τὶ εἶ ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ὑμῖν τὸ μέγεθος ἔνει, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἔκειντε ἐν μέγα: τούτῳ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης ὀυδένι ἔνει.

Ἀλῆθη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλω μεῖζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλος ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, neither will Magnitude Be Inherent in The Self. For then there will Be some other big aspect besides The Magnitude of The Self; That in which Bigness Is Inherent; the αὐτὸ μεῖζον καὶ πλὴν μεγέθους αὐτοῦ, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ὑμῖν μέγα: even if The Being of Smallness is not; these which The Self Must surpass by whatever Is big; καὶ οὖν αὐτὸ ὑπερέχειν ἐκεῖνο ἐν μέγα: but this, Is Impossible, seeing that Smallness cannot ever Be Inherent in any being.

de touto ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδή σμικρότησι ὀυδένι ἐν εἰ.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ ἐ.)

Par: So then, The Self of Magnitude will not be bigger than another, except The Smallness of Her Self, nor will Smallness Be smaller than another except The Magnitude of Self.

Ari: It will not. (γάρ ὅν.)
Loeb

“Nor will greatness exist in the one. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.”

“True.”

“But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness.”

“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither will magnitude therefore be in The One: for there will be some other thing great besides magnitude itself. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be surpassed by that which is great; but which in this case is impossible, since parvitude is not inherent in any being.

True.

But, indeed, magnitude itself will not surpass any thing else but parvitude itself, nor will parvitude be less than any other than magnitude itself.

It will not.

Jowett

Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.

But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.
Oxford Greek

οὕτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζων τοῖς ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττων, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἐχοντα, οὕτε αὐτῶν τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἑκείνῳ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχοντοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλάξων, οὐτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζων ἢ ἐλάττων εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.

οὖκοιν φαίνεται γε.

ἀρ’ οὖν, εἰ μήτε μείζων μήτε ἐλάττων τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν, ἀνάγκη.

οὖκοιν τὸ γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχομένων πολλή ἀνάγκη εξ ἵππου εἴναι, εξ ἵππου δὲ ὅν ἴσον εἴναι.

πῶς γάρ οὖ:

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Others Be bigger nor smaller than The One, since

They neither Possess Bigness nor Smallness, nor Is This Self That which Has The Power

150D μήτε εχοντα μεγέθος μήτε σμικρότητα, οὐτε τοῦτω αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ τὴν δύναμιν in relation to The One, of either surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will only be the case τοῦ τινων ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερεχομένων αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ in relation to Each Other; nor in turn will The One Be either bigger nor smaller than These

πρὸς ἀλλάξων, οὔτε αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν ἑκείνῳ μεῖζων οὐδὲ ἐλάττων τουτων nor The Others, since It neither Possesses Bigness nor Smallness.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων, μήτε ἐχον μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα.

Ari: It does not indeed appear to have come to Light. (οὐκοιν φαίνεται γε.)

Par: Take notice then, if The One is neither bigger nor smaller than The Others, εἰ ὅτι οὖν, οὐτε τοῦτω μήτε μεῖζων μήτε ἐλάττων τῶν ἄλλων, then The Self Must Necessarily neither surpass or Be surpassed by Them?

αὐτὸ ἀναγκή μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερεχομένων ἐκείνων;

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκῆ.)

Par: Is it not Abundantly Necessary Indeed, for That which neither surpasses

οὐκοιν πολλὴ ἀναγκὴ γε τὸ μήτε ὑπερέχον nor Is surpassed to Be Equally extended; for by Being Equally extended It Must Be Equal.

μήτε ὑπερεχομένων εἶναι ἵππου εξ ἵππου δὲ ὅν ἴσον εξ ἵππου εἴναι ἴσον.

Ari: How could it not? (πῶς γάρ οὖν;) (Nicomachus Book I Chapter 17-3, Intro. to Arith.)

150b: μείζων 150c: μείζων, μέγα, μείζων 150d: μείζων, μείζων, μείζων 150e: μείζων, μείζων

149b: ἔλαττων, ἐλαττον, ἐλάττων, ἐλαττον 150a: ἐλάττων 150c: ἐλάττων, ἐλαττον, ἐλαττον 150d: ἐλάττων, ἐλαττον, ἐλαττον 150e: ἐλαττον, ἐλαττον

149b: ἴσον 150a: ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον 150c: ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον, ἴσον

150b: ἱσον

149b: ἴσον 150c: ἱσον, ἱσον 150d: ἱσον 150e: ἱσον, ἱσον, ἱσον, ἱσον, ἱσον, ἱσον, ἱσον
Loeb

“Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.”

“Evidently not.”

“Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?”

“Certainly not.”

“Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal.”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither therefore will other things be greater than The One; nor lesser, since they neither possess magnitude nor parvitude: nor will these two possess any power with respect to The One, either of surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will be the case only with respect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will The One be either greater or lesser than these two, or others, as it neither possesses magnitude nor parvitude.

So indeed it appears.

If The One therefore is neither greater nor lesser than others, is it not necessary that it should neither surpass nor be surpassed by them?

It is necessary.

Is it not also abundantly necessary, that that which neither surpasses nor is surpassed should be equally affected? And must it not, if equally affected, be equal?

How should it not?

Jowett

Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.
καὶ μήν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἐν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἃν ἔχως μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἐχὼν οὕτως ἃν ὑπερέχοιτο οὕτως ἃν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ὁν ἵσον ἃν εἰπῃ ἑαυτῷ.
πάντως μὴν οὖν.
τὸ ἐν ἀρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵσον ἃν εἰπη.
φαίνεται.
καὶ μήν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἃν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτῷ ἃν εἰπῃ ἐξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἃν ἑαυτῷ εἰπη.

Balboas
Par: And most certainly, The One Self will also have to Be in The Same relation to It-Self;
by neither Possessing Bigness nor Smallness in It-Self, nor will It surpass nor will It Be surpassed by It-Self;
but by Being Equally extended, It will Be Equal to It-Self.
It would be surpassed by It-Self, but by Being Equally extended, It will Be Equal to It-Self.

Ari: Entirely so.

Par: Accordingly then, The One will Be Equal both to It-Self and to The Others.

Ari: So it has come to Light.

Par: And certainly if Self were in It-Self, then It would also be Outside About It-Self,
and indeed on the one hand, by Containing It-Self, It would Be bigger than It-Self.
“And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.”

“Certainly.”

“The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.”

“Evidently.”

“But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself,

Thomas Taylor

*The One* therefore will be thus circumstanced with respect to itself: *viz.* from neither possessing magnitude nor parvitude in itself, it will neither surpass nor be surpassed by itself; but being equally affected it will be equal to itself.

Entirely so.

*The One* therefore will be equal both to itself and others.

So it appears.

But if *The One* should be in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and so, through comprehending itself, it would be greater than itself;

Jowett

And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others?

Clearly so.

And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself;
Oxford Greek

περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὔτω μεῖζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἰς αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν. εἰς γὰρ ἂν.
oὐκόν καὶ τὸδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἕνος τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων;
πῶς γὰρ οὖς;
αλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἑναὶ που δεί το γε ὅν ἂει.
ναί.

Balboas

but on the other hand, by Being Contained , It would Be smaller than It-Self ; and in this way
The One Self would be bigger and smaller than It-Self .

Ari: It would be so . (αν ειη γαρ .)

Par: Must not the following also be the case ; that there Is nothing at all Outside
of The One and The Others ? (του ενος τε καὶ των αλλων ;)

Ari: How could it not be in this way ? (πος ου γαρ ;)

Par: But it Must Be the case that , That which Is , Must Always Be somewhere .
αλλα δει γε μην το ον αει ειναι που .

Ari: Yes . (ναι .)
Loeb

and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; thus the one would be both greater and less than itself.”

“Yes, it would.”

“And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others?”

“Of course.”

“But that which exists must always exist somewhere.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

but from being comprehended less than itself: and thus The One would be both greater and lesser than itself.

It would so.

Is not this also necessary, that nothing has any subsistence besides The One and others?

How should it be otherwise?

But ought not whatever has a being to be always somewhere?

Certainly.

Jowett

and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἐν τῷ ὧν ἐν μεῖζον ἔσται ἐλαττον ὃν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἔτερον ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἶπ.

Balboas

Par: Is it not indeed the case that, That which Is in anything, will Subsist

οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὕπερον ἐν μεῖζον ἔσται ἔλαττον ὃν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἔτερον ἐν ἐτέρῳ εἶπ.

Ari: It cannot.

Par: But since there Is no Other, apart from The One and The Others, then Selves

δε επειδή εστι οὐδὲν ἔτερον χωρίς τοῦ ενος καὶ των ἄλλων, δε αὐτὰ Μust Be in something. Then is it not also Necessary that since Selves Are already in
dει εἰναι ἐν τω, συκ αναγκὴ εἰναι ἡδη ἐν

Each-Other, then The Others also Subsist in The One and The One also Subsists in

αλληλοις, τα ἄλλα τε ἐν τω ἐνι καὶ το ἐν ἐν

The Others, or else Selves Exist in no way whatsoever?

151B τοις ἄλλοις, η ἐναι μηδαμοῦ ;

Ari: So it has come to Light.

(φαίνεται.)
“And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it?”

“No, it cannot.”

“But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all?”

“Clearly.”

And does not that which subsists in another, subsist as the lesser in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way subsist in another.

It cannot.

But since there is nothing else except The One and others, and it is necessary that these should be in something, is it not necessary that they should be in one another, viz. others in The One, and The One in others; or that they should be nowhere?

It appears so.

But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

That is clear.
Oxford Greek

ὅτι μὲν ἀρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνεστὶ, μεῖζω ἄν εἰθ ὁ ἂλλα τοῦ ἕνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἑλάττων τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον: ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἂν εἰθ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἕνος ἑλάττω.

ἔοικεν.

τὸ ἐν ἀρα ἴσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἑλάττων ἐστιν αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, since The One Is Inherent in The Others, then

The Others will Be bigger than The One, by Comprehending/Containing The Self;

whereas on the other hand, The One will Be smaller than The Others by Being Contained;

but since The Others Are Inherent in The One, then by The Self/Same Logos, The One will Be bigger than The Others; and thus, The Other Beings will be smaller than The One.

Ari: As it is Reasonable.

Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, Is Equal to, and bigger and smaller than,

both The Self and The Others.

Ari: So it has come to Light.
Loeb

“And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.”

“So it appears.”

“Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others.”

“Evidently.”

Thomas Taylor

Because, therefore, *The One* is in others, others will be greater than *The One*, through comprehending it; but *The One* will be less than others, because comprehended: but if others are inherent in *The One*, *The One* on the same account will be greater than others; but others will be less than *The One*.

It appears so.

*The One*, therefore, is equal to, greater and lesser, both than itself and others.

It seems so.

Jowett

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Clearly.
Oxford Greek

καὶ μήν εἴπερ μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαττόνων καὶ ἴσων, ἴσων ἄν εἰς μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων ἄντω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδή δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν.

πῶς δ’ οὖς: 

’elleσον μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ἄν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐλαττόνων ἄν καὶ πλέον εἰς ἄντω τε ἄντω καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσων ἀντῶ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταυτά.

πῶς: 

ὦνπερ μεῖζον ἐστι, πλειόνων ποὺ καὶ μέτρων ἄν εἰς ἀντῶν, ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν: καὶ ὃν ἐλαττόνων, ἀκαθαρτῶς: καὶ οἷς ἴσων, κατὰ ταυτά.

οὕτως.

Balboas

Par: And certainly, if indeed It is bigger, smaller and equal, then It will be of equal, more and less measures than the self and the others; but if of measures, then also of the parts.

καὶ ἐλαττόνων μετρῶν αὐτῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δὲ εἰς δε μετρῶν, καὶ μερῶν.

Ari: How could it not be? (πῶς δ’ οὖς.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by being of the equal, more and lesser measures,

ἀρα μὲν ἐν ἴσων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων μετρῶν,

then it will also be less and more in number, both in relation to the self and the others,

καὶ τις ἐλαττόνων καὶ πλέον ἀριθμῷ τε αὐτῶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

and also, according to the same logos, It will be equal to the self and to the others.

καὶ τε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἴσων αὐτῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ari: How? (πῶς;) 

Par: Whatever is big, will also be in some way of more measures than selves, whereas

ὦνπερ εἰς τις μεῖζον, ἄν καὶ εἰς ἴσων πλειόνων μετρῶν αὐτῶν: καὶ

it will also be of as many measures as parts; and in the same way for the which is small,

οὐγνοί μετρῶν, μερῶν: καὶ ἄκαθαρτος ἐν ἐλαττόνων,

and according to the same logos for that which is equal.

κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὤν ἴσων.

Ari: In the same way. (οὕτως.)
“And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and
the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.”

“Of course.”

“And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself
and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others.”

“How is that?”

“If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as
measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.”

“True.”

But if it is greater, equal, and lesser, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself
and others; and if of measures, also of parts.

How should it not?

Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be more and less in number, both
with respect to itself and others; and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and others.

How?

That which is greater possesses more measures than that which is smaller, and contains as many
parts as measures; and that which is lesser in the same manner, as also that which is equal.

It is so.

And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than
itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and
the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures; and so
with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν ἐαυτὸν μείζον καὶ ἐλαττῶν ὅν καὶ ἴσον ἴσον ἐν εἴθε μέτρων καὶ πλείονων καὶ ἐλαττῶνων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδή δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν;

πῶς δ’ οὖ:

ἴσον μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὅν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἀν τὸ πλήθος αὐτῷ εἶ, πλείονων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττῶνων δὲ ἐλαττῶν τὸν ἀρίθμον αὐτοῦ.

φαίνεται.

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα ὑσαύτως ἔξει τὸ ἐν; ὅτι μὲν μείζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀρίθμον αὐτῶν: ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἐλαττῶν: ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγεθεί, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις;

ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that by Being big and small and Equal to It-Self,

151D oυκοῦν oν μείζον καὶ ἐλαττῶν καὶ ἴσον εχειτο,

It will also Be of Equal Measures , and of more and of less Measures than The Self?

ἀν καὶ εἰς ἴσον μέτρων πλείονων καὶ ἐλαττῶνων αὐτῷ,

But if this is indeed the case of Measures , then will it not also Be the case for Parts?

δὲ επειδὴ μέτρων , καὶ μερῶν;

Ari: How could it not be ? (πῶς οὐ δ’;)?

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , by Being of Equal Parts to The Self,

ἀρὰ μὲν ἐν εἴθε ἰσὸν μέτρων αὐτῷ,

It will Be Equal in Multitude to The Self ; but on the other hand , if of more , then more ,

ἀν εἰς ἴσον τὸ πλήθος αὐτῶ,

but if of less , then less in Number , than The Self.

δὲ ἐλαττῶνον ἐλαττῶν τὸν αριθμὸν αὐτῶ.

Ari: So it has come to Light . (φαίνεται.)

Par: Is it not the case then , that The One Has to Be Related in the same way to The Others?

οὐκοῦν το ἐν εἴθε ἰσὸν μέτρων πρὸς τὰλλα:

For on the one hand , It has come to Light bigger than Them Selves , and so It must Be more

ὅτι μὲν φαίνεται μείζον αὐτῶν , καὶ ἀνάγκῃ εἶναι πλέον in Number than Selves . But , since It Is smaller , then must It not also Be less in Number?

τὸν αριθμὸν αὐτῶν : ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον , ἐλαττῶν : And since It Is Equal in Magnitude , Must It not also Be Equal in Multitude to The Others?

ἀρὰ μὲν ἴσον μεγεθεὶ , καὶ εἶναι ἴσον τὸ πλήθος τοῖς ἄλλοις;

Ari: Necessarily . (ἀναγκῇ.)
Loeb

“Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?”

“Of course.”

“And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.”

“Clearly.”

“And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others?”

“Yes, it must.”

Thomas Taylor

Since The One, therefore, is both greater, lesser, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts?

How should it not?

If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself.

It appears so.

But will The One be similarly affected towards others? For, since it appears to be greater than others, is it not necessary that it should be more in number than others? but, because it is lesser, must it not also be fewer in number? and because equal in magnitude, must it not also be equal in multitude to others?

It is necessary.

Jowett

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

Certainly.

And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

οὖν δὴ αὕτω, ὡς εἰσκε, τὸ ἔν καὶ ἵσων καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἔσται.

ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ χρόνον μετέχει τὸ ἔν, καὶ ἐστὶ τέ καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἕαυτον οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχουν;

ποίς;

εἰναι μὲν ποιοὶ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἑστὶν.

ναί.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, in this way in turn, as it is Reasonable, The One Self will Be Equal, 151E δὴ οὔτω καὶ ἦσω αὐτῷ, ὡς εἰσκε, τὸ ἔν καὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἵσων and more and less in Number, than both The Self and The Others. καὶ πλέον καὶ ἐλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Ari: It will be so. (ἔσται .)

Par: Take notice then, will The One also Participate of Time? And does The Self also become younger and older, both than It-Self and The Others, and also αὐτο τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον τε ἕαυτον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ neither younger nor older than It-Self nor The Others, by Participating of Time?

The Others, How? (ποις ;)

Par: On the one hand, To Be, Is Present in some way with The Self, if indeed It Is One. μὲν εἰναι ὑπαρχεῖν τού αὐτοῦ εἰσερ ἑστὶν ἐν .

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

(compare This to 160d4)
“And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.”

“Yes, it will.”

“And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?”

“What do you mean?”

“If one is, it is thereby shown to be.”

“Yes.”

And thus again, as it appears, The One will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and others.

It will so.

Will The One, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it subsist in becoming to be younger and older, both than itself and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, though participating of time?

How?

To be in a certain respect is present with it, since it is The One.

certainly.

Once more then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

It will.

Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?

If one is, being must be predicated of it?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

tὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἡ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὡσπερ τὸ ἣν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὕτο τὸ ἐστι μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία; ἔστι γὰρ.

μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἰπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand, what else Is The To Be, than The Participation of Ousia with The Present of Time? Just as, The Was Is The Participation of Ousia with The Past, and in turn, The Will be Is The Communion of Ousia with The Future?

Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)

Par: Accordingly then, It Participates of Time, if indeed It also Participates of The To Be.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Loeb

“But is 'to be' anything else than participation in existence together with present time, just as 'was' denotes participation in existence together with past time, and 'will be' similar participation together with future time?”

“True.”

“Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But what else is to be than a participation of essence with the present time? In the same manner as it was in a communication of essence with the past, and it will be with the future?

It is no other.

It must participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being.

Entirely so.

Jowett

But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?

Very true.

Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

οὐκ οὖν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου;

ναι.

ἀρι ᾧ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἐαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.

ἀνάγκη.

ἀρ᾽ οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;

μεμνήμεθα.

Balboas

Par: Will not then, The Time of which It Participates, Be in a state of Procession?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, It Is Always becoming older than It-Self, if indeed It Proceeds according to Time. (As opposed to Abiding in The Eternal)

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)

Par: Take notice then, do we remember that whatever becomes younger does so, because the older becomes older (than it) ?

Ari: We do remember. (μεμνημέθα.)

146: χρόνου, χρόνου
151a: χρόνου, χρόνου
152a: χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου, χρόνου
152b: χρόνου
152c: προσβύτερον, προσβύτερον, προσβύτερον, προσβύτερον

146d: νεωτέρου, νεωτέρου
151a: νεωτέρου, νεωτέρου
152a: νεωτέρου
152b: νεωτέρου, νεωτέρου
152c: νεωτέρου, νεωτέρου

2nd
Loeb

“And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?”

“Yes.”

“Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.”

“Certainly.”

“Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it?”

“Yes, we do.”

Thomas Taylor

Must is not, therefore, participate of time in progression?

Certainly.

It will always, therefore, subsist in becoming to be older than itself, if it proceeds according to time.

It is necessary.

Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, because it is always becoming younger?

We do call it to mind.

Jowett

And is not time always moving forward?

Yes.

Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time?

Certainly.

And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?

I remember.
οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἑν, νεωτέρον ἂν γιγνομένον ἐαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο;

Ἀνάγκη.

γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερον τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ οὖν.

ναι.

ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἃρ’ οὖν ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ἡ γιγνομένον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἑν τε καὶ ἑσται; οὐ γάρ ποιεῖν νεωτέρον γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἐπείτα ὑπερβῆσαι τὸ νῦν.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that while The One, becomes older than It-Self, οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰς γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον εαυτου, that It is becoming older than It-Self, while It is becoming younger than It-Self?

Ari: Necessarily. (Ἀναγκη.)

Par: Surely then in this way, on the one hand, It will become younger and older than The Self. δὴ οὔτως μὲν γιγνεται νεωτερον τε και πρεσβυτερον αυτον.

Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: But accordingly, on the other hand, It Is not in any way older, when Coming-to-Be ἃρ’ ἐστι οὖν ἡ πρεσβυτερον οἷς γιγνομενον according to The Present Time; That which Is between The Was and The Will Be? For κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἑν τε καὶ ἑσται; γαρ by Proceeding from The Past to The Future, It will not somehow go-beyond The Present? πορευομενον εκ του ποτε εἰς τὸ ἐπείτα γε οὐ που ὑπερβησει το το νῦν.

Ari: How could it. (Γαρ οὐ.)
Loeb

“Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, would become older than a self which becomes younger?”

“There is no doubt of it.”

“Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself.”

“Yes.”

“And it is older (is it not) when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

Does not The One, therefore, while it is becoming older than itself, subsist in becoming older than itself, while it is becoming younger than itself?

Necessarily so.

It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itself.

Certainly.

But is it not then older when it subsists in becoming to be according to the present time, which is between it was and it will be: for, through proceeding from the past to the future, it will not pass beyond the present now?

It will not.

Jowett

Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?

Certainly.

Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?

Yes.

And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time, between "was" and "will be," which is "now": for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present?

