We Dedicate This Book
with All Gratitude
to our Dear Friend
and Beloved Teacher
Dr Pierre Grimes

On the one hand, we have had The Good Fortune to have had this book examined in The Ancient Socratic “Round-The-Hearth” Way,
not only by the senior members of The Noetic Society; such as Pierre and Nancy Grimes, Bill and Rhonda Gilbert, Barbara Stecker, Regina Uliana, Sarah Wallbank, Julie Hoigaard, Julie Grabel-Postel and David Coe who have made This Book so much Better by Their Insight and Their Loving Dedication to The Logos, but also on the other hand, with The Boetheia of All Our Friends at The Noetic Society and The Parmenides Group; Nobuya Teraoka, Jeff Stern, Eldar Iz, Bradley Baumkirshner, Yoni Gileadi, Brian Miller, Jeff Lowe, Josh Bean, Oralia Balboa, Robin Russell, Ingmar Northcutt, Kevin Gray, Alex Dei, Phil Simpkin, Jeff Terrill, Darlene Anderson, Kate Shannon, Sayon Syprasoeuth, Adina Bezerita and also with the Boetheia of those who have moved on to the other place, such as Rod Wallbank, Ken King and Paul Katz.

Juan & Maria Balboa
PLATO

PARMENIDES
ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

[Or Concerning Ideas : Dialectical]

[ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ : ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE

ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ

CEPHALOS, ADEIMANTOS, ANTIPHON, GLAUKON, PYTHODOROS
ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΥΘΟΔΩΡΟΣ
SOCRATES, ZENO, PARMENIDES, ARISTOTLE
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΖΕΝΟ, ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ, ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

Translated by Juan and Maria Balboa, following The Lead of Dr Pierre Grimes
§126A

Cephalos: 1 Immediately after we arrived at Athens from Clazomenae, the place of our abode,

we happened to meet with Adeimantos and Glacon at the place of assembly (the agora);

and Adeimantos, taking me by the hand said ...

Adeimantos: Welcome, O Cephalos, and if there is anything you need, of those things that

we have here, of which we are able to provide, please ask.

Cephalos: Then on the one hand, I am certainly here indeed, for this very purpose,

as being in need of your help.

Adeimantos: Please tell us, your need.

Cephalos: What was your maternal brother’s name? For I do not remember.

For at that time he was just a child when I came here before to the assembly from Clazomenae;

but since that time, a great length of time has already taken place.

But, his father’s name was, Pyrilampes, I believe.

Adeimantos: Quite so. (Παντο γε.)

Cephalos: To be sure, but what was his name?

Adeimantos: Antiphon. But what is it that you need most to enquire after?

Cephalos: You are aware, that these fellow-citizens of mine, are quite philosophical,

and have heard that this very Antiphon, was frequently present with one Pythodoros,

to ακηκοασι οτι ουτος ο Αντιφων πολλα εντευχηκε τινι Πυθοδωρω

§126B

§126C
Adeimantos: But this is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made Them
the subject of quite focused attention: and indeed after that, he now applies himself very
closely to equestrian affairs with his grandfather who also has the same name. Then if we must,
pros ta ipikia kata ton pappon te kai omomoum. alloi ei de, let us go to him; for he just now went home from here; for he lives very near, in Melita.

§127A
Cephalos: After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and we found him
Tauta eipontes ebdizomen ton Antifonon kai katelabomen at home, handing a bridle to a coopersmith to be prepared in a certain way; but as soon as
oikoi ekadonta kaliveno chalkei skenasa tina: de epedh the smith was gone, and his brother had told him the reason for which we had arrived, he also
keinon apellaghe te ei adelphi elogen autou eneka on paramein, te recognized me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and he greeted us kindly;
anevorphise me, ek tis protorfas epidiemias kai sepsazeto, and upon our pleading with him to relate The Discourses/Logos, at first, he hesitated
kai emon deomenein diethn toun logos, to men proston oikei(okeyo)–for he said it was a great deal of work–but afterwards, he most certainly set it out in detail.
--gar efhi einoi polu ergon--epitia menti dihgeto. Therefore, Antiphon said indeed, that Pythodoros spoke to say...
\[\text{de o Antiphon efhi de oti ton Pythodoron legein...}\]

§127B
Antiphon: At that time, Zeno and Parmenides arrived to celebrate The Great Panathenaea.
pote Zínon te kai Parmenídoi afikoyn eis ta megala Panaetína. Thus, on the one hand, Parmenides was already quite well advanced in years, very gray-haired,
oum men Parmenídoi einai hdi mala ev presbytyn, afódras ton polion, but of a beautiful and good appearance, most nearly about sixty-five years of age; but that on the
de kalon kagathon tìn ouin, malista perì exêgonata kai pente epí: de other hand, at that time, Zeno was nearly forty years old, but very tall and graceful to see;
tote Zínona einai efous tetaraksanta eoton, de emhi kai charimena idein: and he was said to have come to be the dear friend of Parmenides. Then Pythodoros said that they
kai auton legevath na gegevnai paidika tòu Parmenídou: de Pythodoron efhi autouz

§127C
lodged with him, in the Ceramicus, outside the walls; where indeed Socrates also arrived,
kataleivn para ta, ev Kerameikó ekto teichous: oì de tòu Sókratì kai afikehathai and many certain others with him, who had set their heart upon hearing the written discourses
tè kai pollous tìnax allous met’ autou, epithumountas akousai tòv grammaton of Zeno; for at that time, they first began to pay attention to his writings; since Socrates was
tòu Zínonos: gar tote auta proston komiethnai up’ ekeinov: de Sókratì einai very young at that time. Therefore, Zeno himself read to themselves, while Parmenides
sofora neon tote. oum tòu Zínona auton anagignoskein autouz, de tòu Parmenídoun happened to be outside; so that only a small part of the discourses still remained to be read,
tuxiav onta eixò: kai einai paino brachat tov logon eiti loipon anagignosekomenon,
§127D
when Pythodoros himself, together with Parmenides came in from outside, and also
ηνικα ὁ Πυθαδώρος υἱος τον Παρμενίδην επεισέλθειν εξώθεν και
Aristotle who he himself said became one of the thirty tyrants. So that they still had to hear
Ἀριστοτέλες υἱος εφίς γενομένον τον τον τριακόντα, καὶ ετει απακούσαι
some small part of the writings; not however Pythodoros himself, since he had indeed heard
αττα σιμμεν τον γραμματων: ου μην υἱος τον γε ακηκοεσθαι
the discourses of Zeno before.

τον Ὁπερνων υἱοστρων.

2 Therefore, Socrates having listened, he then urged him to read again the first hypothesis
ον τον Ὁπερνων ἀκουσαντα τε κελευσαι αναγνωσαι παλιν την πρωτην υποθεσιν
of the first Logos, and having been read; Socrates said . .

τον πρωτου λογον, και αναγνωσθεισης: φαναι

§127E

Socrates: In what way do you mean this, O Zeno? If The Beings are Many, is it then
Πος λεγεις τωτο, ω Ζηνων; ει τα ουνα εστι πολλα, αρα
necessary that They be both Like and Unlike? But this is certainly impossible.
δει ως αυτα ειναι τα ομοια και ανομοια, δε τουτο δι αδυνατον:
For it is not possible for The Unlikable to be Like nor for The Like to be Unlike?
γαρ ουτε ειναι οιον τα ανομοια ομοια ουτε τα ομοια ανομοια;
You do not mean it in this way, do you?

ουχ λεγεις ουτο ; (For Socrates thinks that The Ideas are Separate
Ζηνω: Ας, , in this way.
from Each Other and are not “Woven-together”)

§128A

Do you mean it in this way, or do I not understand you correctly?

λεγεις ουτω, η εγω σοι καταμανθανω ορθως;

Ζηνω: No other way. You have understood quite well the intent of the whole work.

Ουκ αλλα, συνηκας καλως ο βουλεται το ολον γραμμα.

Socrates: I understand, O Parmenides, that Zeno does not only wish to be situated
Μανθανω, ω Παρμενιδες, οτι Ζηνων ου μονον βουλεται οκειοεσθαι
in the other close bonds of friendship with thee, but also to agree with thee in the following
τη ουκ αλλη φιλια σου, αλλα και οδε
For he has written in the very same direction as thou, although, by changing
to συγγράμματα, γιργιράφει στερ ταυτον τρόπον συ, δε μεταβαλλων
certain particulars, he endeavors to deceive us that he asserts something other. For on the one
tina πειραται εξαπατων ημας ως λεγον τι ετερον, γιαρ μεν

§128B
hand, thou asserts in thine poems that The All Is One, and you produce sound proofs
συ φης εν τοις ποιησαν το παν ειναι εν, και παρεχει τεκμηρια
in a beautiful and good way in support of these hypotheses: but on the other hand, he says
καλως τε και εν τοις συντων: δε φησιν
in turn, the following: that many is not, and then he produced very-many and very-mighty
αυ τοις πολλα ειναι ου, και δε αυτος παρεχεται παμπολλα και παμμεγεθη
positive proofs. Therefore, on the one hand, you affirm that The All Is One, but on the other
tεκμηρια, ουν μεν φαναι το τον εν δε
hand, he denies that The All is many; and in this way, almost saying the same thing, each one
μη τον πολλα, και αυτος σχεδον λεγοντας ταυτα τι, εκεστο
speaks, so as to appear not to have said the same things. Thus the latter discourses are revealed
λεγειν ωταν δοκειν μηδεν ειρηκειν τον αυτων, τους αλλους
in a way that is above and beyond our way of speaking/understanding.
υμιν ειρησθαι υπερ ημας τα ειρημενα.

Zeno: Yes, O Socrates. So it is, but thou has not perfectly perceived The Truth of my words;
Nai, ο Σωκρατες. ουν δ' συ ου πανταχω ησησαι την αληθειαν τον γραμματος.

§128C
although, just as Spartan hounds, thou has indeed well pursued and tracked their intent.
καιτοι ωσπερ αι Λακαιαι νακυλακες γε εν μεταθεις τε και ειρετεις τα λεχεντα.
But in the first place, this, remains unnoticed by thee, that the written words are not
αλλα πρωτον μεν τουτο λανθανει σε, στι το γραμμα ου
in every way so venerable, so that it was written, as you say then, with the intention
πανταπασιν ουτα σεμνονει, ωστε γραφηναι απερ συ λεγεισ δε διανοθες
of concealing from men, as if I was doing something of great importance; but on the one hand,
επικρυπτομενον τους ανθρωπους, ως διαπρατομενον τι μεγα: αλλα μεν
thou has spoken something of those things which happen to be the case, but on the other hand,
συ ειτες τι τον συμβεβηκουν, δε
The Truth of the matter is indeed that these writings were composed for the purpose of providing
το αληθες εστι γε ταυτα τα γραμματα
a certain assistance to The Logos of Parmenides, against those who try their hand at comically-
tις βοηθεια το λογο Παρμενιδου προς τους επιχειρουντας κωμ–

§128D
representing Self; by asserting that if One Is, many ridiculous and opposite results
ωδειν αυτον ως ει εν εστι, πολλα και γελοια και εναντια συμβαινει
happen to The Self Logos.
πασχειν το αυτον λογο.

Truly then, this writing, contradicts the advocates of the many, and
dη συν τουτο το γραμμα αντιλεγει τους λεγοντας προς τα πολλα, και
opposes this and many other such opinions; by being willing to make clear that the hypothesis
ανταποδιδοις τουτο και πλειο ταυτα, βουλομενον δηλουν ως η υποθεσις
that asserts that many is, will undergo/experience even more absurd consequences, than that
ει πολλα εστιν, αν πασχοι ετι γελοιοτερα ἥη ἥη
which asserts that The One Is; if anyone of them is sufficiently gone through in detail.
του εν ειναι, ει τις αυτων ἰκανος επεξειοι (επεξειμι).

§128E
Therefore, it has escaped thine notice, O Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed
ουν λανθανει σε, ὁ Σωκρατες, στις ταυτη, γεγραφθαι
by me when I was a youth, through such a thing indeed as the love of contention, and the writing
εμου υπο οντος νεου, δια τοιαυτην δη φιλονεικιαι, και γραφεν
itself was stolen by someone, so that I was not able to consult whether Self should be brought out
αυτο εκλεινε (κλεπτω) τις, διε ουδε βουλευσασθαι ειτ' αυτο εξοιστεον
or Led into The Light or not. It has escaped your notice, I say, that it was not composed by
εξεγεντο εις το φως ειτε μη.
οιει οτι ουχ ὑπο the Love of Honor, which belongs to a more advanced period of life, whereas by a juvenile
φιλοτιμιας πρεσβυτερου, αλλη υπο νεου
love of contention; although, just as I have said indeed, thou does not conjecture amiss.
φιλονεικιαι; επεις, οπερ ειπον γ', ου απεικασας κακως.

Socrates: 3 I admit it then, and I am Led to believe that the case is just as thou has stated it.
§0-04 αποδεχομαι Αλλη, και ηγομαι ως εχειν λεγεις.
But explain to me about the following particulars: Does thou not consider that there is a certain
de επε μοι τοδε: ου νομιζεις ειναι τι

§129A
Idea/Species of Likeness, Self According to Self, and another one such as this but opposite,
eιδος ομοιωτητος αυτο καθη αυτο, και τα αλλη τι τουτω ενοικιον,
that is in turn, an Unlike Idea/Species. But that thou and myself, and all the other beings
εστιν αυ ανομιοιον ο: δε σε και εμε και ταλλα
which we surely call many, have a Share of These Two Beings? And that on the one hand,
α διη καλουμεν πολλα μεταλαμβανεθαι τουτων δυοιν οντων; και μεν
those that Share of Likeness be like, and according to the degree that such beings may
τα μεταλαμβανοντα της ομοιωτητος γινεσθαι ομοια; και κατα οσον τοσοτων αν
Share in This; but those that Share of Unlikeness become unlike; but that those that Share
μεταλαμβανη ταυτη, δε τα της ανομιωτητος ανομια, δε τα
of Both become both? Therefore, if All also Share of both opposite Beings,
αμφοτέρων αμφοτερα; δε ει παντα και μεταλαμβανει αμφοτερων εναντιων οντων,

§129B
and are both like and unlike their Selves by Participating in both; then, what is wonderful?
και εστι ομοια τε και ανομια αυτως αυτα τω μετεχειν αμφιοιν, τι θαυμαστον;
For if, on the one hand, anyone brings to Light that The Like Selves become Unlike,
γαρ ει μεν τις απεσκειν τα ομοια αυτα γινομενα ανομια
or The Unlike Selves become Like, then I think, that it would be monstrously absurd; but if
η τα ανομια ομοια, οιμαι, αν την, τερας: ει
on the other hand, someone were to bring to Light that those that Participate of Both
δε απεσκειν τα μετεχοντα αμφιοιν
of These Ideas, undergo both of these conditions, then as far as I’m concerned, O Zeno,
tou ton peponotha aamphotera, emoiye, o Zηνων,
it does not appear to be out of the ordinary; nor indeed, if anyone would show that All
ouδέν δοκεῖ εἰναι αὐτόν, οὐδὲ γε εἰ τις αποφαίνει αὐτάν
are one, by Their Participation of The One, and that these Same SELVES
ți ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ τοῦ ενός καὶ ταύτα ταύτα πολλὰ αὐ
by their Partaking of Multitude/Plurality. But if someone were to show, that This Self
which 
would agree to that which is affirmed by all. But if on the one hand, anyone would first
show that
we would say that
so that in this way he would bring to
the right side of me are other, from those parts on the left, and that the front parts are other,
and on the right side of me are other, from those parts on the left, and that the front parts are other,
epi δέξια μου εστὶν ετερα, δὲ τὰ ετερα ἐπ’ αριστερα, καὶ μεν τὰ προσήθην ετερα,
from the back parts, and in like manner, the upper from the lower; for I think that I Partake
dε τὰ οπίσων ετερα, καὶ ωςαύτως ανώ καὶ κατω: γαρ οἰμαί μετεχώ

§129C
And similarly in All the other cases; if on the one hand, someone could bring to Light an
καὶ ωςαύτως περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀλλῶν: εἰ μὲν
argument worthy of admiration; by showing that both the Generic and Ideal SELVES
ἀξίων θαυμάζειν, τε τα γενῆ καὶ εἰδή αὐτὰ πασχοντα
undergo
these opposite experiences Them SELVES. But if on the other hand, someone demonstrates that
ταύτα ταυντία παθήναι αὐτοῖς: εἰ δὲ τις αποδείξει
I am both one and many, what would be wondrous about this? And demonstrate this assertion,
ἐμεν εντα καὶ πολλὰ, τι
by saying, on the one hand, that when he wishes to bring to Light that I am many, that the parts
λέγων, μὲν οταν βουλεῖται αποφαίνειν πολλὰ, ως μεν τὰ
don the right side of me are other, from those parts on the left, and that the front parts are other,
epι δέξια μου εστὶν ετερα, δὲ τὰ ετερα ἐπ’ αριστερα, καὶ μεν τὰ προσήθην ετερα,
from the back parts, and in like manner, the upper from the lower; for I think that I Partake
dε τὰ οπίσων ετερα, καὶ ωςαύτως ανώ καὶ κατω: γαρ οἰμαί μετεχώ

§129D
of Plurality/Multitude. But on the other hand, when he brings to Light that I am one,
πληθοῦς: δὲ οταν εν
he should say that since there are Seven of us, I am one man and Participate of The One,
ἐρει ως οντὸν ἐπτα ημων εγω εἰμι εἰς ανθρώπος καὶ μετεχῶν τοῦ ενός
so that in this way he would bring to Light The Truth of both these assertions. Thus if anyone,
οστε αποφαίνειν αιλθή αμφότερα: οὐν εαυ τις
should try to bring to Light that stones and wood and such particulars, are both many and one,
επιγειρῆ αποφαίνειν λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τα τοιαῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ εν,
we would say that self exhibits to our view such things as are many and one, but that he does not
αν φησιμεν αυτον αποδείκνυαι ταυτα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ καὶ εν,
show that The One is Many, nor The Many, One; nor speak of anything wonderful, but we
το εν πολλὰ ουδὲ τα πολλὰ εν, ουδὲ λέγειν τι θαυμάστον, ἀλλ’
would agree to that which is affirmed by all. But if on the one hand, anyone would first
ομολογομεν απερ παντες: δὲ εαυ μεν τις πρωτον

§129E
divide/separate The Ideas apart/separate, Those of which I have just now been speaking, SELVES
dιαίρεται τα εἰδή χωρίς, ο εγω δὴ νυν ελεγω, αὐτὰ
according to SELVES, such as Likeness and Unlikeness and Multitude/Plurality and The One,
καθ’ αὐτὰ, οἰνον ομοίοτητα τε καὶ ανομοίοτητα καὶ πληθὸς καὶ το εν
Rest and Motion and all such as These, then reveal himself as being able to Blend-together and
καὶ σταῖν καὶ κινῆσιν καὶ παντα τα τοιαῦτα, ειτα αποφαίνη δυνάμενα συγκεραννυσθαι και
Separate-Apart SELVES In Them SELVES, then I will indeed be in wondrous admiration, O Zeno.
dιακρίνεται ταυτα εν εαυτοις, εγω’ αυν θαυμαστος αγαμην, ο Ζηνων.
Thus on the one hand, I am Led to think that we should strenuously labor in the investigation of those particulars; but yet on the other hand, it would be deserving of much more admiration, if anyone could solve the following puzzle, as I said, about This (Ousia) Self that is woven-tie; an εὐχοὶ ὁδέ ἀποριαν, ὡς λέγω, τὴν ταυτὴν αὐτὴν πλεκό-

§130A
-together Into The Ideal Selves, in-a-manifold-way; just as you demonstrated in detail about –μεν ἐν τοῖς εἰδεῖσι αὐτοῖς παντωθάπος, ὦστερ ἐπιδείξαι διηλθεῖτε objects we see by the faculty of sight, if you could also in the same way, demonstrate in detail τοῖς ὀρθομένοις [Republic 508A–1], καὶ οὐτοὶ ἐν about The Ideas which we grasp by The Activity of The Logos. λαμβανομένοις λογισµῶ.

Antiphon: 4 Pythodorus said, that on the one hand, when Socrates had said these particulars, he believed that, both Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at each one of them, whereas on αὐτοὺς οἰσθαι τε τον Παρμενίδην καὶ τον Ζήνωνα αν αγαθεῖσαι εἰς ἑκαστὸν the other hand, They Themelves Offered-up Their Mind entirely to what he said, δε (Sym 174D-210E-217B, Rep 432B) προσεχεῖν τὸν νοὸν πανὸ τοὺς αὐτο ὑμεῖς and frequently looked at each other, smiling, as if in admiration of Socrates. τε καὶ θαμά βλέποντας εἰς ἀλλήλους μείναν ὡς αγαμεῖον τον Σωκράτη. And that once Socrates ceased to speak, Parmenides then spoke, saying . . . καὶ ὁπερ αὐτοῦ παυσαμενοῦ εἶπεν τὸν Παρμενίδην οὐν φαναι

§130B

Parremenides: O Socrates, how worthy of admiration is Thine Impulse in The Pursuit of The Logos! And tell me, has Thine Self thus Separated certain Ideas apart from Selves, τοὺς λόγους. καὶ εἰπε μοι, συ αὐτοὺς οὕτω διηρήσαται ἀττα εἰδῆ χωρίς αὐτά as you say, on the one hand, and in turn on the other hand, in the same way, Set apart ως λεγεῖς μεν, αὐ δὲ οὕτω χωρίς those that Participate of These? And does there appear to thee, to be a Certain likeness that is τα μετεχοντα τοιτων; καὶ δοκει σοι εἶναι τι ομοιοτητος Separate from Self Likeness, and indeed a Certain One/Unity and Many/Plurality and all other χωρὶς αὐτα ομοιοτητος καὶ δη εν καὶ πολλα καὶ παντα such Particulars, which we possess, and of which, you have just now heard from Zeno? ὁσα ης ἡμεις εχομεν, δη νυν ηκους Ζηνωνος; Socrates: [S0-05] It does to me indeed. (Εμοιει.)

Parremenides: And how about the following ones; is there a Certain Idea, like That of Justice, Ἡ και τα τοιαυτα, τι εἰδος οιον δικαιου (Eternally)Self by Self; and also of Beauty and of Good and all such Ideas (by Them-Selves)? ουτο καιθ’ ουτο και αυ καλου και αγαθου και παντον τοιουτων; Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)

§130C

Parremenides: What next then? Is there also an Idea of Humans and of All The Elements such as Τι δ’; εἰδος ἀνθρωπον και των παντων οιοι
we are composed of; and a **Certain Ideal** Human **Self** and **One of Fire** and **One of Water**

ημεις εσμεν , και τι ειδος ανθρωπου αυτο η πυρος η ύδατος that is **Separate** from us? (χωρις ημων ;)

**Socrates:** I have certainly often been in dire-straight/pledged/at-a-loss, O Parmenides,

δη πολλακις γεγονα Εν απορια , οω Παρμενιδη ,

concerning whether it is necessary to speak of **Selves**, just as we did about **Those Ideas**,

περι ποτερον χρη φαναι αυτον , ωσπερ περι εκεινον or in another way.