No.
Oxford Greek

ἀρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδάν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐστι τότε ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προίον γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε λήφθηε ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προίον οὖτως ἤχει ὡς ἁρμοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τὴν και τοῦ ἐπείτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν αἰφέμενον, τοῦ δ’ ἐπείτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξύ ἁρμοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τῇ ἐπείτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν.

αληθῆ.

eἰ δὲ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τῷ νῦν πάν τῷ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπὸ ἐπίσχει ἂν τῷ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐστι τότε τοῦτο ὡς ἄν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: Take notice then , will It not at that time cease to become older , since It arrives at The Now and is no longer becoming , but at that time It Is already older ? For when It Proceeds νῦν καὶ οὐ γίγνεται , ἀλλ’ τοτ’ ἤδη πρεσβύτερον ; γὰρ ποτε προίον It will not Be Grasped by The Now . For That which Proceeds Has To Be in such a way as αὖ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν . γὰρ τὸ προίον ἤχει οὕτως ὡς to Grasp both The Now and The Future ; on the one hand , by Departing from The Now , while εφάπτεσθαι αμφότερον , τοῦ νῦν τε καὶ τοῦ ἐπείτα , μὲν αἰφέμενον τοῦ νῦν , δ’ also Apprehending The Future , by Coming-to-Be Between both The Future and The Now . επιλαμβανόμενον τοῦ ἐπείτα , γιγνόμενον μεταξύ αμφότερον , τοῦ ἐπείτα τε καὶ τοῦ νῦν .

Ari: True . (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: But if it is indeed Necessary that All that Is becoming should not by-pass The Now ; since , as soon as it arrives at This Now , That/Ousia will Always cease becoming , τοῦ νῦν , επειδὰν η ἐπείτα τοῦτο , του αἰεί ἐπίσχει γιγνεσθαι and Is , at that time , That which It was Aiming to become .

Ari: So it has come to Light . (φαίνεται .)
Loeb

“Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.”

“True.”

“But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.”

“Clearly.”

Thomas Taylor

Will it not, therefore, cease becoming to be older, when it arrives at the now, and is no longer becoming to be, but is now older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by the now. For that which proceeds subsists in such a manner as to touch upon both the now and the future time; departing, indeed, from the now, but apprehending the future, because it subsists in the middle of the future and the now.

True.

But if it be necessary that whatever is becoming to be should not pass by the now or the present time, hence, as soon as it arrives at the now, it will always cease becoming to be, and is then that which it was in pursuit of becoming.

It appears so.

Jowett

And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.

True.

But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.

Clearly.
καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον.

πάντων μὲν οὖν.

οὖ γὰρ ἐπεσχεν ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἔστιν: ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ; 

ναὶ.

ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον; 

καὶ νεώτερον ἀρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἔστι τὸ ἐν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν. 

Anágkη.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One, also, in Aiming at becoming older, when It Hits-upon The Now, It will also cease becoming at that time that It Is older. 

τοῦτον, καὶ επέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάννυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that It is also older than that, in relation to which it has become older, when it was thus becoming older than The Self?


Ari: Yes. (ναὶ.)

Par: But the older is than the younger? 

δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον; 

Ari: It is. (ἔστιν.)

Par: Accordingly then, at that time, The One is younger than The Self, when by becoming older It Hits upon The Now. 

όταν γιγνόμενον πρεσβύτερον εντύχῃ τῷ νῦν. 

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)
Loeb

“The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.”
“Certainly.”
“It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.”
“Yes.”
“And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not?”
“It is.”
“Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.”
“Undoubtedly.”

Thomas Taylor

_The One_, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at the _now_, will cease _becoming to be_, and then _is_ older.
Entirely so.
Is it not, therefore, older than that in respect of which is becomes older? And does it not become older than itself?
Certainly.
And is not the older older than the younger?
It is.
_The One_, therefore, is younger than itself, when in becoming older it arrives at the _now_.
It is necessary.

Jowett

And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and is then older.
Certainly.
And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was becoming older than itself.
Yes.
And that which is older is older than that which is younger?
True.
Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?
Certainly.
Oxford Greek

tο γε μὴν άει πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἔστι γάρ άει νῦν ὅτανπερ ἦ.
pῶς γάρ ὦ;

ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτῷ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἄν.

"εἰοίκεν.

πλεῖο δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἵσον;
tὸν ἵσον.

Balboas

Par: Most certainly then, The Now is Always Present with The One (Like @ 142c 6),
through-out The Whole of Its Being: For It Is Always Now, as long as and insofar as, It Is.

Ari: How could it not be? (πῶς γάρ οὔ)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Always Is and also becomes older and younger than It-Self.

Ari: It is Reasonable.

Par: But Is or does Self become in a more-extended or in an Equal Period of Time to It-Self?

Ari: In an equal period of time.
Loeb

“But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is.”

“Of course.”

“Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself.”

“So it appears.”

“And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?”

“For an equal time.”

Thomas Taylor

But the now is always present with The One, through the whole of its being; for it is always now as long as it is.

How should it not?

The One, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itself.

So it appears.

But is The One, or does it subsist in becoming to be, in a time more extended than or equal to itself?

In an equal time.

Jowett

But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for whenever it is it is always now.

Certainly.

Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?

Truly.

And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

An equal time.
Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἵσον χρόνον ή γιγνόμενον ή ὃν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.
πῶς δ’ οὖ; Τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἔστιν.
οὐ γὰρ.
Τὸ ἐν ᾗ ἁρα τὸν ἵσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὃν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἐαυτοῦ ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται.
οὐ οἷο δοκεῖ.

Balboas

Par: But most certainly , That which either Is or becomes in an Equal Period of Time , ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν .
has to be of The Same Age .
Ari: How could it not ? (πῶς δ’ οὖ ;)
Par: But That which is of The Same Age , is neither older nor younger .
Ari: It is not . (γάρ οὖ .)
Par: Accordingly then , since The One Self both becomes and Is in a Period of Time that ἔστιν οὔτε πρεσβύτερον αὐτὸς ἐστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε νεώτερον νεώτερον .
Ari: It does not appear to me , that it can . (οὐ δοκεῖ μοι .)

2nd
Loeb

“But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age.”

“Of course.”

“But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger.”

“No.”

“Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself.”

“I agree.”

Thomas Taylor

But that which either is, or subsists in becoming to be, in an equal time possesses the same age.

How should it not?

But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger.

By no means.

The One, therefore, since it both subsists in becoming to be and is, in a time equal to itself, neither is nor is becoming to be younger nor older than itself.

It does not appear to me that it can.

Jowett

But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself?

Of course.

And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?

No.

The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?

I should say not.
Oxford Greek

tί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων;
οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

tόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, δι’ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἕνος, εἴ’περ ἑτερά ἐστιν, ἄλλα μὴ ἑτερον, πλείω ἐστίν ἕνος: ἑτερον μὲν γὰρ ὅν ἐν ἄν ἢν, ἑτερα δὲ ὅντα πλείω ἕνος ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι.

ἔχοι γὰρ ἂν.

Balboas

Par: What follows then, in relation to The Others?

tι δέ ; των ἄλλων ;

Ari: I know not what to say. (οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.)

Par: You may certainly say the following; that Those Other than The One,

153A ἔχεις μὴν λέγειν τόδε , στὶ τα ἄλλα του ἕνος ,

if indeed They Are indeed Other (plural), but not Another (singular), Are more than One.

εἴ’περ ἐστίν γε ἑτερα , ἄλλα μὴ ἑτερον , ἐστίν πλείω ἕνος :

For on the one hand, by Being Other, They will also Be One; but on the other hand, by Being

gαρ μὲν ὅν ἑτερον ἄν ἢν ἐν : δὲ ὅντα

Others, They Are more than One, and They will Possess Multitude.

ετερα ἐστί πλείω ἕνος καὶ ἄν εὐχὶ πλῆθος .

Ari: They will possess it. (γαρ αν εὐχι.)
“Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?”
“I cannot tell.”
“But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude.”
“Yes, they have.”

But how is it affected with respect to others?
I know not what to say.
But this you may say, that things different from The One because they are others, and not another, are more than The One. For that which is another is one; but being others they are more than one, and possess multitude.
They do.

And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older or younger than they?
I cannot tell you.
You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the one-other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than one?
They will have multitude.
Oxford Greek

πλήθος δὲ ἃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἄν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἕνος.
pως δ᾽ οἶς;
tί οὖν; ἀριθμοὶ φύσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἔλαττοι;
tὰ ἔλαττοί.
tὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον: τοῦτο
δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔν. ἦ γάρ;
ναὶ.

Balboas

Par: But by Being Many They will Participate of a greater Number than The One.
dε ἃν πλήθος ἃν μετέχοι πλείονος ἀριθμοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἕνος.

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ᾽ οὐ ;)

Par: What then? Do we say that Those that are more in Number are generated, and
tί οὖν; φύσομεν τὰ πλείω ἀριθμοῦ γίγνεσθαι τε
have also been generated before or do we say that The Few were generated before/Prior?
kαὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔλαττοι;

Ari: The few. (τα ἔλαττοι .)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Least Is First. But This Is The One. Can it be so?
αρα τὸ ὀλίγιστον πρῶτον: δ᾽ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἔν. ἦ γάρ ;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

2nd
Loeb

“And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.”
“Of course.”
“Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers?”
“The smaller.”
“Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it not?”
“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

But multitude participates of a greater number than The One?
How should it not?
What then? Do we say that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few?
We assert this of the few before the many.
That which is the fewest, therefore, is first: but is not this The One?
Certainly.

Jowett

And a multitude implies a number larger than one?
Of course.
And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?
The lesser.
Then the least is the first? And that is the one?
Yes.
Oxford Greek

πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐχόντων: ἔχει δὲ καὶ τάλλα πάντα ἀριθμῶν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν.

ἔχει γάρ.

πρῶτον δὲ γε οἶμαι γεγονός πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα διστερον, τὰ δ’ διστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρώτερον γεγονότας: καὶ αὔτως ἂν εἶ ὑπὲρ τάλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

εἰς γὰρ ἂν.

τί δὲ τόδε; ἄρ’ ἂν εἰ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; ἀδύνατον.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The One has become The First of All Those Possessing Number:

But All The Others also Possess Number, if indeed They are Others and not Another. de panta ta llα καὶ εχει αριθμουνα, είσπερ εστίν αλλα καὶ μη αλλο.

Ari: They have to be. (γαρ εχει.)

Par: But indeed, by having-come-to-be First, I think, It came-to-be Before, de γε γεγονος πρωτον, οιμαι, γεγονος πρωτον, but The Others came-to-be Later. But Those that have-come-to-be Later are younger de τα αλλα υστερον. δ’ τα γεγονοτα υστερον νεωτερα than That which has come-to-be Before: and thus, The Others will Be younger του γεγονοτος πρωτον: καὶ αυτως τα λλα αν ει σται νεωτερα than The One, but The One will be Older than The Others. του ενος, δε το εν πρεσβυτερον των αλλων.

Ari: It will be indeed. (αν ει γαρ.)

Parmenides: 20 But what about the following? Could it Be the case, that The One has come-to-Be, contrary to The Nature of The Self, or is this Impossible?

Aristotle: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)
Loeb

“The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not another.”

“They have.”

“And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.”

“Yes, they would.”

“Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?”

“It is impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

_The One_, therefore, becomes the first of all things possessing number: but all other things have number, if they are _others_ and not _another_.

They have indeed.

But that which is first generated has I think a priority of subsistence: but others are posterior to this. But such as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than _The One_, but _The One_ will be older than others.

It will indeed.

But what shall we say to this? Can _The One_ be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impossible?

Impossible.

Jowett

Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not singular.

They have.

And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.
Oxford Greek

άλλα μήν μέρη γε ἐξον ἐφάνη τὸ ἕν, εὶ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτήν καὶ μέσον.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχή γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτῶδι τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν καὶ τάλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;

τι μήν;

cαι μήν μόρια γε φήσομεν ταῦτ’ εἶναι πάντα τάλλα τὸν ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκείνο ἃ μη τῇ τελευτή γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον.

φήσομεν γὰρ.

Balboas

Par: But surely, The One has indeed come to Light to consist of Parts (Older, Same, Younger); but if of Parts, then also of a Beginning, End and Middle.

de ei μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that The Beginning (HYPARXS) Is Generated First of All, ouκοῦν ἀρχὴ γίγνεται πρῶτον πάντων, both of The Self of The One and of Each of The Others; and after that, The Beginning καὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν of All the others as far as to the end?

πάντα ταῦτα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;

Ari: What follows then? (τι μην ;)

Par: And we shall most certainly say that All these Others, Are Parts of The Whole and καὶ γε μήν φήσομεν παντα ταυτ’ τάλλα εἰναι μορία τοῦ ὅλου τε of The One; but That Self has come-to-Be At-Once with The End, One-and-Whole.

καὶ ἑνὸς, ἐνε κεφείνων αὐτὸ γεγονέναι ἀμα τῇ τελευτή ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον.

Ari: We shall say so. (γαρ φήσομεν.)
But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.”
“Yes.”
“And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?”
“Certainly.”
“And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.”
“Yes, we shall say that.”

But *The One* appears to consist of parts; and if of parts, it possesses a beginning, end and middle.
Certainly.
Is not, therefore, the beginning generated first of all, both of *The One* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end?
What then?
And, indeed, we should say that all these are parts of a whole and of one; but that *The One*, together with the end, is generated one and a whole.
We should say so.

And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?
Yes.
And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes into being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you reach the end?
Certainly.
And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?
Yes; that is what we shall say.
Oxford Greek

τελευτὴ δὲ γε οἷς εἶσταν γίγνεται, τοῦτῳ δ᾽ ἀμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι: ὅστ᾽ εἰπέρ ἀνάγκῃ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμα τελευτὴ ἀν γεγονὸς ὅταν τῶν ἄλλων πεφύκος εἰ ἐνεσθαι.

φαίνεται.

νεώτερον ἁρ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἑστι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα.

οὔτως αὕ μοι φαίνεται.

τί δὲ δή: ἄρχην ἡ ἄλλον μέρος ὅπιον τοῦ ἐνὸς ἦ ἄλλον ὅπιον, ἐὰν περὶ μέρος ἦ ἄλλα μὴ μέρη, ἢ ἀναγκαίον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὅν; ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Par: But The End I suspect, comes-to-Be the very last of all. Thus The One Naturally comes-to-Be At-Once with This; so that, if indeed it Is Necessary that The One Self come-to-Be contrary to Nature, in that The One would have-come-to-Be, At-Once the End; which will Be Naturally Generated Last of The Others.

tελευτη ἀν αὐτο πεφυκε γιγνεσθαι υστατον των ἄλλων.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται .)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is younger than The Others, while The Others are older than The One.

tο τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα του ενος.

Ari: To me, it has come to Light in turn in this way in turn. (μοι φαινεται αὐοετως .)

Par: But what then? Must not The Beginning or any other Part whatsoever of The One, or of anything else, if indeed and inasmuch as it Is a Part (singular), the End will then be younger, as indeed a Part?

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)
Loeb

“The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.”

“That is clear.”

“Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.”

“I think that is clear, too.”

“Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?”

“It must.”

Thomas Taylor

But the end I think must be generated last of all, and The One must be naturally generated together with this; so that The One, since it is necessary that it should not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the last of others.

"The One, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than The One.

So again it appears to me.

But what, must not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of The One, or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts - must it not necessarily be one, since it is a part?

Necessarily.

Jowett

But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

Clearly.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?

Certainly.
οὔκ ὁ τὸ ἑν ἃμα τῇ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἃν καὶ ἃμα τῷ δεύτερῳ, καὶ οὐδὲν ὁ ἀπολείπεται τῶν άλλων γιγνομένων, διότι ἂν προσχεῖται ὑπόμον, ἢ εἰ ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἐσχάτον διελθὸν ὅλον ἐν γένεσι, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρῶτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε άλλου οὐδὲν ὁ ἀπολείφθην ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

ἀληθῆ.

πάσιν ἄρα τοῖς άλλοις τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἱσχει τὸ ἑν; ὡστὲ εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἑν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ἐσχατῶν τῶν άλλων γεγονός ἃν εἴη, ἃλλ᾽ ἃμα.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Has-come-to-Be At-Once with both The First Part, and also Will come-to-Be At-Once with The Second Part; and It does not abandon a single one of The Others that are coming-to-Be, nor any Part to which It Can Be Attached; until it comes to both; and also Arriving at The Extreme Part, It Becomes One Whole; by neither Being excluded of The Middle nor of The First nor of The Last, nor of any other Part in Its coming-to-Be.

µεσοῦ οὔτε πρῶτου οὔτε εσχάτου οὔτε άλλου ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ .)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, will Possess The Self/Same Age with All The Others. So that if The One was not Produced contrary to Its Self Nature, then It has come-to-Be before, or in eis μὴ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀν γεγονός, neither Before nor Later than The Others, but at-the-same-time with Them.
Loeb

“This then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.”

“True.”

“Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them.

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the first part, will be generated, and together with the second; and it will never desert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other whatever in its generation.

True.

The One, therefore, will possess the same age with others, as (if it be not The One contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor posterior to others, but together with them;

Jowett

And will not the one come into being together with each part-together with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part, which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous;
Ari: ὡσπερ νεωτέρον ἂν εἴη, οὔδε τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός; κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερον τέ καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τάλλα ἐκεῖνου ὑσαῦτως.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ ὡς ἐχον ταῦτα καὶ γεγονός. ἄλλα τι αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον τέ καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἄρα ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ὡς ὁ καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἐτέρως; οὔκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Oxford Greek

καὶ κατὰ τὸν τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων οὐτε πρεσβύτερον οὐτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὔδε τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός; κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερον τέ καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τάλλα ἐκεῖνου ὑσαῦτως.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἔστι μὲν δὴ ὡς ἐχον ταῦτα καὶ γεγονός. ἄλλα τι αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον τέ καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἄρα ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ὡς ὁ καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἐτέρως; οὔκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Balboas

And by This καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον Relationship , The One will neither be older nor younger than The Others , nor The Others τὸν λόγον, τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ οὖτε πρεσβύτερον οὐτε νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων οὐδε τάλλα than The One. Whereas, according to the former Relationship , The One was both older τοῦ ενος, δὲ κατὰ τὸν προσθεν τέ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τάλλα ὠσματως ἐκεῖνου.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανω μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, on the one hand, The One Is and Has-to-Be and Has-come-to-Be in this way δὴ μὲν εἰσα περὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ γεγονός οὕτως also. But then in turn, what shall we say about The Self coming-to-Be older and also younger καὶ. ἄλλα αὐτο τε περὶ αὐτὸ γεγονός πρεσβύτερον τέ καὶ νεώτερον than The Others, and The Others than The One; and again, that It neither comes-to-Be τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τάλλα τοῦ ενος, καὶ μήτε γεγονός νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον; ἄρα ἔχει αὐτὸ οὕτω περὶ τοῦ εἶναι youngor nor older? Therefore does It Have-to-Be in the same way with That which Is just as It also does with That which Is coming-to-Be, or otherwise?

Ari: I am not able to say. ἔχω οὐκ λέγειν.
And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one.”

“Certainly.”

“In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?”

“I cannot say.”

and on this account The One will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than The One: but, according to the former reasoning, The One was both older and younger than others, and others in a similar manner than it.

Entirely so.

After this manner, therefore, The One subsists and is generated. But what shall we say respecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than The One; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we say that it subsists in the same manner with respect to the term becoming to be as with respect to the term to be? or otherwise?

I am not able to say.

and according to this argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly.

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older, nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?

I cannot answer.
Oxford Greek

ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε: εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον ἐτέρον ἐτέρον, γίγνεσθαι γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἴ ὡς το πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδ’ α’ τὸ νεώτερον ὅν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι: ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἵσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅπως ὅπως, ἵσα ποιεὶ διαφέρειν αἱ ἀσφέρειν ἢ τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ.

πῶς γὰρ ὁὐ:

Balboas

Par: But I am indeed able to affirm the following, that if One Member Is also older than Another Member, Self cannot still become even older, other than by the age difference, which Self First possessed as soon as Self came-to-Be; nor in turn that by Being younger can It become still younger; for if Equals are added to un-equals—whether Time is added or anything, Self will always make them differ Equally by just as much as they differed at First. It will make them differ Equally by just as much as they differed at First.

Ari: How could it be otherwise? (πως γαρ οὐ;)
Loeb

“But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first.”

“Yes, of course.”

Thomas Taylor

But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwise subsist in becoming to be older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger subsist in becoming to be younger, otherwise than by the same difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same interval by which they were distant at first.

How should it be otherwise?

Jowett

But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Of course.
Oxford Greek

οὐκ ἂρα τὸ γε ὡς τὸν ἄνδρος ὑπὸς γίγνοιτ' ἂν ποτὲ πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον, εἰπερ ίσω διαφέρει αεί τὴν ἁλλίκιαν: ἀλλ' ἐστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ' οὖ.

άλληθ.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἂρα ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ὑπὸς ποτὲ πρεσβύτερον ποτὲ οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται.

οὐ γάρ οὖν.

δὴ δὲ εἰ τίδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται.

πή δή;

ἡ τὸ τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τάλα τοῦ ἄνδρος.

tί οὖν;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The Being Cannot indeed come-to-Be older nor younger

154c ἂρα τὸ οὖν αὐτὸς γέγονε πρεσβυτερον οὔτε νεωτερον than The One, at any time, if indeed It Is Always Equally different in age; whereas (του ενος BT) ποτε , εἰπερ αἰτιο το διαφέρει την ηλικιαν : οὖλ.

It Is and Has Come-to-Be older, but then That which Is younger, does not come-to-Be.

εστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβυτερον , δε δ' το νεωτερον , ου γιγνεται.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: And so, The One Being, will not at any time become older nor younger, καὶ αὐτὸ το εν οὖν οὔτε ποτὲ γίγνεται πρεσβυτερον οὔτε νεωτερον than The Others Beings. (των αλλων οντων .)

Par: It will not. (γὰρ οὐν οὐ .)

Par: Then See if The One Being becomes older and younger in this way .

δε οὐρι τε το νεωτερον και νεωτερον τίδε .

Ari: In what way then ? (πιη δη ;)

Par: Insofar as The One has come to Light older than The Other Beings ,

η το εν εφανη πρεσβυτερον των αλλων

and The Others than The One .

τε και ταλλα του ενος .

Ari: What follows then ? (τι ουν ;)
“Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so.”

“True.”

“And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things.”

“No, it does not.”

“But see whether they become older and younger in this way.”

“In what way?”

“Because the one was found to be older than the others, and the others than the one.”

“What then?”

Thomas Taylor

*That which is*, therefore, cannot subsist in *becoming to be* older or younger than *one being*, since it *is* always equally different from it in age: but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger; but by no means subsists in *becoming so*.

True.

That which *is* one, therefore, will never subsist in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings.

Never.

But see whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older.

After what manner?

The same as that through which *The One* appeared to be older than others, and others than *The One*.

What then?

Jowett

Then that which *is*, cannot become older or younger than that which *is*, since the difference of age is always the same; the one *is* and has become older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.

True.

And the one which *is* does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are *No*.

But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another way.

In what way?

Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

And what of that?
Oxford Greek

volent to en ton alla prosbutevor II, pleioi mou chronon geveni et ta alla.
nai.

palin the skopse: en pléon kai halassotti chronov proosthómen ton izon chronon, ara to idio morio diosse to pleion tou elassotonin the smikrotéfin.

on ou ar a estai, otoper to prot翁 oun prois talla hlikia diaphiron to en, touto kai eis to epiteia, alla izon lambravón chronon tois allous elasson aie ti hlikia diosse auton oun proteron: h oj;

nai.

Balboas

Par: At the Time when The One has come to Light older than The Others, It has-come-to-be in some way for a longer Period of Time than The Others.

Ari: Yes. (vai.)

Par: Surely then consider again. If we add an Equal Time to a longer and shorter Period of Time, then will the longer differ from the shorter by an Equal or by a smaller Part?

Ari: By a smaller part. (smikrotéfin.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One will not be different in age from The Others by as much as ara to en ouk estai diaphoron hlikia pros talla otoper

This Time and in The Future, as It Was at First longer; but by receiving an Equal Time touto kai eis to epiteia, oun to prot翁, alla lambravon izon chronon along with The Others, It will Always differ by a less age than Theirs than before. Or not?

Ari: Yes, this is the case. (vai.)
Loeb

“When the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.”

“Yes.”

“Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction?”

“By a smaller fraction.”

“Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

Since *The One* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others.

Certainly.

But again consider, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a small part?

By a smaller.

*The One*, therefore, will not differ from others by so great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a less age than before. Will it not be so?

Certainly.

Jowett

If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion than before?

By a smaller portion.

Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

οὔκοιν τὸ γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἦ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ᾿ ἂν ἦ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἑκείνα πρὸς ἄ ἴν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;
νεώτερον.

ei δὲ ἑκείνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἑκείνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἦ πρότερον;
pάνυ γε.

tὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἃρα γεγονός πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὅν, ἐςτὶ δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλά γίγνεται αἱ ἑκείνου πρεσβύτερον:

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case indeed, that Whatever differs less in age, in relation to anything, than It did before, It will become younger than in the past, in relation to Those to which It was older before?

Hη πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;

Ari: Younger. (νεώτερον.)

Par: But if in turn, That Is younger, will not The Others Be older than before, δει εἰ αὐτο ἑκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἑκείνα τα ἅλλα πρεσβύτερα ἡ πρότερον in relation to The One? (πρὸς το εν;) 

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, That which has-come-to-be younger, ἀρὰ μεν το γεγονος νεώτερον will become older, in relation to That which has-come-to-be before and by Being older; but on γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον πρός το γεγονος πρότερον τε καὶ ὁ πρεσβύτερον, the other hand, It never (really) Is older, for It Is Always becoming older than That;

δε οὐδέποτε εστὶ πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ αἱ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑκείνου:
“And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older?”

“Yes, it becomes younger.”

“But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?”

“Certainly.”

“Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older;

Thomas Taylor

But does not that which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those than which it was before older?

Younger.

But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with respect to The One be older than before?

Entirely so.

That, therefore, which was generated younger, will subsist in becoming to be older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never is older, but always is becoming older than it;

Jowett

And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it was older?

Yes, younger.

And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older than they were before, in relation to the one.

Certainly.

Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but is always becoming,
Oxford Greek

ἐκείνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδοσιν, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ’ αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεώτερου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως, ἵνα γὰρ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβύτερου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεώτερου: γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἀν οἶον τε εἰτήν, εἶ γὰρ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ’ εἰεν ἄν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα: τὸ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὅν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός.

Balboas

for on the
gar μὲν
one hand, That advances to a younger state, but on the other hand, The Other to an older state. 155A εκείνο επιδίδοσιν επὶ το νεώτερον, δ’ το επὶ το πρεσβύτερον. But in turn, in the same way, That which Is older is becoming younger than The younger.

For by both of Them tending to that which is opposite, They become opposite to Each other; gar αὐτοῖν ὁντε εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον γεγονὸς τοῦ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλων, on the one hand, The younger become older than The older, but on the other hand, The older μὲν τὸ νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον του πρεσβύτερου, δὲ το πρεσβύτερου become younger than The younger; but they will not Be able to Be such. For if They νεώτερον του νεώτερου: δὲ αὐτῶν εἰς τὸν γεγονὸς τοῦ νεώτερου. γεγονός γενέσθαι εἰς τον νεώτερον του νεώτερου. would-have-become, then They would no longer be-coming-to-be, but would Be. But now, γεγονός αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ γεγονός, ἀλλ’ εἰς εἶεν. δὲ νῦν They are becoming both older and younger than Each other. On the one hand, The One γεγονός μὲν πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων: μὲν το εν becomes younger than The Others, because It came to Light Being older, and would-have-giveneta νεώτερον του ἄλλων, στὶ εἰςαν εἰς τον πρεσβύτερον και come-to-Be before; 155B γεγονος πρότερον,
for the latter always tends towards being younger, and the former towards being older. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another—the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier,

Thomas Taylor

the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile state, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is becoming to be younger than the younger, after the same manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they subsist in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to become so. For if they should become they would no longer subsist in becoming, but would now be. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and The One indeed becomes younger than others, because it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation:

Jowett

for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one another, the younger older than the older and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however have become; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior,
Oxford Greek

tά δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς προσβύτερα, ὅτι ἐστερα γέγονε, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τάλλα oúto πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἱσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτὸν προσβύτερα ἑφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν ὦτως,

οὔκ ὁ μὲν οὔδὲν ἐπέρον ἐπέρον προσβύτερον γίγνεται οὔδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἵσαρ ἀριθμῷ ἀλληλίαν ἄει διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλῶν προσβύτερον γίγνοντ’ ἄν οὔδέ νεώτερον, οὔτε τάλλα τοῦ ἑνός; ἦ δὲ ἄλλῳ ἄει μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ἐστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐστέρα τῶν προτέρων.

Balboas

whereas on the other hand, The Others have-come-to-be older than

The One since They have-come-to-be later. According to The Self Logos, The Others τοῦ ενός οτι γέγονεν υστερα . κατὰ τον αὐτον λόγον τάλλα will also be related in the same way in relation to The One, inasmuch as They also came-to-

και ισχει ὑστερον προς το εν, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ e−

Light older than The Self, and to-have-come-to-be before.

–φαίνη προσβύτερα αὐτοῦ καὶ γεγονότα πρότερα .

Ari: It has come to Light in this way. (γαρ φαινεται οὐν οὑτος .)

Par: Is it not always the case that, on the one hand, insofar as One Member does not

αἰι οὐκοῦν μεν η επερον οὐδὲν

become older nor younger than Another, by differing from Each Other by an Equal Number, γίγνεται προσβύτερον οὔδε νεώτερον επερον το διαφερεῖν αἱ ἀλληλίαν κατα το σω αριθμῷ , then will The One become older nor younger than The Others, nor The Others than oυτε αν το εν γιγνοτ’ προσβύτερον οὔδε νεώτερον τοιν αλλων , οὔτε τάλλα The One; but on the other hand, insofar as Those that are Prior must Necessarily Always τοῦ ενός : δὲ η τα προτερα αναγκη αἰεi
differ by a different part from Those that come-to-be later, and The Later from The Prior.

155διαφερθέναι ἀλλω μορίῳ των γενόμεναι υστερον , καὶ τα υστερα των προτερων ,
and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier.”

“Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, and vice versa—

but others are older than *The One*, because they have a posterior generation; and, from the same reason, other things will be similarly related with respect to *The One*, since they appear to be more ancient and to have a prior generation.

So indeed it appears.

Does it not follow, that so far as the one does not become younger or older than the other, because they differ by an equal number from each other, that, so far as this, *The One* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *The One*? But that, so far as it is necessary that the prior should always differ from such as are becoming to be posterior, and the posterior from the prior;

and the others become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older, and prior to the one.

That is clear.

Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the other than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion
Oxford Greek

ταύτη δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἄλληλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἑν τῶν ἄλλων;

πάντα μὲν οὖν.

κατά δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἑν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε ἐστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Then, in this way, it is Necessary  that They must become older and younger than Each Other;  

denter ταὐτῇ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερα τε καὶ νεώτερα ἄλληλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἑν τῶν ἄλλων;  

Par: Surely then, according to all these accounts, The One than The One and The One than The Others?  

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μὲν οὖν οὕν.)  

Ari: That is perfectly so. (μὲν παντελῶς οὕν.)  

Ari: Entirely so.
Loeb

from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?"
“Certainly.”
“For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others.”
“Perfectly true.”

Thomas Taylor

so far it is necessary that they should become older and younger than each other, both others than The One and The One than others?
Entirely so.
On all these accounts, therefore, The One is, and is becoming to be, older and younger both than itself and others; and again, neither is nor is becoming to be older nor younger than itself and others.
It is perfectly so.

Jowett

in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.
Certainly.
For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.
Certainly.
επειδή δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸν πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἃρ' οὖκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἑπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; ἀνάγκη.

νὴ ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.

τί μὴν;

Balboas

Par: But since The One Participates of Time, and of becoming older and younger, 155D ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐν μετέχει χρόνου καὶ του γίγνεσθαι πρεσβυτερον τε καὶ νεωτερον, is it not Necessary that It should also Participate of The Past, The Future and The Present, ἃρ' οὖνκ ἀναγκη καὶ μετέχειν του ποτε καὶ του ἑπειτα καὶ του νυν, if indeed It Participates of Time?

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκή .)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Was, and Is, and Will be; and was-coming-into-Being καὶ ἐγίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.

Ari: What follows then? (τι μὴν ;)
Loeb

“But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?”

“It must.”

“Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But since The One participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate of the past, present, and future, since it participates of time?

It is necessary.

The One, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated.

What then?

Jowett

But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?

Of course it must.

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Certainly.
καὶ εἶν αὐτὸ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.
πάνα γε.
καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ δὴ εἶν αὐτὸ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτὸ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν.

ορθῶς λέγεις.
καὶ ὅνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅνομαται καὶ λέγεται: καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὅντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἐν ἔστιν.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως.

Par: And there Should/Can/Must/Will Be Something (Ousia, 152a) in relation to That, καὶ καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἄν τι ἀν, καὶ εἴη καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.

that also Belongs to That; which Was, and Is, and Will be.
καὶ καὶ εἴη ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανε γε.)

Par: Surely then, there Can/Must/Will Be Knowledge, and opinion, and perception δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ πράττομεν παντα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ.

of The Self, since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning The Self.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λέγεις ορθῶς.)

Par: Surely then, there Is a Name and a Logos in relation to The Self, and so It is Named δὴ καὶ εἴπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ πράττομεν παντα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅσαπερ τυγχάνει των τοιούτων περὶ τα ἀλλὰ ὅντα, is also the case concerning The Other Beings.

Ari: There fore, it has to be entirely in this way.
οὖν μὲν ἔχει παντελῶς οὕτως.
“And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?”
“Certainly.”
“And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it.”
“You are right.”
“And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.”
“That is perfectly true.”

And there will also be something belonging to it, and which may be asserted of it, and which was, and is, and will be.
Entirely so.
There will, therefore, be science, opinion, and sense of The One, since we have now treated of all these things about it.
You speak rightly.
A name, therefore, and discourse may subsist about The One, and it may be denominated and spoken of: and whatever particulars of the same kind take place in other things, will also take place about The One.
The case is perfectly so.

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?
True.
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
Quite right.
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed, and everything of this kind which appertains to other: things appertains to the one.
Certainly, that is true.
Oxford Greek
3rd

ἐτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγομεν. τὸ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἄρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὑν καὶ πολλά καὶ μήτε ἐν μητε πολλά καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὐτο ποτε οὐσίας; ἀνάγκη.

ἄρ’ οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷον τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἦ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; οὐχ οἷον τε.

Balboas
3rd

Par: Take notice then, is it possible, that It will Participate at the Time that It does not Participate; or that It will not Participate at the Time when It does Participate?

Ari: It is not possible. (οὐχ οἷον τε.)

Parmenides: 21 Surely then in the third place, let us still relate, that if The One Is such as we have described, is it not Necessary that The Self, Is One and Being and Many (143b) and Neither One Nor Many and Participates of Time, because on the one hand, It Is One, and μήτε ἐν μητε πολλά καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, then at that Time, It Participates of Ousia; but on the other hand, because It Is Not, then in turn, It does not, at that Time Participate of Ousia?

Aristotle: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
“Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?”

“Yes, it must.”

“And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?”

“No, it cannot.”

In the third place, let us consider, if The One subsists in the manner we have already asserted, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that because it is one it should participate of essence; but that because it is not, it should not at any time participate of essence?

It is necessary.

Is it, therefore, possible, that when it participates and becomes such as it is, that then it should not participate; or that it should participate when it does not participate?

It cannot be possible.

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is, neither one nor many, and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?

Certainly.

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?

Impossible.
Ari: Εν αλλω αρα χρόνῳ μετέχει και εν αλλω ου μετέχει: οὔτω γάρ ἃν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε και ου μετέχοι.

ορθῶς.

όκοιδι ἐστι καὶ οὕτως χρόνος, οτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ οτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ή πῶς οὐδέν τε ἐσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, εάν μὴ ποτε και λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ και ἀφίη.

οὐδαμῶς.

τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἀρα γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς;

ἔγογε.

τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἀρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι;

καὶ πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, It Participates at one Time, and does not Participate at another Time.

156a γαρ μόνως οὐσίαν μετέχει τε και οὐ μετέχει τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθῶς.)

Par: Is there not also such a Time, when It Shares of That which Is and when It takes-leave essere οὐκοιν ται οὕτως χρόνου, οτε μεταλαμβάνειν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ οτε ἀπαλλάττεται of the Self? Or how can it be possible, that It Will on the one hand, Possess The Self at one

Ari: No other way. (οὐδαμώς.)

Par: Surely then, do you not call The Receiving/Sharing of Ousia coming-to-Be?

γε οὐ αρα ὑπὸ καλεῖς τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν οὐσίας γίγνεσθαι;

Ari: I do at least. (γέγογε.)

Par: But accordingly then, is not the loss of Ousia, to perish/to dissolve?

δὲ αρα οὐκ το ἀπαλλαττεσθαι οὐσίας απόλλυσθαι

Ari: Entirely so. (καὶ πάνυ γε.)
“Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.”

“True.”

“And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it?”

“There is no other way at all.”

“But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming?”

“Yes.”

“And losing existence is destruction?”

“Certainly.”

Loeb

It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the same.

Right.

Is not that also time, when it receives being and again loses it? Or how can it be possible that, being such as it is, it should at one time possess the same thing, and at another time not, unless it both receives and loses it?

No otherwise.

Do you not denominate the receiving of essence to become?

I do.

And is not to lose essence the same as to perish?

Entirely so.

Jowett

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.

True.

And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at; some time?

Impossible.

And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

I should.

And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?

I should.
Oxford Greek

tὸ ἐν δῆ, ὡς ἐοικε, λαμβάνων τε καὶ ἀφιέν ὦσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. ἀνάγκη.

ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλά ὑπὸ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἄρ’ οἶχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἐν, τὸ πολλά εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; πάνυ γε.

ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλά ἄρ’ οἶχ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; πολλά γε.

καὶ μὴν ἀνόρμιον γε καὶ ὄρμιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὀμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; ναί.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, The One, as it is Reasonable, comes-to-Be and dissolves, by receiving/grasping/taking/seizing and by letting-go/discharging/losing Ousia, by accordingly on the one hand, when It comes-to-Be One, does It not cease to Be Many, αρ’ μὲν οὖτος γίγνηται ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλύμενοις εἰναι πολλά, but on the other hand, when It comes-to-Be Many, does It not cease to Be The One?

Ari: Entirely so.

Par: But accordingly then, by coming-to-Be One and Many, αρ’ γίγνομενον ἐν καὶ πολλά must It not Necessarily Be both Dispersed-apart and Collected-together?

Ari: Very much so indeed.

Par: And most certainly, when It comes-to-Be Unlike and Like, καὶ γε μὴν οὖτος γίγνηται ἀναμοιον καὶ ὀμοιον, It then also comes-to-Be Assimilated and Dissimilated?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Loeb

“The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is generated and destroyed.”

“Inevitably.”

“And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?”

“Certainly.”

“And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and combined?”

“Inevitably.”

“And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and dissimilated?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

_The One_, therefore, as it seems, by receiving the losing essence, is generated and perishes.

Necessarily so.

But since it is both one and many, and subsists in becoming to be and perishing, when it becomes one does it cease to be many, and when it becomes many does it cease to be one?

Entirely so.

But, in consequence of becoming one and many, must it not be separated and collected?

It must.

And when it becomes dissimilar and similar, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated?

Certainly.

Jowett

The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.

Certainly.

And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one it ceases to be many, and when many, it ceases to be one?

Certainly.

And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?

Inevitably.

And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

καὶ ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἱσον, αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοεσθαι;
οὖτως.

ὅταν δὲ κινούμενον τῇ ἰστήτῃ καὶ ὅταν ἐστῶς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεὶ δήποτε αὐτὸ
γε μηδ’ ἐν ἔνι χρόνῳ εἶναι.

πώς δή;

ἐστῶς τε πρότερον ἐστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ἐστερον ἐστάναι, ἀνευ μὲν
tοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἰδόν τε ἐσται ταῦτα πάσχειν.

πώς γὰρ;

Balboas

Par: And when It comes-to-Be more, less, and Equal,
καὶ ὅταν μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἱσον,
then It also Becomes-increased and Becomes-decreased and also Becomes-Equalized?
156C τε αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἐσταθείν;

Ari: It becomes in this way. (οὕτως ὅταν)

Par: But when It Is-Standing-Still, from-Being-in-the-state-of-motion,
δε ὅταν ἐστοίτοι κινούμενον
and in turn when It Is At-Rest, It Is then changed into That which Is In-Motion, then surely
ὅταν ἐστῶσ μεταβάλλῃ εἰπι τὸ κινεῖσθαι δῇ
it is necessary that The Self must indeed not Be in Any/Some Singular Period in Time.

Ari: How could it indeed? (πώς δή ὅταν)

Par: But that which was formerly At-Rest, and later-on Moves, and that which
κινούμενον πρότερον ἐσταναι, και
was-Moving before and later-on Stands-still; on the one hand, will not Be Able to experience
κινούμενον ἐσταναι, και
these experiences without Mutation/Alteration.

Ari: How could it? (πώς γὰρ ὅταν)
Loeb

“And when it becomes greater and smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and
equalized?”

“Yes.”

“And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must
itself be in no time at all.”

“How is that?”

“It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion
and afterwards at rest, without changing.”

“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

And when it becomes greater, lesser, and equal, must it not be increased, corrupted, and equalized?
It must so.
But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it is changed into being
moved, it is requisite that it should not subsist in one time.
How should it?
But that which before stood still and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards
stands still, cannot suffer these affections without mutation.
For how can it?

Jowett

And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalized?
True.
And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time
at all?
How can it?
But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and
afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.
Impossible.
Oxford Greek

χρόνος δὲ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ὦ τι ὁ ὁν τε ἁμα μὴτε κανείσθαι μὴτε ἐστάναι.
οὐ γὰρ ὁν.
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἀνεὐ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.
οὐκ εἰκός.
πότ’ οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ὁν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὁν.
οὐ γὰρ ὁν.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand, there is indeed No-Time, in which Anything can change
At-That-Same-Time; that is, neither when Moving nor when Standing-still.
Aristotle: There is not. (γαρ οὖν οὐν.)
Parmenides: Certainly then, Nothing Can Be changed without Mutation.
Ari: It is not likely that it can. (οὐκ εἰκός.)
Par: Then at what Time will Anything Change/Mutate/Alter? For Nothing
Is Altered while Being At-Rest, nor while Being In-Motion, nor while Being in Time.
Ari: It will not. (οὐ γὰρ οὖν.)
Loeb

“And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.”
“No, there is none.”
“And certainly it cannot change without changing.”
“I should say not.”
“Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time.”
“No, it does not.”

Thomas Taylor

But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor stand still.
There is not.
But it cannot be changed without mutation.
It is not probable that it can.
When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time.
It will not.

Jowett

And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?
There cannot.
But neither can it change without changing.
True.
When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?
It cannot.
Oxford Greek

ἀρ’ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ς τότ’ ἄν εἰή, ὅτε μεταβάλλει;
τὸ ποῖον δὴ;
τὸ εξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ εξαίφνης τοιὸνδε τί ἔσωκε σημαίνειν, ώς εξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἐκάτερον.
οὐ γὰρ ἐκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι ἐστῶτος ἐτοι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἐτοι
μεταβάλλει: ἀλλὰ ἡ εξαίφνης αὐτὴ τῆς ἑστάναις τις εὐκάθηται

Balboas

Par: Take notice then, Is This, That which Is Outside of the ordinary,
In Which, It will Be, at the (No)-Time when It Changes?