η αλλος .

**Parmenides:** And are you also at-a-loss/puzzled, about the following particulars, O Socrates?

Whether it is necessary to affirm that there is a **Separate** Idea/Form/Species of each one of these
eιτε χρη φαναι ειναι χωρις ειδος εκαστου τουτων which may also appear to be ridiculous, such as of hair and clay and dust, or of anything else

α αν και δοξειν ειναι γελοια , οιον θρει και πηλος και ρυπος η τι αλλο which may also appear to be quite without honor and most worthless, by **Being Other** in turn,

ατιμωτατον τε και φαυλωτατον , ον αλλο αυ

§130D
than those particulars with which we are familiar, or whether it is not necessary?

τον ον ημεις μεταχειρισμεθα , ειτε και μη ;

**Socrates:** On the one hand, I do not affirm that these exist in any other way from these which

μεν ταυτα ειναι Ουδαμως αλλα απερ ταυτα we do indeed also see; whereas on the other hand, is it not the height of absurdity, insofar as
gε και ορωμεν : δε μη λιαν ατοπον η one imagines that there is a **certain** Idea of these selves? Nevertheless at times it also actually

οισθηναι ειναι τι ειδος αυτον . μεντοι ποτε και ηην troubles me; in regards to whether or not the very same thing, can be affirmed of everything.

εθραξε με περι μη ταυτον τι η παντον : But thereafter, having been fixed in this opinion, I then run-away fleeing, in fear of falling

μη επειτα οταν στω ταυτη , οιχωμαι φευγον , δεισες εμπεσον at that time, into a certain abyss of nonsense, and utterly perish. But then, I reach up from

ποτε εις τινα βαθον φλωριας διαφθαρω . δ’ ουν αφικομενος those considerations, and again I seriously apply myself to those considerations, concerning

εκεινα , πραγματευωνος διατριβω εις εκεινα περι which, we have just now asserted, whether such Ideas/Forms/Species have to exist.

α α δη νυν ελεγομεν ειδη εχειν .

§130E

**Parmenides:** That is because you are still a young man, O Socrates, and **Philosophy** has not

ει γαρ ετι Νες , ος Σωκρατες , και φιλοσοφια ουπω as of yet, received you into **Her Embraces**. For in my opinion, when you are received by Her,

ως ετι , σου αντειληπται κατ’ εμην δοξαν , οτε αντιλημεται you will not dishonor any of these selves; but now since you are still young, you give heed,

ουδεν ατιμωσεις αυτον : ανεν δια ετι τινη λικιαν αποβλεπεις to the opinions of human-beings.

ορος δογχας ανθρωπων .

~~Are The Ideas Related to Wholes/Parts and Genera/Species?~~
Tell me then, the following. Does it appear to thee, as you say, that there exist Certain Ideas/Species, of which the other things have a Share, thus keeping The Names of Selves; einai allá metaalambanonta tade ischein tas epoymimais auton,

§131A

such as, on the one hand, those that have a Share of Likeness are like; therefore, those that oion mon metaalambontai omoiotepos omos, de have a Share of Greatness/Magnanimity/Generosity/Magnitude are great/generous/big, whereas megéthous, megalia, on the other hand, those that Share of Righteousness and Beauty come-to-be just and beautiful? de dikaiosunis kai kallos gignesthai dikaias te kai kalas; Socrates: Entirely so indeed.

§131B

Parmenides: Now surely, is it not the case then, that each thing which has a Share, either P0-06 étoi Osaitou ekastous to metaalambanov has a Share of The Whole (Genera) Idea or of only a Part (Species)? Or, can there be metalaambanovn to olon eidos on en einai in each of the many, or in what way?

Socrates: And how could there be?

§131C

Parmenides: Accordingly then, by Being One and The Same in many separate existents, then P0-08 ara on En kai tautoon en polloiou choris osis The Whole is in each at the same time, and in this way Self will be separate from Self. olon enestai ama, kai oustos auton an eitai choris auton. Socrates: It cannot be in this way; but if This Idea were indeed such as The Self is to Daytime, S0-11 an Oik, ei ge oion h aisth thmera by Being One, It is at-once present in many places and yet Self is in no way more separate oui sa mia estin amia esti pollasso kai auth oudein mallon choris from Self; if then in this way, every Idea may also be At-Once One and The Same in all.

Socrates: It is to say, then, that there is One Whole, over many.

§131C

Or is it not something such as this that you are Led to say?

η ou to tis otouvnei λegivein;
Socrates: Perhaps.
§131D

Parmenides: Then either, will the whole sail exist over each individual, and those that participate can only participate of “parts of selves”; and hence there will no longer be one whole in each individual, but only one part of each.

Socrates: It has come to Light in this way indeed.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, O Socrates, “these ideal selves” are divisible, and if thou attempts to divide The Great Self, then in that case would it not be revealed to be without-The-Logos, and that each of The Many that are Great, will be one of which is less than The Greatness of Self? and thus would it still be One? but only one part of each.

Socrates: By no means.

§131E

Parmenides: Then if one of us has a “part of the small”, then in that case The Small of Self will be “bigger” than this, since it is a part of Itself, and thus The Small Self will then be equal to another thing by having the part received?

Socrates: Impossible.

Parmenides: But then on the other hand, this to which the part of The Small will be added and then subtracted, will be smaller, but not greater, than before.

prostethi ofairopethen estai summiksteron allα’ ou meizoun η πριν.
Socrates: This most certainly cannot come to pass.
S0-18 ουτο γε αν Ουκ γενοιτο.

Parmenides: To thee then, O Socrates, in what way are the other existents able to have a Share
P0-16 σοι ουν, οι Σωκρατες, Τινα τροπον τα αλλα δυναμενα μεταλαμβανειν of The Ideas, since they are unable to do so according to Parts, nor according to Wholes?
tον ειδον, μητε κατα μερη μητε κατα ολα;

Socrates: No by Zeus, it does not appear to me to be in any way an easy matter to define
S0-19 Ου μα τον Δια, ου δοκει μοι, ειναι ουδαμως ευκολον διορισασθαι something such as this.
tο τοιουτου.

Parmenides: What next then? What do you say to this?
P0-17 Τι δη δε; πως εχεις προς τοδε;

Socrates: To what?
S0-20 Το ποιον;

§132A

Parmenides: I suspect that thou believes each Idea to be One from something such as this.
P0-18 Οιμαι σε οισεθαι εκαστον ειδος ειναι εν εκ του τοιουτου:
When many particulars appear to thee to be great, thou may opine, that by looking
οται πολλ’ αττα δοκει σοι ειναι μεγαλα, δοξη ιδοντι at all of them, One Certain (Common) Ideal Self is found to be Equally in their case,
pαντα μια τις η ιδεα αυτη ειναι ισος επι from whence thou are Led to believe The Great to be One. (Inferred concept, not Idea. PG)
οθεν ηηει το μεγα ειναι εν.

Socrates: You speak The Truth.
S0-21 λεγεις Αληθη.

Parmenides: What then if when thou Sees The Great Self with The Soul, and All
P0-19 Τι δ’ εαν επι ιδη’ το μεγα αυτο τη μυχη και παντα The Other Ideas that are Great in a similar way. Then in turn, will not a Certain Great One,
tα αλλα μεγαλα ωσαντως, αυ ουχι τι μεγα εν necessarily come to Light, through which, All These come to Light as Great?
anαγκη φανεται, ω παντα ταυτα φαινεσθαι μεγαλα;

Socrates: It seems so.
S0-22 Εισθεν.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, another offspring idea of Greatness will appear, besides
P0-20 αρα Αλλο γεγονος ειδος μεγεθους αναφανησεται, παρ’ The Great Self, and also of those that Partake of Self; and besides all these, yet another
tο μεγεθος αυτο τε και τα μετεχοντα αυτου: και επι πασιν τουτοις ετερον to have a

§132B

in turn, through which, all these will appear to be great. And surely then, each of
αι οι παντα ταυτα εσται μεγαλα: και δη εκαστον thine “ideas”, will no longer be One, but an infinite multitude/plurality.
σοι των ειδων ουκετε εσται εν, αλλ’ το απειρα πληθος.

Socrates: Then, O Parmenides, each one of these ideas is nothing more than a conception,
S0-23 Αλλα, οι Παρμενιδη, εκαστον τουτον των ειδων μη η νοημα, and will not subsist in any place other than in the proper Self in Souls; for in this way, each
και εγγενεσθαι ουδαμον αλλοθι η εν προσηκη αυτω ψυχαις: γαρ ουτω εκαστον

~~~Socrates the empiricist !?~~~
will indeed be one; and that which was just now mentioned will not still happen.

Parmenides: What then? Is Each One of These Intellections/conceptions One, whereas on the other hand, It Is an Intellection/conception of nothing?

Socrates: But this is impossible.

Parmenides: Hence, It Is a Intellection of a certain something?

Socrates: Yes.

§132C

Parmenides: Of Being or of non-being?

Socrates: Of being.

Parmenides: Will It not Be of One Certain Entity, which that Intellection Intellects in every case, as Being One Certain Idea?

Socrates: Yes.

Parmenides: Then will not This Idea that Is Being Intellected Be One, by Always Being The Self in every case?

Socrates: This again, has come to Light as Necessary!

Parmenides: But what then? Or does it not appear Necessary, for thee to say that inasmuch as other things Participate of The Ideas/Species, that each one of Them must be composed of
tάλλα μετεχείν τον ειδόν εκαστόν ειναι εκ
Thoughts/Intellections and that All of Them in turn, must be Able to Intellect/Think

Socrates: Yes.

§132D

Socrates: But this possesses no Logos! Nevertheless, O Parmenides, it seems to me indeed,

All’ τουτο εχει ουδε λογον, αλλ’ ο Παρμενιδη, εμοιγε to be clearly seen especially, as follows: On the one hand, These Ideas/Species are Set-Up in Their Very Nature, just as Paradigms/Models, whereas on the other hand, the others are

eν τη φυσει οσπερ παραδειγματα, δε τα αλλα
Assimilated to These Models, and are Their likenesses; and The Self Participation, by the eοικεια τουτοις και ειναι ομοιωματα: και η αυτη μεθεξις τοις other things, is nothing else than to become Assimilated to The SELVES of The Ideas/Species.

αλλοις ουκ τις αλλη η γιγνεσθαι εικασθηναι αυτοις των ειδον.
Parmenides: Therefore, if anything becomes Like The Idea/Species, can it be possible that

The Idea/Species not be Like that which becomes assimilated, and by as much as the assimilated
to eidos μη εναι ομοιον εκεινο τω εκκαινηεται, τε οσον αφομοιοθη

nature is rendered Like Self? Or is there any reason why, the like cannot be like The Like?
καθ’ αυτο; η εστι τις μηχανη το ομοιον μη ειναι ομοιον ομοιο;

Socrates: There is not.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, is there not a Great Necessity, that The Relationship

§132E

of like to Like should Participate of One Idea/Species/Paradigm of The Self?

ομοιον τω ομοιο μετεχειν ενος ειδους του αυτου;

Socrates: Necessarily.

§133A

besides that species, and that species will again become like another; and so a new species
παρα εκεινο αν αυ η ομοιον τω ετερον, και καινον ειδος
would never cease to always come to be, as long as any species becomes like its participant.
kαι ουδεποτε παυεται εις γιγνομενον, εαν το ειδος γιγνηται ομοιον το εαυτου μετεχοντι.

Socrates: You speak most truly.

Parmenides: Hence, neither can a (partible) thing Be Like The (Impartible) Idea/Species, nor

The Species Be Like the thing. For if this were not the case, another species will always appear
to eidos αλλω δε ει μη, αλλο ειδος αει αναφανησεται

§133A

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§133A

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§133A

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§133A

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§133A

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§133A

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§133A

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to eidos αλλω δε ει μη, αλλο ειδος αει αναφανησεται

§133A

besides that species, and that species will again become like another; and so a new species
παρα εκεινο αν αυ η ομοιον τω ετερον, και καινον ειδος

would never cease to always come to be, as long as any species becomes like its participant.
kαι ουδεποτε παυεται εις γιγνομενον, εαν το ειδος γιγνηται ομοιον το εαυτου μετεχοντι.

Socrates: You speak most truly.
The Ideal Selves are unknowable, may still remain un-persuaded.
auta einai agnossta epi apithanos.

Socrates: In what way then, O Parmenides?

Parmenides: In a way that I think both thou and any other person, O Socrates, who would
set up The Ousia of each Idea as Subsisting Self by Self; you must agree
tietha oustian ekastou einai autin kai autin', an omologhsetai
in the first place, that None of The Ideal Selves, Subsist in us.
protos moni miandemion atovn einai en hmin.

Socrates: For if They did, then how could Their Ousia still Subsist Self by Self?

Parmenides: You speak Well. Is it not also the case, that of The Ideas that exist in relation to
Each Other, however many They Are, Maintain Their Self Ousia in relation to Selves,
allhla aia osai eisivn, echeiin tin auta oustian proo autas,

but not in relation to Those existing among us; whether in relation to Certain Likenesses,
all' ou proo ta hmin eite omoiomata
or in whatever way one may then set Selves up; and we do Participate of each and every Self,
eite opi tis de tis- auta estei, hminis einai metexontes ekastai
to which we apply some particular name; but on the other hand, that Those Beings that exist
wv epinomazomena: de ta onta
among us bear the same name as Those, and again Selves also exist in relation to our selves,
but not in relation to Those Ideas; and again Selves exist in relation to Them Selves, but not ἀλλ’ον προς εκείνους τα εἰδή, αὐτοῦ εστὶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ in relation to Those with whom they thus only Share Their Name.

Socrates: How do you mean this?

Parmenides: Such as, if one of us were The Lord or the servant of any one; then, the one who is a servant, is certainly not in any way, the servant of That Selfhood of The Lord, nor is The One who is Lord, The Lord of The Selfhood of the servant; whereas by δεσποτῆς αὐτου δουλος, ἀλλ’à being human, they Share in both these human relations. On the other hand, Self Mastership is the Lordship; and Self Stewardship, in the same way, is Stewardship in Relation to Lordship. Thus the relationships in us exercise none of Their Power in relation to Those Ideas nor Those in relation to us. Thus I say that They both Subsist by Them Selves and also Selves in Relation to Selves; and in a similar way, Those in us in relation to Them Selves. Or do you not understand what I say? Socrates: I understand quite well indeed.

Parmenides: On the one hand, is it not also the case, that if Self Knowledge is μεν καὶ Όυκουν αὐτὴ επιστήμη ἐστὶν...
The Knowledge of That which Is True, then Knowledge would be of That Self?

Socrates: Perfectly so.

Parmenides: But on the other hand, will every Knowledge, which Is, then in turn, Be The Knowledge of Each-one of The Real Beings that Exist; or not?

Socrates: Yes, it will.

Parmenides: But will not The Knowledge among us, be The Truth which exists among us?

Socrates: Yes, it will.

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess, nor can They exist As Such among us.

Socrates: Certainly not then.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, not a Single One of The Ideas are Recognized/Known by us, seeing that we do not Participate of Self Knowledge!

Socrates: It does not seem likely.

Parmenides: Therefore, The Beautiful Self, which is also The Good Self and All The Selves

§134B

And in turn, would not Each Knowledge among us, be a Knowledge of Each of Those Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships that happen to exist among us?

Socrates: Necessarily so.

Parmenides: But certainly, The Ideal Selves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess, nor can They exist As Such among us.

Socrates: Certainly not then.

Parmenides: Which Ideal Real Being, we do not indeed possess.

Socrates: We do not.

Parmenides: Accordingly then, not a Single One of The Ideas are Recognized/Known by us, seeing that we do not Participate of Self Knowledge!

Socrates: It does not seem likely.

Parmenides: Therefore, The Beautiful Self, which is also The Good Self and All The Selves

§134C

which we have surely taken-up as Being Ideas, are also Un-Known by us?
Socrates: I am afraid they are.

§134E

Parmenides: Behold then, this *even more* fearful consequence.

Socrates: What is it?

§134D

Parmenides: You will say perhaps, that if indeed there is a *Certain Genus/Class* of *Knowledge*, then *Self* is *much more-Perfect* than the *knowledge* which exists among us; and the same goes *auto* even *polo* *akribisteron* *η* *την* *επιστημην* *παρ’* *ημιν,* *ουτως* for *Beauty*, and all the other *Genera/Classes/Kinds/Wholes*.

και καλλος και παντα ταλλα.

Socrates: Yes.

§134C

Parmenides: Then you will not affirm that *anyone* Possesses *That Most Perfect Knowledge* more than *God*?

Socrates: Necessarily not.

§134B

Parmenides: Take notice then; is it possible in turn, that *God*, can *Know* of our affairs, by *Possessing* *Self Knowledge*? (εχειν αυτην επιστημην ;)

Socrates: Why not?

§134A

Parmenides: Since it has been agreed by us, O Socrates, that neither do *Those Ideas Have* *The Power* which *They Possess* in relation to *Those* among us, nor *Those* among us, in relation *την δυναμιν ην* *εχει* *προς* *τα* *παρ’* *ημιν* , *μιτε* *τα* *παρ’* *ημιν* *προς* *to Those*; but that *Selves* exist in relation to *Selves* in each realm.

εκεινα, *αλλ’* αυτα *προς* *αυτα* *εκατερα*.

Socrates: It was so agreed.

§134F

Parmenides: Is it not so, that if there is *The Most Perfect Mastership* among *Divinity*, and *The Most Perfect Self Knowledge*, then neither will *The Mastership* of *Those Gods Rule* *η* *ακριβηστατη* *αυτη* *επιστημη,* *ουτ’* *αν* *η* *δεσποτεια* *εκεινον* *δεσποσειειν*
Rulers (Apology 31a, Phaedo 62b) nor have any Cognition of human affairs (by Self-Knowledge).

Socrates: But then would not The Logos, be wondrous in the extreme,
insofar as one were to deprive Divinity of knowing?

η τις εἰ αποστερησεί τον θεον τού ειδεναι.

§135A

Parmenides: Nevertheless, O Socrates, these and very many other consequences besides these,
must be so in relation to The Ideas, if The Ideal Selves of The Real Beings Exist, and if one
determines that Each One is a Certain Ideal Self; so that one who hears these words is puzzled
and questions whether Selves do exist; or if They do Exist, that They Exist in The Highest
Degree, so that it appears0 abundantly necessary that Selves must be unknown by human nature.

Πολλή ἀναγκή αὕτα εἶναι ἀγνωστά τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει:
And whosoever speaks in this way, may appear to say something important; and, which
we just now said, may be thought of as being an extraordinary statement, by remaining unable
αρτι ελέγομεν, εἶναι θαυμαστὸς ὡς δύσ- to be persuaded. And yet on the one hand, as it falls to The Ability of an Individual of a Very
-αναπαίστον. καὶ μὲν ὡς δύνησμενον τοῦ ανθρώπος πανο
Good Natural Disposition, to be able to learn that there is a Certain Genus of Each Idea, and
εὐφορος (Phi32B, Rep399C) μαθεῖν εστι τι γενος εκαστου καὶ

§135B

That of Self Ousia According to In-and-Of Self, so on the other hand, they will deserve - even
αὐτη ουσια καθ’ αὐτην, δε του θαυμασ- greater admiration, who having made this Discovery, shall be able to teach yet another person
τοτερου εὑρήσοντος δύνησμενον διδαξει και ἀλλον
how to thoroughly-well-distinguish all these particulars, in a Sufficiently-Effective Way.

According to my Intellect.

Socrates: I agree with you entirely, O Parmenides, for you speak According to my Intellect.

§135C

The Idea of Each One of The Real Beings Is Always of The Self, and in this way,
entirely destroy The Power of Dialectics.

πανταπασι διαφθερει την δυναμιν του διαλεγεσθαι.
Therefore, in such a way, you also appear to perceive much According to my Mind.  

Socrates: You speak The Truth.

P0-56 λέγεις Ἀλήθη.

Parthenides: 8 What then will you do in relation to Philosophy?

Po-54 Τί οὖν ποιήσῃς περὶ φιλοσοφίας;  
In what way will you Turn your Mind, if you are ignorant of these Particular /Certain Ideas?

πη τρέψῃ (3ον περ.σιν.) ανεξομολογημένων τοιῶν;

Socrates: At the present time, I do indeed appear, not to see in what way at all.

Po-57 εν τῷ παροντὶ μοι γε δοκῶ ὦν καθόραν παντὶ.

Parthenides: For Prior to Exercising Thyself, O Socrates, Thou should endeavor beforehand

γὰρ Πρὸ γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σωκράτες, επιχειρεῖς πρὶν to Define what is Beautiful and Just and Good, and Each One of The Ideas. For just now orizesthai ti te kalon kai dikaios kai agathon kai ekastoon toon eidos. 

§135D

the following also came to my Mind while hearing Thee Dialoging with Aristotle here.

Therefore on the one hand, The Impulse, by which Thou are impelled towards The Logos is

τοῦτο καὶ εννοεῖς αἱκονον σου διαλέγομενοι Αριστοτέλει ενεβαίνει.

Therefore on the one hand, The Impulse, by which Thou are impelled towards The Logos is

οὖν μεν ἡ ὁμοια ἢν ὁμήμη επι τοὺς λόγους ΒEAUTIFUL and Divine -Thou may be sure of that- whereas on the other hand, Thou must also

καλὴ καὶ θεῖα, εң ισθή : δε καὶ Collect Thy-Self Together, by exercising more in That Way that appears to be useless

εἰκαστήριον -κυστὸν διὰ γυμνασίας μαλλὸν τῆς δοκούσης εἶναι ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦ μεθῆτι ἀλλά ἄνθρωπον, and is called by them empty talk; for if Thou does not, 

τοιν ποιλλὸν καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ αἰσθασιᾶς, δε ἐν μήθῃ, while Thou are still young, The Truth will utterly-elude Thee.

εἰς εἰς εἰς νέος, ἡ αἰθήμασι διαφευγέται σε.

Socrates: What then, O Parthenides, is The Way of this exercise?

Po-58 Τις οὖν, ο Παρμενίδη, ὁ τρόπος τῆς γυμνασίας;

§135E

Parthenides: The Way is just That which you heard Zeno practicing. Except that I was also

Po-56 ὀνπέρ Οὔτος ἡκούσας Ζήνωνος. πλην καὶ quite pleased with this that Thou said to him, because Thou would not allow him to look upon 

γε ἡγασθῆναι πρὸς τὸν σου εἰσόντος τοῦτον στὶ όυκ εἰςα (εἰκα) εἰσεκοπεῖν the wandering that exists among the objects of sight nor upon the wandering that exists 

τὴν πλανήν εν τοῖς φροσμένοις οὐδὲ in relation to them, but to consider according to Those which one can Grasp Especially

περὶ ταύτα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑκεῖνα α τίς αν λαβοῖ μαλίστα by The Logos, and in This Way, one would be Led to See The Ideas.

λογικοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ εντὸς ἡγαστίου εἰδῆ.

Socrates: For it appears to me, that in this way it may indeed be shown without difficulty,

Po-59 γὰρ δοκεῖς μοι ταύτη ἡ γε ἀποφαινεῖν οὐδὲν χαλέπον that The Beings experience both Like and Unlike, and anything else that exists.

τα αντά παρασκευὰ καὶ ομοια καὶ αναλοια καὶ οτιόν ἄλλο εἰναι.

Parthenides: Quite rightly indeed. But it is also necessary that, besides this, you should still

Po-57 γ’ καλοῖς καὶ δὲ καὶ χρῆ πρὸς τοῦτο ετι also suppose the following; to consider not only the consequences resulting from the hypothesis, 

και ποιεῖν τοῦτο, σκοπεῖν μή μονον τα συμβαίνοντα εκ τῆς υποθέσεως, 

21
§136A

whether Each Ideal-Self being hypothesized exists, but also the consequences resulting from

ei ekaston upotithemewen estin, alla kai

hypothesizing if This Ideal-Self does not exist, if you wish to be more exercised in This Way.

upotithethai ei touto to auton mi esti, ei bouleiei mallon gynanasthenai.

Socrates: In what way do you mean?

§136B

and to The Many, both in relation to Selves and in relation to Each-Other.

kai tois pollous kai proos auta kai proos allila:

And again in turn (2), one should hypothesize, if Likeness Exists, or if It does not exist,

kai authes au, ean upothi, eis omioiostis estin hei mhi esti,

what will result for each of The Hypothesis, both to The Selves that are being Hypothesized

ti xumvethetai ef' ekateras tis upothesewh kai tois autois upothethai

and to the Others, both in relation to Selves and in relation to Each-Other.

kai tois allous kai proos auta kai proos allila.

And (3) The Self/Same Logos must also be applied to The Unlike, to Motion and Rest,

kai o autos logos kai peri anomoiou peri kinesis kai stases

to Generation and Dissolution and to the existence and to the non-existence of Self, and in One

peri genesewh kai phorhes kai peri tov einai kai tou mhi einai autou; kai eni

Logos, concerning That which should be Hypothesized as Always-Being and as not-Being and

logoi (Pro-Tim 168E), peri otiou au upothi ows aein ontous kai ows ouk ontous kai

anything else that undergoes any experience whatsoever, one must consider the consequences

allo paschontos pathos otion, deis skopouin ta xumvaimonta

§136C

in relation to Self and in relation to each one of The Others being considered, which anyone

pros auton kai pros ekaston en tois alloun, o ti

may set-up for this purpose, and in relation to Many, and similarly in relation to Everything.

an proelei, kai pros pleio kai osantos pros xumantanta:

And in turn (4), how The Others are related to Selves and to any Other which one

kai au talaia pros auta te kai pros ti allo o

may select, whether you Hypothesize as the subject of your Hypothesis That which Always Is,

an prooirmi, enantie upothi ows upethesos o aein

or as non-Being; if you care about being Perfectly exercised to Thoroughly-Behold

eantie ows mhi on, eis mellleis telous umnasamenos disophysai

The Truth, in a Masterful Way.

to altheis kuriotis...
Socrates: You speak, O Parmenides, of an Extraordinary Study of Realities, and I do not quite understand. But why not hypothesize in detail A Certain/Definite Self for me, in order that I may be more able to understand?

Ina μαλλων καταμαθω;

§136D

Parmenides: You assign, O Socrates, much work, for one as old as myself.

Socrates: Then in that case, Zeno, why not Thou unfold it in detail for us?

Antiphon: Then Zeno, laughing, said:

Και τον Ζηνονα γελασαντα φαναι:

Zeno: We must ask Parmenides himself, O Socrates. For, as it has been said, it is indeed, no trifling matter. Or do you not see how great the work is that you are assigning? Therefore on the one hand, if more of us were present, it would be inopportune to make such a request; μεν ει πλειους μην ην, αν ουκ αξιον δεισθαι:

and especially for a man of his age, to speak of matters such as these γαρ απρεπη τε και αλλως τηλικωτω λεγειν τα τοιοατα:

§136E

in the presence of many people. For the many are ignorant that, without This Discursive Procession and Wandering through All Beings/Cities (Poem-Frag1), it happens to be impossible –οδου τε και πλανης δια παντον εντυχοντα αδυνατον for Intellect to Hold-on to The Truth (Meno 85C-D). Thus on the one hand, O Parmenides, I νον σχειν το αληθεια.

and, you assign, O Parmenides, for me, και τους αλλους δεισθαι του Παρμενιδου, ενδειξασθαι ο λεγοι και μη ποιειν αλλως.

§137A

Parmenides: It is necessary to comply with your request. And yet, I appear to my self to sympathize with the fate of the horse of Ibycus, which being a race-horse, and being advanced in years, when being about to contend in the chariot races, and by knowing the experience, γυτεροι, μελλοντι υς’ αγονιευσθαι αρματι και δι’ εμπειριαν trembled with fear at the forthcoming event, and to whom, Ibycus, comparing him self, said

tremonti το μελλον, απεικαξων εαυτων εφη
And Self being so old is Involuntarily Compelled to Return to The Object of My Love -
καὶ αὐτὸς ὁν ὀντὸς πρεσβύτης ἀκὼν ἀναγκαζόμεθα εἶναι εἰς τὸν ἐρωτα:

And I also, being as old as I am appear to my self to exceedingly dread the present undertaking,
καὶ γὰρ ὁντα τὴλικοῦν δοκῶ μοι μᾶλα φοβεῖσθαι remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great A Sea of Logos'.
μεμνημένος πῶς χρῆ διανευρίσαι τοιούτον τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων:

§137B
For thus it is necessary to take this task in hand, seeing that, it is at the request of Zeno,
γὰρ δὲ δεῖ χαριζόμεθα, επειδή, o λέγει Ζήνων, and in any case, we are by our selves.
καὶ ομοί εἰμεν αὐτοί.
Therefore, from where then shall we begin, and what shall we Hypothesize first?
οὖν ποθὲν δὴ αρξομέθα καὶ τί υποθήσομεθα πρῶτον;
Or if you wish, seeing that it certainly appears that we must Play A Reality-Based Game,
η βουλέσθε, επειδήπερ δοκεῖ παίξειν πραγματειώδη παιδίαν,
I must begin from my Self and The Hypothesis of my Self; by Hypothesizing about
αρξομαι απ’ εμαύτου καὶ τῆς υποθέσεως εμαύτου, υποθέμενος περὶ The One Self, whether One Is, or whether One is not, what must the result be?
tοῦ εὐνὸς αὐτοῦ, εἶτε ἐν ἐστίν εἶτε ἐν μὴ, τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν;
Zeno: By all means.

§137C
Aristotle: I will attend Thee in this, O Parmenides, for Thou may call upon me
η ὁ νεώτατος;
For the labor will be very much less, should he answer what he thinks; and his answer,
γὰρ ἄν μᾶλις’ πολυπραγμονὴν ηκίστα αὐτὸν αποκρινόμενο οἰετέαι, καὶ αποκρίσις at the same time, will afford me a time for resting from that arduous investigation.

§137C
Aristotle: I will attend Thee in this, O Parmenides, for Thou may call upon me
Ἐτοίμος σοι τοῦτο, ὁ Παρμενιδῆ, γὰρ λέγεις εἰμὶ as calling upon the youngest. Ask me, then, as one who will answer Thee.
λέγων τὸν νεώτατον: ἐρωτα ἀλλ’ ὡς αποκρινομένου.
IBYCUS
6th Century B.C.

Eros,
Even now
Looks at me,
From Under Dark Eyelids
With Tenderness
And Casts me
Spellbound
Into Aphrodite’s Nets
Where I lie
Inextricably Caught,

For I Swear
His Mere Approach
Makes me tremble

EROS : Ibycus : Like : Race : Chariot-horse

An Old Champion Chariot Horse
As he draws
A swift cart/chariot
Unwillingly
To The Race.

Translated by Willis Barnstone
The Norton Book of Classical Literature
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
The First Hypothesis

Parmenides: 10 Well then, if One Is, could not The One Be Many in Some Other Way?
[Aristotle: How could it be many? (πως αν γαρ;)]
[Par: Accordingly then, neither Can any Part Belong to Self nor Can Self Be a Whole.]
[Ari: Why not then? (τι δή;)]
[Par: Because The Part Is in some way a Part of a Whole.]
[Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)]

§137D

[Par: What then about The Whole? Would not That from which no Part is absent Be Whole?]
[Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)]
[Par: Accordingly then, from both these consequences The One would Be Composed of Parts, by Being a Whole and by Possessing Parts.
[Par: Necessarily. (αναγκή;)]

§137E

[Par: Accordingly then, in both ways, The One will Be Many, but Not-One.]
[Ari: True. (αλήθη.)]
[Par: But It Must indeed, not Be Many, but One Self. (See 142A)]
[Ari: It must. (δει.)]
[Par: Hence It will neither Be a Whole, nor Possess Parts, if The One “Is to Be” One.]
[Ari: It will not. (ου γαρ.)]
[Par: Is it not the case then, that if It Can have No Part, then neither Can It have a Beginning?
[Ari: Rightly so. (ορθώς.)]
[Par: And certainly The Beginning and End Are indeed The Limit of Each Part?]
[Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ ου;)]
[Par: Accordingly then, The One is Unlimited, if It has either Beginning or End?]
[Ari: Unlimited. (απειρον.)]
[Par: Accordingly then, It Must also “Be” without Figure/Form/Shape,]
[Ari: How is this the case? (πως;)]

for It Can neither Participate of The Circular nor of The Straight/Rectilinear.

γαρ αν ουτε μετεχει στρογγυλον ουτε ευθεος.

Ari: How is this the case? (πως ;)
Par: For The Circular Is Indeed that in which The Extremities Must Be
P1-013 στρογγυλόν εστι γε τοιοτο ου τα εσχατα αν
in every way Equally distant from The Middle.
πανταχοι που ισον απεχη απο το μεσον.
Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)
Par: And The Straight Is indeed that in which The Middle
P1-014 και ευθυ γε μην η ου το μεσον
Is situated in line with both The Extremes?
πιπροσθεν αμφιον τιν εσχατοιν.
Ari: It is so. (ουτος.)
Par: It is not the case then, that The One will then Possess Parts and Be Many,
P1-015 ουκουν το εν αν εχω μερη και αν ειη πολλ.’,
by Participating of either a Straight or of a Round Figure?
μετεχου ειτε ευθος ειτε περιφερους σχηματος.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

§138A
Par: Accordingly then, It is neither Straight nor Round, seeing that It has No Part.
P1-016 αρα εστιν ουτε ευθυ ουτε περιφερες, επειπερ εχει ουδε μερη.
Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)
Par: And certainly, by “Being” Such, It will indeed exist in-no-way-whatsoever,
P1-017 Και μην ον τοιοτον αν γε ειη ουδαμου:
for It will neither exist In-Another, nor In-It-Self.
γαρ αν ουτε ειη αν αλλω ουτε εν εαυτω.
Ari: How so? (πως διε.)
Par: For on the one hand, by Being In-Another, It would somehow Be Circularly
P1-018 γαρ μεν ον εν αλλω αν που κυκλω
Comprehended by That in which It Is, and would Be touched by Self in many places.
περιεχουτο υπ’ εκεινου εν ο ενει ι, και αν αποτο αυτου πολλοισ πολλαχου:
Thus on the other hand, it is also Impossible, that The One which “Is” also Partless, and
δε και αδυνατον του ενος τε και αμερους και
which does not Participate of The Circle, to Be touched in a circular way, in many places.
μη μετεχοντος κυκλου απεσθαι κυκλω πολλαχη.
Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

§138B
Par: But surely, if Self were indeed In-It-Self, then Self would also Contain
P1-019 αλλα μην αυτο ειη γε εν εαυτω και περιεχον
It-Self, and if indeed, by Being no other than Self, Self would Be In-It-Self;
εαυτο και ειπερ ον ουκ αλλο η αυτο, ειη εν εαυτω:
for it is Impossible that anything not be Contained by That in which it is.
γαρ αδυνατον τι μη περιεχοντι το εν ειναι.
Ari: For it is impossible.
γαρ αδυνατον.
Par: Is it not so then, that on the one hand, The Self that Contains Is One Certain Aspect,
P1-020 αν ουκουν μεν το αυτο περιεχον ειη ετερον τι
, while on the other hand, That which is Being Contained is Another? For The Same Whole
δε το περιεχομενον ετερον: γαρ ταυτον ολον
can indeed not, be both *acted upon* (Passive) and also be The Creative Principle (Active),
eg e ou amphi peisetai kai poimsei
and in this way, The One would no longer be One, but Two At-Once.

Ari: For then it would not. (γαρ ουν ου.)
Par: Accordingly, The One Is Not Anywhere, by Being Neither In-It-Self nor In-Another.

§138C

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<tr>
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<td>It is not. ouk estin.</td>
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Parmenides: 11 Observe then, if It Has to Be Understood in such a way as this;
P1-022 Ora de e ei exon oion owtos then It Is either Remaining-Stationary or Being-Moved.
estin te estanai he kineisthai.
Aristotle: Why then could it not? (τι δι γαρ ου;)
Par: But surely then, by changing place, It would become situated elsewhere, and thus Be Moved? (καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται ;)

Ari: In this case it would most certainly indeed. (εἰπὲ γε δῆτ.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that it has been declared Impossible, on the one hand,

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Take notice then, is it not still even more Impossible that It become in-anything?

Ari: I do not grasp in what way, you mean this. (ουκ εννοοῦσα σύ τη.)

Par: If anything comes to Be in-anything, is it not Necessary

Ari: Necessary. (αναγκη.)

§138E

Par: Then if this can take place in something else, then it Must Only happen to That which has Parts; for One Part of Self will already Be in-That Whole, but Another Part will Be

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: But is it not even much more Impossible that That which has neither Parts nor

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ έοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One does not Change place by going Anywhere and by becoming

Ari: Immoveable. (ακινητον.)

§139A

Par: Accordingly then, The One “Is” Immoveable according to every kind of Motion.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεῖται .)
Par: But we have certainly indeed also said that it is Impossible for
Self to Be in-anything (138b).
Ari: We have said so. (γαρ φαμεν .)
Par: Accordingly then, It cannot ever Be in-That which Is Self.
Ari: Why then? (τι δή;)
Par: Because then Self would already Be in-That, in which Self Is.
Ari: Entirely so. (παντω μεν ουν .)
Par: But Self was also found to Be such that It Can neither Be in-It-Self nor in-Another.
Ari: It cannot. (ου γαρ ουν .)

§139B
Par: Accordingly then, The One Is never in The Self.
Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν .)
Par: But most certainly, since It can never Be in The Self, then
It will never Be At-Rest/At-Peace nor Be Led to Stand still.
Ari: For it is not such that it can be. (γαρ τε ου οιον .)
Par: Accordingly then, The One, as it is likely, neither Stands-still nor Is Moved.
Ari: It certainly does not appear to be the case.

§139C
Par: And most certainly by Being The Same with-The Other, It would Be That;
Ari: It could not. (ου γαρ ουν .)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, It will not Be The Same with-The Other, or
§139D

Par: But surely if not by reason of this, then It will not Be Other from-It-Self; but if Self

Par: Since whenever anything Comes to Be The Same with-anything it does not Become One.

Par: That which Becomes The Same with-The Many, Must Come to Be Many, but not One.

Par: Accordingly then, if The One Is to Be The Same with-It-Self, then It will Be,
Par: So in this way The One will not Be Other or The Same with-Self nor with- Other.  

Par: Surely then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike anything,  

Par: Because The Like Is That which Is affected in some way by The Same.  

Par: But it was shown that The Nature of The Same Is indeed Separate from The One.  

§140A  

Par: But certainly, if The One would experience anything Apart from Being One, then It would experience to Be More than One, but this, is Impossible. 

Par: Accordingly then, it is not in any way possible for The One to experience Being The Same; neither with-Another nor with-It-Self. 

Par: Most certainly then, neither can The One experience Being Other; for in this way, It would also experience to Be More than One. 

§140B  

Par: Most certainly then that which undergoes Being Other than-It-Self or Another, will Be Unlike either It-Self or Another, if indeed That which experiences The Same Is Like, ανομοιον η εαυτω η αλλω, ειτερ το πεπονδος ταυτον ομοιον. 

Par: But The One, as it is indeed likely, by not experiencing in any way Being Other, “Is” neither Unlike It-Self nor The Other. 

Par: Accordingly then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike,
Neither **to-The Other** nor **to-It-Self**.

οὖθ’ ετέρῳ οὔτε εαυτῷ.

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light**. (οὐ φαίνεται.)  
**Par:** And most certainly then, by “**Being**” **Such**, **It** will neither **Be Equal** nor **Unequal**, neither **to-It-Self** nor **to-Another**. (οὔτε εαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.)

**Ari:** In what way? (πώς;)  
**Par:** For on the one hand, if **It** were **Equal**, **It** would **Be of** **The Same/Self Measures**  

**§140C**

**Par:** But on the other hand, by **Being** in some way **Greater** or **Lesser** than **that-to-which**

| P1-070 | δὲ οὖν τὸν μειζὸν η ἐλαττὸν μὲν οἷς  
It **Is Commensurate**, **It will have more Measures** than the **lesser**, but **fewer** than the **greater**.  
αν ξυμμετρον, μὲν εξεί πλείω μετρα τον ἐλαττονον, δὲ ελαττω τοι μειζονων.  

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** Thus to **those-to-which** **It would not** be **Commensurable**, on the one hand, **It will have**  

**§140D**

| P1-071 | δ’ οἷς αὖ μη συμμετρον, μὲν εσται  
smaller Measures than some, but on the other hand, greater Measures than others.  
συμμετρον των δὲ μειζονων μετρον των.  

**Ari:** How could it not. (πῶς γὰρ οὖν;)  
**Par:** Is it not **Impossible** then, for **That** which does **not Participate** of **The Self**  

| P1-072 | οὐκοῦν αὐδυνατον τὸ μὴ μετεχον του αυτου  
ten to either **Be of** **The Same/Self Measures**, or **of anything else** of **The Same/Selves**?  
η ειναι τον αυτων μετρον η ἅλλων οντινων των αυτων;  

**Ari:** It is impossible. (αὐδυνατὸν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, on the one hand, **It will neither** **Be Equal to-It-Self**,  

| P1-073 | αὖ μὲν αὖ οὔτε εἰς ἴσον εαυτῷ  
no to-Another, by not **Being of** **The Same/Self Measures**.  
οὔτε ἅλλα, μὴ οὖν τον αὐτων μέτρον.  

**Ari:** It does indeed not appear to be so. (οὐκοῦν γε φαίνεται.)

**Par:** But most certainly then, by **Being of** **more** or **fewer Measures** **It will also** **Be**

| P1-074 | ἅλλα γε μὴν οὖν πλείωνον η ἐλαττονον μέτρον, αὐτὶ καὶ εἰς  
of as many **Parts** as there are **Measures**; and in this way it will again, no longer “**Be”** **One**,  
tοσαυτων μερων, οσανπερ μετρων, και ουτως αὐ ουκετι εσται εν;  
but **Be as many as there are also Measures**.

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

**Par:** But if indeed **It would Be of** **One Measure**, **It would Become Equal to That Measure**.  

| P1-075 | δὲ εἰ γε εἰς ἴσον μέτρον, αὖ γιγνοτο ίσον τω μέτρω:  
But This has come to **Light** that it is **Impossible**; that **The Self Be Equal to anything**.  
δὲ τουτο εφανη αὐδυνατον, αὐτο ειναι ίσον τω.  

**Ari:** It has so come to **Light**. (γὰρ εφανη.)
Par: Accordingly then, it will neither Participate of One Measure, nor of Many, nor of a Younger or of The Self/Same Age?

Aristotle: Is there any reason why not? (δὴ γὰρ τι οὐ)

Par: Since on the one hand, if It somehow Has The Self/Same Age as Self, or as Another, of which we said, that is, of neither Likeness nor Equality.

Ari: Yes, we said that. (οὐν γὰρ ἐλεγομεν.)

Par: We also said, that it certainly does not Participate of Unlikeness nor Inequality.

Ari: By all means. (παντὶ μὲν οὖν.)

Par: How then, by “Being” of Such a Nature, can It be either Older or Younger or of The Self/Same Age as such a thing that has to Be?

Ari: In no way, whatsoever! (οὐδαμῶς.)

Par: Accordingly then, the One, could not indeed Be Younger nor Older nor have to Be of The Self/Same Age as Self nor as Another.

Ari: It has not come to Light. (οὐ διδασκεῖται.)

Par: Take notice then, Neither Can it Be Possible for the One to Be in Time, at all, if It “Must Be Such as This”? For if Some Entity were to Be in Time, then in that case, if one was to participate.

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκή.)

Par: Is it not so then, that the Older Is indeed Always growing Older than the Younger?

Ari: Certainly. What next? (μὴν τί;)

§140E

Parmenides: 12 What next then? Do you believe that The One Has to Possess The Power to Be Older or Younger or of The Self/Same Age?

Par: On the other hand, if It somehow Has The Self/Same Age as Self, or as Another, of which we said, that is, of neither Likeness nor Equality.

Par: Then, if It will Participate of the Equality and Likeness of Time; of which we said, that is, of neither Likeness nor Equality.

Ari: Yes, we said that. (οὐν γὰρ ἐλεγομεν.)

Par: We also said, that it certainly does not Participate of Unlikeness nor Inequality.

Ari: By all means. (παντὶ μὲν οὖν.)

§141A
§141B
Par: Accordingly then, That which Is growing Older than It Self, Is also at The Same Time

Growing Younger than It Self, if indeed It Must Possess That which It grows Older Than.

Aristotle: What do you mean? (πως λέγεις.)

Parmenides: The following; it is in no way necessary for One which Is Different from another

Become Different, by Being already Different. Thus on the one hand, by Being already
given that, one of them being Different from that which Is already Different. Whereas, on the other hand, it will have

to have a distinction, and that which Is already Different

Coming to Be Different, can neither have Become Different, nor Be about to Be Different,

—accordingly one of them being Different from that which has Become Different, and furthermore it Is going to Be

—since the one of them being Different from that which will come to Be Different; whereas that which Is in the process of

to be

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκή γαρ.)

§141C
Par: But certainly, That which Is Older Is simply a Difference/Distinction

In relation to the Younger, and to nothing else.

Ari: So it is. (γαρ εστι.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Becoming Older than It-Self, Must Necessarily, at the same time, also Become Younger than It-Self.

Ari: It seems likely. (εἰσεικέν.)

Par: But surely, neither can It also Come to Be in more nor less Time than It-Self; whereas

It Must Be and Become and have Become and Be about to Be for an Equal Time with It-Self.

Ari: For this is also necessarily the case.

γαρ ταύτα και αναγκή ουν.

§141D
Par: Accordingly then, it Is Necessary, as it is Reasonable, that Each Self that Exists in Time

and which indeed Participates of such an Existence, has to Be of The Self/Same Age

και γε μετέχει του τοιοτου, εχει την αυτήν ηλικίαν as Self, and at the same time, also comes to Be Older and Younger than Self.

Ari: That is likely to be the case. (κινδύνευει .)

Par: But surely, The One, Cannot indeed, Participate of such experiences.
Ari: It cannot so participate.

Par: Accordingly then, Self does not Participate in Time, nor does It Exist in any Time.

Ari: Surely then, such cannot be the case, as The Logos surely proves.

Par: What then? Does it appear that “Was” and “has Become” and “Was Becoming”,

Ari: Indeed it does.

§141E

Par: What then? Does “Will Be” and “Will come to Be” and “Will Be coming to Be”,

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But surely then, does not That which “Is” and That which “Is Becoming” signify

Ari: By all means. (παντως μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The One, does not Ever Participate of Time in any way at all,

Ari: Most True! (αληθευτατα.)

Par: Therefore, is it possible for It to Participate of Ousia,

Ari: It is not possible.

Par: Accordingly then, The One in no way whatsoever Participates of Ousia.

Ari: It is not likely.

Par: Accordingly then, The One, in no way whatsoever, Is.

Ari: It has not come to Light.

Par: Accordingly then, neither Is It, in such a way, so as “To Be” One,
It would already be, by Being and by Participating of Ousia; whereas according to Reason, The One is neither One nor Is, if one Must Trust in such a Logos.

Ari: I dare say so.

§142A

Par: But, could any non-Being Be of Self, of The One which Is Not, or could any non-Being Belong to This Self? (Not According to 137D: Pierre Grimes)

Ari: And how could it?

Par: Accordingly then, there Is neither Name, nor Logos, nor any Knowledge nor perception, nor opinion, that can be attributed to Self, or Be The Object of Knowledge, nor do The Real Beings have a perception of Self.

Ari: It is not likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Therefore Is it Possible that these conclusions have to Be in this way about The One?

Ari: To me at least, it certainly does not appear to be in this way.

On the one hand, it appears that Aristotle is indeed following The Reasoned Account of Parmenides, but on the other hand, he refuses to believe, let alone Trust The Same Reasoned Account!

For how can anything possess anything, if first of all it does not possess Being nor existence?!

How about, THE VERY CAUSE of Ousia Her Self?

“TRANSCENDANT IN DIGNITY AND POWER” - Republic 509b-
The Second Hypothesis: The One That Is

The Book of TAO
XV. The Wise Ones of Old
had Subtle Wisdom and Depth of Understanding;
They were so Profound that They could not be Understood;
And since They could not be Understood,
then They must necessarily be Described in the following way:
Cautious; Like crossing a Wintry Stream . . .
Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India, edited by JFB

§142B

Parmenides: 13 Do you wish then, that we Return again to The Hypothesis from The Beginning,

Parmenides: Do you wish then, that we Return again to The Hypothesis from The Beginning, to See if anything of Another Kind may come to Light for us who are Returning?

Aristotle: By all means then, I do so wish.

Par: Is it not the case then, that if we say “One Is”, then we must go through The Same Logos about these following conclusions about Self, whatever they happen to Be; or is it not so?

Ari: It certainly is so.

Par: See then, from The Beginning. Accordingly then, on the one hand, if One Is, then Can Self Be such as It Is, while on the other hand, It does not Participate of Ousia?

Ari: It could not be so.

Par: And is it not the case then, that The Ousia of The One Could Not Be The Same Being as The One; for if That Were Not The Ousia of That One, then neither Could This One with This do, γαρ εκείνη ἄν ἦν οὐς εἰς εἴκους, οὐδ’ ἄν εἴκον τὸ εἰν

§142C

Participate of That, for then to say “One is” would also be like saying “One One”, μετειχεῖν εἰκείνης, ἀλλ’ λέγειν εἰς εἰκαί, ἄν τε καὶ τὴν ὀμοίου ἐν εἴν. Whereas our Present Hypothesis is not This (First) One; that is; “What Must “Be” the result if One One?”, but “What Must Be the result, if One Is”. Is it not so?

Ari: It certainly is so.
Par: Is it not the case then, that That which Is, signifies Something Different than The One?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη .)

(The 1st Intelligible Triad, 1246 (P6) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, that whenever anyone says that One Is, that another way

Ari: By all means indeed, (παντο γε .)

Par: Surely then, let us say again, what will happen “If One Is”. Consider then,

Ari: How? (πως ;)

§142D

Par: In the following way. If That which Is, is said to Belong to The One Being,

it will also mean that, The One Belongs to The Being of The One. Whereas, it is not the case that both The Ousia and The One Are The Self, since both Belong to That Self which we hypothesized; such as The One Being. Accordingly then, on the one hand, Must not

The One and That which Is Have Come into Being as Parts of This Whole (ET 116, 152) ?

to ev te kai to evn gignesthai moria tou tovou ;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη .)

Par: Then shall we call Each of These Parts, simply a piece, or Must The Part

Ari: Of The Whole. (του ολου .)

“Snatch All The Wine-Members, and Lead Them to Me!” -Orpheus-

(The 2nd Intelligible Triad, 1247 (P8) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: And since It Is One which Is also a Whole, It will Contain a Part.

Ari: By all means indeed. (παντο γε .)

Par: What then? Can each of These Parts of The One Being; both The One

Ari: By all means indeed in the very least, a Member/Part of The Whole?
§142E

and The Being abandon each other, so that neither The One be a Part of The Being, nor καὶ τὸ οὖν ἀπολειπεσθῶν, η ἡ τὸ εν εἰναι μοριον του ἦ The Being be a Part of The One?
tὸ οὖν μοριον του ενος;
Ari: That could not be. (οὐκ ἀν εἶπ.)
Par: Accordingly then, once again, Each of These Members, Maintains/Has both The One
P2-012 ἀρα πάλιν και έκαστον των μοριων ἱσχει(ισχω) τε το εν and The Being, so that the least (mud, hair, dirt) part in turn becomes a part composed of The Two, και τὸ οὖν και τὸ ἐλαχιστον τὸ μοριον αὐ τὸ γίνεται μοριον εκ δύον, and The Self/Same Logos Is Always According to This Way, so that whenever και τον αὐτον λογον αἰτι κατα ουτως, στις εν a Part comes to Be, This Relationship Is Always Maintained with The Part: For it Is Always
γενηται τουτω αἰτι ισχει το μοριον: γαι αἰτι the case that both, The One will Maintain/Keep The Being and The Being Keep The One.
τε το το εν ισχει το ον και το ον το εν:

§143A

So that it is Necessary that The Two Members Always Come to Be, but Never only one.
ωστε ειναι αναγκη δου αει γενομενον μηδηποτε εν.
Ari: By all means, it is so! (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

(Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Is it not the case then, that in This Way The One Being will be Unlimited Multitude?
P2-013 ουκουν ουτω το εν εν εν αν ειτη το απειρον πληθος;
Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

(Proclus Commentary Book 8)

Par: Surely then, let us proceed again in the following way, even further.
P2-014 δη θει και τηδε ετι.
Ari: In what way? (πη;) Par: We say that The One Participates of Ousia, on which account, One Is?
P2-015 φαμεν το εν μετεχειν ουσιας, διο εστιν;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: And because of this, it was indeed brought to Light that The One Being is Many.
P2-016 και δια τωντα δη εφανη το εν εν πολλα.
Ari: It is so. (ουτους.)
Par: What next? What of The One Self, which we surely say Participates of Ousia.
P2-017 τι δε; το εν αυτο, ο δη φαμεν μετεχειν ουσιας.
What if we grasp Self According to Self by The Understanding, Alone, Without This Ousia, εαν λαβωμεν αυτο καθαι αυτο τη διανοια μονον ανευ τουτου of Which we say It Participates, would One Alone, indeed come to Light,
ου φαμεν μετεχειν, αρα εν μονον γε φανησται or is This Self also Many?
Ari: One, at least, I think.
εν εγω ειμαι.

(One or One or Two, Three, Four or Five?
compared to 155E 3rd Hypo)
§143B

**Par:** Let us **See** then. On the one hand, must not **The Ousia of Self Be/Exist**

**P2-018** ιδόμεν δή: μεν αναγγή μη την ουσίαν αυτού ειναι

**In-One-Certain-Way,** whereas on the other hand, **Self Is Different,** if indeed

tι αλλ’ δε αυτο ετερον, ειπερ

**The One Is Not The Ousia,** but is **Seen** as **Being One,** by **Participating of The Ousia**.

tο εν μη ουσία, αλλ’ ας εν μετεσχεν ουσίας.

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγγη.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if on the one hand, **The Ousia Is Different,**

**P2-019** ουκουν ει μεν η ουσία ετερον,

while on the other hand, **The One Is Different**; then in that case,

dε το εν ετερον,

it is neither by **The One of The Ousia** that **The One Is Different,**

ουτε το εν της ουσιας το εν ετερον

nor by **The Ousia of The One** that **Is,** that **The Ousia is Other**,

ουτε το ουσια του ενος ειναι η ουσια αλλα,

but by **That** which is **Different** and also **Other,** that **They are Different from Each Other**.

αλλα το ετερο τε και αλλω ετερα αλληλων.

**Ari:** By all means so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

**Par:** So that **That** which **Is Different Is not The Same with either The One nor The Ousia**.

**P2-020** εστε το ετερον εστιν ου ταυτον ουτε το ενι ουτε τη ουσια.

**Ari:** How is this the case? (πος γαρ?)

§143C

**Par:** How then you ask? If you wish that we make a **Selection of Selves**; such as either

**P2-021** Τι ουν; εαν βουλει προελαμβανα αυτων ειτε

of **The Ousia and The Other/Different,** or, of **The Ousia and The One,** or

tην ουσιαν και το ετερον ειτε την ουσιαν και το εν ειτε

of **The One and The Other,** accordingly then, is it not the case, that in either way that

eιτε το εν και το ετερον, αρ’ ουκ εν τη εκαστη

we may choose, we are choosing a certain **Duality,** which can **Correctly** be called, **Both**?

προαρεσει προαρεσει τινε (dual) ω εχει ορθως καλεισθαι αμφοτερο;

**Ari:** How? (πος?)

**Par:** In the following way. Is it possible to say **Ousia**? (ωδε: εστιν ειπειν ουσιαν?)

**P2-022**

**Ari:** It is. (εστιν.)

**Par:** And in turn, is it possible to say **One**? (και αιωθις ειπειν εν;)?

**P2-023**

**Ari:** This also. (ταυτο και.)

**Par:** Take notice then, have we not spoken of **Each One of The Two Selves**?

**P2-024** αρ’ ουν ουχ ειρηται εκατερον [dual] αυτουν;

**Ari:** Yes. (οι.)

**Par:** What about when I say **Ousia and One**; have I not accordingly mentioned **Both**?

**P2-025** τι δ’ οσταν ειπο ουσια τε και εν ουκ αρα αμφοτερο;

**Ari:** By all means indeed. (πανυ γε.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if there is **Both Ousia and Other,** or **Both**

**P2-026** ουκουν εαν και ουσια τε και ετερον η τε

**Other and One,** then in this way, I speak of **Each Pair,** in every way, as **Both**?

ετερον και εν, και ουτω λεγο εφ’ εκαστου πανταχος αμφω;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

§143D

Par: If Both of which have been Named Correctly; then on the one hand, can it possibly be the case, for Self to be Both, and on the other hand, not be Two?

Ari: It cannot exist in such a way. (οὐχ οίον τε.)

Par: Concerning which then, if Two should exist [ητον-subj.dual for ειμι], then could Each One of The Two SELVES EXIST by some (Divine) Resource/Efficacy/Design and not be One?

Ari: If so come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

Par: But if Each of The SELVES, Is One, by Adding-together [from συντιθημ] whatsoever Yoked-Pair (Phaedo 71c) to any One, would not All The Yoked-Pairs Become Three?