Ari: What kind of state is that then? (τὸ ποῖον δὴ ;)

Par: The Sudden. For The Sudden Is Likely to signify something Like This, such as
That from which It changes into each of these conditions. For while It Stands-still, It will
become from standing-still, nor while in motion will It Be changed out of the motion:
but That Nature which Is Outside of the ordinary, The Sudden Her-Self, is Something
situated ἀλλὰ φύσις αὐτὴ τῆς εὐκάθηται

156c τάσι
156d τοτε, τοτῆ
156d τότ’
156e τότε
155a τότε, τοτὲ
156a τότε, τοτὲ
156a τότε
156d ἔσταναι, ἐστῶτος
156d ἔστωτος
156e ἔσταναι, ἐστών
156e ἔστων
κινεῖται, κινεῖται
κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι
κινούμενον, κινούμενον
κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον
156d κινουμένης
156c κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινούμενον
156c κινούμενον, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι
Loeb

“Does this strange thing, then, exist, in which it would be at the moment when it changes?”

“What sort of thing is that?”

“The instant. For the instant seems to indicate a something from which there is a change in one direction or the other. For it does not change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving; but there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed between

Thomas Taylor

Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes?

What thing?

The sudden, or that which unapparently starts forth to the view. For the sudden seems to signify some such thing, as that from which it passes into each of these conditions. For while it stands still it will not be changed from standing, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature the sudden is situated between

Jowett

And does this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing really exist?

What thing?

The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such, nor, from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature, which we call the moment lying between
Oxford Greek

μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ σύσσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὸ τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπί το ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

κινινευεῖ.

και τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἶπερ ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ᾽ ἐκάτερα—πόνος γὰρ ἂν οὔτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ—μεταβάλλον δ᾽ ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὔτε χρόνῳ ἂν εἰς, οὔδὲ κινοῖτ᾽ ἂν τότε, οὔδ᾽ ἂν σταῖη.

οὔ γάρ.

ἀρ′ οὖν οὔτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει,

Balboas

Between (The Gap) Motion and The Stationary, by Being in No-Time, and certainly into This 156ε μεταξὺ κινήσεως τε καὶ τῆς στάσεως, οὐδαὶ εἰς οὔνομεν χρόνω, καὶ δὴ εἰς ταύτην καὶ and also from This, That which moves, changes to That which Stands-Still, τε καὶ εἴ ταύτης τὸ κινούμενον μεταβάλλει εἰπὶ το ἐστάναι καὶ in turn That which is At-Rest, changes to That which is Moved.

καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

Ari: I dare say.

κινινευεῖ.

Par: And surely, if indeed The One Stands-still and Is Moved, It will Be Changed καὶ δὴ εἶπερ τὸ εἰς ἐστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται, ἂν μεταβάλλοι into Each. For only in this way will It create both of these conditions. But when It Is Changing εἰς ἐκάτερα: γὰρ μονὸς ὅποιον ἂν οὔσα αμφότερα: δ᾽ μεταβάλλον It will Be Changed by The Sudden Turn-About; and when It Changes, It Will Be in μεταβάλλει εἰς ἐκάτερα: καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἂν εἰς εν No-Time, for At That Time, It will neither be Moved, nor Stand-still.

οὔτεν χρόνῳ, τότε ἂν οὔδε κινοῖ, οὔδ᾽ ἂν σταῖη.

Ari: It will not.

gὰρ οὐ.

Par: Take notice then, does The One also have to Be in this way, in relation to the other ἂν οὔν καὶ εἴει ἀυτὸσ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας mutations?

μεταβολὰς,
motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into motion.”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, must change in each direction; for that is the only way in which it can do both. But in changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it can be in no time, and at that instant it will be neither in motion nor at rest.”

“No.”

“And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes?

Thomas Taylor

motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved passes into standing still, and that which stands still into motion.

It appears so.

The One, therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both these affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed suddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither stand still nor be moved.

It will not.

Will The One also be thus affected with respect to other mutations?

Jowett

rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this that which is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.

So it appears.

And the one then, since it is at rest and also in motion, will change to either, for only in this way can it be in both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.

It will not.

And it will be in the same case in relation to the other changes,
And when It Is changed from That which Is, into that which dissolves, or from that which Is not, to that which comes-to-Be; does It Become at that Time, Between (The Gap) certain states of moving and of standing-still? And At That Time, It neither exists, nor does not exist, nor Becomes nor dissolves?

Ari: It certainly does appear to be likely.

Par: And surely according to The Self/Same Logos (Rep 511B-C), when It Passes from One to Many and from Many into One, It is neither One nor Many, neither is It dispersed nor gathered-together. And in Passing from Like to Unlike, and from Unlike to Like, it is neither One nor Many.
Loeb

When it changes from being to destruction or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?

“Yes, so it appears.”

“And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimilation;

Thomas Taylor

And when it is changed from being into the loss of being, or from non-being into becoming to be, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes?

It appears so.

And in the same manner, when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor collected. And in passing from similar to dissimilar, and from dissimilar to similar, it is neither similar nor dissimilar, nor is assimilated nor dissimilated.

Jowett

when it passes from being into cessation of being, or from not-being into becoming-then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and, neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.

Very true.

And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation;
Oxford Greek

οὔτε ὁμοιόμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιόμενον: καὶ ἐκ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἰσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἑναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἰσομενὸν οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσομενὸν εἰ ἐν.

οὐκ ἐοίκε.

ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ᾽ ἄν πάσχοι τὸ ἑν, εἰ ἐστίν.

πῶς δ’ οὖ;
Loeb

and in passing from small to great and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality.”

“Apparently not.”

“All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists.”

“Yes, certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

And while it passes from small into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor perishing, nor equalized.

It does not appear that it can.

But all these passions The One will suffer, if it is.

How should it not?

Jowett

and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalization.

True.

All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one has being.

Of course.
157β—<

Oxford Greek
4th

tί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀρα οὐ σκεπτέον;
σκεπτέον.

λέγωμεν δή, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, τάλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι;

λέγωμεν.

οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἔστι τάλλα: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἤν.

ἀρθῶς.

Balboas
4th

Parmenides: 22 Then must we not consider what will likely happen to The Others if One Is?

δὲ αρα οὐ σκεπτέον Τι αν προσηκοι πασχειν τοις ἄλλοις ει εν εστιν ;

Aristotle: We must so consider . (σκεπτεον .)

Par: Then let us say, if One Is , what Those Other than The One Must experience ?

δη λέγωμεν , ει εν εστι , τι ταλλα του ενος χρη πεπονθεναι ;

Ari: Let us do so . (λεγωμεν .)

Par: Is it not the case then , if indeed The Others Are Other than The One ,

ουκουν επείπερ ταλλα εστιν αλλα του ενος ,

then They Are not The One ; for otherwise they would not Be Other than The One ?

εστι ουτε το εν : γαρ ου εν ην αλλα του ενος .

Ari: Rightly so .(ορθως .)
Loeb
4th

“Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?”
“We must.”
“Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists?”
“Let us do so.”
“Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one for if they were, they
would not be other than the one.”
“True.”

Thomas Taylor
4th

But should we not consider what other things ought to suffer if The One is?
We should.
Let us relate, therefore, if The One is, what other things ought to suffer from The One.
By all means.
Does it not follow that because other things are different from The One they are not The One: for
otherwise they would not be different from The One?
Right.

Jowett
4th

But if one is, what will happen to the others -is not that also to be considered?
Yes.
Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of the others than the one.
Let us do so.
Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were they could not
be other than the one. Very true.
Very true.
Oxford Greek

οὔδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἐνὸς τάλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πι. πι δὴ:
ὅτι ποὺ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν: εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἢν ἐν εἰ. ὀρθῶς.
μόρια δὲ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστίν ὁ ἂν ὄλον ἢ. φαμέν γάρ.
ἄλλα μὴν τὸ γε ὄλον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια: ἐκαστὸν γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὖ πολλῶν μόριον χρῆ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὄλον.
πῶς τοῦτο;

Balboas

Par: Yet certainly, The Others Are not entirely deprived of The One, but Participate of It, in a Certain (Definite) Way.
Ari: In a certain way then? (πι δὴ ;)
Par: Since The Others Are Other than The One in some (indefinite) way by having Parts, for if They had no Parts, They would Be Entirely One.
Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς .)
Par: But we said that since They have Parts, They will Belong to That which Is Whole.
Ari: We have so affirmed. (γαρ φαμέν.)
Par: But certainly, it is indeed Necessary that The Whole will Be One composed of Many, and of which Whole, The Many Parts Are Parts. For Each One of Those Parts must not be a piece/fragment of many, but a Part of a Whole.
Ari: How is this so? (πῶς τούτῳ ;)

Ari: In a certain way then? (πι δὴ ;)
Par: Since The Others Are Other than The One in some (indefinite) way by having Parts, for if They had no Parts, They would Be Entirely One.
Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς .)
Par: But we said that since They have Parts, They will Belong to That which Is Whole.
Ari: We have so affirmed. (γαρ φαμέν.)
Par: But certainly, it is indeed Necessary that The Whole will Be One composed of Many, and of which Whole, The Many Parts Are Parts. For Each One of Those Parts must not be a piece/fragment of many, but a Part of a Whole.
Ari: How is this so? (πῶς τούτῳ ;)
Loeb

“And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.”

“In what way?”

“Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.”

“True.”

“But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole.”

“Yes, we affirm that they do.”

“But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole.”

“How is that?”

Thomas Taylor

Nor yet are others entirely deprived of The One, but participate it in a certain respect.

In what respect?

Because things different from The One are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one.

Right.

But parts we have asserted belong to that which is a whole.

We have so.

But it is necessary that a whole should be one composed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole.

How so?

Jowett

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

In what way?

Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

So we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole.

How do you mean?
Oxford Greek

εἰ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἰη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἰη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήσου μόριον ἔσται, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ
tῶν ἄλλων δή ἐνός ἐκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων. ἐνός γὰρ μὴ ὑν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων
ἔσται, καὶ ὁδότως ἐνός ἐκάστου ὡς ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὅ ὑν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὐδένος τῶν πολλῶν
ἔσται. μηδένος δὲ ὅ ὑν πάντων τούτων τι εἰη, ὅν οὐδένος οὐδέν ἔστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἅλλο ὅπιον
ἀδύνατον εἰη.

φαίνεται γε δή.

Balboas

Par: If anything would be a piece of many, among which it would exist, surely then somehow the Self would also be a piece of it-self and of each one of the others, which is surely impossible, if indeed It is also a piece of all. For by not being a piece of one of these, It will be a piece of each one. And by not being a piece of all, It will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece of the others, except of this, and thus it will not be a piece of each one. It will be a piece of each, It will not in any way be piece of the many. But anything that does not-exist-in-one, cannot exist in all of those of which it belongs to none, neither as a piece or anything else at all. It will not exist in any way, nor in any way be piece of the many. For by not being a piece of the others, except of this, and thus it will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece of these, It will be a piece of each. And thus it will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece of each, It will be a piece of the many. But anything that does not-exist-in-one, cannot exist in all of those of which it belongs to none, neither as a piece or anything else at all. It will not in any way be piece of the many. For by not being a piece of the others, except of this, and thus it will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece of these, It will be a piece of each. And thus it will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece of each, It will not exist in any way, nor in any way be piece of the many.

Ari: Surely then it has indeed come to Light. ( δὴ γε φαίνεται. )

157a πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά
157c πολλῶν, πολλῶν
157d πολλά, πολλῶν, πολλά
158a πολλά
158b αὐτῶν, αὑτῷ, αὑτῷ, αὐτῷ
158c αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
158d αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
Loeb

“If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.”

“That is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

If any thing should be a part of many, among which it subsists itself, it would doubtless be a part of itself (which is impossible), and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and so it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impossible that it should be any thing belonging to all those, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing else.

So it appears.

Jowett

If anything were a part of many, being itself one of them, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one; and if not a part of each, one it will not be a part of anyone of the many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which it is anything.

Clearly not.
Oxford Greek

οὕκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὔτε πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μᾶς τινὸς ἵδεας καὶ ἐνός τινος ὁ καλούμεν όλον, ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἄν τὸ μόριον εἴη.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ei ἄρα τάλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν τοῦ ἄλον τε καὶ ἐνός μετέχοι.

πάνυ γε.

ἐν ἄρα ἄλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τάλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, The Part Is not a piece of many nor of all; of One Undefined Idea, and of Some Unity, which we call Whole, which has-come-to-Be One Perfect Idea composed from All, of That which The Part will Be a Part.

Ari: Entirely so. (παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The Others have Parts, then they will also Participate of The Whole and also of The One/Unity/Oneness.

Ari: Very much so. (παντὸς γέ.)

Par: Accordingly then, Those that Are Other than The One, Must Be One Perfect Whole which has Parts.

Ari: They must be. (ἀναγκῇ.)

Par: And most certainly, The Self/Same Logos also applies to each Part. For καὶ γε μὴν ο ἀυτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰκάστου μορίου. γαρ The Part Must Participate of The One. For if each of These Parts Is a Part, then “each” τούτου ἀναγκῇ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός.
Loeb

“Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part.”

“Certainly.”

“If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.”

“True.”

“Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.”

“Yes, they must.”

“And the same reasoning applies to each part for the part must partake of the one.

Thomas Taylor

A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this.

Entirely so.

If, therefore, other things have parts, they will also participate of a whole and one.

Certainly.

One perfect whole, therefore, possessing parts, must necessarily be different from The One.

It is necessary.

But the same reasoning is true concerning each of the parts; for it is necessary that each of these should participate of The One.

Jowett

Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of all—of this the part will be a part.

Certainly.

If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and in the one.

True.

Then the others than the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.

Certainly.

And the same argument holds of each part, for the part must participate in the one;
Oxford Greek

ei γὰρ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν μορίων ἑστι, τὸ γε ἔκαστον εἶναι ἐν δῆπτω σημαίνει, ἀφοφησμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὐτῷ δὲ ὑπ' ἑπερ ἔκαστον ἑσται.

ὁρθῶς,

μετέχει δὲ γε ἂν τοῦ ἐνὸς δῆλον ὥστε ἄλλο ὑπ' ἑν ἐν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετείχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐν.

νὸν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἴναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀδύνατον ποι.

ἀδύνατον.

μετέχειν δὲ γε τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ ἔλοι καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἔλοι ἑσται, οὐ μόρια τὰ μόρια: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ἐν μόριον τοῦ ἔλοι, ὁ ἂν ἦ μορίον ἔλοι.

οὖτως.

Balboas

For if each of These Parts Is a Part, then “each”
γὰρ εἰ ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἑστὶ μορίων, το ἐκαστὸν without a doubt, indeed signifies to Be “One”; by first Being Distinct from the others, 158A ἐδήπου γε σημαίνει εἰναι εν, μὲν αφοφησμένων τῶν ἄλλων then by Being “According to Self”, if indeed It will Be that which Is called, “Each Part”.

τοῦ ὑπ' ἑπερ ἔκαστον, εἰπερ εὐκρινήν ἐκαστον.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθῶς.)

Par: But It will indeed Participate of The One, since this Is clear by Being another 

τὸν ἐνος. ὅστε ἄλλῳ

than One; for otherwise It would not Participate, but It would Be One Self; but now 

η ἑν: γὰρ οὐ μετείχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ ἂν ἦν εἰν αὐτῳ: δὲ νῦν on the one hand, it Is Impossible that some Part to Be One, except by The One Self.

μὲν ἀδύνατον ποι: εἰναι ενι πλήν τῳ ενι αὐτῳ.

Ari: Impossible. (ἀδύνατον.)

Par: But on the other hand, it is quite Necessary that both The Whole and The Part Participate 

τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ μετείχειν of The One; for on the one hand, The Whole of which The Parts Are Parts, will be One, but 

τοῦ ἐνος: γὰρ μὲν τῷ ἔλοι ὑπ' το αὐτοὶ, μὲν τῷ μορίῳ ἐσται εὖ: δ' then in turn, Each Singular Part of The Whole, Is That which will Be a Part of The Whole.

αὐτῷ ἐκαστόν εἰν μορίων τοῦ ἔλοι, ὁ ἂν ἦ μορίον το ἔλοι.

Ari: It is so. (οὔτως.)

152a οἴνως
157d αὐτῷ
158a αὐτῶν, αὐτὸ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ
158b αὐτῷ, αὐτό, αὐτῷ
159c αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ
155c μετέχειν
157e μετέχειν, μετέχειν
158a μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχειν
158b μετέχειν, μετέχειν, μετέχειν
159c μετέχειν
157c ἔλοι, ἔλοι, ἔλω
157e ἔλοι, ἔλοι, ἔλω
158a ἔλοι, ἔλοι, ἔλοι, ἔλοι
158b ἔλοι
158d ἔλοι, ἔλοι, ἔλοι

4th
Loeb

For if each of the parts is a part, the word 'each' implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be 'each.'

“True.”

“But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one.”

“Yes, it is impossible.”

“And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the whole.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

For, if each of these is a part, the very being each, in a certain respect, signifies one; since it is distinguished from others, and has a subsistence by itself, if it is that which is called each.

Right.

But it participates of The One as it is evidently something different from The One; for otherwise it would not participate, but would be The One Itself. But now it is impossible that any thing can be The One except The One Itself.

Impossible.

But it is necessary both to a whole and to a part to participate of The One: for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part.

It is so.

Jowett

for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self-related; otherwise it is not each.

True.

But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one; for if not, it would merely have participated, but would have been one; whereas only the itself can be one.

Very true.

Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and each part will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.

True.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὑντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ;
πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;
τὰ δ᾽ ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη: εἴ γὰρ μήτε ἐν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τάλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς,
oideon ἂν εἴη.
oὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that The Beings which Participate of The One, Participate of The Self, by Being Other (as in 148b)?

Ari: How could they not? (πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;)

Par: But Those that Are Other than The One will Be Many in some indefinite way. δ᾽ τα ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτῶν πολλά που.

For if Those that Are Other than The One Were neither One nor More than One, then They γαρ εἴη τάλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη μήτε ἐν μήτε πλεῖο ενὸς, would be nothing. (αν εἴη οὐδὲν.)

Ari: They would be nothing then. (οὐ γὰρ οὖν.)
“And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it?”

“Of course.”

“But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything.”

“No.”

Must not, therefore, those which participate of The One participate it, as being different from The One?

How should they not?

But things different from The One will in a certain respect be many; for if things different from The One were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

They would.

And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?

Of course.

And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

True.
Oxford Greek

ἐπεὶ δὲ γε πλεῖω ἕνός ἐστι τά τε τοῦ ἕνός μορίου καὶ τά τοῦ ἕνός ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τά μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἕνός;
πῶς;
ὥδε ἰδομεν. ἀλλὸ τι οἰκ̄ ἐν οντα οὐδέ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἕνος τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει
δὴλα δὴ.

Balboas

Par: Since The Beings that Participate both of a Part of One, and
The Beings that Participate of The One Whole, Are indeed More than One, then Must not
These Beings which Participate of The One already Be Unlimited Multitude?
eκεῖνα τα μεταλαμβάνοντα του ἕνος ηδὴ εἶναι αὐτηρα πλήθει;
Ari: How? (πως ;)
Par: Let us See in the following way. At the Time when They Partake of Something other
ιδομεν ὥδε τοτε οντα μεταλαμβανει τι αλλο than The One, do They Participate of Not-One, and do not Participate of The Self?
tου ενος μετεχοντα ουχ εν, ουδε μεταλαμβανει αυτου;
Ari: Clearly so, (δηλα δη :)

157a ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
158a ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
158b ὅλον
158d ὅλον, ὅλον, ὅλον
158c ὅλον
156a μετέχοντα, μετέχειν
158b μετέχει, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα, μετέχοντα
158c μετέχει
158d μετέχει

144a ἄπειρον
145a ἄπειρον
158b ἄπειρα
158c ἄπειρον
158d ἄπειρα
157a τότε, τότε
158b τότε
But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number?"

“How so?”

“Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one?”

“Clearly.”

But since the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not necessary that these very things which participate of The One should be infinite in multitude?

How?

Thus: they are different from The One, nor are they participants of The One, then when they have already participated of it.

Certainly.

But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

How so?

Let us look at the matter thus:-Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time. when they are partaking of it?

Clearly.
οὐκοῦν πλῆθη ὠντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐνι;
πλῆθη μὲντοι.

τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ώς οἷοί τε ἐσμέν ὁτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἰπερ τὸν ἐν ὁμοί μὴ μετέχοι, πλῆθος εἰναι καὶ οὐχ ἐν;
ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὔτήν καθ’ αὐτήν τὴν ἄπειραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἂν αὔτής αἰε ὄρωμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει;
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that They are Multitudes, in which The One Is Not?
Ari: Multitudes, certainly. (πληθη μεντοι.) (ὐνειμμ)

Par: What then? If we would be willing to take away through our Understanding, the least possible Quantity from These, then is it not Necessary that This Very Quantity which is taken away, Must Be a Multitude and also Not-One, if indeed, It does Not Participate of The One?
Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: By Always Considering That Other (Ousia) Nature of The Ideas/Kinds/Genera in this way, as Subsisting Herself by Herself, will not then, such a Quantity of Her Self, which we may behold, Will Always Be, Unlimited Multitude?
Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανταπασι μεν οὐν.)
Loeb

“Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not?”
“Yes, they are multitudes.”
“Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one?”
“It must.”
“And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not?”
“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Are not those multitudes in which The One is not? Multitudes, certainly.
What then?
If we should be willing by cogitation to take away the least quantity from these, would it not be necessary that this quantity which is taken away should be multitude, and not one, since it does not participate of The One?
It is necessary.
By always surveying, therefore, another nature of form, itself subsisting by itself, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude?
Entirely so.