Ari: How could they not be; (ποις δ’ ου;) 1

Par: But is not Three an Odd Number and Two an Even Number?

Ari: How could they not be; (ποις δ’ ου;) 2

§143E

Par: What next then? By Being Two,

is it not Necessary, that Twice, also Exists,

and by Being Three, Thrice, if indeed Two, First-Arises from Twice The One and Three, First-Arises from Thrice The One?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκή.)

Par: Then, by Being Two and Twice, is it not also Necessary that Twice-Two Exist?

and in turn by Being Three and Thrice, is it not Necessary that Thrice-Three also Exist?

Ari: How could they not? (ποις δ’ ου;)

Par: What next then? By Being Three and Twice and by Being Two and Thrice,

is it not Necessary, that Twice-Three and Thrice-Two Exist;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκή.)
Ari: It is altogether so indeed. (πολλή γε.)

§144A
Par: Accordingly then, there would also Exist Even-Times Even and Odd-Times Odd.

By all means indeed! (καὶ παντὸς γε.)

Par: Therefore, if These Aspects have to be in this way, can you think of any Number that has been left out, which does not Necessarily Exist?

Ari: Not in any way indeed. (οὐδ’ομοὶ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, if One Is, then also, Number has to Necessarily Exist.

Ari: By all means indeed! (καὶ παντὸς γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if All Number Participates of Ousia,

Ari: Yes! (ναι γε.)

§144B
Par: Accordingly then, The Ousia has been Distributed to All Beings which are Many, and will not abandon a Single One of The Real-Beings, neither The Least, nor The Greatest? Rather, is it not irrational to even ask this question? For surely then, it is oxymoron. And, does how can Ousia indeed abandon Any of The Real-Beings?

Aristotle: Not in any way. (οὐδ’ομοὶ γε.)

[[The Second Member of The Yoked-Pair/Couple: The Dividing Power of Number. Pierre Grimes]]

Par: Accordingly then, The Ousia, as Such, has been thoroughly and in-every-way cut-up-in-pieces; into both The Least and The Greatest Beings, and so She is The Most divided of All Beings, and thus She Contains Unlimited/Inexterminable Parts; pieces.

μεμερισταὶ πάντων καὶ απεραντα μερή.
Ari: It has to be so. (εχει ουτε.)
Par: Accordingly then, The Parts/pieces of Her Self Are very Many.

Ari: Very many indeed. (πλειοστα μεντοι.)
Par: What follows then? Is there any one of These Selves which Exists, on the one hand,
a Part/piece of The Ousia, but yet, it is Not One Part/piece?

Ari: And how can this come to be? (και πως αν τουτο γενειοτι;) 
Par: But surely if it is indeed the case, then I suspect, that it Must Always Be the case, that
as long as Self is such as It Is, It Must Indeed Be a Certain One; and so It cannot be nothing.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.) 
Par: Accordingly then, The One, Is Present with Each and Every Part/piece of The Ousia

Ari: It is so. (ουτε.)

§144D

Par: Therefore, can One Being Be a Whole that Exists in Many Ways/Places At-Once?

Par: Accordingly then, One Being has been cut-up in pieces, if indeed It is not Whole 

Par: And most certainly then, that which is partible Must Be as many as its pieces.

Par: Accordingly then we did not just now speak The Truth, when we said that The Ousia was

Distributed into very many Parts. For She is not Distributed into more Parts than The One is, 
eινεφειμενη πλειοστα μερη. γαρ ουδε νεφειμητα πλειω του ενος,
but as it is likely, She Is Equal to The One. For The Being does not abandon The One, nor 

does The One abandon The Being; but Always Subsist as Two Parts Equalized Through All.

Ari: It has come to Light entirely in this way. (πανταπασιν ουτε.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, has been Distributed by The Ousia

The One will Be Limited by The Whole; or are not The Parts Contained by The Whole? to en au to peperasmenon kata to olon: he ou ta moria periexetai upo tou olou;

Aristotle: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then certainly, That which Contains will indeed Be The Limit.

Ari: How could it not be? (πως δ’ ου:) (Nicomachos Intro to Arith Book 1 Chap 7)

(The 2nd Intellectual & Intellectual Triad of Gods, 1251 (P31) Proclus Commentary Book 8)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Being, Is in some way, both One and Many,

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.) (Nicamachos Intro to Arith Book 1 Chap 7)

(The 3rd Intellectual Triad of The Perfective-Preservative Gods, 1252 (P34) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, if It Has indeed been Limited, then Must It not also Possess Extremes?

Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)

Par: What then? If The One Being Is a Whole, then will It not also Possess a Beginning,

Ari: It will possess these. (εχοι.) (Inherent Overall Symmetry)

Par: Then The Middle will most certainly Be Equally Distant from The Extremes;

Ari: It could not be The Middle in any other way. (Parmenides Poem, Fragment 8 42-44)
Ari: It could not. (γαρ ου)
Par: And certainly, as it Reasonable, by Being So Disposed, The One will Participate
§145C of a Certain Figure, whether Straight or Round, or of a Certain Mixture from both.
Ari: For it will so participate. (γαρ αν μετεχοι)

(Kronos: The Monad of The Intellectual Gods/Hebdomad, 1253 (P40) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, by Being Maintained in this way, will Self not Subsist
§145C both In-It-Self and In-Another?
Ari: How? (πως)
Par: For Each One of The (Beginning-Middle-End/Future-Present-Past) Parts Is, in some way, In The Whole, and is not in any way Outside of The Whole.
Ari: It is so. (ουτως)

Par: Thus All The Parts Are Comprehended/Contained by The Whole?
§145C
Ari: Yes. (ναι)
Par: And certainly, The One Is indeed All The Parts of Self;
Ari: How could it not be. (γαρ ου)
Par: Is it not the case then, that The One, Is also The Whole?
Ari: It has so come to Light. (φαινεται)

Par: But certainly in turn, The Whole Is indeed not In The Parts; neither In All,
§145D nor In a Certain One. For if It Were In All, then It would Necessarily also Be In One: for if
Ari: It so.
but if on the one hand, This One Is The One of All The Parts, whereas on the other hand, 
δε ει μεν, touto esti to en ton apantov, δε
The Whole Is not In This One, then how can It still indeed Be In All The Parts?

to olon μη en touto en, poe esti ge en estin en panton tois;

Ari: In no way at all. (ουδαμας.)
Par: Surely then, It cannot Be In Any of The Parts. For if The Whole Were In Any
P2-067 μην oude en tis tou meron, gar ei to olon eis en tis of The Parts, then The Greater would Be In The Less, which is Impossible.
to pleon an eis en to elappanti, o estin adunaton.

Ari: It is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.)
Par: Then by not Being In Many, nor In One, nor In All of The Parts, then Must not
P2-068 δ’ μη ον en pleosi methe en eni methe en apasi tois meresti ouk
The Whole Necessarily Be, In some other way, or cease to Be in any way at all?
to olon anagnike estin en tiv etereo he esti eni metafamous;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

§145E

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, by Being in no way at all, It would
P2-069 oikoun men on metafamous an be nothing, but on the other hand, by Being Whole, if indeed It Is not In-Self, 
ei oude, δε on olon eiper estin ouk en autw,
than It Must Necessarily Be In-Another?

αναγκη εσται en allo;

Ari: By all means indeed. (πως γε.)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, inasmuch as The One Is Whole, It Is In-Another,
P2-070 ara men he to en olon, estin en allo whereas on the other hand, by Self Being In-It-Self, It happens to Be All The Parts,
δε η autw onta en eautow touxanai panta ta meri, 
and in this way The One Self Must Necessarily Be both In-It-Self and In-Another.

και ouxw to en autw anagnike einai te en eautw kai en etereo.

Ari: It must be so. (αναγκη.)
Par: Surely then, since The One Disposition Is-Established in this way, is it not then
P2-071 δη to en pevkes estanai Oustw ouk ar’ Necessary that It should also Be Moved (In-Another) and Remain-Still (In-It-Self)?

αναγκη kai kineisai kai estanai;

Ari: In what way? (πιτ;) Par: On the one hand, It must somehow Stand-still, if indeed Self Is In-It-Self. For by
P2-072 men pou esthke, eiper autw estin en eautou. gar

§146A

Being In One and by not departing from This, It will Be In-The Self; that is, In-It-Self.
gar on en eni kai μη metabaivn en eis tou eis en eis to autw, en eautw.

Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)
Par: But That which Is indeed Always In The Self, without a doubt, Must Necessarily
P2-073 δε to ge aei en to autw hpetov anagnike
Always Be At-Rest. (aei einai estostes.)

Ari: Entirely so. (πως γε.)
Par: What follows then? On the contrary, is it not Necessary that That which Is
P2-074 ti δε; to enantion ou anagnke to en

47
Always **In-Another Must Never Be In The Self**? But if **It Never Is In The Self**,  
αιεν εν ετερῳ μηδέποτ’ ειναι εν τω αυτω, δε μηδεποτε ον εν τω αυτω  
then neither **Can It Stand-still**. But if **It Cannot Stand-still**, then **It Must Be In-Motion**?  
μηδε εσταναι, δε μη εστος κινεισθαι;  
Ari: It must be so. (ουτως.)

(Rhea: The Monad of The 1" Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1254 (P45) Proclus Book 8)

**§146B**

Par: Accordingly then, by **The Self Always Being** both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another**,  
P2-075 ἀρα αυτο αὐτον ταυτον εις τον ενεαυτο και ετερον εαυτου,  
then **The One Must Necessarily Always Be In-Motion**, and also **Always Be At-Rest**.  
το εν αναγκῃ αυτη κινεισθαι τε και εσταναι.  
Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαίνεται.)

(Zeus: The Monad of The 2" Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1255 (P50) Proclus Book 8)

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**§146C**

Par: And **Self Must certainly Be The Same With-It-Self and Other Than-It-Self**;  
P2-076 Και αυτο δε αυτο γε ειναι ταυτον εαυτω και ετερον εαυτου,  
and similarly **Be The Same** and also **Other Than-The Others**, if indeed **It also Experiences**  
kai ωσαυτως ειναι ταυτον τε και ετερον τοις αλλοις, ειπερ και πεπονθεν  
The Prior Relationships/Dispositions. (τα προσθεν.)  
Ari: How? (ποις;)  
Par: **In some way, Everything Has to Be in this way in Relation to** Everything. For **Everything**  
P2-077 που παν εχει ωδη προς απαν.  
Is either **The Self/Same with or Other than something** or if **It Is not The Same nor Other**,  
εστιν μη ταυτον μη ετερον; ειπερ και πεπονθεν  
then **It will have The Same Dynamic** that a **Part Has to a Whole or that a Whole Has to a Part**.  
αν ειπερ αυτος μερος εχει προς τουτο, η ως όλον αν ει προς μερος.  
Ari: It has so come to **Light**. (φαίνεται.)

Par: Take notice then, **Is The One Self a Part of Self**?  
P2-078 αρ’ ουν εστιν το εν αυτο μερος αυτου;  
Ari: Not at all. (ουδαμως.)  
Par: Accordingly then, **Self will not Have a Whole to Part Relationship with It-Self**,  
P2-079 αρα αυτο αν ουδ’ εινη όλον προς μερος προς εαυτου  
as if **It were a Part of Self**. (ως ον μερος αυτου.)  
Ari: That is not possible. (γαρ ου οιον τε.)  
Par: But accordingly then, **Oneness/Unity is Other than The One**?  
P2-080 αλλ’ αρα ενοικ(Generative of εις) εστιν ετερον το εν;  
Ari: Without a doubt. (ου δητα.)  
(Ocean: The Seventh Intellectual Monad, 1255 (P53) Proclus Book 8)
Ari: It must. (αναγκη .)
Par: What then? By Self Being In The Self, is not That which Is elsewhere than with It-Self
P2-083 ti δε ; αυτω οντος εν τω αυτω ουκ το ον επερωθη εαυτω Necessarily Be Other than It-Self, if indeed Self will also Be elsewhere than with It-Self ?
Ari: It so appears to me least. (δοκει εμοιε .)
Par: In this way, as it has come to Light, The One Being certainly Has to Be At-Once,
P2-084 οτω εφανη το εν εν μη εχον αμα both In-It-Self and In-Another ? (τε εν εαυτου και εν ετερον ;)
Ari: For it has come to Light. (γαρ εφανη .)
Par: Accordingly then, as it is likely, from this account The One will Be Other than It-Self.
P2-085 αρα , ας εοικεν , ταυτη το εν αν ειη ετερον εαυτου .
Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

§146D

Par: What follows then? If Anything Is Other from Another,
P2-086 τι ουν ; ει τι εστιν ετερον του , will It not Be Other from That to which It Is Being Other ?
estai ouch eteron ountos eteron ;
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Parmenides: 16 Is it not the case then, that As many as Are Not-One,
P2-087 ουκουν οσα εστιν μη εν , So many Are Other than The One ; and is not The One Other from Those that are Not-One ?
απανθ’ ετερα του ενος , και το εν των μη εν ;
Aristotle: How could it not be? (πως δ’ ου;) Par: Accordingly then, The One will be Other than The Others .
P2-088 αρα το εν αν ειη ετερον των αλλων .
Ari: It is other. (ετερον.)
Par: See then ; are not both The Self/Same and The Other Opposite to each other ?
P2-089 ορα δη : αρ’ ουκ τε ταυτον και το ετερον εναντα αλληλοις ;
Ari: How could they not be? (πως δ’ ου;) Par: Therefore, will The Self/Same ever Be Truly Disposed In The Other, or The Other
P2-090 ουν ταυτον ποτε ειναι η εθελησει εν τω ετερο τη η το ετερον In The Self/Same ? (εν ταυτω ;)
Ari: They will not be so disposed. (ουκ εθελησει .)
Par: Accordingly then, if The Other will Never Be In The Self/Same, then there Are None of
P2-091 αρα ει το ετερον μηδεποτε εσται εν ταυτω , εστι ουδεν

§146E

The Beings In which The Other Ever Subsists . For if It Were in any Being at any time at all ,
ton onton en ω to eteron oudeoun χρωνον estin . γαρ ει ειη εν τω οντιουν then at that time , The Other would also Be In The Self/Same . Or is it not so ?
ton ekeivon chronon , to eteron αν ειη εν ταυτω . ουχ ουτως ;
Ari: It would be so. (ουτως .)
Par: But since It Is never In The Self/Same, The Other will never Be In any of The Beings .
P2-092 δ’ επειδη εστιν ουδεποτε εν τω αυτω, το ετερον αν ουδεποτε ειη εν τινι των οντων.
Ari: True. (αληθη .)
§147A

**Par:** Accordingly then, *The Other* will not be *In Those* that *Are Not-One*, nor *In The One*.  

**P2-093** ἀρα τὸ ετερὸν αὐν οὐτ’ εἰς ἐν τοῖς μὴ εν οὔτε ἐν τῷ οὐν.  

**Ari:** It will not be so. (γὰρ οὐ οὖν.)  

**Par:** Accordingly then, *The One*, will indeed not *Be Other* from *Those* that *Are Not-One*  

**P2-094** ἀρα τὸ εὖ αὐν γ’ οὐκ εἰς ετερα τον μὴ εν ἢν οὐκ ἢν οὐκ ἢν.  

**Ari:** That which are *Not-One* Be *Other* than *The One* by *That* which is *Other*.  

οὐδὲ τ’ αὐτὸς εἰς ετερα τοῦ οὐνοῦ τῷ ετερῷ.  

**Ari:** Indeed not. (γὰρ οὖν.)  

**Par:** Then *They* will not *Be Other* than *Each Other* by not *Participating* of *The Other*.  

**P2-095** γε μὴν εἰς ετερα ἀλλήλων μὴ μεταχείται τοῦ ετεροῦ.  

**Ari:** How can they? (πῶς γὰρ;)  

§147B

**Par:** But if *They* are neither *Other from-Them Selves*, nor *from The Other*, then Must  

**P2-096** δὲ εἰ ἐστὶ μητὲ ετερα αὐτοίς μητὲ τῷ ετερῷ, αὐ νοῦ  

*They* not *Already Entirely Flee* from (Phaedo 104c) *That* which *Is Other* from *Each Other*?  

οὐ ἢ δὴ πάντη εἰκεφευγὼν τὸ εἰναὶ ετερα ἀλλήλων;  

**Ari:** They must flee. (ἐκφευγόν.)  

**Par:** Most certainly then, neither will *Those* that are *Not-One Participate* of *The One*;  

**P2-097** γε μὴν ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ τα μη εν μεταχεί τοῦ οὐνοῦ:  

for if *They* did, then *They* would no longer be *Not-One*, but in a certain way *Be One*.  

γαρ αὖ αὖ οὖ ἢν μη εν ἀλλα πῃ εν.  

**Ari:** True. (ἀληθῆ.)  

**Par:** Accordingly then, *Those* that are *Not-One* will not *Be Number*; for in this way,  

**P2-098** ἀρα τα μη εν αὐν οὐδ’ εἰς αριθμόνι: γαρ οὔτω  

by indeed *Possessing Number*, *They* could not entirely *Be*, *Not-One*.  

γε εἰχοντα αριθμόν αὖ πανταπασιν ἢν μη εν.  

**Ari:** Certainly not. (γὰρ οὖν οὖν.)  

**Par:** What follows then? *Are Those* that are *Not-One*, *Parts* of *The One*? Or would *Those*  

**P2-099** τι δὲ; εἰς τα μη εν μοριὰ του οὐνοῦ; ἢ καν τα  

that are *Not-One*, by *Possessing Number in this* (Negative) *way*, *Partake* of *The One*?  

μη εν αρα οὔτω μετείχε τοῦ οὐνοῦ;  

**Ari:** They would so participate. (μετείχεν;)  

§147C

**Par:** Accordingly then on the one hand, if *The (Positive) One* is *entirely One*, then  

**P2-100** ἀρα μὲν εἰ το επὶ εἰς εἰκεν πάντη δε  

in *relation to Those* that are *Not-One*; *The One* will not *Be a Part* of *Those* that are *Not-One*,  

τα μη εν το επὶ εἰς εἰκεν πάντη δε  

nor could *The One Be a Whole in relation to Them*, as if *They* were *Parts*; nor in turn, will  

οὔτε οὐλον ὠς μοριῶν: οὔτε αὐ.  

*Those* that are *Not-One Be Parts* of *The One*, nor *Wholes*, just as if *The One Were a Part*.  

τα μη εν μορια του ενού, οὔτε ολο ας τω επι μοριω.  

**Ari:** They will not. (γαρ οὐ.)  

**Par:** But we have certainly said that *Those* that *Are* neither *Parts* nor *Wholes*,  

**P2-101** αλλα μὴν εἴματεν τα μητε μορια μητε ολα  

nor *Other from Each Other*, will have to *Be The Same* with *Each Other*.  

μητε ετερα αλλήλων εσσεσθαι ταυτα αλλήλωι ς.  

**Ari:** For we have said so. (γαρ εἴματεν.)
Par: Accordingly then, shall we also say that *The One Has The Relationship to Those* that *Are Not-One*, *in the same way as The Self Has to Be to Selves*?

Ari: We must say so. (*φωμεν.*)

Par: Accordingly then, *The One*, as it is *Reasonable*, *Is both Other/Different from The Others and from It Self and The Self/Same as Those* and with *It Self*.

§147C

Ari: It has indeed come to *Light* from this *Logos* to venture saying it.

(From *The Assimilative/Leading/Super-Kosmic Gods*, 1255 (P55) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, *Is It* also *Like* and *Unlike It-Self and Like* and *Unlike The Others*?

Ari: Perhaps. (*ισος.*)

Par: Seeing that *The One Has come to Light Other/Different from The Others*,

then surely *The Others will also Be Other/Different in some (indefinite) way from That*.

Ari: What next then? (*τι μην.*)

Par: *In the same way*, will not *The One Be Other/Different from The Others*, just as

The *Others Are also Different from That*, and *It is neither more nor less* (in this *Difference*)?

Ari: How could it not be so? (*τι αν γαρ.*)

Par: Accordingly then, if *It is neither more nor less*, *They Are Different* in a *similar* way.

Ari: Yes. (*ναι.*)

Par: Is it not so then, that inasmuch as *The One experiences Being Different than The Others*,

and *The Others also than The One*, then *in this way The One will also experience Being*

Ari: *What do you mean?* (*πως λεγεις.*)

Par: The following. *Do you not assign every Name to something?*

Ari: *I do at least.* (*ειρωνει.*)

Par: *What follows then? Can you pronounce The Self/Same Name either often or once?*

Ari: *I can at least.* (*ειρωνει.*)

Par: Therefore on the one hand, *do you Name That* to which the name *belongs*, when

§147D

*The Self/Same* both *in relation to The Others* and *The Others in relation to The One*.

Ari: *What do you mean?* (*πως λεγεις.*)

Par: *The following*. *Do you not assign every Name to something?*

Ari: *I do at least.* (*ειρωνει.*)

Par: *What follows then? Can you pronounce The Self/Same Name* either often or once?

Ari: *I can at least.* (*ειρωνει.*)

Par: Therefore on the one hand, *do you Name That* to which the name *belongs*, when

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you say It once ; but not on the other hand , when you say that Name often ? Or rather ,
prosagoromeis apax , ouk de ean ekwv polllakiai ; h polly
must you always mean The Same Name whether you utter The Same Name once or often?
anagke se aei legeni tauton onoma eanete phugexh tauton apax eanete polllakiai ;
Ari: Of course , what follows then ? (men ti ;)
Par: Is it not the case then , that Another Name also belongs to some particular ?
Ari: Entirely so . (apan ve .)

§147E

Par: Accordingly then , when you utter Self whether once or often , you do not apply the Name
Ari: Necessarily so . (anagke .)
Par: Surely then when we say , on the one hand , that The Others Are Other from The One ,
Ari: It is Reasonable . (eokein .)
Par: But surely then , The Like Is indeed contrary to The Unlike .
Ari: And this also . (kai touto .)
Par: Is it not also the case , that The Other/Different Is contrary to The Self/Same ?
Ari: For it has come to Light . (gar efavn .)
§148B
Par: But to **Be The Self/Same with The Others** is indeed the opposite *experience*

P2-120 ἐὰν εἰναι τὸ ταυτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔστι γέ τοι αὐτοκριτίκον παθός
from that to **Be Other from The Others**.

τὸ εἰναι ετερον τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάντα γέ.)

Par: Most certainly, insofar as **The One Is Other**, It has come to **Light** to **Be Like**.

P2-121 γέ μὴν ἂν ετερον, ἑβανη ὁμοιον.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, insofar as **It Is The Self/Same**, It will be **Be Unlike**.

P2-122 ἀρα η ταυτὸν ἐσται αὐτοκριτικον
by *experiencing the experience* that **Is** opposite to **That** which makes **It Like**.

κατὰ παθεὶ παθὸς τοιαύτων τῷ ὁμοιούντι.

Whereas on the other hand, **The Other in some way made** **It Like**?

δὲ τὸ ετερον ποὺ ὁμοιον;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, **That** which **Is The Self/Same** will *make* **It Unlike**;

P2-123 ἀρα το ταυτὸν ἀναμοιοσεῖ,
otherwise **The Same** will *not Be* opposite to **The Other**.

Ari: It is reasonable. (εἰκότευ.)

§148C

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** will **Be** both **Like** and **Unlike** **The Others**. On the one hand,

P2-124 ἀρα το εν εσται ὁμοιον και αὐτοκριτικον τοῖς ἄλλοις, μὲν
insofar as **It Is Other**, **It** will **Be Like**; but on the other hand, insofar as **It Is Same**, **Unlike**.

τὸ ετερον ὁμοιον, δὲ το ενεπερνει αὐτοκριτικον

Ari: As it is reasonable, and according to **This Logos**, it surely has to be so.

οὑς εἰκότευ καὶ γὰρ τοιαύτων λόγον, δὴ εχεὶ ων.

Par: For **The One** also has to **Be** in the following way.

P2-125 γὰρ καὶ εχεὶ τοιαύτω.

Ari: In what way? (τινα;)...

Par: Insofar as **It experiences Being The Same**, **It does not experience** alteration; whereas if

P2-126 ἡ πεπονθει ετερον, μὴ πεπονθεὶ ἀλλοιον, δὲ
**It does not experience** alteration, **It Cannot Be Unlike**; but if **It is Not** **Unlike**, **It Is Like**;

μὴ πεπονθος ἀλλοιον μὴ αὐτοκριτικον, μὴ αὐτοκριτικον:
but insofar as **It experiences Being Other**, then **It experiences** alteration, thus by **Being**

δὴ ἡ πεπονθεὶν ἀλλο ἀλλοιον, δὲ ὅν
altered **It Is Unlike**. (ἀλλοιον εἰναι αὐτοκριτικον.)

Ari: You speak **The Truth**. (λεγεις αἱθή.)

Par: Accordingly then, since **The One Being Is both The Same and Other from The Others**,

P2-127 ἀρα στὶ το εν ὀν εστὶ τε ταυτὸν καὶ ετερον τοῖς ἄλλοις,

§148D

according to both and according to each, thus, **It will Be both Like and Unlike The Others**.

κατ’ ἀμφότερα καὶ καδ’ εκατερον, αν εἰτε ὁμοιον και αὐτοκριτικον τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάντα γέ.)

Par: And in a similar way, is **This** not the case, in relation to-*Itself*, **Seeing that The One**

P2-128 καὶ ἐσαυτός ὑποκον ἐαυτο ἐπειπερ
§148E

Being has come to Light both Other from-It-Self and The Same with-It-Self; according to both and according to each, thus, It will come to Light both Like and Unlike? Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

(The Unpolluted/Liberated/Super-Kosmic & Kosmic Middle Order of Gods, (P58) Proclus)

Par: What then? Consider how The One Has to be in relation to Grasping/Touching, according to The Self and to The Others, and then in relation to not Grasping/Touching. Ari: I so consider. (σκοπω.)

Par: For The One Being has come to Light in some way In The Whole It-Self.

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Is also In The Others? Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

§148E

Par: Thus on the one hand insofar as The One Is In Others, It will Grasp The Others; but insofar as Self Is In It-Self, on the one hand, It will be kept from Grasping The Others, whereas on the other hand, Self will Grasp Self, by Being In It-Self.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: In this way then, on the one hand, The One will Grasp both Self and The Others.

Ari: It will so grasp. (απτοιτο.)