Jowett

They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?
Very true.
And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one?
It must.
And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number?
Certainly.
Oxford Greek

καὶ μὴν ἐπειδὴ γε ἐν ἐκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἢδη ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια.

κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῖς ἑνός συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῖς ἑνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινονησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔτερον τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, δὴ ἢ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἀλλήλα: ἢ δὲ ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ’ ἑαυτά ἀπειράν.

φαίνεται.

οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἀπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.

πάντως γε.

Balboas

Par: And most certainly , whenever Each Part becomes One , Each Part Will Already Possess Limit , in relation to Each Other , and in relation to The Whole , and 

The Whole in relation to The Parts .

tο ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μορία .

Ari: Exactly so then . (κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν .)

Par: Surely then , on the one hand , it then results for Those Other than The One , as it Is Reasonable , both from Their Sharing-a-Commonness with Each Other and from The One ,

that Something Other Will Come-to-Be within Them-Selves ; which certainly Provides Them to eτερον γίγνεσθαι εν εαυτοῖς , ο ἢ παρέσχε The Limit in relation to Each Other ; but on the other hand , by The Nature of Them-Selves ,

perí πρὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλα : δὴ τὰ ὑπὸ εαυτών .

according to Them-Selves (Other/Many) , The Unlimited Comes-to-Be .

καθ’ εαυτά απειράν .

Ari: So it has come to Light . (φαίνεται .)

Par: Surely then in this way , Those Other than The One , according to both δὴ οὕτω τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς κατὰ καὶ

Wholes and Parts , are Unlimited and also Participate of Limit .

όλα καὶ μοῦρα εστὶ απειρά τε καὶ μετέχει περάτος .

Ari: Entirely so . (παντὸς γε .)
Loeb

“And, further, when each part becomes a part, straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts.”

“Undoubtedly.”

“The result, then, to the things which are other than one, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits.”

“So it appears.”

“Then the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

And since every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts.

Perfectly so.

It will happen, therefore, to things different from The One, as it appears both from The One and from their communicating with each other, that a certain something different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of these causes them to become essentially connected with infinity.

It appears so.

And thus things different from The One, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Entirely so.

Jowett

And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.

Just so.

The result to the others than the one is that of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit.

That is clear.

Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.

Certainly.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;
πῶς δὴ;
ηὶ μὲν ποι ἀπειρὰ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταύτων πεπονθότα ἃν εἰ ἑαυτῇ.
καὶ μὴν ἦ γε ἀπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτῃ πάντ᾽ ἃν εἰ ἑαυτῶν πεπονθότα.
πῶς δ’ οὖν;
ηὶ δὲ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἰναι καὶ ἀπειρὰ πέπονθεν, ἑναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὅντα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν.

ναὶ.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then , that They are Like and Unlike , to Each Other and to Themselves ?
158E Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνομοία τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς;
Ari: in what way then ? (πη δὴ ;)
Par: Since on the one hand , according to Their Own Nature , All of Them will be ,
ηὶ μὲν κατὰ ἑαυτῶν τὴν φύσιν πάντα ἃν εἰ ἑαυτῶν;
and in This Way , They are (passively) affected by The Same .
Ari: Entirely so . (πανυ γε .)
Par: And certainly , insofar as They All indeed Participate of Limit ,
καὶ μὴν ἦν ἀπαντα γε μετέχει πέρατος ,
and by Experiencing in This Way , They will All be The Same .
Ari: How could they not ; (πως δ’ οὖν .)
Par: But on the other hand , inasmuch as They have been so affected so as to be

both Limited and Unlimited , they are affected by experiences that are opposite to one another .
Ari: Yes . (ναι.)
Loeb

“And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves?”

“How is that?”

“Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way.”

“Certainly.”

“And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also.”

“Obviously.”

“And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

Are they not, therefore, similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves?

Why?

Because, so far as all of them are in a certain respect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in consequence of this, suffer that which is the same.

- -

How should they not?

But so far as they suffer to be bounded and infinite, which are passions contrary to each other, they suffer these passions.

Certainly.

Jowett

Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.

How is that?

Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.

True.

And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.

Of course.

But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are affected in opposite ways.

Yes.
Oxford Greek

tὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία γε ὡς οἷν τε ἀνομοιότατα.
tί μήν;
κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἐκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὀροια ἀν εἴη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἀμφιτέρως ἐναντιώτατα τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα.
κινδυνεύει.

Balboas

Par: But opposites are indeed as most Unlike as it is possible.

Ari: Of course, what then? (τι μην ;)

Par: Thus on the one hand, each of these experiences, will be both Like them-selves αρα μὲν εκατερον το παθος αν ειη τε ομοια αυτοις and Like each other; but on the other hand, according to both affections, και αλληλοις, δ᾽ κατα αμφοτερα they are in both ways, most opposite and most Unlike. αυτα αμφοτερως εναντιωτατα τε και ανομοιωτατα.

Ari: I dare say so. (κινδυνευει .)
Loeb

“But opposites are as unlike as possible.”
“To be sure.”
“Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.”
“Yes, that must be true.”

Thomas Taylor

But things contrary, as such, are most dissimilar.
What then?
According to each of these passions, therefore, they are similar to themselves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar.
It appears so.

Jowett

And opposites are the most unlike of things.
Certainly.
Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.
That appears to be true.
Oxford Greek

οὖτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλληλοις δροιά τε καὶ ἄνοριον ἂν εἴη.

οὖτως.

καὶ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐτερα ἄλληλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἔστώτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκετὶ χαλεπῶς εὑρήσωμεν πεπονθότα τάλλα τοῦ ἕνου, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφανῇ πεπονθότα.

ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, in this way, The Other Beings will Themselves be both

δὴ οὕτω τὰ ἀλλὰ ἂν αὐτὰ εἰ ὑ ὑ 

Like and Unlike with Themselves and with Each Other.

ομωία τε καὶ αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις.

Ari: It is so. (οὐτῶς.)

Par: Surely then, They will be both The Same and Other from Each Other, and

δὴ καὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐτερα ἄλληλοις, καὶ will be In-Motion and Standing-still, and it will not in any way be difficult for us to discover

κινούμενα καὶ ἐστώτα, καὶ οὐκετὶ χαλεπῶς εὑρήσωμεν that all kinds of contrary experiences are undergone by Those that are Other than The One, seeing that They appear to have been so affected.

ἐπείπερ ταὐτά ἐφανῇ πεπονθότα.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λέγεις ὁρθῶς.)
Loeb

“Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.”

“So they are.”

“And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.”

“You are right.”

Thomas Taylor

And thus others will be the same with themselves and with each other, and similar and dissimilar.

They will so.

And again, they will be the same and different from each other, will both be moved and stand still; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary passions suffered by things different from The One, while they appear to be passive, in the manner we have related.

You speak rightly.

Jowett

Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?

True.

And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them, since they have been shown to have experienced the affections aforesaid?

True.
οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἣδη ἐφύμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοποῦμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐν εἰ ἐστιν, ἀρα καὶ οὕχ
ὠς ἐξελεῖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνος ἢ ὀὕτω μόνον;
πάνω μὲν οὖν.

λέγωμεν δή ὡς ἑρημός ἐν εἰ ἐστιν, τί χρή τὰ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ὕφιστος  ἔστιν, ἄρα καὶ
ὁμοιόταται.

λέγωμεν γάρ.
ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ χωρὶς χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἔνος εἶναι;
τί δή;

Balboas
5th

Parmenides: 23 Is it not so then, that if on the one hand, we presently let these matters be
as Openly Clear, so then in turn, we can consider, if One Is, whether Those Other than
those that are visible, that is, as it were, we can consider, if One Is, whether Those Other
Then, do not Have to Be in This Way, or if they Have to be solely in the following way?

Aristotle: Entirely so. (πανυ μὲν οὖν .)

Par: Surely then, let us state from the beginning, if One Is, what those other than The One must undergo/experience/suffer.

Ari: Let us do so. (λέγομεν γάρ .)

Par: Take notice then, on the one hand, is not The One Separate/Apart/Distinct
from the others, and on the other hand, the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel to The One?

Ari: Why do you ask? (τι δή ;)
“Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative.”

“Certainly.”

“Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one.”

“By all means.”

“Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from the one?”

“Why is that?”

Shall we not, therefore, pass by these things as evident, and again consider if The One is, whether things different from The One will subsist not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone?

Entirely so.

Let us, therefore, assert again from the beginning, if The One is, what things different from The One ought to suffer.

Let us.

Is, therefore, The One separate from others, and are others separate from The One?

Why?

Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

By all means.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?

Let us ask that question.

Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?

Why so?
Oxford Greek

ὅτι ποι οὐκ ἐστὶ παρὰ τὰῦτα ἔτερον, ὃ άλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνός, άλλο δὲ τῶν άλλων: πάντα γάρ
eἰρηται, ὅταν ῥήθη τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὰῦτα.
pάντα γάρ.
oδκ ἄρα ἐτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔτερον τοὐτῶν, ἐν ϕ τὸ τε ἐν ἄν εἰη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰῦτα.
oδκ γάρ.
oδδεποτε ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰῦτα.
oδκ ἐοικεν.

Balboas

Par: Because nothing exists in some other way besides these ways. One which exists
οτι ουκ εστι που ετερον παρα ταυτα, μεν ο εστι
by being other than The One, then the other; which exists by being other than the others.
159C άλλο του ενος, δε άλλο των άλλων.
For that is all that can be specified, when we say, The One and the others.
γαρ παντα ειρηται, ὅταν ῥηθη το εν τε και ταῦτα
Ari: All indeed. (παντα γαρ.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no other way besides these, in which both The One
αρα εστιν ουκ ετερον, ετ' τουτων, εν ϕ το το εν
and the others can subsist in The Self (Parallel) Existence. (Odyssey 602 on Heracles)
και ταῦτα αν ειη τω σιτω
Ari: For there is none. (γαρ ου.) (Since They are Parallel)

Par: Accordingly then, The One and the others, never subsist in The Same/Self.
αρα το εν και ταῦτα ουδεποτε εν ταυτω
Ari: It does not appear that they do. (ουκ εοικεν.)
Loeb

“Because there is nothing else besides these, which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said 'one and the others' we have included all things.”

“Yes, all things.”

“Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be.”

“No.”

“Then the one and the others can never be in the same.”

“Apparently not.”

Thomas Taylor

Because there is no other different besides these, viz. that which is different from The One, and that which is different from others; for all that can be spoken is asserted, when we say The One and others.

All, indeed.

There is nothing else, therefore, besides these in which The One and others can subsist after the same manner.

Nothing.

The One and others, therefore, are never in the same.

It does not appear that they are.

Jowett

Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression "one and the others" includes all things.

Yes, all things.

Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist?

There is nothing.

Then the one and the others are never in the same?

True.
Oxford Greek

χωρίς ἀρα;

ναι.
oïδὲ μὴν μόρια γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν.

πώς γάρ;
oίτ’ ἀρα δὸλον εἶη ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τε ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ
μόρια μὴ ἔχει.

πώς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Are They Separate then? (ἀρα χωρίς ἃ)
Ari: Yes, they are separate. (ναι ἃ)
Par: We most certainly affirmed that That which Is Truly One, has no Parts (137e).

γε μὴν φαμέν ὡς το αληθῶς ἐν ἔχειν οὐδὲ μορία.

Ari: How could it? (πως γάρ ἃ)
Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Whole One be in the others,
ἀρα οὔτ’ ἐν τὸ ἅλον ἐν εἰη ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις,
nor The Parts of The Self, if It is both Separate from the others, and also, if It has no Parts.

οὔτε μορία αὐτοῦ, εἰ ἐστὶ τε χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἔχει μὴ μορία.

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως γάρ ἃ)
Loeb

“Then they are separate?”

“Yes.”

“And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts.”

“How can it have parts?”

“Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts.”

“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

Are they separate, therefore?

They are.

We have likewise asserted that the truly one has not any parts.

For how can it?

Neither, therefore, will the whole of The One be in others, nor the parts of it, if it is separate from others, and has no parts.

How should it not be so?

Jowett

Then they are separated from each other?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts?

Impossible.

Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Impossible.
οὐδὲνι ἁρά τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τάλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μορίον τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα.

οὐκ ἐσκεν.

οὐδαμῇ ἁρά ἐν τάλλα ἐστὶν, οὐδ᾿ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδὲν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδ᾿ ἁρα πολλά ἐστι τάλλα: ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν: νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μορία ἐστὶ τάλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείδη αὐτοῦ ὅλαμη μετέχει.

ὅρηδος.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, in no way will the others Participate of The One, since they neither Participate according to a certain Part of The Self, nor according to The Whole.

μήτε μετέχοντα κατὰ τι μορίον αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον.

Ari: It does not appear to be likely. (οὐκ εἰσκεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, in no way are the others One, nor have/maintain any One in themselves.

Ari: They have not then. (γὰρ οὐκ οὐν.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither are the others Many. For if they were Many, then Each Self would be One by being a Part of The Whole; but now, those other than The One are neither ἂν ἦν ἐν μορίον τοῦ ὅλου: δὲ νῦν τάλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστι οὔτε One nor Many, nor a Whole, nor Parts, since they in no way Participate of The Self.

Ari: Rightly so. (ἠρθοῦς.)
Loeb

“Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole.”
“No, apparently not.”
“The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity.”
“No.”
“But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way.”
“Right.”

Thomas Taylor

In no way, therefore, will others participate of The One, since they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole.
It does not appear that they can.
By no means, therefore, are others The One, nor have they any one in themselves.
They have not.
Neither, the, are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from The One are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, since they in no respect participate of The One.
Right.

Jowett

Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?
It would seem not.
Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?
There is not.
Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.
True.
οὖθ᾽ ἀρα δῶο ὁδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τὸν ἕνος πανταχῆ στέρεται.

οὖθ᾽.

οὖθ᾽ ὁμοία ἄρα καὶ ἄνομοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὸ ἐν τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίοτης καὶ ἀνομοίας: εἰ γὰρ ὁμοία καὶ ἄνομοια αὐτὰ εἶτ᾽ ἢ ἠχοῖ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοίαις, δῶο ποὺ εἶδη ἔναντι ἄλληλοις ἠχοὶ ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τὸν ἕνος.

φαίνεται.

ὅν δὲ γε ἄδυνατον δυοῖν τινῶν μετέχειν ἤ μηδ᾽ ἕνος μετέχοι.

ἀδυνατον.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Two nor Three, nor are These Numbers contained in them, since they are entirely deprived of The One.

Ari: So it is. (οὐτοὶ ἐστιν)

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor The Same/Selves with The One, nor are Likeness and Unlikeness inherent in them selves. For if selves were Like and Unlike, or Contained Likeness and Unlikeness in themselves, then διὰ ἂν εἰς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοίας ἰν αὐτοῖς, those other than The One would somehow Contain in themselves, Two Opposite Ideas.

Ari: So it appears. (φαίνεται)

Par: But it is indeed impossible for anything to Participate of Two Opposite Ideas, which do not in any way Participate of The One.

Ari: Impossible. (ἄδυνατον)
Loeb

“Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity.”

“True.”

“Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another.”

“That is clear.”

“But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one.”

“Impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

*Others*, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, because they are entirely deprived of *The One*.

So it is.

*Others*, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same with *The One*, nor are similitude and dissimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were similar and dissimilar, so far as they contained in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, so far things different from *The One* would comprehend in themselves two contrary species.

So it appears.

But it is impossible for those to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one.

Impossible.

Jowett

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?

True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?

Impossible.
οὖτ’ ἂρα ὅρια ὅτ’ ἁνομοῖα ἐστὶν οὖτ’ ἁμφότερα τάλλα. ὅρια μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὤντα ἡ ἁνομοῖα ἐνός ἀν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἰδοὺς μετέχοι, ἁμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίων: ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφανή.

άληθη.

οὔτ’ ἂρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὔτ’ ἑτερα, οὐδὲ κανούμενα οὐδὲ ἑστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλέμενα, οὐδὲ μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἑλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα: οὐδὲ ἂλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων:

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor Both.
160Α ἂρα τοῖν εἶστιν οὔτ’ ἁμοῖα οὔτ’ ἁμοῖα οὔτ’ ἁμοῖα.
For on the one hand, if they were Like or Unlike, then They would Participate of One Different Idea; but on the other hand, if they were Both Like and Unlike, then They would Participate of Two Opposite Ideas; but this has been shown to be impossible.

Ari: This is true. (αλήθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, they are neither themselves nor others,
160Α ἂρα τα οὐδ’ αὐτα οὐδ’ ἑτερα, nor In-motion nor Standing-still, nor generated nor dissolved, nor are greater nor less,
160Α οὐδὲ κανούμενα οὐδὲ εστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλέμενα, οὐδὲ μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἑλάττω nor Equal; nor do they undergo anything else of this kind.
160Α οὐδ’ οὐδὲ πεπονθε οὐδὲν ἂλλο τῶν τοιούτων.
Loeb

“The others are, then, not like nor unlike nor both. For if they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two elements, and if they were both, of the two opposites and that was shown to be impossible.”

“True.”

“They are, then, neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor equal, and they experience no similar affections;

Thomas Taylor

Others, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor both. For, if they were things similar or dissimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but these things appear to be impossible.
True.

Others, therefore, are neither same nor different, nor are moved nor stand still, nor are generated nor destroyed, nor are greater, or lesser, or equal, nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind.

Jowett

Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.
True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort;
Oxford Greek

εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἕνος καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἄρτιου μεθέξει, ὃν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἕνος γε πάντη πάντως στερομένοις.

ἀληθέστατα.

οὕτω δὴ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τε ἔστι τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν ἔστι καὶ πρὸς ἕαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

For if they could sustain undergoing any such experience, then They would also Participate of One and Two and Three, and of Even and of Odd; all of which, have indeed been shown to be impossible for themselves to Participate, by being entirely deprived of The One.

Ari: All this is most true. (ἀληθέστατα.)

Par: Surely then in this way, if One Is, then The One is All, and also, nothing at all; and so also in Relation to It-Self and in the (non) relation to the other selves.

Ari: This is entirely so. (παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.)
for if the others are subject to such affections, they will participate in one and two and three and odd and even, in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.”

“Very true.”

“Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.”

“Perfectly true.”

Thomas Taylor

For, if others could sustain to suffer any such affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely deprived of The One.

All this is most true.

Hence, then, if The One is, The One is all things and nothing; and is similarly affected towards itself and towards others.

Entirely so.

Jowett

for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

6th

eἶεν: εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἄρ’ οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τούτο; σκεπτέον γὰρ.

τίς οὖν ἂν εἰη αὕτη ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἕν μὴ ἔστιν; ὅρα τι διαφέρει τῆςδε, εἰ μὴ ἕν μὴ ἔστιν; διαφέρει μέντοι.

Balboas

6th

Par: What then, will be the hypothesis itself, if One is not?

Will it then differ in any way from the following hypothesis: If Not-One is not?

[[Pierre: Consider 151es :

"On the one hand, To Be, is in some way Present with It, if indeed It Is One. But what else is To Be, than The Participation of Ousia with The Present, The Past and The Future?]]

Ari: It will indeed differ.
“Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happen if one does not exist?”
“Yes, we ought.”
“What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist? Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?”
“Certainly it is different.”

Let this then be admitted. But should we not after this consider what ought to happen if The One is not?
We should.
What then will be the hypothesis if The One is not? Will it differ from the hypothesis if that which is not one is not?
It will indeed differ.

Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?
Yes; we ought.
What is the meaning of the hypothesis-If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis-If the not one is not?
There is a difference, certainly.
ξ —>

Oxford Greek

διαφερει μόνων, ἢ καὶ πὰν τοῦναντίων ἐστίν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰ ἐν μὴ ἐστίν; πὰν τοῦναντίων.

τι δ’ εἰ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἐστίν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἐστίν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἃρα ἐφ’ ἐκαστοῦ ἂν δῆλοι ὅτι ἐτερὸν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὁν;

πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Will it merely differ, or is the expression, if Not-One is not, Entirely Opposite to the hypothesis, if One is not?

Ari: Entirely opposite. (παν τοῦναντίων)

Par: But what if anyone were to say, ‘if Greatness is not’ or ‘Smallness is not’, or anything else of this kind, then they should make it clear in each of these cases, that they speak of The Non-Being, as something Other? (The Principle of The 6th .PG)

Ari: Entirely so. (πανο γε.)
Loeb

“Is it merely different, or are the two expressions—if not one does not exist and if one does not exist—complete opposites?”

“They are complete opposites.”

“Now if a person should say 'if greatness does not exist', 'if smallness does not exist,' or anything of that sort, would he not make it clear that in each case the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Will it only differ, or is the hypothesis if that which is not one is not, entirely contrary to the hypothesis if The One is not?

 Entirely contrary.

But what, if any one should say, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not evince in each of these that he speaks of that which is not as something different?

 Entirely so.

Jowett

Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions-if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

They are entirely opposed.

And suppose a person to say:-If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean, whenever he uses such an expression, that "what is not" is other than other things?

To be sure.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δήλοι ὅτι ἔτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ἄν, ὅταν εἴη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὁ λέγειν.

ἵσμεν.

πρώτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴη ἐν, εἴτε τὸ ἐἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ ἐἶναι:

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that now they also make it clear what they mean when they say, if One Is not, that The Non-Being Is Other from The Others, and so we will know, That which they mean?

καὶ ἴσμεν ὁ λέγειν;

Ari: We will know. (ἴσμεν [εἰδομαι].)

Par: On the one hand, when they say One, first of all, do they speak of something that Is Knowable, and secondly, of something Other from The Others, whether they add existence to The Self or non-existence;

τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι:
Loeb

“And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says 'if one is not,' that the thing which is not is different from other things, and do we not know what he means?”

“Yes, we do know.”

“In the first place, then, he speaks of something which is known, and secondly of something different from other things, when he says 'one,' whether he adds to it that it is or that it is not;

Thomas Taylor

Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls that which is not different from others, when he says if The One is not; and should we understand that which he says?

We should understand.

In the first place, therefore, he speaks of something which may be known; and afterwards of something different from others when he says The One, whether he adds to it to be or not to be:

Jowett

And so when he says "If one is not" he clearly means, that what "is not" is other than all others; we know what he means-do we not?

Yes, we do.

When he says "one," he says something which is known; and secondly something which is other than all other things; it makes no difference whether he predicate of one being or not being,
Oxford Greek

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἴναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ή ὦ; 

άνάγκη. ὡδὲ ἄρα λεκτέον εἴξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τι χρῆ εἴναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς έοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἡ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἶπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. 

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς έοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἡ μηδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἶπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. 

ἀλήθη. 

οὗκον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑτερα αὐτοῦ εἴναι, ἡ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἑτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι; 

πάνω γε. 

Balboas

for what they call non-existence, will be no less 

γὰρ τι τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἴναι, οὐδὲν ἦττον 

recognized/known, and that non-existence is Different from The Others; or is it not so? 

160D γιγνώσκεται, καὶ στὶ διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ή σου; 

Ari: It is necessarily so. (αναγκη;) 

Par: Accordingly then, we must affirm from the beginning, what Must Be, if One Is not, 

αρα λεκτέον εἴξ αρχῆς, τι χρῆ εἴναι, εἰ εν εστι μη, 

in the following way. Thus on the one hand, as it is Reasonable, This Must Belong to 

The Self; first of all, there Must Be Knowledge of The Self, or else, nothing which is said 

αὐτῷ, πρῶτον εἰναι επιστήμην αὐτῷ, η μηδὲ τι ο λέγεται 

Will Be Recognized/Known, when anyone says, if One Is not. 

γιγνώσκεσθαι, στην τις εἴπη εἰ εν εστιν μη. 

Ari: True. (ἀλήθη;) 

Par: Is this not also the case then, that The Others Must Be Other from The Self, 

ουκούν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἰναι ἑτερα αὐτῷ, 

or else The Others would not then Be said to Be Other from That? 

η τῶν ἄλλων μηδὲ λέγεσθαι ἑτερον εκεῖνο; 

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνω γε;)
for that which is said to be non-existent is known none the less, and is known to be different from other things, is it not?”

“Certainly.”

“Then we should begin at the beginning by asking: if one is not, what must follow?

In the first place this must be true of the one, that there is knowledge of it, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known.”

“True.”

“And is it not also true that the others differ from the one, or it cannot be said to differ from the others?”

“Certainly.”

for that which is said not to be will be not the less known, nor that it is something different from others: is it not so?

It is necessary it should.

Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, if The One is not, what ought to be the consequence.

In the first place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there should be a science of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one says if The One is not.

True.

Must not this also happen, that either other things must be different from it, or that it must be said to be different from others?

 Entirely so.

for that which is said "not to be" is known to be something all the same, and is distinguished from other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences?
In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, "if one is not," would not be known.

True.

Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

καὶ ἐπεροιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑπεροιότητα λέγει, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἡκείνου και τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτω καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τιοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὅν ἐν: οὐ γὰρ ἀν τὸ ἐν ἐλέγετο οδὴ ἀν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐτέρα, οδὴ ἡκείνῳ ἀν τὸ ἐνὸς ἐτέρα, ἀν ἐν τῷ ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τῷ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετήν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.

ὅρθος.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , Difference-in-Kind , besides Knowledge , Is Present in The Self .

ορᾶ ἐπεροιότης πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ .

so that when it is said that The One Is Other than The Others , they will not speak of

gap στὸν λέγῃ το ἐν ετέρον τῶν ἄλλων , οὐ λέγει the Difference-in-Kind of The Others , but of The Difference of That .

160E τὴν ἑπεροιότητα τῶν ἄλλων , ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου .

Ari: So it has come to Light . (φαίνεται .)

Par: And certainly , The Being that Is Not-One , Must Participate of That and of a Certain

καὶ γε μὴν τὸ οὐ μὴν τῆς ἑπεροιότητι τοῦ ἑκείνου καὶ τινὸς One and of This and in relation to This and of These and All such as These . For then ,

τοῦ καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτω καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τιοιούτων . γὰρ neither could The One Be spoken of , nor of Those Other than The One , nor would

οὐ αὐτῷ το ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐτέρα τοῦ ἐνος , ουδὲ αὐτῷ any thing of That Be Present with That , nor could anything Be said about The Self ,

τὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἑν τῆς ἑκείνου , οὐδὲ αὐτῷ το τῆς ἑτερας, if It neither Participated of Some nor of Those Others .

ei μήτε μετὴν τοῦ τινὸς μήτε τῶν τούτων ἄλλων .

Ari: Rightly said . (ὁρθὸς .)
Loeb

“Then a difference belongs to the one in addition to knowledge; for when we say that the one differs from the others, we speak of a difference in the one, not in the others.”

“That is clear.”

“And the non-existent one partakes of 'that' and 'some' and 'this' and 'relation to this' and 'these' and all notions of that sort; for the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things which are other than one, nor could anything in relation to the one or belonging to it be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of the notion some or of those other notions.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

Diversity, therefore, besides science, is present with it; for, when any one says that The One is different from others, he will not speak of the diversity of others, but of the diversity of The One.

It appears so.

And besides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of that, and of some certain thing, and of this, and of these, and every thing of this kind. For neither could The One be spoken of, nor things different from The One, nor would any thing be present with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of some certain thing or things of this kind.

Right.

Jowett

Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.

Clearly so.

Moreover, the one that is not is something and partakes of relation to "that," and "this," and "these," and the like, and is an attribute of "this"; for the one, or the others than the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one that is not have been or been spoken of, nor could it have been said to be anything, if it did not partake of "some," or of the other relations just now mentioned.

True.
161a—>

Oxford Greek

εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἕνῳ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τὸ γε ἐν εἰκόνι καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτ’ εἰκόνι μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ νόμος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεί οὐδὲν: εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν εἰκόνι καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετείναι.

καὶ πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Thus on the one hand, it is not possible for to be, to be Present with The One, if indeed it does not exist; but on the other hand, nothing prevents it to Participate of many, if indeed The One is not, and is not something else than that. But it must even do so, if indeed The One is not, and is not something else than that. Certainly then, if neither The One nor that exists, then nothing will exist. But if the Discourse/Logos is about something else, then there is nothing that can be spoken of.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανύ γε.)
Loeb

“It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor 'that,' is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of 'that' and of many other attributes.”

“Yes, certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

But to be cannot be present with The One if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of the many: but, indeed, it is necessary that it should, if the one is that, and is not something different from that. If, therefore, it is neither The One nor that, neither will it be; but discourse must take place about something else, and it will be necessary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if The One is established as that and not as another, it is necessary that it should participate of that and of many other things.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, since it is not; but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many things, if it and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor the one that is not is supposed not to be, and we are speaking of something of a different nature, we can predicate nothing of it. But supposing that the one that is not and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate "that," and in many others.

Certainly.
Oxford Greek

καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἢρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα: τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔτερα ὄντα ἔτεροι καὶ εἰ ἂν.

ναι.

tὰ δ’ ἔτεροια οὐκ ἄλλοια;

πῶς δ’ οὐ;

tὰ δ’ ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια;

ἀνόμοια μὲν ὄν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, Unlikeness Is also Present with The Self in relation to the others.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But are not those of another kind, various?

Ari: How could they not be? (πῶς δ’ οὐ;)

Par: But are not the various, Unlike?

Ari: They are indeed unlike. (μὲν οὖν ἀνομοία.)
Loeb

“And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind.”

“Yes.”

“And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?”

“Of course.”

“And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?”

“Yes, they are unlike.”

Thomas Taylor

Dissimilitude, therefore, is present with it as to other things: for other things being different from The One will also be foreign from it.

Certainly.

But are not things foreign various?

How should they not?

And are not things various dissimilars?

Dissimilars.

Jowett

And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.

Certainly.

And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?

Of course.

And are not things other in kind unlike?

They are unlike.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοὖν εἰπὲ τῷ ἑνὶ ἄνομοια ἐστὶ, δὴλον ὅτι ἄνομοὶ τὰ γε ἄνομοια ἄνομοι ἐν εἰ. δὴλον. ἐστὶν ἀνομοίτης, πρὸς ἰν τὰ ἄλλα ἄνομοια αὐτῷ ἐστὶν. ἔοικεν.

eἶδος ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἄνομοιτης, ἀρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐαυτῷ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; πῶς;

eἶ ἐνος ἄνομοιτης ἐστι τῷ ἑνί, οὐκ ἰν περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον ὁ λόγος εἶ ἰν οἰου τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδ᾽ ἀν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἰ ἰεν ἐνος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀλλού ἢ ἑνός.

πάνω γε.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that if indeed they are unlike The One, 161B οὐκοὖν εἰπὲ τῷ ἑνὶ ἄνομοια τῷ ἑνὶ ἄνομοια ἐν εἰ, it is evident that they will indeed be unlike That which Is Unlike . δὴλον ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα ἄνομοια ἐστὶν ἀνομοίτης τῷ εἰ.

Ari: It is evident . (δὴλον.)

Par: Certainly then, Unlikeness will also Be in The One , δὴλον ἀνομοίτης τὸν καὶ εἰς τῷ ἑνὶ, according to which, The Others will Be Unlike in relation to The Self . ἂν ἐστὶν ἀνομοίωσις πρὸς αὐτῷ.

Ari: So it is Reasonable . (ἐοικεν.)

Par: But certainly, if It isUnlike The Others , δὲ δὴ εἰ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸν ἄνομοιότητα τῶν ἄλλων, then must not The Self Be The Likeness of It-Self ? ἀρ′ ἐναναγκὴ οὐκ αὐτῷ εἰναὶ ὁμοιότητα εαυτῷ; ὃς;

Ari: How ? (πῶς;)  

Par: If Unity were Unlike The One, then The Discourse, would somehow εἰ ἐνος ἐστὶ ἀνομοιοτήτας τῷ ἑνὶ, ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ εἰς πού not Be Possible about The One, nor about That which is Like It; nor would there Be ὁ λόγος, ἐνος, ἐναν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἑνοῦ τοιοῦτον, οὐδ᾽ αὐτῷ εἰη the hypothesis about The One, but about something other than The One. ἡ ὑπόθεσις περὶ ἑνοῦ, ἄλλα περὶ ἀλλοῦ ἡ ἑνοῦ.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

6th
Loeb

“Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it.”

“Evidently.”

“Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike.”

“So it appears.”

“But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?”

“How is that?”

“If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

If, therefore, they are dissimilars to The One, it is evident they will be dissimilars to that which is dissimilar.

It is evident.

Dissimilitude, therefore, will be present with The One, according to which others will be dissimilars to it.

It appears so.

But if a dissimilitude with respect to other things belongs to it, must not similitude to itself be present with it?

How?

If there be a dissimilitude of The One with respect to The One, discourse would not take place about a thing of this kind as of The One; nor would the hypothesis be about The One, but about something different from The One.

 Entirely so.

Jowett

And if they are unlike the one, that which they are unlike will clearly be unlike them?

Clearly so.

Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others are unlike it?

That would seem to be true.

And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.

How so?

If the one have unlikeness to one, something else must be meant; nor will the hypothesis relate to one; but it will relate to something other than one?

Quite so.
οὐ δεῖ δὲ γε.
οὐ δήτα.

δεῖ ἀρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνι αὐτοῦ ἐαυτῷ εἶναι.

dei.

καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἴσον γ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; εἰ γὰρ εἰη ἴσον, εἰη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὁμοιὸν ἂν εἰη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἴσοτητα. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἰπέρ μὴ ἔστιν ἐν.

ἀδύνατα.

Balboas

Par: But that must not indeed be the case.
161C δε δει ου γε .

Ari: Without a doubt. (ου δητα .)

Par: Accordingly then, The Likeness to The One to It-Self Must Be of The Self .

Ari: It must. (δει .)

Par: And most certainly in turn, The One Is not Equal to Others. For if It Were Equal, Και γε μην αν ουδ᾽ εστι ισον τοις αλλοις ; γαρ ει ειημοιον , then It would already Be and It would also Be Like Them-Selves, according to Equality ; αν ἡδη ειη τε αν και ειη ομοιον εαυτους κατα την ισοτητα ; but both of these conditions Are Impossible, if indeed One Is not . δ᾽ αμφότερα ταυτα αδυνατα , ειπερ εν εστιν μη .

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατα .)

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Greek words:

161a ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητα
161b ὁμοιότης
161c ὁμοιότητα
161d ὁμοιότης
161e ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότητα
161f ὁμοιοτης
161g ὁμοιοτητα
161h ὁμοιοτητα
161i ὁμοιοτητα
161j ὁμοιοτητα
161k ὁμοιοτητα
161l ὁμοιοτητα
161m ὁμοιοτητα
161n ὁμοιοτητα
161o ὁμοιοτητα
161p ὁμοιοτητα
161q ὁμοιοτητα
161r ὁμοιοτητα
161s ὁμοιοτητα
161t ὁμοιοτητα
161u ὁμοιοτητα
161v ὁμοιοτητα
161w ὁμοιοτητα
161x ὁμοιοτητα
161y ὁμοιοτητα
161z ὁμοιοτητα
Loeb

“But that is inadmissible.”
“It certainly is.”
“Then the one must possess likeness to itself.”
“It must.”
“And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like
them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist.”
“Yes, they are impossible.”

Thomas Taylor

But it ought not.
Certainly not.
There ought, therefore, to be a similitude of The One with respect to itself.
There ought.
But neither is The One equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be
similar to them; but both these are impossible, since The One is not.
Impossible.

Jowett

But that cannot be.
No.
Then the one must have likeness to itself?
It must.
Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would at once be and be like them in virtue
of the equality; but if one has no being, then it can neither be nor be like?
It cannot.
Oxford Greek

Ξηθή δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ὅρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τάλλα ἐκείνω μὴ ἵσα εἶναι; ἀνάγκη.

τὰ δὲ μὴ ἵσα οὐκ ἄνισα;

ναὶ.

τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἄνισῳ ἄνισα;

πῶς δ’ οὖ;

καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἐν, πρὸς ἣν τάλλα αὐτῷ ἐστίν ἄνισα; μετέχει.

Balboas

Par: Then since, The One is not equal to the others, then must it not be necessary επειδὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, δὲ ἀρα οὐκ ἀναγκὴ that the others must also not be equal to That One? τάλλα καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἵσα ἐκείνω;

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκή.)

Par: But are not those that are not-Equal, unequal? δὲ οὐκ τα ἰσα άνισα;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But are not those that are unequal, unequal to That which is Unequal? δὲ οὐ τα άνισα ανισα τω ανισω;

Ari: How could they not be? (πῶς οὐ δ’;)

Par: And surely then, The One will Participate of Inequality, καὶ δὴ το ἐν μετέχει ανισότητος, because of which, the others are unequal to The Self. προς ἣν τάλλα ἐστιν ανισα αυτω;

Ari: It will so participate. (μετέχει.)

6th
Loeb

“And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they?”
“Certainly not.”
“And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?”
“Yes.”
“And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them?”
(Of course.)
“Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it?”
“Yes, it does.”

Thomas Taylor

But since it is not equal to others, is it not necessary that others also should not be equal to it?
It is necessary.
But are not things which are not equal unequal?
Certainly.
And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal?
How should they not?
The One, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it.
It will participate.

Jowett

But since it is not equal to the others, neither can the others be equal to it?
Certainly not.
And things that are not equal are unequal?
True.
And they are unequal to an unequal?
Of course.
Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?
Very true.
Oxford Greek

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητος γε ἔστι μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης. ἔστι γάρ.
εἴστην ἄρα καὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί; κινδυνεύει.
μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.
πάντες γε.
μεταξὺ ἄρα τι ἀυτοῖν αὐτῆσθαι.
εἴστι.
ἐξεῖ ὅποι τὸ ἄλλο εἰσεῖν μεταξὺ ἀυτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;
οὖκ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ.
ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης ἀυτῷ, ἀυτῷ μεταξὺ τούτων οὖσα.
φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: But certainly, Bigness and Smallness do indeed belong to Inequality.
Ari: They do indeed. (γαρ εστι).
Par: Accordingly then, Bigness and Smallness and such as these, belong to The One?
Ari: It appears likely. (κινδυνεύει).
Par: Certainly then, Bigness and Smallness always stand-apart from each other.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε).
Par: Accordingly then, something always exists between Them-Selves.
Ari: It is so. (εστιν).
Par: Therefore, can you assign anything else between Them-Selves, except Equality?
Ari: Nothing else but this. (ουκ, ἀλλα τουτο).
Par: Accordingly then, in whatsoever, there is Bigness and Smallness.
Ari: οὕτως, οὕτως, οὕτως, οὕτως. That is also Present, by Being Between These.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)
Loeb

“But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?”

“So it appears.”

“Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another.”

“Certainly.”

“Then there is always something between them.”

“There is.”

“Can you think of anything between them except equality?”

“No, only equality.”

“Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two.”

“That is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality.

They do.

Do magnitude and parvitude, therefore, belong to a one of this kind?

It appears they do.

But magnitude and parvitude are always separated from each other.

Entirely so.

Something, therefore, always subsists between them.

Certainly.

Can you assign any thing else between these, except equality?

Nothing else.

With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality also is present, subsisting as a medium between these.

It appears so.

Jowett

And inequality implies greatness and smallness?

Yes.

Then the one, if of such a nature, has greatness and smallness?

That appears to be true.

And greatness and smallness always stand apart?

True.

Then there is always something between them?

There is.

And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?

No, it is equality which lies between them.

Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?

That is clear.
Oxford Greek

tὸ δὴ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἄν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.

ἔοικεν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πη.

πῶς δὴ;

ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὗτος ὡς λέγομεν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὗτος ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐίναι: εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ή οὔχ οὗτος; οὗτο μὲν οὖν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, as it is Reasonable, The One that does not Truly exist, will also have a Share of Equality, Bigness and Smallness. 

Ari: So it is Reasonable. (ἔοικεν.)

Par: And certainly, The Self Must also Participate of Ousia in a Definite way.

Ari: How so? (πῶς δῆ;) 

Par: The Self Must Possess Ousia in This way that we have described. For otherwise, we shall not speak Truly when we say, The One Is not; but if we do speak Truly, ημεῖς εἰναὶ οὐκ λέγομεν αληθῆ λέγοντες, τὸ εἰναὶ οὔ, δὲ εἰ ἀληθῆ, then it is clear that we have affirmed that Selves Are Beings: or is it not in this way?

Ari: It is indeed thus. (μὲν οὖν οὕτω.)
Loeb

“Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness.”

“So it appears.”

“And it must also, in a way, partake of existence.”

“How is that?”

“It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?”

“You are.”

Thomas Taylor

But to *The One which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong.

So it seems.

But it ought likewise, in a certain respect, to participate of essence.

How so?

Ought it to possess the properties which we have already described? for, unless this is the case, we shall not speak the truth when we say *The One is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have asserted things which have a subsistence: is it not so?

It is.

Jowett

Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?

Clearly.

Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?

How so?

It must be so, for if not, then we should not speak the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we speak the truth, clearly we must say what is. Am I not right?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

ἐπειδὴ δὲ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἤμιν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν.

ἀνάγκη.

ἔστιν ὥσ, ὡς οἰκε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὅν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὅν, ἀλλὰ πῃ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὸς ἔσται ὅν.

παντάπασι μὲν ὀὖν.

Balboas

Par: Then since, we affirm that we speak The Truth, then it is also Necessary to affirm that we speak of Beings.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, as it is Reasonable, The One which Has no Being, exists.

For if it were not the case that there will be non-Being, then That which Is would let something go to non-Being, and it (non-Being) would immediately be Being.

Ari: Altogether so. (παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.)
“Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, we necessarily assert that we say that which is.”

“Necessarily.”

“Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, then it will be existent.”

“Certainly.”

But since we assert that we speak truly, it is likewise necessary to assert that we speak of things which exist.

It is necessary.

*The One*, therefore, *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while *not being*, but remits something of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*.

Entirely so.

And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also affirm that we say what is?

Certainly.

Then, as would appear, the one, when it is not, is; for if it were not to be when it is not, but were to relinquish something of being, so as to become not-being, it would at once be.

Quite true.
Accordingly then, The Self Must Possess The Bond of That which Is not, in order to be non-Being, if It is going to not Be; just as, in a similar way, The Being Must Possess the Bond to not Be non-Being, in order that It may in turn Perfectly Be such as It Is.

For in this way, especially, both, The Being will Be, and the non-Being will not Be; on the one hand, The Being Participates of Ousia in order that The Being Be; but on the other hand, if It is going to Perfectly Be.

The Being Participates of non-Ousia, in order that It may be, non-Being, (The Patho-logos)
Loeb

“Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, thus assuring its own perfect existence,

Thomas Taylor

It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of not to be, to be that which is not, if it is about not to be: just as being ought to have as a bond not to be that which is not, that it may be perfectly that which is. For thus, in a most eminent degree, being will be and non-being will not be: being participating of essence, in order that it may be being; but of non-essence in order that it may obtain to be non-being, if it is about perfectly to be:

Jowett

Then the one which is not, if it is to maintain itself, must have the being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not being is when being partakes of the being of being, and not of the being of not-being—that is, the perfection of being;
Oxford Greek

ὅν, εἴ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὁν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὁν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὁν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.

ἀληθέστατα.

οὖκον ἐπεῖπερ τῷ τῷ ὁντὶ τῆς μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὁντὶ τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἐν, ἐπεῖδη ὁὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη.

Balboas

Furthermore, on the one hand, **the non-Being Participates**

non-Οσία, in order that it may be non-Being; whereas on the other hand, non-Being

μὴ οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὁν δὲ Participates of Ousia, in order that **it may be**, non-Being, if in turn,

οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὁν, εἰ αὐ it will also Perfectly not Be, the non-Being.

καὶ τελεως μὴ εσται το μη ὁν.