Par: But on the other hand, what about the following? Must not Everything which is about Grasping Anything, be situated next to That which It is about to Grasp, by Filling-up, which lies Besides That, so as to Grasp It? (Direct Contact, тην ταυτινη εδραν η αν κειται μετ’ η εκεινην, η απεσθαι;) (No Intermediary) Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The One Self were also about to Grasp Self, then It must be situated Immediately Next to It-Self; by Filling-up That Neighboring Place, In-which, Self Is.

Ari: It must do so. (γαρ δει ουν.)

§149A

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, if The One Being were made Two; then These Two Selves could also come-to-be in Two Places at the same time; but on the other...
hand, as long as and inasmuch as *It Is One*, *It will not Be* so Disposed?

Ari: It will not do so. (γαρ οὐν όν)
Par: Accordingly then, *The Self/Same Necessity Applies to The One*;
P2-137 αρα ἡ αὐτή αναγκή τοῦ ενι οὔτε so that *It can neither Be Two*, nor can *Self Be Grasped* by *Self*.

μητε εἰναι δυο μητε αυτον απετεθαι αυτω.

Ari: *The Self/Same necessity*. (ἡ αὐτή.)
Par: Certainly then, *It will not Grasp The Others*.
P2-138 μην ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ανέχεται τῶν ἀλλῶν.

Ari: Why then? (τι δῆ;) Par: For we say that, *That* which is about to *Grasp*, must be *Separate* from *That*, by *Being*
P2-139 φαμεν οτι, το μελλόν αφεσθαι δει ειναι χωρίς εκεινω ον next to *That* which *It Is* about to *Grasp*; thus there *Is no Third Term Between Them Selves*.

εφεξής ου μελλει αφεσθαι, δε ειναι μηδεν τριτον εν μεσω αυτων.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)
Par: Accordingly then, at the very least *Two Terms Are Necessary*, if *Contact* is about to be.
P2-140 αρα ολιγιστον δυο το ειναι δει, ει αψις μελλει ειναι.

Ari: It is necessary. (δει.)

§149B

Par: But if on the one hand, a *Third Term* is added right after *The Two*, then *(Their) Selves*
P2-141 δε εαν μεν τριτον προσγενησαι εξης των δυοιν, μεν αυτα will be *Three*, but *(Their) Contacts (Relationships)* will *Be Two*.

εσται τρια, δε αι αψεις δυο. (Nicomachus Book 1 Chap 8 Introduction to Arithmetic)
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: And surely then in this way, whenever *One Term Is* added, *One Contact Is* also added,
P2-142 και δη ουσα συμβαινει ενος προσγινομουν μια αψις και προσγινηται, and the amount of all the Contacts will *Always Be One* less than *The Number of Terms*. For every succeeding Number of Terms exceeds the amount of all Contacts, by just as much as,

ο επεται αριθμος ο πλενεκτει το πλειο πασον τον αψουν τω ισο
The Number of their Contacts was exceeded by *The Number* of the first Two Terms. For the touto των αψουν ειναι επελενεκτησε εις τον αριθμον τα πρωτα δυο. γαρ το

§149C
rest, *One Term Is* immediately added to both *The Number of Terms* and at the same time *One*

*λοιπον εν ηδη προσγινηται τε τον αριθμον και αμα μια Contact Is* immediately added, to *The Contacts*.

ταις αψειν.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)
Par: Accordingly then, whatever *The Number of Terms* there *Are* of *The Selves*,
P2-143 αρα οσα τον αριθμον τα ουντα εστι αυτων
Their Contacts will *Always Be less*, by *One*.

αι αψεις αei ειςιν ελαττους μια.
Ari: True. (αληθη.)
Par: Then, if indeed only one term exists, but two are not, then there can be no contact.

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ ;)

Par: Have we not said that, those that are other than the one are not one,

nor do they participate of self, if indeed they are other? oute metexhei auton, eiper estin allia.

Ari: Neither. (γαρ ου λύν.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no number that is inherent in the others,

since one/unity is not inherent in them.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ ;)

§ 149D

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither one nor two,

nor do they possess the name of any other number.

Ari: They do not. (ου λύν.)

Par: Accordingly then, the one is one, alone, and it will not be two.

Ari: It will not so come to light. (ου φαινεται λύτω.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no contact; since there are no two terms/beings/selves.

Ari: There are not. (εστιν ου λύτω.)

Par: Accordingly then, the one will neither grasp the others,

nor will the others grasp the one, if indeed there is no contact.

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ ουν ου λύτω.)

Par: Surely then in this way, according to all these statements, the one will both

Grasp and not Grasp the others and It-self.

Ari: It is reasonable. (εοικεν λύτω.)

(The Kosmic/Sublunary Gods, 1201 (P 63) Proclus Book 8)

Parmenides: 18 Take notice then, is the one equal and unequal to self and to the others?

Aristotle: How? (πως ;)

§ 149E

Par: If the one were bigger or smaller than the others, or in turn if the others were bigger

or smaller than the one, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither the one by being

the one, nor there would be one, and the others, and in turn the one.

Ari: How? (πως ;)
One, nor The Others by Being Other than The One would be something bigger nor something en outhe ta alla alla tou enos an eis, ti meiζω outhe ti smaller than Each Other, by Virtue of The Selfhood of Their Ousias. But if Each One, elαttw αλλήλων γε ταίς αυταίς ταύταις ουσίαις; αλλ’ eι εκατέρα μεν besides Being Such as They Are, would also Possess Equality, then They would Be Equal to proso ευναι τοιαύτα εξειν ισοτητα αν εις ίσα προς Each Other. But if, The Others Possessed Bigness but The One Smallness, or The One allηλα: de ei τα μεν μεγέθος δε το σμικρητην, η το εν Bigness but The Others Smallness, then on the one hand, wherever The Idea of Bigness would μεγέθος δε ταλλα σμικρητην, μεν οπότερο τω ειδε μεγέθος Be Present, One would be bigger; but The One in which Smallness Exists would be smaller? προσει, αν εις μειζων, δε ω σμικρητης ελαττων; Ari: Necessarily. (άναγκη.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that both These Certain Ideas; Bigness and Smallness, how could it not be so? Necessarily. (έναν τον.)

Ari: How could they? (πως αν γαρ;)

§150A

Par: Accordingly then, if Smallness Comes to Be In The One, then It will either Be Present P2-155 αρα εις σμικρητης εγχινηται εν τω ενι; αν ητοι ενειη In The Whole of Self or In a Part of Self. en olou autou h en merai.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: What then, if Smallness would Come to Be In The Whole? Will It not either Be P2-156 τι δ’ εις εγχινηται εν ωλο; αν ουκ εις εισ ικι τω ενι, αν ουχι εις εισ \[\text{The Whole of The One Self or Encompass/Contain Self}\].

Ari: Manifestly so. (δηλον δη.)

Par: Take notice then, if on the one hand, Smallness is extended Equally throughout The Whole of The One Self or Encompass/Contain Self? ες τεταμη ισου δι’ εις ωλου τω ενι αυτου η περιεχουσα αυτο; Ari: How could it not be so?

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως ου δ’);

Par: Therefore, Is it indeed Possible for Smallness to Be Equal or bigger than anything, and to P2-158 σου γε δυνατον σμικρητηα ειναι ιση η μειζω τω τινος, και do the functions of Bigness/Magnitude and Equality, but not perform the functions of It-Self? πραττειν τα μεγεθου τε και ισοτητος, αλλα μη τα εαυτης; Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

§150B

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, Smallness will not be extended throughout P2-159 αρα μεν σμικρητη εν ουκ εις
the Whole of The One, but in a Part, if indeed at all.

ολος το ενι, αλλ’ εν μερει επερ.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Nor indeed in turn, In The Whole Part; for if It did, then would not these Be functions

Always Be either Equal or bigger than that in which Smallness happens to Be extended.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, Smallness will never Exist in any of The Real Beings, since It cannot

exist in a Part nor in a Whole; nor will there Be anything small except The Smallness of Self. eγεννυμενη εν μερει μητ’ εν ολω: ουδε εσται τι σμικρον πλην σμικροτητος αυτης.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

§150C

Par: Accordingly then, neither will Magnitude Be Inherent in Self. For then there will be

αρα σμικροτης ποτε ενεσται ουδενι των οντων, μητ’

Exist in a Part nor in a Whole; for if The Being of Smallness is not; these which Self Must surpass by whatever Is big;

και οντος σμικρου ουκ, ταυτα ου αυτω αναγκη υπερεχειν εανπερ η μεγα; but this, Is Impossible, seeing that Smallness cannot ever Be Inherent in any being.

de touto αδυνατον, επειδε σμικροτης ουδαμου ενι.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Then certainly, Self Magnitude will not be bigger than another, except Self Smallness,

ουδε σμικροτης ελαττον η αλλου αυτου μεγεθους.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Others Be bigger nor smaller than The One, since

αρα ουτε τα αλλα μειζω ουδε ελαττον του ενος.

§150D

They neither Possess Bigness nor Smallness, nor Is This Self, That which Has The Power

μητε εχοντα μεγεθος μητε σμικροτητα, ουτε τοιο ουτω εκεν την δυναμιν

in relation to The One, of either surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will only be the case

tου την υπερεχειν και υπερεχεσθαι, αλλα

in relation to Each Other; nor in turn will The One Be either bigger nor smaller than These

ουδε των αλλων, μητε εχον μεγεθος μητε σμικροτητα.

Ari: It has not indeed come to Light.

ουκουν γε φαινεται.

Par: Take notice then, if The One is neither bigger nor smaller than The Others,

αρ’ ουν, ει το εν μητε μειζων μητε ελαττον των αλλων,
then Self Must Necessarily neither surpass or Be surpassed by Them?

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκή)

Par: Is it not Abundantly Necessary Indeed, for That which neither surpasses

§150E

P2-166 οὐκοῦν πόλλη ἀναγκή γε το μήτε ὑπερχειν μήτε ὑπερεχεσθαι εκείνων;

Ari: How could it not? (πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ) (Nicomachus Book I Chapter 17-3, Intro. to Arith.)

§151A

but on the other hand, by Being Contained, It would Be smaller than It-Self; and in this way

de περιέχομεν ἐλάττων, καὶ οὔτω

The One Self would be bigger and smaller than It-Self.

Ari: It would be so. (αν εἶπε γὰρ.)

Par: Must not the following also be the case; that there Is nothing at all Outside

P2-170 ἀναγκὴ οὐκοῦν τοῦτο καὶ ἐναι μηδὲν εκτὸς

of The One and The Others? (τὸν ἑνὸς τε καὶ τὸν ἀλλὸν; )

Ari: How could it not be in this way? (πῶς οὐ γὰρ; )

Par: But it Must Be the case that, That which Is, Must Always Be somewhere.

P2-171 ἀλλὰ δεὶ γε μὴν το τὸν αὐτὸν εἰς εἰναι εἰναι ποῦ.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Is it not indeed the case that, That which Is in anything, will Subsist

P2-172 οὐκοῦν γε το τὸν ἑνὸς ἔσται by Being the smaller in the bigger? For otherwise, One cannot Subsist in The Other.

Ari: It cannot. (γὰρ οὐ.)

Par: But since there Is no Other, apart from The One and The Others, then Selves

P2-173 δε επειδὴ στὶς οὐ δένετον ἑτέρον χωρίς τον ἑνὸς καὶ τὸν ἀλλὸν, δὲ αὐτὰ Must Be in something. Then is it not also Necessary that since Selves Are already in
dei εἶναι ἐν τῷ, οὐκ ἀναγκὴ εἰναι ηδή ἐν
Each-Other, then The Others also Subsist in The One and The One also Subsists in

§151B

The Others, or else Selves Exist in no way whatsoever?

tois αλλας, η ειναι μηδαιμον;

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, since The One Is Inherent in The Others, then

The Others will be bigger than The One, by Comprehending/Containing The Self;
ta αλλα αν ειι μειζων του ενος, περιεχοντα αυτο,

whereas on the other hand, The One will be smaller than The Others by Being Contained;
dε το εν ελαττων των αλλων, περιεχομενον:

but since The Others Are Inherent in The One, then by The Self/Same Logos, The One
dε στι τα αλλα εν τω ενι, κατα τον αυτον λογον το εν

will be bigger than The Others; and thus, The Other Beings will be smaller than The One.

αν ειι μειζων των αλλων, δε τα αλλα ελαττω του ενος.

Ari: As it is Reasonable. (φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, Is Equal to, and bigger and smaller than,

both Self and The Others.
tε αυτου και των αλλων.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

§151C

Par: And certainly, if indeed It is bigger, smaller and Equal, then It will Be of Equal, more

και μην ειπε μειζων και ελαττων και εσον, και αν ειν πλειονων

and less Measures than Self and The Others; whereas if of Measures, then also of Parts.

και ελαττουν μετρων αυτο και των αλλων, δε επειδη μετρων, και μερων.

Ari: How could it not be? (πως δ’ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by Being of Equal, more and lesser Measures,

και και ειν ελαττων και πλειον αριθμο τε αυτου και των αλλων

and also, according to The Same Logos, It will Be Equal to Self and to The Others.

tε κατα ταυτα ις εσον αυτω και τοις αλλοις.

Ari: How? (πως;) 

Par: Whatever Is big, will also Be in some way of more Measures than Selves, whereas

οντην εστι μειζων, αν και ειπ που πλειονων μετρων αυτου: δε

it will also Be of as many Measures as Parts; and in the same way for that which Is small,

οντην μετρων, μερων και ωςαυτως εν ελαττων,

and according to The Same Logos for that which Is equal.

tε κατα ταυτα ις εσον.

Ari: In the same way.(ουτως.)
§151D
Par: Is it not the case then , that by Being big and small and Equal to It-Self ,

It will also Be of Equal Measures , and of more and of less Measures than Self ?

Ari: How could it not be ? (πως ου δ’) ;

Par: Accordingly then , on the one hand , by Being of Equal Parts to Self ,

It will Be Equal in Multitude to Self ; but on the other hand , if of more , then more ,

Ari: So it has come to Light . (φαινεται .)

Par: Is it not the case then , that The One Has to Be Related in the same way to The Others ?

For on the one hand , It has come to Light bigger than Them Selves , and so It must Be more

Ari: Necessarily .(αναγκη .)

§151E
Par: Surely then , in this way in turn , as it is Reasonable , The One Self will Be Equal ,

and more and less in Number , than both Self and The Others .

Ari: It will be so . (εσται .)

(Time : Kosmic Souls , (P68 , P92) Proclus Book 8)

Parmenides: 19 Take notice then , will The One also Participate of Time ? And does

Self also become younger and older , both than It-Self and The Others , and also

Ari: Yes . (ναι .) (compare This to 160d4)

(Present-Past-Future/Angels-Spirits-Heroes , (P68 , P97) Proclus Book 8)

Par: But on the other hand , what else Is The To Be , than The Participation of Ousia with
§152A

**The Present of Time?** Just as, The Was Is The Participation of Ousia with
tou paron ton chrónon, oswpet to hns meta
The Past, and in turn, The Will Be Is The Communion of Ousia with The Future?
tou perëliðhtos kai au to estai esti koinonia oussias meta tou meüllonotos;
Ari: It is so. (estì gar.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, It Participates of Time, if indeed It also Participates of The To Be.
P2-186  ara mev metechi chrónon, eipere kai tov eivain.
Ari: Entirely so. (παντι γε.)

**Par:** Will not then, The Time of which It Participates, Be in a state of Procession?
P2-187 oukouv to chrónon pereümmenou;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, It Is Always becoming older than It-Self,
P2-188  ara aei gignetai presbhuteron eautou,
if indeed It Proceeds according to Time. (As opposed to Abiding in The Eternal)
eipere proérchetai kata chrónon.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Take notice then, do we remember (141a) that whatever becomes younger does so,
P2-189  arp’ ouv mevniemetha gignomenu nevteron
because the older becomes older (than it)?
ou to presbhuteron gignetai presbhuteron;
Ari: We do remember. (μεμνημεθα.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that while The One, becomes older than It-Self,
P2-190 oukouv epeidhi to ev gignetai presbhuteron eautou,

§152B

that It is becoming older than It-Self, while It is becoming younger than It-Self?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Surely then in this way, on the one hand, It will become younger and older than Self.
P2-191 de outics mev gignetai nevteron te kai presbhuteron eautou.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** But accordingly, on the other hand, It Is not in any way older, when Coming-to-Be
P2-192  arp’ de esti ouc h presbhuteron ouc gignomenu
according to The Present Time; That which Is between The Was and The Will Be? For
kata touv chrónon ton metexu touh hν te kai estai; gar
by Proceeding from The Past to The Future, It will not somehow go-beyond The Present?
pereumenu ek tou pote eis to epeita γε ouv pou uperbhssetai to vnu.
Ari: How could it. (γαρ ου.)

§152C

**Par:** Take notice then, will It not at that time cease to become older, since It arrives at The
P2-193  arp’ ouv oux tote epischai tou gignesai presbhuteron, epeidhan entuchη tou
Now and is no longer becoming, but at that time It Is already older? For when It Proceeds
vnu kai ou gignetai, all’ tou’ esti hν presbhuteron; gar pote proion
It will not be Grasped by The Now. For That which Proceeds Has To Be in such a way as
αν αυτό λήψις υπό του νυν. γαρ το προϊόν εξεί αυτως ος
to Grasp both The Now and The Future; on the one hand, by Departing from The Now, while
εφαπτόμενοι αμφοτέρων του νυν τε και του επείτα, μεν αφεμένον τον νυν, δ’
also Apprehending The Future, by Coming-to-Be Between both The Future and The Now.
eπαλαμβάνομεν του επείτα, γιγνομένον μεταξύ αμφοτέρων, του επείτα τε και του νυν.
Ari: True. (αληθής)
Par: But if it is indeed Necessary that All that Is becoming should not by-pass
The Now; since, as soon as it arrives at This Now, That/Ousia will Always cease becoming,
tο νυν, επειδήν η κατα τούτο, του αει επισχεί γιγνεσθαι

§152D

and Is, at that time, That which It was Aiming to become.
και εστί τοτε τουτο ο τι αν τυχή γιγνομένον.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One, also, in Aiming at becoming older, when It Hits-upon
The Now, It will also cease becoming at that time that It Is older.
tο νυν, και επεισεξάν του γιγνεσθαι τοτε εστί πρεσβυτέρων.
Ari: Entirely so.
πανυ γε.
Par: Is it not the case then, that It is also older than that, in relation to which
It has become older, when it was thus becoming older than Self?
εγιγνετο δε εγιγνετο αυτου;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: But the older is older than the younger?
Ari: It is. (εστίν.)
Par: Accordingly then, at that time, The One is younger than Self,
when by becoming older It Hits upon The Now.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκή.)

§152Ε

Par: Most certainly then, The Now is Always Present with The One (Like @ 142c 6),
μη μην το νυν αει παρεστι το ενι
through-out The Whole of Its Being: For It Is Always Now, as long as and insofar as, It Is.
δια παντοζ του ειναι: γαρ αει νυν οτανπερ η εστί.
Ari: How could it not be? (πως γαρ ου;)?
Par: Accordingly then, The One Always Is and also becomes older and younger than It-Self.
Ari: It is Reasonable. (εισικεν.)
Par: But Is or does Self become in a more-extended or in an Equal Period of Time to It-Self?
Ari: He is the One who
πλειω η ισον τον χρονον εαυτου;
Ari: In an equal period of time. (τον ωσυν.)
Par: But most certainly, That which either Is or becomes in an Equal Period of Time,
has to be of The Same Age.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ ου;) 
Par: But That which is of The Same Age, is neither older nor younger.

Ari: It is not. (γαρ ου;) 
Par: Accordingly then, since The One Self both becomes and Is in a Period of Time that
is Equal to It-Self, then It neither Is nor becomes neither younger nor older than It-Self.

Ari: It does not appear to me, that it can. (ου δοκει μοι;) 
Par: What follows then, in relation to The Others?

Ari: I know not what to say. (ουκ εξω λεγειν.)

§153A

Par: You may certainly say the following; that Those Other than The One,
eχεις μην λεγειν τοδε, στι τα αλλα του ενας,
if indeed They Are indeed Other (plural), but not Another (singular), Are more than One.
eιπερ εστιν γε ετερα, αλλα μη ετερον, εστιν πλειω ενος:
For on the one hand, by Being Other, They will also Be One; but on the other hand, by Being
γαρ μεν ον ετερον αν ην εν: δε οντα
Others, They Are more than One, and They will Possess Multitude.
eτερα εστι πλειω ενος και αν εχω πληθος.

Ari: They will possess it. (γαρ αν εχοι;) 
Par: But by Being Many They will Participate of a greater Number than The One.

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ ου;) 
Par: What then? Do we say that Those that are more in Number are generated, and
και γεγονει το προτερον η τα ελαττω
Ari: The few. (τα ελαττω;) 
Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Least Is First. But This Is The One. Can it be so?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

§153B

Par: Accordingly then, The One has become The First of All Those Possessing Number:
Ari: They have to be. (γαρ εχει.)
**Par:** But indeed, by *having-come-to-be First*, I think, *It came-to-be Before*,
*The Others came-to-be Later*. But *Those* that *have-come-to-be Later* are *younger* than *That* which *has come-to-be Before*: and thus, *The Others* will be *younger* than *The One*, but *The One* will be *Older* than *The Others*.

*The One* has come to *be* older than *The Others*. For it will be.

**Parmenides:** 20 But what about the following? Could it *be* the case, that *The One*
has *come-to-be*, contrary to *The Nature of Self*, or is this *Impossible*?

**Aristotle:** Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

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§153C

**Par:** But surely, *The One* has indeed come to *Light* to consist of *Parts* (Older, Same, Younger);
but if of *Parts*, then also of a *Beginning*, *End* and *Middle*.

*The One* and *The Others*; and after that, *The Beginning*
και του ενος αυτου και εκαστου των αλλων, και μετα την αρχην
of *All the others* as far as to the *end*?

**Ari:** What follows then? (τι μην :)  
**Par:** And we shall most certainly say that *All* these *Others*, *Are Parts* of *The Whole* and
και εκεινον αυτο γενοναι αμα τη τελευτη εν τε και ολον.  

**Ari:** We shall say so. (γαρ φησομεν.)  
**Par:** But *The End* I suspect, *comes-to-be* the very *last* of all. Thus *The One Naturally*

§153D

*comes-to-be* in this way *At-Once*; so that, if indeed it *Is Necessary* that *The One Self*
γινεσθαι αυτο αμα: oστ’ ειπερ αναγκη το εν αυτο
*come-to-Be* contrary to *Nature*, in that *The One* would *have-come-to-Be*, *At-Once*.

**Ari:** So it has come to *Light*. (φαινεται.)
**Par:** Accordingly then, *The One* is *younger* than *The Others*,

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while The Others are older than The One.

Ari: To me, it has come to Light in this way in turn, (μοι φαίνεται ουτώς αυ.)
Par: But what then? Must not The Beginning or any other Part whatsoever of The One, or of anything else, if indeed and inasmuch as it Is a Part (singular),

§153E

or Parts (plural), Necessarily be One, if it Is indeed a Part?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκή.)

P2-219 oynamo to ev gnomenew aima tē to prōtō

and also Will come-to-Be At-Once with The Second Part; and It does not abandon a single one
cai an gninou’ aima to déuterō, kai apoleipetai oundenos

of The Others that are coming-to-Be, nor any Part to which It Can Be Attached; until
ton allōn gnomenewn, otipēr osouwn an prosychngntai, eow
Arriving at The Extreme Part, It Becomes One Whole; by neither Being excluded
dielhōn pros to eschaton genhntai en olōn, oute apoleipthn
of The Middle nor of The First nor of The Last, nor of any other Part in Its coming-to-Be.

mesou oute prōtō oute eschatou oute oundenos allou ev tē genvsei.

Ari: True. (αλήθη.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One, will Possess The Self/Same Age with All The Others.

So that if The One was not Produced contrary to Its Self Nature, then It has come-to-Be
wste eti ev eih mē pevōken para autō vosin, an gegovos

§154A

neither Before nor Later than The Others, but at-the-same-time with Them. And by This
oute protéron oute vseteron ton allōn, all’ aima . kai kata touton

Relationship, The One will neither be older nor younger than The Others, nor The Others
ton logon, to ev an oute eih presbyteron oute nevateron ton allōn oúde talla
than The One. Whereas, according to the former Relationship, The One was both older