**Ari:** Most truly. (ἀληθέστατα.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, seeing that both non-Being is present with Real-Being,

οὐκοῦν ἐπεῖπερ τῇ τοῦ μη εἶναι μετεστι τῷ ὁντὶ and That which Is, is present with non-Real-Being, is it not also the case that The One,

και του ειναι μη τῳ ὁντι, και τῳ ἐνι since indeed It Is not, Must Necessarily Share of existence, in order that It may not Be.

ἐπεῖδη ἐστὶ οὐκ ἀναγκή μετεῖναι του εἶναι εἰς τῳ μη εἴναι.

**Ari:** It is necessary. (ἀναγκή.)

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162β—→

162β: οὐσίας
162α: οὐσίας, οὐσίας
162β: οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσία, οὐσία
163α: οὐσίας, οὐσίας
163β: οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας, οὐσίας

6th
and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence.”

“Very true.”

“Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence.”

“Yes, necessarily.”

but non-being participating of non-essence, in order that it may not be that which is not being; but participating of essence, in order that it may obtain to be non-being, if it is to be perfectly that which is not.

Most truly so.

Since, therefore, non-being is present with being, and being with non-being, is it not necessary that The One also, since it is not, should participate of being, in order that it may not be?

It is necessary.

and when not-being does not partake of the not-being of not-being but of the being of not-being-that is the perfection of not-being.

Most true.

Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

Certainly.
καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἑνὶ, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.
φαίνεται.
καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἰπέρ μὴ ἔστιν.
πῶς δ’ οὖ;  
oiōν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἐξεως;
oūχ οὐίν τε.

Balboas

**Par:** Certainly then, Ousia will also Manifestly Be with The One, if It Is not.

**Ari:** It will so appear. (φαίνεται.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, so also the non-Ousia, if indeed She Is not.

**Ari:** How could it not? (πῶς δ’ οὖ;)  

**Par:** Therefore, is it also Possible that that which is maintained/kept in some way, is not so maintained, when it is not changed from this condition (passive) by habit?  

**Ari:** It cannot. (τε οἰον οὐχ.)
Loeb

“Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence.”
“Clearly.”
“And non-existence also, if it does not exist.”
“Of course.”
“Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it?”
“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

Essence, therefore, will appear with The One, if it is not.
So it seems.
And non-essence, since it is not.
How should it not?
Can any thing, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not so affected when not changed from this habit?
It cannot.

Jowett

Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?
Clearly.
And has not-being also, if it is not?
Of course.
But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?
Impossible.
Oxford Greek

πάν ἀρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, δὲ ἂν οὔτω τε καὶ μὴ οὔτως ἔχη.
pως δ’ οὐ;
μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις; ἢ τί φήσομεν;
κίνησις.
oὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ἄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὃν ἐφάνη;
ναι.
oὔτως ἀρα καὶ οὐκ οὔτως ἔχον φαίνεται.
ἐσεκεν.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, everything which can be kept in this way, and in turn not kept in this (indefinite) way, signifies, that which can be changed in such a way.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ οὐ ;)

Par: But is Alteration a Motion; or what else should we call It?

Ari: It is a motion. (κίνησις ;)

Par: Is it not the case, that The One has been shown to be both Being and non-Being?

Ari: Yes. (ναι ;)

Par: Accordingly then, It has been shown to be kept in this way and not kept in this way.

Ari: It has so appeared. (ἐσεκεν ;)
Loeb

“Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change.”

“Of course.”

“But change is motion; we agree to that?”

“It is motion.”

“And did we not see that the one is and is not?”

“Yes.”

“Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

Every thing, therefore, signifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in some particular manner.

How should it not?

Is mutation a motion, or what else do we call it?

It is a motion.

But has not The One appeared to be both being and non-being?

Certainly.

It has appeared, therefore, to be thus and not thus affected.

It has.

Jowett

Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Certainly.

And change is motion—we may say that?

Yes, motion.

And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

Yes.

And therefore is and is not in the same state?

Yes.
Oxford Greek

καὶ κινοὔμενον ἃρα τὸ οὐκ ὡν ἐν πέφανται, ἑπεὶ περὶ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον.

κινδυνεύει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπὲρ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἂν μεθίστατο ποθέν ποι.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐκ ἃρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ’ ἂν.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, has not The One Being also been shown to be in Motion, αρα οὐκ τὸ εν ἐν ὁν καὶ πέφανταί κινοὔμενον, seeing that It also has to be altered from Being into non-Being.

επεὶ περὶ καὶ εἶχον μεταβολὴν εκ τοῦ εἶναι επὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι.

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνεύει.)

Par: But certainly, if indeed It in no way Is among The Real Beings, since It Is not, αλλὰ μὴν εἰ γέ μηδαμοῦ εὐτί τῶν ὄντων, ὡς εὑρίσκειν οὐκ, then if indeed It Is not, It will not alternate from one place to another.

επεὶ εὕρεται μὴ, ἀν οὐδ' μεθίστατο(μεθίστημι) ποθὲν ποι.

Ari: How is that the case? (πῶς γάρ;) 

Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not be moved by Alteration.

αρα αὖ γε οὐκ κινοῖτ’ τῷ μεταβαίνειν.

Ari: It will not. (γάρ οὖ.)
Loeb

“And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being.”

“There is not much doubt of that.”

“But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another.”

“Of course not.”

“Then its motion cannot be change of place.”

“No, it cannot.”

Thomas Taylor

_The One_, therefore, which is _non-being_ appears to be moved, since it possesses a mutation from _being_ into _non-being_.

It appears so.

But if it be no where among beings, as _it is not_ in consequence of _not being_, it cannot pass elsewhere.

For how can it?

It will not, therefore, be moved by transition.

It will not.

Jowett

Thus the one that is not has been shown to have motion also, because it changes from being to not-being?

That appears to be true.

But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

Impossible.

Then it cannot move by changing place?

No.
Oxford Greek

οδέ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅν στρέφεσθαι: ταὐτῷ γὰρ ὀυδαμῷ ἀπτεται. ὅν γὰρ ἔστι τὸ ταὐτόν: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

οὐκ ᾣρα τὸ ἐν γε μὴ ὃν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύνατο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἂν ὁ μὴ ἔστιν.

οὖ γὰρ οὖν.

οἰδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται ποῦ τὸ ἐν ἐαυτῷ, ὦτε τὸ ὃν ὦτε τὸ μὴ ὃν: οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἐτι περὶ του ἔνος, εἶπερ ἠλλοιουτο αὐτῷ ἐαυτοῖ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀλλοῦ τινός.

ὁρθῶς.

Balboas

Par: Certainly then, neither will It Turn-about in The Self;

for It will not Grasp The Self/Same in any way. For The Being Is The Self/Same.

Therefore it Is Impossible for non-Being to Reside in any of The Real Beings.

Ari: For it is impossible.

γαρ ἀδύνατον.

Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, cannot Turn-about in That in which It Is not.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ οὖν οὐ.)

Par: Certainly then, The One, whether The One that Is, or The One that Is not, cannot in any way be altered into something other than It-Self. For then The Logos would

no longer be about The One, but about something else, if indeed It was altered from It-Self. οὐ ετι ην περι του ενος, αλλα περι τινος αλλου. ειπερ αυτο ηλλοιουτο εαυτου.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθῶς.)
Loeb

“Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing.”

“No, it is impossible.”

“Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not.”

“No.”

“And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else.”

“Quite right.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither will it revolve in same: for it will never touch same, since same is being. But it is impossible that non-being can reside in any being.

Impossible.

The One, therefore, which is not, cannot revolve in that in which it is not.

It cannot.

Neither will The One be altered from itself, either into being or non-being: for our discourse would no longer be concerning The One, if it was altered from itself, but concerning something different from this one.

Right.

Jowett

Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same, for the same is, and that which is not cannot be reckoned among things that are?

It cannot.

Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

No.

Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered and became different from itself, then we could not be still speaking of the one, but of something else?

True.
Oxford Greek

eἰ δὲ μὴ ἄλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταὐτῷ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἃρ' ἄν πη ἐτι κινοῖτο;
πῶς γὰρ;
tὸ γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἁγεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι.
ἀνάγκη.
tὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, οὐκ ὡς ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινέται.
ἔοικεν.

Balboas

Par: But if It does not alter, nor turn-about in The Self/Same, nor undergoes transition, is there any way in which It can still be moved?

Ari: How could there be? (πως γὰρ ;)

Par: Most certainly then, That which is Immovable must necessarily be kept at Rest; but That which is at Rest/Peace/ Quiet must Abide/Stand-still.

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀνάγκη .)

Par: Accordingly then The One that Is not, as it was shown, both stands-still and is moved.

Ari: as it is Reasonable. (ἔοικεν .)
Loeb

“But if it neither changes into something else, nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?”

“No how can it?”

“But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest.”

“Yes, it must.”

“Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *Same*, nor suffers transition, is there any way in which it can be moved?

How should there?

But that which is immovable must necessarily be at rest; and that which is at rest must abide or stand still.

It is necessary.

*The One which is not*, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved.

It appears so.

Jowett

But if the one neither suffers alteration, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?

Impossible.

Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand still?

Certainly.

Then the one that is not, stands still, and is also in motion?

That seems to be true.
Oxford Greek

καὶ μὴν εἶπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἄλλοιοδραμής: ὅπη γὰρ ἢν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ’ ὦσαυτῶς ἔχει ὡς εἰχεν, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρως.

οὖτως.

κινούμενον δῆ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἄλλοιοται.

ναὶ.

καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἄν ἄλλοιοῖται.

οὐ γὰρ.

Ἰὴ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ἢν ἐν, ἄλλοιοται: ἦ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἄλλοιοται.

οὐ γὰρ.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ἢν ἄλλοιοται τε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοιοται.

φαίνεται.

Balboas

Par: And most certainly, if indeed It were moved, there is a Great Necessity that The Self must be altered. For in so far as anything may be moved, it is no longer kept in the same way allloiothēsai, γαρ ὅτι τι ἂν κινηθῇ, οὐκέθ’ εѣχει ὦσαυτῶς τοσοῦτον such as it was before, but in another way. κατὰ ως εἰχὲν, ἀλλ’ ἐτέρως.

Ari: In this way. (οὐτως.)

Par: Surely then, since The One moves, It is also altered.

δη τὸ ἐν κινούμενον καὶ ἄλλοιοται.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And most certainly, by Being in no way moved, It will be in no way altered.

καὶ ἢν μὴν μηδαμὴ κινοῦμενον ἢν οὐδαμὴ ἄλλοιοιτο.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, in so far as The One that Is not moves, It is altered, but on the other hand, in so far as It Is not moved, It is not altered. ἄλλοιοται, δὲ η ἢ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἄλλοιοται.

Ari: It is not. (γαρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, is both altered and not altered. ἢν τὸ ἐν ὰν μὴ τέ ἄλλοιοται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοιοται.

Ari: Apparently. (φαίνεται.)
Loeb

“And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one.”

“True.”

“Then in moving, the one changes in nature.”

“Yes.”

“And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way.”

“No.”

“Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change.”

“True.”

“Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.”

“So it appears.”

Thomas Taylor

But if it be moved, there is a great necessity that it should be altered; for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the same manner as before, but differently.

There is so.

The One, therefore, since it is moved, is also altered.

Certainly.

But as again it is in no respect moved, it will be in no respect altered.

It will not.

So far, therefore, as The One which is not is moved, it is altered; but so far as it is not moved it is not altered.

Certainly not.

The One, therefore, which is not, is both altered and not altered.

It appears so.

Jowett

But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another?

Yes.

Then the one, being moved, is altered?

Yes.

And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?

No.

Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?

Right.

Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?

That is clear.
Oxford Greek

tὸ δ’ ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρ’ οὖκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἔτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἑξέως: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μίτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρα μὴ ὅν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὐτ’ ἀπόλλυται.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Thus on the one hand, is it not Necessary that That which is altered must become other than before, and on the other hand, that It Must undergo a dissolution from Its former habit/condition; but That which Is not altered, can neither come-to-be generated nor dissolved?

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκή.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, The One which Is not, by being altered, will be generated and dissolved; but on the other hand, by not undergoing alteration, It will not be subject to either generation nor dissolution. And thus, The One that Is not, will not be generated and dissolved, and will not be generated nor dissolved. And thus, the will be generated and dissolved, and will not be generated nor dissolved. It will not be generated and dissolved, and will not be generated nor dissolved.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ οὖν οὐ.)
Loeb

“And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?”

“That is inevitable.”

“Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.”

“Quite true.”

Thomas Taylor

But is it not necessary that when any thing is altered it should become different from what it was before, and should suffer a dissolution of its former habit; but that a nature which is not altered should neither be generated nor dissolved?

It is necessary.

The One, therefore, which is not, through being altered, will be generated and dissolved; but at the same time, from its not suffering alteration, will not be subject to either generation or corruption. And thus The One which is not will be generated and dissolved, and will neither be generated nor dissolved.

It will not.

Jowett

And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor be destroyed?

Very true.

And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?

True.
Oxford Greek
7th

ἀδικη δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵωμεν πάλιν ὁφόμενοι εἰ ταὐτά ἑμῖν φανεῖται ἀπερ καὶ νῦν ἢ ἑτερα. ἀλλὰ χρή.

Balboas
7th

Parmenides: 25 Surely then, let us again return to The Beginning, to See if these conclusions will come to Light for us just as they do now, or otherwise.

Ari: Then we must do so. (ἀλλὰ χρή.)
“Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.”
“Yes, we should do that.”

But let us again return to the beginning, and see whether these things will appear to us in our subsequent discussion as they do now, or otherwise.
It is necessary, indeed, so to do.

And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether these or some other consequences will follow.
Let us do as you say.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τι χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν;

ναὶ.

τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἄρα μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἡ οὐσίας ἀποισίαν τούτῳ ὧν ἂν φωμέν μὴ εἶναι;

οὔδὲν ἄλλο.

ποτέρον οὖν, ὅταν φωμέν μὴ εἶναι τι, πώς οὐκ εἶναι φαμέν αὐτό, πώς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει δι’ οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὔδὲ πη μετέχει οὐσίας τὸ γε μὴ ὃν; ἀπλοώστατα μὲν οὖν.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that we have already said, 163C οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, what must result in relation to The Self, if One Is not? τι χρὴ συμβαίνειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ ἐν εἰστι μή;

Ari: Yes. (ναι)

Par: But when we say That which Is not, do we not then signify anything else, δε οταν λεγόμεν το εστιν μη, αν μη αρα σημαινει τι ἄλλο than the absence of Ousia from That which we say, Is not? (The Principle of The 7th)

η αποισιν αουσιν τουτω το εστιν μη ειναι μη;

Ari: Nothing else. (οὐδὲν ἄλλο .)

Par: Therefore, when we say that anything is not, do we say that The Self is not in some way, but that in some way It is? Or does the term 'is not', simply signify this; πος, δε πος ειναι; η το λεγομενον εστι μη απλως σημαινει τουτο that It is in no way, anywhere, since It does not Participate in a certain definite way στι εστιν ουδαμως ουδαμα, ουδε μετεχει πη of Ousia since indeed It is, the non Being?

ουσιας γε το μη ον ;

Ari: It signifies this, most simply. (μεν ουν απλοωστατα .)
Loeb

“We ask, then, if the one is not, what will be the consequences in regard to it?”

“Yes.”

“Does the expression 'is not' denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?”

“No, nothing else.”

“And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression 'is not' mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?”

“Without any qualifications whatsoever.”

Thomas Taylor

Have we not already related, if The One is not, what ought to happen concerning it?

Certainly.

But when we say it is not, do we signify any thing else than the absence of essence from that which we say is not?

Nothing else.

Whether, therefore, when we say that any thing is not, do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is? Or does the term is not simply signify that it is in no respect any where, and that it does not any how participate of essence, since it is not?

It signifies, indeed, most simply.

Jowett

If one is not, we ask what will happen in respect of one? That is the question.

Yes.

Do not the words "is not" signify absence of being in that to which we apply them?

Just so.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? or do we mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind participation of being?

Quite absolutely.
οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύνατο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν.

οὐ γάρ.

tὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλῳ ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ’ ἀπολλάνων οὐσίαν;

οὔδὲν ἄλλο.

ὁμίλος γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ’ ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ’ ἀπολλεῖν αὐτῷ.

πῶς γάρ;

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, neither will the non Being, Be Able to Be, nor ever Participate in any other way of Ousia.

Ari: For it cannot.

Par: But that which becomes and that which dissolves, are not anything else than the one to have a Share of Ousia, but the other to lose Ousia?

Ari: Nothing else.

Par: Then that which has indeed no Share of This, can neither receive nor lose The Self.

Ari: How could it?
Loeb

“Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.”
“No.”
“But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence.”
“No, nothing else.”
“But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it.”
“Of course not.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither therefore can that which is not be, nor in any other respect participate of essence.
It cannot.
But is to be generated and corrupted any thing else than for this to receive essence and for that to lose essence?
It is nothing else.
That therefore with which nothing of essence is present, can neither receive nor lose it.
How can it?

Jowett

Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?
It cannot.
And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?
Nothing else.
And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?
Impossible.
Accordingly then, seeing that the One in no way is, it can neither possess, nor lose, nor Partake of Ousia, in any way whatsoever.

That is reasonable.

Accordingly then, the One which is not, can neither be dissolved nor generated, if indeed it in no way Participates of Ousia.

It does not appear that it will.
Loeb

“Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all.”

“That is reasonable.”

“Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence.”

“No; that is clear.”

Thomas Taylor

*The One*, therefore, since it is no respect *is*, can neither possess, nor lose, nor receive essence, in any manner whatever.

It is proper it should be so.

*The One which is not*, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, since it in no respect participates of essence.

It does not appear that it will.

Jowett

The one then, since it in no way *is*, cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?

True.

Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither nor becomes?

No.
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι;

όνωσα, πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Loeb

“Then it is not changed in nature at all; for such change involves coming into being and perishing.”

“True.”

“And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?”

“Certainly not.”

“And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.”

“Yes, of course, the same place.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither, therefore, will it be in any respect altered; for if it suffered this passion it would be generated and corrupted.

True.

But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary that it should not be moved?

It is necessary.

But that which is no respect is, we have likewise asserted, cannot stand still; for that which stands ought always to be in a certain same?

How should it not?

Jowett

Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?

True.

But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?

Certainly not.

Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere; for that which stands must always be in one and the same spot?

Of course.
Oxford Greek

οὕτω δὴ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὅν μήτε ποτὲ ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.

μὴ γάρ οὖν.

ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲν ἐστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων: ἣδη γὰρ ἄν τοῦτον μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι. δῆλον.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, we must say in turn, that in this way, the non Being,

Can Never, stand-still nor be moved.

μὴ ποτὲ ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι.

Ari: For it cannot do so. (γαρ μη ουν.)

Par: But clearly, nothing of The Real Beings Is indeed Present with The Self;

αὐτόν ὃν μὴν οὐδὲν ἐστι γε

for this, by Participating of Being, would Already Participate of Ousia.

Ari: Clearly. (δῆλον.)
Loeb

“Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion.”
“No, neither.”
“Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.”
“That is plain.”

Thomas Taylor

And thus we must assert that non-being neither at any time stands nor is moved.
For indeed it does not.
But likewise nothing of beings if present with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of essence.
It is evident.

Jowett

Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and never moves?
Neither.
Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for if there had been, it would partake of being?
That is clear.
οὔτε ἀρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἴσότης αὐτῷ ἐστίν.
οὐ γὰρ.
oū deix miν ὀμοιότης γε οὔτε ἐτεροιότης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτό οὔτε πρὸς τάλλα εἰ̣η ἄν αὐτῷ.
oū phainetai.
ti δὲ τάλλα ἐσθ’ ὅπως ἀν εἰ̣η αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δει έίναι;
oūk estin.
oūte ἀρα άρμοια οὔτε ἄνόμοια οὔτε ταυτά δει έτερά ἐστιν αὐτῷ τά ἄλλα.
oū γὰρ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then, neither Bigness nor Smallness, nor Equality, Belongs to The Self.
Ari: It does not. (γαρ οὖν .)
Par: Most certainly then, neither Likeness nor Unlikeness,
neither in relation to The Self nor in relation to the others, will Be with The Self.
oūte πρὸς αὐτό οὔτε πρὸς τάλλα ἀν εἰ̣η αὐτῷ.
Ari: It does not appear that it will. (ου φαίνεται .)
Par: What follows then? Can The Other Beings Be in any way Present with The Self,
ti δὲ ; ἀν τάλλα εἰ̣η ὅπως εἰ̣η ἄντω ,
Ari: They cannot. (εστιν οὐκ .)
Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike,
ορα τα ἄλλα οὔτε ομοία οὔτε ανομοία οὔτε ταυτά
Ari: They are not. (γαρ οὖν .)
Loeb

“Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it.”
“No.”
“Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things.”
“Clearly not.”
“And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?”
“Impossible.”
“Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different.”
“No.”

Thomas Taylor

Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it.
Certainly not.
Neither will similitude or diversity, either with respect to itself or others, be present with it.
It does not appear that they will.
But what, can other things be in any respect present with it, if nothing ought to be present with it?
They cannot.
Neither, therefore, are similars nor dissimilars, nor same nor different, different from it.
They are not.

Jowett

And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be attributed to it?
No.
Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
Clearly not.
Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?
Certainly not.
And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?
They cannot.
Oxford Greek

ti de; to ekei'vou h ti ekeivn h to ti h to touto h ti toutou h allo h allw h potē h epieita h nev
h epistēmē h dōxa h aïostra h logos h onoma h allo otiouc tov ontwv peri to mi hon
estei;
ouc estai.
ohtow dh en ouk dh echei pouc ouðarh.
oekouv dh eoi肯c gen ouðarh echeiv.

Balboas

Par: What then? Can anything be of That, or with That, or with anything, or of another, or another, or at some time Past, or at some time in the Future, or Now. Or Can there be knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or discourse, or name, or anything else whatsoever of The Real Beings, where the non Being is concerned? dh outw en on ouc ouc echei pou ouðami.

Ari: There can not. (estai ouk.)

Par: Surely then, in this way, One Being Is not, not can exist in any way at all. dh ge oukouv eoi肯c echeivan ouðami.

Ari: Surely then, it is indeed not likely to be the case, that it can exist anywhere.
Loeb

“Well, then, will the notions 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some,' or 'this' or 'of this' or 'of another' or 'to another' or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?”

“No.”

“Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever.”

“It appears to have none whatsoever.”

Thomas Taylor

But what, can any thing be asserted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with some other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now - or can science, or opinion, or sense, or discourse, or a name, or any thing else belonging to beings, subsist about that which is not?

There cannot.

The One therefore which is not, will not in any respect subsist any where.

So indeed it appears.

Jowett

Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?

No.

Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?

Such appears to be the conclusion.
Now then, let us yet declare, what must happen to the others, if one is not.

For we say so.

Then, on the one hand, selves must exist in some (indefinite) way; (The Principle)

for if others do not at all exist, we could not discourse about the others.

So it is.

But if The Logos/Discourse is about the others, then the others are indeed other.

Or do you not require that both another and the other be applied to the self?

I do at least.
“Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist.”
“Let us do so.”
“Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others.”
“True.”
“But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?”
“Yes, I do.”

But let us again declare if The One is not, what other things ought to suffer.
Let us.
But in a certain respect others ought to subsist; for, unless others have a being, we cannot discourse concerning them.
True.
But if discourse is about others, others will be different: or do you not call others and different the same?
I do.

Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that.
Yes; let us determine that.
The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them.
True.
But to speak of the others implies difference-the terms “other" and "different" are synonymous?
True.
Oxford Greek

ἐτερον δὲ γε ποιφιμεν τὸ ἐτερον εἶναι ἐτέρου, και τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλους; ναι.
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἐστι τι οὐ ἄλλα ἐσται.
ἀνάγκη.
τι δὴ οὖν ἄν εἰη; τοῦ μὲν γάρ ἄνος οὐκ ἐσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.
οὐ γάρ.
ἀλλήλων ἁρα ἐστι: τοῦτο γάρ αὐτοῖς ἐπι λειπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις.
ὁρθῶς.
κατὰ πλῆθη ἁρα ἐκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστι: κατὰ ἐν γάρ οὐκ ἄν οἰα τε εἰη, μὴ ὄντος ἄνος.

Balboas

Par: But do we indeed say that the other is in some (indefinite) way other from the other, and certainly that which is other is other than another? και δὴ το αλλο ειναι αλλο αλλου; Ναι.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Accordingly then, if they are also about to be other, to the others, then there is something from which they will be other.
Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκη.)
Par: Certainly then, what will this be? For they will indeed not be other than The One, by non Being.
Ari: They will not. (γαρ οὐ.)
Par: Accordingly then, they are other from each other; for this still remains for selves:
Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθως.)
Par: Accordingly then, each is other from the others, according to multitude.

For they cannot be so according to One, and by the non Being of One.
“And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other?”
“Yes.”
“Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others.”
“Yes, there must be.”
“Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist.”
“No.”
“Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing.”
“True.”
“They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist.

But do we not say that different is different from different, and other is other than another?
Certainly.
With respect to others, therefore, if they are about to be others, there is something than which they will be others.
It is necessary.
But what will this be? For they will not be different from *The One*, since it is not.
They will not.
They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing.
Right.
According to multitudes, therefore, each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to *The One*, since *The One is not*.

Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?
Yes.
Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?
Certainly.
And what can that be?-for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one.
They will not.
Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing.
True.
And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular;
Oxford Greek

But each mass of selves, as it appears, is infinite multitude; and even if anyone should take that which appears to be the smallest piece, just as a dream in sleep, it then suddenly appears to be opposite to that which appeared to be one, and instead of that which appeared to be the smallest, it would now be many; that is, an immensely great mass, in relation to the minute fragments of self.

Ari: Most rightly. (ορθότατα.)

Par: Surely then, among such masses, the others will be other from one another, if One has no Being and others exist. (ει ενος μη οντος αλλα εστιν.)

Ari: Perfectly so. (μεν κοιμιδη ουν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that there will be many masses/heaps, each of which, will appear to be one, but which is not so, if indeed One will not be at all?

Ari: It will be so. (ουτω.)
Loeb

But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it.”

“Very true.”

“Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist.”

“Certainly.”

“There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?”

“Yes.”

Thomas Taylor

But each mass of these, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one should assume that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, on a sudden, instead of that which seemed to be one, many would rise to the view; and instead of that which is smallest, a quantity perfectly great with respect to the multitude distributed from it.

Most right.

But among these masses or heaps, others will be mutually different from one another, if they are others and The One is not.

Eminently so.

Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not so since The One is not?

There will so.

Jowett

for if one is not, they cannot be singular but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up?

Very true.

And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not?

Exactly.

And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not?

True.
Oxford Greek

καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑκαστὸν, πολλῶν ὀντων.
πάνυ γε.
καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἡ ἀρτία, τὰ δὲ περιττᾶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατον ἡ, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι: φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλά καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἑκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρὸν ὀντων.
πῶς δ᾽ οὖν;

Balboas

Par: Thus, there will also appear to be a number of selves, if indeed each of these heaps, being many, also appear to be one.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: And certainly, some which are among the selves will appear to be even and others odd, although not truly, if indeed One will not exist at all.

Ari: They will not be so. (γαρ οὖν οὖν.)

Par: And most certainly, that which is smallest, as we have said, will also appear to be in selves, but this will appear to be many and big, since they are small.

Ari: How could it not? (πῶς δ᾽ οὖν ;)

164ε αὐτῶν
164δ αὐτῶν, αὐτὸς
164ε αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς
164δα αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς
164ε αὐτῶν

165α πρὸς ἑκαστὸν τῶν πολλῶν ὡς ὀντων σμικρῶν.
Loeb

“And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many.”
“Certainly.”
“And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist.”
“True.”
“And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.”
“Of course.”

Thomas Taylor

There will likewise appear to be a number of these, if each of these which are many is one.
Entirely so.
But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, since The One will not have a being.
They will not.
But likewise that which is smallest, as we have said, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will seem to be many things and great, with respect to each of the things which are many and small.
How should it not?

Jowett

And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of them appears to be one, though it is really many?
It can.
And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?
Yes.
And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions which are contained in it?
Certainly.
Oxford Greek

καὶ ᾧσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἐκαστοὶς ὄγκος δοξασθῆσεται εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ ἀν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὸν δοξαεῖν ἔλθειν, τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν φαντασμα ἱσότητος.

εἰκός.

οόκουν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτὸς γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἄρχην οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων;

πῇ δὴ;

Balboas

Par: And certainly each mass will seem to the eye of opinion to be equal to the many
καὶ μὴν ἐκαστοὶς ὄγκος δοξασθῆσεται εἶναι ἱσός τοῖς πολλοῖς
and small masses. For it will not appear to change from a more into a lesser quantity,
καὶ σμικροῖς; γὰρ αὐτὸν φαινόμενος μετέβαινεν εκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον,
before it appears to arrive at something between; but this will be a phantasm of equality.
πρὶν δοξαεῖν ἔλθειν εἰς τὸ μεταξὸν; δὲ τοῦτο ἐὰν εἰς ἱσότητα.

Ari: It is likely. (εἰκός .)

Par: Is it not the case, that although it appears to have a limit, in relation to
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔχων πέρας πρὸς another mass, and self in relation to self, it neither has a
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔχων περας πρὸς another mass, and self in relation to self,
Beginning nor Limit nor Middle?

Ari: In what way then? (πῇ δὴ.)
Loeb

“And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality.”

“That is reasonable.”

“And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?”

“Why is that?”

Thomas Taylor

And every small heap will seem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many small heaps: for it will not appear to pass from a greater into a lesser quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between; and this will be a phantasm of equality.

It is likely to be so.

Will it not also appear to be bounded with respect to another heap, itself with respect to itself, at the same time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end?

How so?

Jowett

And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would arise the appearance of equality.

Yes.

And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.

How so?
Oxford Greek

ὅτι οἱ αὐτῶν ὅταν τί λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τι τούτων ὄν, πρὸ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀλλή ἄεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτήν ἑτέρα υπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δὲ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἕνος αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀπὸ οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς.

ἀληθετατα.

θρύπτεσθαι δὴ ὃιμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πάν τὸ ὄν, δ ὃν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὡς τι τούτων ὄν, πρὸ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτήν ἑτέρα υπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δὲ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἕνος αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀπὸ οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς.

Balboas

Par: For when anyone grasps something of These through the empirical mind, as if it were existing, then another “beginning” will also always appear to be prior to ‘the beginning’, and after the end, another “end” will always still remain; and in “the middle” there will always be, others more inward than “the middle”; but smaller, because each of the selves is not Capable of receiving The One, and inasmuch as by The One not Being.

μὴ δύνασθαι λαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ ἑνὸς, ἀτε τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐκ ὄντος.

Ari: This is most true.

Balboas

Par: Surely then, all The Being, which anyone may grasp through the empirical mind, I think, must necessarily be broken-up into minute pieces. For the masses will, in some way always be apprehended without One/Unity.

Ari: Entirely so. (παν ἐν οὐν.)
Loeb

“Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist.”

“Very true.”

“So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Because, when any one apprehends by the dianoëtic power some one of these prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and smaller, because each of them cannot receive one one, since The One is not.

This is most true.

But every thing which any one may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, must I think be broken to pieces and distributed; for the bulk will in a certain respect be apprehended without The One.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since the one is not.

Very true.

And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?

Certainly.
οὐκοὖν τὸ γε τοιοῦτον πάρρωθεν μὲν ὄρωντι καὶ ἁμβλυὲ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι πληθεί ἄπειρον ἐν ἑκαστὸν φανήναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος;

ἄναγκαιοτατον μὲν οὖν ὁὖτω δὴ ἄπειρα τε καὶ πέρας έχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά ἐκαστα τάλλα δεὶ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἐστιν, τάλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός.

δεὶ γάρ.

Oxford Greek

Balboas

Par: Is it not indeed the case then, that such a mass, on the one hand, to those who
behold it from afar and with a dull eye, it will necessarily appear to be one; whereas on the
other hand, to those who See it with an Intellectual Eye, closely and acutely, then in that case
will not each “one” be revealed to be infinite in multitude, if indeed each “one” is deprived of
The One, by not Being?

Ari: Most necessarily so. (μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτον οὖν.)

Par: Surely then, in this way each of the others must appear to be Unlimited and
Limited, and One and many, if One is not at all, but those other than The One exist.

Ari: It must be so. (γὰρ δεὶ.)
Loeb

“Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?”

“That is perfectly conclusive.”

“Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not.”

“Yes, they must.”

Thomas Taylor

But will not such a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, necessarily appear to be one: but to him who with an intellectual eye surveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, since it is deprived of The One, because it has no subsistence?

It is necessary it should be so in the highest degree.

Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, if The One is not, and other things besides The One have a subsistence.

It ought to be so.

Jowett

And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which is not?

Nothing more certain.

Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.

They must.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅροια τε καὶ ἀνόροια δοξεῖ εἶναι;
πὴ δὴ;
οἶν ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστᾶντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅροια εἶναι.
πάνυ γε.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, that they will appear to be both like and unlike?

Ari: In what way, then? (πη δη ;)

Par: On the one hand, in such a way as, to those who behold others from afar,

everything appears to be one, as in a shadow painting, by appearing to have experienced The Same and by appearing to be like.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)
Loeb

“And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?”

“Why?”

“Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.”

“Certainly.”

Thomas Taylor

Will they, therefore, appear to be similars and dissimilars?

But how?

Since to him who beholds others at a distance, involved as it were in shadow, they all appear to be one, they will seem to suffer same and to be similar.

Entirely so.

Jowett

Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?

In what way?

Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?

True.
Oxford Greek

προσέλθοντα δὲ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἐτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἐτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς.

οὖτω.

καὶ ὅμοιοὺς δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὑγκοὺς ἀντοιχὶ τε ἀντοιχὶ ἀνάγκη φανεροθαί καὶ ἀλλήλοις.

πάντα μὲν ὅν. οἴκους καὶ τοὺς ἀντοιχὶς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀπομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἑστώτας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα του τῶν τοιαύτα, ἀ διελθεῖν εὐπέτες ἥδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὑντος πολλὰ ἑστὶν.

ἀληθεστάτα μὲν ὅν.

Balboas

Par: But on the other hand, as they approach closely, they will appear to be many and other, and diverse from and unlike themselves, through the phantom appearance of the other. eτερα καὶ ἐτεροῖα καὶ ἀνομοία εαυτοῖς τῷ φαντασματί του ἑτέρου.

Ari: It is so. (oυτω .)

Par: Certainly then, the massive selves will necessarily appear to be δὴ τοὺς ὑγκους αντοιχὶς αναγκὴ φανεροθαί both like and unlike themselves, and to each other, καὶ ὅμοιοις καὶ ἀνομοίοις εαυτοῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανο μὲν οὖν .)

Par: Is it not so then, that these are both selves and others from each other, οἴκουν τοὺς καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, and have contact and are separate from themselves, and are moved with every possible motion, καὶ ἀπομένους καὶ χωρὶς εαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις and are stationary in every way, and are generated and dissolved, and are neither of these, καὶ ἑστώσας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, and all such things possible, which we can at this time easily go through in detail, that is καὶ παντα τα τοιαυτα που, α ὡμῖν ἡδη εὐπέτες διελθεῖν, of course, if One has no Being and many exist?

165Ε εἰ ενος μὴ οντος πολλὰ εστίν.

Ari: Most true then. (αληθεστατα μὲν οὖν .)
Loeb

“But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other.”

“Yes.”

“And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.”

“Certainly.”

“And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, if the many exist and the one does not.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the phantasm of diversity.

It is so.

The heaps, therefore, will necessarily appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves, and to each other.

Entirely so.

Will they not also be the same and different from each other, and in contact with, and separate from, themselves, and moved with all possible motions, and every way abiding: likewise generated and corrupted, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which may be easily enumerated, if, though The One is not, the many have a subsistence?

All this is most true.

Jowett

But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different; and because of the appearance of the difference, different in kind from, and unlike, themselves?

True.

And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.

Certainly.

And must they not be the same and yet different from one another, and in contact with themselves, although they are separated, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated, if the one is not and the many are?

Most true.
Oxford Greek
9th

ἐτι δὴ ἀπαξ ἑλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπομεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τάλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι.

εἴπομεν γάρ οὖν.

οὐσκόν ἐν μὲν οὖκ ἔσται τάλλα.

πώς γάρ:

οὔδε μὴν πολλά γε: ἐν γάρ πολλοίς οὐδὲν ἐνείη δὲ καὶ ἐν. εἰ γάρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐν, ἀπαντα ὡστε οὐδ’ ἀν πολλά εἴη.

Ἀλήθη.

μὴ ἑνότος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλαὶ οὔτε ἐν ἓστι τάλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

Balboas
9th

Parmenides: 27 Surely then, let us return again to The Beginning one more time, and relate what must then be, to those other than The One, if One Is not.

Aristotle: Let us so relate. (γαρ εἴπομεν οὖν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, the others will not be one.

Ari: How could they? (πως γὰρ ;)

Par: Nor indeed will they be many; for one would also be present in many.

Ari: True. (ἀλήθη.)

Par: Then, by One not being present in the others, neither are others many nor one.

Ari: They are not. (γαρ οὐ .)
“Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not.”
“Let us do so.”
“Well, the others will not be one?”
“Of course not.”
“Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many.”
“True.”
“If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.”
“No.”

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from The One, if The One is not. Let us relate.
Does it not, therefore, follow that others are not The One?
How should it not be so?
Nor yet are they many; for, in the many, The One also would be inherent. For, if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that neither can there be many.
True.
The One, therefore, not being inherent in others, others are neither many nor one.
They are not.
οὐδὲ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά.

τί δή;

ὅτι τὰλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει,
οὐδὲ τί τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἑστιν: οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἑστὶ τοῖς μὴ ὄνσιν.

αληθῆ.

οὐδὲν τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἑστιν: οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἑστὶ τοῖς μὴ ὄνσιν.

οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Balboas

Par: Nor will they indeed appear to be one nor many.

166A οὐδὲ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά.

Ari: Why then? (τι δή ;)

Par: Since the others cannot in any way ever have any Communion with The Real Beings,

οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἑστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν.

Par: So then, neither is there any opinion about that which is not present in others, nor

αρὰ οὐδὲν γε ἑστὶν δόξα τοῦ ὄντος μὴ βοηθῆσαι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὧν ἄλλως, ἄλλως.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ οὖν οὐ.)
“And they do not even appear to be one or many.”

“Why is that?”

“Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts.”

“True.”

“Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connection with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others.”

“No.”

Nor will they appear either to be one or many.

Why not?

Because others cannot in any respect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be present with others; for no part subsists with non-beings.

True.

Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in others, nor any phantasm; nor can that which is not become in any respect the subject of opinion to others.

It cannot.

Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Why not?

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not, be connected with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.

True.

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No.
Oxford Greek

ἐν ᾧρᾳ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἴναι οὐδὲ πολλά: ἀνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλά δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γὰρ.
ἐν ᾧρᾳ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τάλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά.
οὐκ ἐοικεν.

οὐδὲ ᾧρᾳ ὀμοια οὐδὲ ἀνομοια.
οὐ γὰρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ᾽ ἔτερα, οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὀσα ἐν τοῖς πρώσθεν διηλθομεν ώς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαινεται τάλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

ἀληθῆ.

Balboas

Par: Accordingly then , if One Is not , then It cannot be opined to be any one

166B  αρὰ  εἰ  εν  εστὶν  μη  ,  οὐδὲ  δοξάζεται  εἰναι  τι  εν  particular aspect of the others , nor yet of many ; for it is Impossible to form an opinion of many 

tον ἄλλων οὐδὲ πολλὰ: γαρ ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι πολλὰ 

without Unity/One .

165e  εἶνε  ενὸς .

Ari: It is impossible . ( γαρ ἀδύνατον .)

Par: Accordingly then , If One Is not , then neither will the others exist ;

αρὰ  εἰ  εν  εστὶ  μη  ,  οὔτε  τάλλα  εστὶν  

nor can one , nor many , be opined .

οὔτε  εν  οὐδὲ  πολλὰ  δοξάζεται  .

Ari: It is not likely . ( οὐκ  εοικεν .)

Par: Accordingly then , neither do like nor unlike exist .

αρὰ  οὐδ᾽ ὀμοία αὐτὲ ἀνομοία .

Ari: They do not . ( γαρ  οὐ .)

Par: Most certainly then , nor the same nor the other , nor those who grasp , nor those 

γε  μὴν  οὔτε  τα  αὐτα  οὐδ᾽ ἔτερα  ,  οὐδὲ  ἀπτόμενα  αὐτὲ  χωρὶς  ,  οὐδὲ  ἄλλα  οσα  τοις  αὐτα  προοθεν  ἐν  διηλθομεν  ώς  appearance of existing ; for no particular of these will exist , nor will the others appear to be 

φαινομενα  ,  οὔτε  τι  τοιων  εστὶν  οὔτε  τάλλα  φαινεται  

if One Is not .

εἰ  εν  εστὶ  μη  .

Ari: True . ( ἀληθῆ .)
Loeb

“Then if one does not exist, none of the others will be conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is impossible to conceive of many without one.”

“True, it is impossible.”

“Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”

“No so it seems.”

“Nor like nor unlike.”

“No.”

“Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not exist.”

“True.”

Thomas Taylor

The One, therefore, if it is not, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of others, nor yet many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without The One.

It is impossible.

If The One, therefore, is not, neither have others any subsistence; nor can The One or the many be conceived by opinion.

It does not appear that they can.

Neither, therefore, do similars nor dissimilars subsist.

They do not.

Nor same nor different, nor things in contact, nor such as are separate from each other, nor other things, such as we have already discussed, as appearing to subsist; for no particular of these will have any existence, nor will others appear to be, if The One is not.

True.

Jowett

Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

Then if one is not, there is no conception of can be conceived to be either one or many?

It would seem not.

Nor as like or unlike?

No.

Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we enumerated as appearing to be; the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?

True.
Oxford Greek

οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὅρθως ἂν εἴποιμεν; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

eἰρήσθω τοίνυν τούτῳ τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν εἰτ’ ἔστιν εἰτ’ τε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτὸ τε καὶ τάλλα καὶ

πρὸς αὐτά καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.

ἀληθέστατα.

Balboas

Par: Is it not the case then, if we must summarily say, that

if One is not, and nothing exists; then will our assertion be Correctly stated?

Ari: Altogether so.

Par: Now then, let this then be affirmed by you and me; and we may add this also:

That if One is, or is not, then as it is likely/reasonable, both in relation to The Self

and in relation to the others, and also in relation to them-selves and to each other,

that All exist in every way, and also, All do not exist in every way,

and appear to be, and also, do not appear to be.

Ari: Most true. (ἀληθέστατα.)

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Completed with The Boetheia of All Our Friends
at The Noetic Society and The Parmenides Group; such as Nancy Grimes, Nobuya Teraoka, Julie Postel, Jeff Stern, Eldar Ix, Bradley Baumkirshner, Yoni Gileadi, Julie Hoigaard, Brian Miller, Jeff Lowe, Josh Bean, Oralia Balboa, Robin Russell, Ingmar Northcutt, Kevin Gray, Alex Dei, Jeff Terrill, and Our Beloved Friend and Leader
and Spiritual-Guide, Pierre Grimes
Loeb

“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the one is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”

“Most assuredly.”

“Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear.”

“Very true.”

Thomas Taylor

If we should, therefore, summarily say, that if The One is not, nothing is, will not our assertion be right?

Entirely so.

Let this then be asserted by us, and this also: that whether The One is or is not, both itself, as it appears, and others, both with respect to themselves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the same time are not all, and appear to be, and at the same time do not appear.

It is most true.

Jowett

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?

Certainly.

Let thus much be said; and further let us affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be.

Most true.
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