tou evos : de kata ton proshein te presbyteron

and younger than The Others, and The Others, in a similar way, than That.

kai nevateron

and also.

Ari: Entirely so. (παντο μεν ουν.)
Par: Surely then, on the one hand, The One Is and Has-to-Be and Has-come-to-Be in this way
P2-221 δη μεν esti te egenon kai gegovos outhos

also. But then in turn, what shall we say about Self coming-to-Be older and also younger
kai. all’ aυ tēi peroi autō gynesthai presbyteron te kai nevateron

and The Others, and The Others than The One; and again, that It neither comes-to-Be

ton allōn kai talla tou evos , kai mēt gynesthai

younger nor older? Therefore does It Have-to-Be in the same way with That which Is

nevateron mēt presbyteron ; ora echei outho peroi tou einai

just as It also does with That which Is coming-to-Be, or otherwise?

ωσπερ kai perii tou gynesthai, η eterous ;
§154B
Par: But I am indeed able to affirm the following, that if One Member Is also older

P2-222 αλλ’ εξω γε τοσονδε, οτι ει οτερον εστιν και πρεσβυτερων than Another Member, Self cannot still become even older, other than by the age difference ετερου, αυτο αν ουκ δύνατο ετι γινησθαι ετι πρεσβυτερον, η τη ηλικια διηνεχε ανεξινευς which Self First possessed as soon as Self came-to-Be; nor in turn that by Being younger can It

ως το πρωτον ευθυς γενομενον, ουδε αυτο τον νεωτερον become still younger; for if Equals are added to un-equals -whether Time is added or anything γινησθαι ετι : γαρ ισα προστιθημενα ανισοις, χρονω τε και αλλω whatsoever-It will always make them differ Equally by just as much as they differed at First.

οσοουν, αν αει ποιει διαφερειν ισω οσωπερ διενεκη το πρωτον.
Ari: How could it be otherwise? (πος γαρ ου;)  

§154C
Par: Accordingly then, The Being Cannot indeed come-to-Be older nor younger

P2-223 αρα τον αν ουκ γε γινησθαι πρεσβυτερων ουδε νεωτερον than The One, at any time, if indeed It Is Always Equally different in age; whereas (του ενος BT) ποτε, ειπερ αει ισω διαφερει την ηλικιαν: αλλ’ It Is and Has Come-to-Be older, but then That which Is younger, does not come-to-Be.

εστι και γεγονε πρεσβυτερον, δε δ’ το νεωτερον, ου γινηται.
Ari: True. (αληθη;)  
Par: And so, The One Being, will not at any time become older nor younger, P2-224 και αρα τον ουτε ποτε γινηται πρεσβυτερων ουτε νεωτερον than The Others Beings. (των αλλων οντων.)
Ari: It will not. (γαρ ουν ου;)  
Par: Then See if The One Being becomes older and younger in this way.

P2-225 δε ορα ει γινηται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον τηδε.
Ari: In what way then? (πι δη;)  
Par: Insofar as The One has come to Light older than The Other Beings, P2-226 η τον εφανη πρεσβυτερον των αλλων and The Others than The One.

τε και ταλλα του ενος.
Ari: What follows then? (τι ουν;)  

§154D
Par: At the Time when The One has come to Light older than The Others, It has-come-to-be

P2-227 οταν τον η πρεσβυτερων των αλλων, γεγονεν in some way for a longer Period of Time than The Others.

που πλειον χρονον η τα αλλα.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)  
Par: Surely then consider again. If we add an Equal Time to a longer and shorter Period

P2-228 δη σκοπει παλιν: εαν προστιθημεν τον ισον χρονον πλεον και ελαττωνι of Time, then will the longer differ from the shorter by an Equal or by a smaller Part?

χρονον, αρα το πλεον διοσχει ου ελαττωνος το ισοι η σμικροτερω μοριοι;
Ari: By a smaller part. (συμικροτερω.)
§154E
Par: Is it not the case indeed, that Whatever differs less in age, in relation to anything, than It did before, It will become younger than in the past, in relation to Those to which It was older before? (ην πρεσβυτέρον προτερόν;)
Ari: Younger. (νεώτερον.)
Par: But if in turn, That Is younger, will not The Others Be older than before, in relation to The One? (προς το εν;) Ari: Entirely so. (πάντως;)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, That which has-come-to-be younger,
§155A
one hand, That advances to a younger state, but on the other hand, The Other to an older state. Ekeino epididōsēn epι το νεώτερον, δ’ το επι το πρεσβυτέρον. But in turn, in the same way, That which Is older is becoming younger than The younger. δ’ αυ σώσατος το πρεσβυτέρον γιγνεται νεώτεριν του νεώτερον. For by both of Them tending to that which is opposite, They become opposite to Each other; γαρ αυτωι ινωτε εις το εναντίον γιγνεθον το εναντίον αλλήλων, on the one hand, The younger become older than The older, but on the other hand, The older μεν το νεώτερον πρεσβυτέρον του πρεσβυτερου, δε το πρεσβυτερον become younger than The younger; but they will not Be able to Be such. For if They νεώτερον του νεώτερον: δε αν ουκ ειτην γενεθαι οιω τε. γαρ ει would-have-become, then They would no longer be-coming-to-be, but would Be. But now, γιγνοντο, αν ουκ επι γενοντο, αλλ’ αν ειεν. δε νυν They are becoming both older and younger than Each other. On the one hand, The One γιγνονται μεν πρεσβυτερα και νεώτερα αλλήλων: μεν το εν becomes younger than The Others, because It came to Light Being older, and would-have-γιγνεται νεώτερον τοις αλλών, στι εφανη ον πρεσβυτερον και

§155B
come-to-Be before; whereas on the other hand, The Others have-come-to-be older than γεγονος προτερον, δε τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα
The One since They have-come-to-be later. According to The Self Logos, The Others
tou enos osti gegevne vsterpa. kata tov auton logoν ταλλα
will also be related in the same way in relation to The One, inasmuch as They also came-to-
and, and to-have-come-to-be before.
–φανη πρεσβύτερα αυτον και γεγονοτα προτερα.
Ari: For It has thus come to Light in this way.

§155C

differ by a different part from Those that come-to-be later, and The Later from The Prior.
diaφερειν αλλα μορια των γενομενα υστερον και τα υστερα των προτερον.
Then, in this way, it is Necessary that They must become older and younger than Each Other;
δη ταυτη αναγκη γιγανθαι πρεσβυτερα τε και νεωτερα αλληλων
both The Others than The One and The One than The Others?
tε τα αλλα του ενος και το εν των αλλων;
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)
Par: Surely then, according to all these accounts, The One Self, both Is, and

§155D

Par: But since The One Participates of Time, and of becoming older and younger,

Par: Accordingly then, The One Was, and Is, and Will be; and was-coming-into-Being
Par: And there Should/Can/Must/Will Be Something (Ousia, 152a) in relation to That,
that also Belongs to That; which Was, and Is, and Will be.

καὶ καὶ εἰκονοῦ ήν καὶ εστὶν καὶ εσται.

Ari: Entirely so. (παντο γε.)

Par: Surely then, there Can/Must/Will Be Knowledge, and opinion, and perception of Self, since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning Self.

αυτου, ειπερ ημεις νυν πραττομεν παντα ταυτα περι αυτου.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λεγεις ορθως.)

Par: Surely then, there Is a Name and a Logos in relation to Self, and so It is Named of Self, since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning the Other Beings, is also the case concerning The One.

εστιν και περι το εν.

Ari: Therefore, it has to be entirely in this way.

ουν μεν εχει παντελως ουτως.
The Third Hypothesis

Par: Take notice then, is it possible, that It will Participate at the Time that It does not Participate; or that It will not Participate at the Time when It does Participate?

Ari: It is not possible. (οὐχ οἶνον τε.)

Par: Accordingly then, It Participates at one Time, and does not Participate at another Time.

§156A

For only thus, will it be possible for It to Participate and not Participate of The Self.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθῶς.)

Par: Is there not also such a Time, when It Shares of That which Is and when It takes-leave of Self? Or how can it be possible, that It Will on the one hand, Possess The Self at one oint; η πος οἶνον τε εσταὶ μὲν εχεὶν το αυτο
Time, but at another Time Not Possess It, unless if It both Receives-and-loses Self?
tote δε τοτε μη εχειν εαν μη και λαμβανει και αφιη αυτο;
Ari: No other way. (ουδομως.)
Par: Surely then, do you call The Receiving/Sharing of Ousia coming-to-Be?
P3-05 γε δι αρα ου καλεις το μεταλαμβανειν ουσιας γιγνεθαι;
Ari: I do at least. (εγογε.)
Par: But accordingly then, is not the loss of Ousia, to perish/to dissolve?
P3-06 δε αρα ουκ το απαλλαττεσθαι ουσιας απολλυθαι;
Ari: Entirely so. (και πανυ γε.)
Par: Surely then, The One, as it is Reasonable, comes-to-Be and dissolves,
P3-07 δη το εν, ως εοικε, γιγνεται τε και απολυται,

§156B
by receiving/grasping/taking/seizing and by letting-go/discharging/losing Ousia,

λαμβανειν τε και αφιεν ουσιαν .
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: Then by Being One and Many and by coming-to-Be and by letting-go-of-Being,
P3-08 δε ον εν και πολλα και γιγνομενον και απολλυμενον
accordingly on the one hand, when It comes-to-Be One, does It not cease to Be Many,
αρ’ μεν οταν γιγνεται εν, το ουχ απολυται ειναι πολλα,
but on the other hand, when It comes-to-Be Many, does It not cease to Be The One?
δε οταν πολλα, απολυται ειναι το εν;
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: But accordingly then, by coming-to-Be One and Many,
P3-09 αρ’ γιγνομενον εν και πολλα
must It not Necessarily Be both Dispersed/Scattered-apart and Collected-together?
ουκ αναγκη τε διακρινεσθαι και συγκρινεσθαι;
Ari: Very much so indeed. (πολλη γε.)
Par: And most certainly, when It comes-to-Be Unlike and Like,
P3-10 και γε μην οταν γιγνεται ανομοιον και ομοιον,
It then also comes-to-Be Assimilated and Dissimilated?
τε ομοιουσθαι και ανομοιουσθαι;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: And when It comes-to-Be more, less, and Equal,
P3-11 και οταν μειζον και έλαττον και ισον,

§156C
then It also Becomes-increased and Becomes-decreased and also Becomes-Equalized?
τε αυξανεσθαι και φθινειν και ισουσθαι;
Ari: It becomes in this way. (ουτος.)
Par: But when It Is Standing-Still, from-Being-in-the-state-of-motion,
P3-12 δε οταν ιστηται κινουμενον
and in turn when It Is At-Rest, It Is then changed into That which Is In-Motion, then surely
οταν εστος μεταβαλλει επι το κινεισθαι δη
it is necessary that Self must indeed not Be in Any/Some Singular Period in Time .
δει αυτο γε μη δη ειναι που ενι εν χρονω .
Ari: How could it indeed? (πως δη ;)
Par: But that which was formerly At-Rest, and later-on Moves, and that which was-Moving before and later-on Stands-still; on the one hand, will not Be Able to experience these experiences without Transformation/Mutation/Alteration.

Ari: How could it? (πος γαρ ;)

Par: On the other hand, there Is indeed No-Time (The Gap), in which Anything can Transform At-That-Same-Time; that is, neither when Moving nor when Standing-still.

Aristotle: There is not. (γαρ ουν ου .)

Parmenides: Certainly then, Nothing Can Be Transformed without That which Transforms.

Ari: It is not likely that it can. (ουκ εικος .)

Par: Then at what Time will Anything Transform/Change/Mutate/Alter? For Nothing

§156D

Is Transformed while Being At-Rest, nor while Being In-Motion, nor while Being in Time.

Ari: It will not. (ου γαρ ουν .)

Par: Take notice then, Is This, That which Is Outside of the ordinary,

§156E

Between (The Gap) Motion and The Stationary, by Being in No-Time, and certainly into This

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνευει .)

Par: And surely, if indeed The One Stands-still and Is Moved, It will Be Transformed
It will Be Changed by *The Sudden Turn-About*; and when It Transforms, It Will Be in metaballéi ēkathphēs, kai sthn metaballéi, αν ειη εν No-Time, for *At That Time*, It will neither be Moved, nor Stand-still.

par. Take notice then, does The One also have to Be in this way, in relation to the other

P3-20 αρ’ ουν και εχει ουτω προς τας αλλαξ Transformations? And when It Is changed from That which Is, into that which dissolves, metabolah, othen metaballē ek tou einai eis to apollusathai

§157A

or from that which Is not, to that which comes-to-Be; does It Become at that Time,

η εκ του ειναι μη εις το γιγνεσθαι, γιγνεται τοτε Between (The Gap) certain states of moving and of standing-still? And *At That Time*, It neither metaxōn tīnōn kinnhseon te kai stathseon, kai tōte oute Exists, nor does not Exist, nor Becomes nor dissolves?

εστι ουτε ουκ εστι, ουτε γιγνεται ουτε απολυται; Ari: It certainly does appear to be likely.

γον εικε.

Par: And surely according to The Self/Same Logos (Rep 511B-C), when It Passes from One

P3-21 και δη κατα τον αυτον λογον ιον εξ ενος into Many and from Many into One, *It is neither One nor Many*, neither is *It dispersed* επι πολλα και εκ πολλων εφ εν εστιν ουτε εν ουτε πολλα, ουτε διακρίνεται nor gathered-together. And in *Passing from Like to Unlike*, and from Unlike to Like, ουτε συγκρίνεται. Kai ιον εξ ομοιου επι ανομοιον και εξ ανομοιου επι ομοιον

§157B

*It is neither Like nor Unlike*, nor is Assimilated nor Dissimilated. And while *It Passes from* ουτε ομοιον ουτε ανομοιον, ουτε ομοιοουμενον ουτε ανομοιουμενον: και ιον εκ Small into Big, and into Equal and into Its contraries, *It will neither be Small nor Big*, συμκρου επι μεγα και επι ιον και εις τα εναντια αν ουτε ειη συμκρον ουτε μεγα nor Equal, nor increasing, nor decreasing, nor Equalized.

ουτε ιον ουτε ομαδομενον ουτε φθινον ουτε ισομενον.

Ari: It does not appear that it can.

ουκ εικε.

Par: Certainly then, if *The One Is*, It will undergo all these experiences.

P3-22 δη ει το εν εστιν αν πασχοι παντ’ ταυτα τα παθηματα.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ ου;)
The Fourth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 22 Then must we not consider what The Others will properly undergo if One Is?

Aristotle: We must so consider. (σκέπτεον.)

Par: Then let us say, if One Is, what Those Other than The One Must undergo?

Ari: Let us do so. (λεγομεν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, if indeed The Others Are Otherwise/Different than The One,

then They Are not The One; for then They would not Be Different than The One?

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

§157C

Par: Yet certainly, The Others Are not entirely deprived/sterile of The One, but Participate of It, in a Certain (Definite) Way.

Ari: In a certain way then? (πτι δϊ ;)

Par: Since The Others Are Different than The One in some (indefinite) way by having Parts, for if They had no Parts, They would Be Entirely One.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: But we said that since They have Parts, They will Belong to That which Is Whole.

Ari: We have so affirmed. (γαρ φαιμεν.)

Par: But certainly, it is indeed Necessary that The Whole will Be One composed of Many, and of which Whole, The Many Whole-Parts Are Parts. For Each One of Those Parts must not be a piece/fragment of many, but a Whole-Part of The Whole.

Ari: How is this so? (πως τουτο ;)
§157D
Par: If anything would be a piece of many, among which it would exist, surely then somehow
Self would also be a piece of it-self, and of each one of the others, which is surely impossible,
but of each, It will not be a piece of one of these. If it will not be a piece of all,
and of each, It will not be a piece of the many. But anything that does not-exist-in-one,
and of each, It will not be a piece of the many. But anything that does not-exist-in-one,
either as a piece or anything else at all. Eiναὶ παντὸν τοῦτον, ὥστε εὐθέας, οὐδὲν καὶ μορίον καὶ ἀλλο ὑπολογίζω.
Ari: Surely then it has indeed come to Light. (ἅδε γε φαίνεται.)

§157E
Par: Accordingly then, The Part is not A part of The Many nor of all;
but of One Undefined Idea, and of Some Unity, which we call Whole, which has-come-to-be
One Perfect Idea composed from All; of That which The Part will be a Part.
en teleion εξ ἀπαντῶν, τούτου τὸ μορίον ἀν ειπὶ μορίον.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανταπασι μεν οὖν.)
Par: Accordingly then, if The Others have Parts, then they will also Participate
of The Whole and also of One/Unity/Oneness.
tοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνοῦ.
Ari: Very much so. (πανο γε.)
Par: Accordingly then, Those that Are Other than The One, Must Be One Perfect
Whole which has Parts. (ὁλον εχον μορια .)
Ari: They must be. (ἀναγκη .)
Par: And most certainly, The Self/Same Logos, also applies to each Part. For
The Part Must Participate of The One. For if each of These Parts is a Part, then “each”
tοῦτου ἀναγκῇ μετέχειν τοῦ ενοῦ. γαρ ει ἑκαστὸν αὐτῶν εστὶ μορίον ,το εὑρεσθὼ

§158A
without a doubt, indeed signifies to Be “One”; by first Being Distinct from the others,
then by Being “According to Self”, if indeed It will be that which Is called, “Each Part”.
Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθός.)
Par: But It will indeed Participate of The One, since this Is clear by Being Different
than One; for otherwise It would not Participate, but It would Be One Self; but now
η εν: γαρ ου μετεχεν, ἀλλ’ αν ἦν εν αυτο: δε νυν
on the one hand, it is **Impossible** that **some Part** to **Be One**, except by **The One Self**.

Ari: Impossible. (οδύνατον)

Par: But on the other hand, it is quite **Necessary** that both **The Whole** and **The Part Participate** of **The One**; for on the one hand, **The Whole** of which **The Parts Are Parts**, will **Be One**, but **not** of **The One**. (as in 148b)

Par: Then in turn, **Each Singular Part** of **The Whole**, **Is That** which will **Be a Part** of **The Whole**.

Ari: It is so. (ουτος)

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§158B

Par: Is it not the case then, that **The Beings** which **Participate** of **The One**, **not**? (πως δ' ου)

Par: But Those that **Are Other** than **The One** will **Be Many in some indefinite way**.

Par: For if Those that **Are Other** than **The One Were neither One nor More** than **One**, then They **would be nothing**. (αν ειη ουδεν)

Ari: They would be nothing then. (ου γαρ ουν)

Par: Since **The Beings** that **Participate** both of a **Part of One**, and **The Beings** that **Participate** of **The One Whole**, **Are** indeed **More** than **One**, then **Must** not **for if Those that** **Are Other** than **The One Were neither One nor More** than **One**, then They **would be nothing**. (αν ειη ουδεν)

Ari: **How**? (πως)

Par: Let us **See** in the following way. At the **Time** when They **Partake** of **Something other**

Par: **The Beings** which **Participate** of **The One already Be Unlimited Multitude**?

Ari: **Clearly so**. (δηλα δη)

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§158C

Par: Is it not the case then, that **They are Multitudes**, in which **The One Is Not**?

Par: If we would be willing to take away through our Understanding,

Par: the least possible **Quantity** from **These**, then is it not **Necessary** that **This Very Quantity**

Par: if indeed, **It does Not Participate** of **The One**?

Ari: Mutatis mutandis. (πληθιεις ενεμι)

Par: What then? If we would be willing to take away through our Understanding,

Par: which is taken away, **Must Be a Multitude** and also **Not-One**, if indeed, **It does Not Participate** of **The One**?
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη .)
Par: By Always Considering That Other (Ousia) Nature of The Ideas/Kinds/Genera
in this way, as Subsisting Her Self by Her Self, will not then, such a Quantity of Her Self,
which we may behold, Will Always Be, Unlimited Multitude?
Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανταπασι μεν ουν .)

§158D
Par: And most certainly, whenever Each Part becomes One, Each Part Will Already
Possess Limit, in relation to Each Other, and in relation to The Whole, and
The Whole in relation to The Parts.
Ari: Exactly so then. (κομψη μεν ουν .)
Par: Surely then, on the one hand, it then results for Those Other than The One, as it Is
Reasonable, both from Their Sharing-a-Commonness with Each Other and from The One,
that Something Other Will Come-to-Be within Them-Selves; which certainly Provides Them
The Limit in relation to Each Other; but on the other hand, by The Nature of Them-Selves,
according to Them-Selves (Other/Many), The Unlimited Comes-to-Be.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται .)
Par: Surely then in this way, Those Other than The One, according to both
Wholes and Parts, are Unlimited and also Participate of Limit.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)

§158E
Par: Is it not the case then, that They are Like and Unlike, to Each Other and to Themselves?
Ari: in what way then? (τη δη ;)
Par: Since on the one hand, according to Their Own Nature, All of Them will be,
in some way Unlimited; and in This Way, They are (passively) affected by The Same.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)
Par: And certainly, insofar as They All indeed Participate of Limit,
and by Experiencing in This Way, They will All be The Same.
Ari: How could they not; (πως δ’ ου .)
Par: But on the other hand, inasmuch as They have been so affected so as to be both Limited and Unlimited, they are affected by experiences that are opposite to one another.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

§159A
Par: But opposites are indeed as most Unlike as it is possible.

Ari: Of course, what then? (τι μήν;) Par: Thus on the one hand, each of these experiences, will be both Like them-selves and Like each other; but on the other hand, according to both affections, they are in both ways, most opposite and most Unlike.

Ari: I dare say so. (κινδυνεύει.) Par: Surely then, in this way, The Other Selves will be both Like and Unlike Them-selves and Each-other, ομοια τε και ανομοια αυτοις και αλληλοις.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.) Par: Surely then, They will be both The Same and Other from Each Other, and will be In-Motion and Standing-still, και ουκετι χαλασμα ευρησομεν.

§159B
that all kinds of contrary experiences are undergone by Those that are Other than The One, παντα εναντια τα παθη πεπονθοτα ταλλα του ενος, seeing that They appear to have been so affected, επειπερ ταυτα εφανη πεπονθοτα.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λεγεις ορθως.)
The Fifth Hypothesis

Parallel / Non-Relational

Par: Take notice then, on the one hand, is not The One Separate/Apart/Distinct from the others, and on the other hand, the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel to The One? Then all other, and of the One which exists, whether the others must undergo/experience/suffer.

Ari: Why do you ask? (τι δή ;)

Par: Because nothing exists in some other way besides these ways. One which exists is It not so then, that if on the one hand, we presently let these matters Be as Openly Clear, so then in turn, we can consider, if One Is, whether Those Other than the others, and on the other hand, the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel to The One? Then all other, and of the One which exists, whether the others must undergo/experience/suffer.

Ari: Let us do so. (λεγομεν γαρ ;)

Par: Take notice then, on the one hand, is not The One Separate/Apart/Distinct from the others, and on the other hand, the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel to The One? Then all other, and of the One which exists, whether the others must undergo/experience/suffer.

Ari: All indeed. (παντα γαρ ;)

Par: Accordingly then, there is no other way besides these, in which both The One and the others can subsist in The Self (Parallel) Existence. (Odyssey 602 on Heracles) and the others can subsist in The Self (Parallel) Existence. (Odyssey 602 on Heracles) and The One.

Ari: For there is none. (γαρ ου ;)  (Since They are Parallel)

Par: Accordingly then, The One and the others, never subsist in The Same.

Ari: It does not appear that they do. (ουκ εισεχεν ;)

Par: Are They Separate then? (αρα χωρις ;)

Ari: Yes, they are separate. (ναι ;)

Par: We most certainly affirmed that That which Is Truly One, has no Parts (137C).

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ ;)
Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Whole One be in the others,
nor The Parts of Self, if It is both Separate from the others, and also, if It has no Parts.
ou'te moria autou, ei esti te xorizis tov allon kai echei mh moria.
Ari: How could it not be so? (πως γαρ ;)

§159D
Par: Accordingly then, in no way will the others Participate of The One, since they
neither Participate according to a certain Part of Self, nor according to The Whole.
mepo metexonta kato ti morion autou meta kata olon.
Ari: It does not appear to be likely.
oik eoikey.
Par: Accordingly then, in no way are the others One, nor have/maintain any One in themselves.
Ari: For they have not then.
gar ou ouv.
Par: Accordingly then, neither are the others Many. For if they were Many, then Each Self
would be One by being a Part of The Whole; but now, those other than The One are neither
an en morion tou olou: de xun tallla tou enos esti ou te One nor Many, nor a Whole, nor Parts, since they in no way Participate of Self.
en ou te pollla ou te olon ou te moria, epeidh oudaimi metexei autou.
Ari: Rightly so.
orhosi.

§159E
Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Two nor Three, nor are These Numbers
contained in them, since they are entirely deprived of The One.
enestin en autois, eiper pantarchi stperetai tou enos.
Ari: So it is.
ouwos.
Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike,
or The Same/Selves with The One, nor are Likeness and Unlikeness inherent in them selves.
oute auta to eni, outhe omoiostes kai anomoiostes enestin en autois.
For if selves were Like and Unlike, or Contained Likeness and Unlikeness in themselves, then
gar ei auta eis omoia kai anomoia h exoi omoiostita kai anomoiostita en eautois,
those other than The One would somehow Contain in themselves, Two Opposite Ideas.
ta allla tou enos an pou exoi en eautois duo enantia eidi.
Ari: So it has come to Light.
phainetai.
Par: But it is indeed impossible for anything to Participate of Two Opposite Ideas,
which do not in any way Participate of The One.
Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον .)
§160A
Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor Both.
For on the one hand, if they were Like or Unlike, then They would Participate
of One Different Idea; but on the other hand, if they were Both Like and Unlike, then
They would Participate of Two Opposite Ideas; but this has been shown to be impossible.

Ari: This is true. (αληθη.)
Par: Accordingly then, they are neither themselves nor others,
or In-motion nor Standing-still, nor generated nor dissolved, nor are greater nor less,
or Equal; nor do they undergo anything else of this kind. For if they could sustain undergoing
any such experience, then They would also Participate of One and Two and Three,
and so also in relation to It-Self and in the (non) relation to the other selves.
Ari: All this is most true. (αληθεστατα.)
Par: Surely then in this way, if One Is, then The One Is All, and also, nothing at all;
and so also in relation to It-Self and in the (non) relation to the other selves.
Ari: This is entirely so.

§160B
and of Even and of Odd; all of which, have indeed been shown to be impossible for themselves
and to Participate, by being entirely deprived of The One.
Ari: All this is most true. (αληθεστατα.)
Par: Surely then in this way, if One Is, then The One Is All, and also, nothing at all;
and so also in relation to It-Self and in the (non) relation to the other selves.
Ari: This is entirely so.
The Sixth Hypothesis

If X is not, then X must be other

**Parmenides: 24** Very well. Surely then, after this, should we not consider,

\[ \text{Εἰςν : δὴ δὲ μετὰ τουτο άρ' ου σκέπτεον,} \]

what must be the result, if The One is not?

\[ \text{τί χρὴ συμβιαινεῖν εἰ το εν εστὶ μῆ;} \]

(The Word Hypothesis)

**Aristotle:** We must so consider. (σκέπτεον .)

**Par:** What then, will be the hypothesis herself, if One is not?

\[ \text{ὑποθέσεις αυτή, εἰ εν εστίν μῆ;} \]

Will it then differ in any way from the following hypothesis: If Not-One is not?

\[ \text{αρὰ διαφέρει τι τησδὲ , εἰ μή ευ εστίν μῆ;} \]

[[Pierre: Consider 151E8 :]

“The on the one hand, To Be, is in some way Present with It, if indeed It Is One. But what else is To Be, than The Participation of Ousia with The Present, The Past and The Future?]]

**Ari:** It will indeed differ. (μεντοι διαφέρει .)

§160C

**Par:** Will it merely differ, or is the expression, if Not-One Is not,

\[ \text{μονον διαφέρει , η εστίν ειπεῖν εἰ μή ευ εστὶ μῆ} \]

Entirely Opposite to the hypothesis, if One is not?

\[ \text{παν τουναντιον του εἰ εν εστίν μῆ;} \]

**Ari:** Entirely opposite. (παν τουναντιον .)

**Par:** But what if anyone were to say, if Greatness Is not’ or ‘Smallness Is not’,

\[ \text{δ' τι εἰ τις λεγοι , εἰ μεγεθος εστίν μη} \]

or anything else of this kind, then they should make it clear in each of these cases,

\[ \text{η τι αλλο των τοιοτων , αρα αν δῆλοι ἕφ' εκαστῳ} \]

that they speak of The Non-Being, as something Other? (The Principle)

\[ \text{στι λεγοι το μη ον τι ετερον ;} \]

of The 6th .PG)

**Ari:** Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that now they also make it clear what they mean when they

\[ \text{ουκουν νυν και δῆλοι λεγει οταν} \]

say, if One Is not, that The Non-Being Is Other from The Others,

\[ \text{ειπη} \] ει ευ εστι μη , στι το μη ον ετερον των αλλων

and so we will know, That which they mean?

\[ \text{και ἰσμεν} \] ο λεγει ;

**Ari:** We will know. (ἰσμεν [ειδομαι].)

**Par:** On the one hand, when they say One, first of all, do they speak of something

\[ \text{μεν σταν ειπη ευ , πρωτον αρα λεγει τι} \]
that *Is Knowable*, and secondly, of *something Other* from *The Others*, whether they add γνωστὸν, επείτα ἐτερὸν τῶν ἄλλων, εἰτε προσθείς *existence* to *Self* or *non-existence*; for what they call *non-existence*, will be *no less* to εἶναι αὐτῷ εἰτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι: γαρ τι τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἄττων

§160D

*recognized/known*, and that *non-existence* is *Different* from *The Others*; or is it not so? γιγνόσκεται καὶ στὶ διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. η ὦ; Ari: It is necessarily so. (ἀναγκῇ.) Par: Accordingly then, we must affirm from the beginning, what *Must Be*, if *One Is not*, [Π6-07] ἀρα λεκτεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὶ χρὴ εἶναι, εἰ εν εστὶ μὴ, in the following way. Thus on the one hand, as it is *Reasonable*, *This Must Belong to Self*; οδὲ. οὐν μὲν, οἷς εοικεν, τοῦτο δὲι ὑπαρχειν αὐτῷ, first of all, there *Must Be Knowledge of Self*, or else, nothing which is said προτὸν εἶναι εἰσπίτημα αὐτοῦ, η μηδὲ τι ο λεγεται *Will Be Recognized/Known*, when anyone says, if *One Is not*.

gιγνόσκεσθαι, σταν τις εἴπη ει εν ἐστιν μη. Ari: True. (ἀληθῇ.) Par: Is this not also the case then, that *The Others Must Be Other* from *Self*, [Π6-08] οὐκοῦν καὶ τα ἄλλα εἶναι ετερὰ αὐτοῦ, or else *That would not Be said to Be Other* from *The Others*?
 η εκεῖνο μηδὲ λέγεσθαι ετερὸν τῶν ἄλλων;

§160E

*the Difference-in-Kind* of *The Others*, but of *The Difference* of *That*. τὴν εἰσπίτημα τῶν ἄλλων, ἄλλα τὴν εκεῖνου. Ari: So it has come to *Light*. (φαινεῖται.) Par: And certainly, *The Being* that *Is Not-One*, *Must Participate of That* and of a *Certain* [Π6-10] καὶ γε μὴν τὸ οὖν μὴ εν μετέχει τοῦ εκεῖνου καὶ τινὸς *One and of This* and in relation to *This* and of *These* and *All such as These*. For then, τοῦ καὶ τουτοῦ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τουτῶν καὶ παντῶν τῶν τοιούτων, γαρ neither could *The One Be* spoken of, nor of *Those Other* than *The One*, nor would οὐ αὐτὸ τὸ εν ἐλεγετο οὐδ’ τοῦ ετερὰ τοῦ ενος, οὐδ’ αν anything of *That Be Present with That*, nor could anything *Be* said about *Self*, τι εκεῖνον ἡ εκεῖνο, οὐδ’ αν τι ελεγετο αὐτω, if *It neither Participated of Some nor of Those Others*.
 εἰ μητε μετην του τινὸς μητε των τουτων ἄλλων.
 Ari: Rightly said. (ὁρθῶς.)

§161A

Par: Surely then on the one hand, it *Is not Possible for to be*, to *be Present* with *The One*, [Π6-11] δὴ μὴν τε οὐχ οἰον εἰναι τῷ ενι,
if indeed It does not exist; but on the other hand, nothing prevents it to Participate of many, εἰπέρ γε μὴ εστὶ, δὲ οὐδὲν καλὸνει μετεχεῖν πολλῶν. But it Must even do so, if indeed The One Is not, and Is not something else than that. ἀλλὰ αναρκή καὶ, εἰπέρ γε τὸ εν εστὶν μὴ καὶ μὴ ἀλλο εκεῖνο. Certainly then, if neither The One nor that exists, then nothing will exist. But if The μέντοι εὶ μὴ το εν μὴ’ εκεῖνο μὴ εσταί, ἀλλὰ o Logos is about something else, then there is nothing that can be spoken of. λόγος περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ δει φθεγγεῖσθαι:
But if non-existence underlies That One and Is not something else, then it Is also Necessary εἰ μὴ εἰναι υποκεῖται εκεῖνο εν καὶ μὴ τὸ ἄλλο, καὶ αναρκή for Self to also have a Share of that non-existence and of many others. αὐτῷ μετείναι τοῦ εκεῖνο καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων.
Ari: Entirely so.
  πανυ γε.
Par: Accordingly then, Unlikeness Is also Present with Self in relation to the others.
Πε-12 ἀρα ἀναρκὶοιτὶς εστὶν Καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα.
For the others, by being other than The One, will also be of a different kind/genus.
γαρ τὰ ἄλλα ὑπὲρ τὸ εἰστὶν ἐνοικὸν αὐτῷ εἰ καὶ εἰς εἰστὶν εἰσὶν.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: But are not those of another kind, various?
Πε-13 δ’ οὐκ τὰ εἰστὶν ἐνοικὸν ἄλλοια;
Ari: How then could they not be?
  πῶς δ’ οὐ;
Par: But are not the various, Unlike?
Πε-14 δ’ οὐκ τὰ ἄλλοια ἀνομοια;
Ari: They are indeed unlike. (μὲν οὐν ἀνομοια.)

§161B
Par: Is it not the case then, that if indeed they are unlike The One,
Πε-15 οὐκουν εἰπέρ εστὶν ἀνομοι ○ τὸ ενι, it is evident that they will indeed be unlike That which Is Unlike.
  δὴ λογος οἴτι το αὐτῷ εἰς εἰς ανομοιαν ανομοιοί.
Ari: It is evident. (δὴ λογο.)
Par: Certainly then, Unlikeness will also Be in The One,
Πε-16 δὴ ανομοιοιτὶς αὐτῷ τὸ ενι, according to which, The Others will Be Unlike in relation to Self.  
  ἀναγκη συν αὐτῷ εἰς τὸν εἰς αὐτὸν; 
Ari: So it is Reasonable. (εἰσεί.)
Par: But certainly, if It is Unlike The Others,
Πε-17 δὲ δὴ εἰ αὐτῷ εστὶν ανομοιοιτὶς τῶν ἄλλων, then must not Self Be The Likeness of It-Self?
  αὐτῷ αὐτῷ εἰς εἰς εἷς αὐτῷ εἰς τὸν εἰς αὐτόν; 
Ari: How? (πῶς ;)
Par: If Unity were Unlike The One, then The Logos, would somehow
Πε-18 εἰ ενος εστὶν ανομοιοιτὶς τὸ ενι, o λόγος αὐτῷ αὐτῷ not Be Possible about The One, nor about That which is Like It; nor would there Be  
  οὐκοι συν αὐτῷ το ενος τον εις αὐτόν, οὐδ’ αὐτῷ εἰς
the hypothesis about One, but about something other than One.
η υποθέσεις περί ενός, ἄλλα περὶ ἄλλου ἡ ενός.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανο γε.)

§161C
Par: But that must not indeed be the case.
Ari: Without a doubt. (ου δήτα.)
Par: Accordingly then, The Likeness to The One to It-Self Must Be of Self.
Ari: It must. (δει.)
Par: And most certainly in turn, The One Is not Equal to Others. For if It Were Equal,
then It would already Be and It would also Be Like Them-Selves, according to Equality;
but both of these conditions Are Impossible, if indeed One Is not.
Ari: Impossible. (αναγκη.)
Par: Then since, The One Is not Equal to the others, then must it not Be Necessary
that the others Must also not Be Equal to That (One)?
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: But are not those that Are not-Equal, unequal?
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: But are not those that are unequal, unequal to That which Is Unequal?
Ari: How could they not be? (πως ου δε')
Par: And surely then, The One will Participate of Inequality,
because of which, the others are unequal to Self.
Ari: It will so participate. (μετέχει.)

§161D
Par: But certainly, Bigness and Smallness do indeed belong to Inequality.
Ari: They do indeed. (γερ εστι.)
Par: Accordingly then, Bigness and Smallness and such as these, belong to The One?
Ari: It appears likely. (κινδυνευει.)
Par: Certainly then, Bigness and Smallness always stand-apart from each other.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανο γε.)
Par: Accordingly then, something always exists between Them-Selves.
Ari: It is so. (ἔστιν .)
Par: Therefore, can you assign anything else between Them-Selves, except Equality?

Equality Is also Present, by Being Between These.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

§161E
Par: Surely then, as it is Reasonable, The One that does not Truly exist,

will also have a Share of Equality, Bigness and Smallness.

Ari: So it is Reasonable. (εοίκεν .)
Par: And certainly, Self Must also Participate of Ousia in a Definite way.

Kai γε μην αυτο δει και μετεχειν ουσιας πη.

Ari: How so? (πως ð;)
Par: Self Must Possess Ousia in This way that we have described. For otherwise,

we shall not speak Truly when we say, The One Is not; but if we do speak Truly,

then it is clear that we have affirmed that Selves Are Beings: or is it not in this way?

Ari: It is indeed thus. (μεν ουν ουτω .)

§162A
Par: Then since, we affirm that we speak The Truth, then it Is also Necessary

to affirm that we speak of Beings.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκῇ .)
Par: Accordingly then, as it is Reasonable, The One which Has no Being, exists.

For if it were not the case that there will be non-Being, then That which Is would

let something go to non-Being, and it (non-Being) would immediately be Being.

Ari: Altogether so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν .)
Par: Accordingly then, Self Must Possess The Bond of That which Is not, in order to be

non-Being, if It is going to not Be; just as, in a similar way, The Being Must Possess

the Bond to not Be non-Being, in order that It may in turn Perfectly Be such as It Is.

The Bond to not Be non-Being, in order that It may in turn Perfectly Be such as It Is.
For in this way, especially, both, The Being will Be, and the non-Being will not Be; on the one hand, The Being Participates of Ousia in order that The Being Be; but on the other hand, μεν το ον μετηχοντα ουσιας του ον ειναι, de

\section*{§162B}
The Being Participates of non-Ousia, in order that It may be, non-Being, (The μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον, Patho-logos) if It is going to Perfectly Be. Furthermore, on the one hand, the non-Being Participates ει μελετει τελεως ειναι, de μεν το μη ον non-Ousia, in order that it may be non-Being; whereas on the other hand, non-Being μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον de Participates of Ousia, in order that it may be, non-Being, if in turn, ουσιας του ειναι μη ον, ei au it will also Perfectly not Be, the non-Being.

και τελεως μη εσται το μη ον.

Ari: Most truly, (αληθεστατα.)

Par: Is it not the case then, seeing that both non-Being is present with Real-Being,

And That which Is, is present with non-Real-Being, is it not also the case that The One, και του ειναι μη το οντι, και το ενι, since indeed It Is not, Must Necessarily Share of existence, in order that It may not Be.

επειδη εστι ουκ αναγκη μεταναι του ειναι εις το μη ειναι.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Certainly then, Ousia will also Manifestly Be with The One, if It Is not.

Ari: It will so appear.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ ου ;)

Par: Therefore, it is also Possible that that which is maintained/kept in some way,

ουν τε Οιον το εχον πως is not so maintained, when it is not changed from this condition (passive) by habit? μη ουτω εχειν, μη μεταβαλλον εκ ταυτης της εξεως;

Ari: It cannot. (τε οιον ουχ.)

\section*{§162C}
Par: Accordingly then, everything which can be kept in this way, and in turn

\noindent not kept in this (indefinite) way, signifies, that which can be changed in such a way.

μη ουτως, σημαντει το μεταβολην τοιουτον.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ ου ;)

Par: But is Alteration a Motion; or what else should we call It?

Ari: It is a motion. (κινησις.)

Par: Is it not the case, that The One has been shown to be both Being and non-Being?

ουκουν το εν εφανη τε ον και ουκ ον;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Accordingly then, It has been shown to be kept in this way and not kept in this way.

P6-45 αρα φανεται εχον ουτως και ουχ ουτως.

Ari: It has so appeared. (εικονεν.)
Par: Accordingly then, has not The One Being also been shown to be in Motion,

P6-46 αρα ουκ το εν ον και πεφανται κινουμενον, seeing that It also has to be altered from Being into non-Being.

επειπερ και εχον μεταβολην εκ του ειναι επι το μη ειναι.

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνευει.)
Par: But certainly, if indeed It in no way Is among The Real Beings, since It Is not,

P6-47 αλλα μην ει γε μηδαμου εστι τον ουτων, οες εστιν ουκ, then if indeed It is not, It will not alternate from one place to another.

ειπερ εστιν μη, αν ουδ’ μεθισταιτο(μεθιστημι) ποθεν ποι.

Ari: How is that the case? (πος γαρ ;)
Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not be moved by Alteration.

P6-48 αρα αν γε ουκ κινοιτ’ το μεταβαινειν.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου .)

§162D

Par: Certainly then, neither will It Turn-about in The Self ;

P6-49 μην ουδε ον στρεφοιτο εν τω αυτω for It will not Grasp The Self/Same in any way. For The Being Is The Self/Same.

γαρ απτεται ταυτω ουδαμω. γαρ το ον εστι ταυτων: Therefore it Is Impossible for non-Being to Reside in any of The Real Beings.

δε ειναι αδυνατον το μη ον εν τω των οντων.

Ari: For it is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον .)
Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, cannot Turn-about in That in which It Is not.

P6-50 αρα το εν ον μη, αν δυναιτο ουκ στρεφεσθαι εν εκεινο εν ο εστιν μη.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ ουν ου .)
Par: Certainly then, The One, whether The One that Is, or The One that Is not,

P6-51 μην το εν ουτε το ον ουτε το ον μη cannot in any way be altered into something other than It-Self. For then The Logos would ουδε που αλλοιουται εαυτου. γαρ ο λογος αν no longer be about The One, but about something else, if indeed It was altered from It-Self.

ου ετε την περι του ενος, αλλα περι τινος αλλου. ειπερ αυτο ηλλοιουτο εαυτου.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθος .)

§162E

Par: But if It does not alter, nor turn-about in The Same, nor undergoes transition,

P6-52 δε ει μητ’ αλλοιουται μητε στρεφεται εν ταυτω μητε μεταβαινει is there any way in which It can still be moved?

αρ αν πη ετι κινοιτο ;

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ ;)
Par: Most certainly then, That which is Immovable must necessarily be kept at Rest;

P6-53 γε μην το ακινητον αναγκη αγειν ησυχαιαν, but That which is at Rest/Peace/ Quiet must Abide/Stand-still.

δε τον ησυχαζον εσταναι.
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη .)
Par: Accordingly then The One that Is not, as it was shown, both stands-still and is moved.

§163A
Par: And most certainly, if indeed It were moved, there is a Great Necessity that Self

must be altered. For in so far as anything may be moved, it is no longer kept in the same way
as it was before, but in another way.

Ari: In this way. (ουτως .)
Par: Surely then, since The One moves, It is also altered.

§163B
habit/condition; but That which Is not altered, can neither come-to-be generated nor dissolved?

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη .)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, The One which Is not, by being altered,
will be generated and dissolved; but on the other hand, by not undergoing alteration,
it will not be subject to either generation nor dissolution. And thus, The One that Is not,
will be generated and dissolved, and will not be generated nor dissolved.

Ari: For thus it will not.

γαρ ουν ου .
The Seventh Hypothesis

§163C
Par: Is it not the case then, that we have already said,

P7-02  οὐκουν,  φαμὲν,  what must result in relation to Self, if One Is not?
ti  χρὴ  ἐξιμιαίνειν  περὶ  αὐτοῦ,  εἰ  ἐν  ἐστὶ  μὴ;
Ari: Yes. (nai)
Par: But when we say That which Is not, do we not then signify anything else,

P7-03  δὲ  οὐταν  λέγομεν  τὸ  εστὶν  μὴ,  ἂν  μὴ  αρὰ  σημαίνει  τι  ἄλλο  than the absence of Ousia from That which we say, Is not? (The Principle of The 7th)
η  αποστίησαν  οὐσίας  τουτῷ  ὦ  φεμὲν  ειναι  μὴ;
Ari: Nothing else. (οὐδὲν ἄλλο.)
Par: Therefore, when we say that anything is not, do we say that Self is not

P7-04  οὖν  οταν  φομὲν  τι  εἰναι  μὴ,  ποτὲρον  φομὲν  αὐτο  εἰναι  οὐκ  in some way , but that in some way It is? Or does the term ‘is not’, simply signify this;
ποις,  δὲ  ποις  εἰναι;  η  το  λέγομεν  εστὶν  μὴ  ἀπλῶς  σημαίνει  τουτῳ  that It is in no way, anywhere, since It does not Participate in a certain definite way
οτι  εστὶν  οὐδαμῶς  οὐδάη,  οὐδὲ  μετεχεῖ  πῆ  of Ousia since indeed It is, the non Being (162A-B)?
ουσίας  γε  το  μη  ον;
Ari: It signifies this, most simply.(μὲν οὖν ἀπλοῦστατα .)

§163D
Par: Accordingly then, neither will the non Being, Be Able to Be,

P7-05  ἀρὰ  οὔτε  αν  το  μη  ον  δύναιτο  εἰναι  nor ever Participate in any other way of Ousia.
οὔτε  μετεχεῖν  οὐδαμῶς  ἄλλος  οὐσίας.
Ari: For it cannot. (γὰρ οὐ .)
Par: But that which becomes and that which dissolves, are not anything else than

P7-06  δὲ  το  γίγνεσθαι  καὶ  το  απολλυσθαι  ἢν  μη  τι  ἄλλο  η
the one to have a Share of Ousia, but the other to lose Ousia?
to μεν μεταλαμβάνειν ουσίας, to δ’ απολλύναι ουσιαν;
Ari: Nothing else, (οὐδὲν ἀλλ’.)
Par: Then that which has indeed no Share of This, can neither receive nor lose Self.
P7-07 δε ω γε μὴν μετεστήν τοιτου, αν ουτ’ λαμβανοι ουτ’ απολλύοι αυτο.
Ari: How could it ? (πῶς γαρ ;)
Par: Accordingly then, seeing that The One in no way Is,
P7-08 αρα επειδή τω ενι ουδαμή εστιν,
It can neither possess, nor lose, nor Partake of Ousia, in any way whatsoever.
ουτε εκτεον ουτε απαλλακτεον ουτε μεταληπτεον ουσιας ουδαμος .
Ari: That is reasonable. (εἰκος .)
Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, can neither be dissolved nor generated,
P7-09 αρα το εν ον μη ουτε απολλυται ουτε γιγνεται ,
if indeed It in no way Participates of Ousia .
επειπερ ουδαιμη μετεχει ουσιας .
Ari: It does not appear that it will . (ου φαινεται .)

§163E
Par: Accordingly then, It can not be altered in any way; for if It were
P7-10 αρ’ ουδ’ αλλοιωται ουδαμη : γαρ αν
to experience This Participation, then It would already Be generated and dissolved .
πασχον τουτο ηδη γιγνοιτο τε και απολλυματο .
Ari: This is true. (αληθη.)
Par: But if It is not altered, then Is it not Necessary that It can not be moved ?
P7-11 δε ει μη αλλοιωται , μηδε αναγκη ουκ κινεσθαι ;
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: Certainly then, The Being which exists in no way at all, we shall say, can not
P7-12 μην ον μηδαμον φησομεν ουδε
Stand-still . For That which Is-At-Rest, must Always Be, in a Certain way in The Self .
esstai ναρ το εστος δει αει ειναι εν τινι τω αυτω .
Ari: In the self; how could it not ?
tω αυτω : πως γαρ ου ;
Par: Surely then, we must say in turn, that in this way , the non Being ,
P7-13 δη λεγομεν αν ουτω το μη ου
Can Never, stand-still nor be moved .
μης ποτε εσταναι μης κινεσθαι .
Ari: For it cannot do so. (γαρ μη ουν .)
Par: But clearly, nothing of The Real Beings Is indeed Present with Self ;
P7-14 αλλα μην ουδ’ τι των οντων εστι γε αυτω .
for this , by Participating of Being, would Already Participate of Ousia .
γαρ του μετεχον οντος αν ηδη μετεχοι ουσιας .
Ari: Clearly. (δηλον .)

§164A
Par: Accordingly then, neither Bigness nor Smallness, nor Equality, Belongs to Self .
P7-15 αρα ουτε μεγεθος ουτε σμικροτης ουτε ισοτης εστιν αυτω .
Ari: It does not. (γαρ ου .)
Par: Most certainly then, neither Likeness nor Unlikeness, neither in relation to Self nor in relation to the others, will Be with Self.

Ari: It does not appear that it will. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

Par: What follows then? Can The Other Beings Be in any way Present with Self, if None Can Be Present with Self?

Ari: They cannot. (οὐκ εἰσί.)

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor The Same/Selves nor Other, from Self.

Ari: They are not. (γὰρ οὐκ.)

Par: What then? Can anything be of That, or with That, or with anything, or of another, or with another, or at some time Past, or at some time in the Future, or Now.

Ari: There can not. (εἰσί οὐκ.)

Par: Surely then, in this way, One Being Is not, not can exist in any way at all.

Ari: Surely then, it is indeed not likely to be the case, that it can exist anywhere.
The Eighth Hypothesis

Par: Now then, let us yet declare, what must happen to the others, if One is not.

Ari: For we say so.

Par: Then, on the one hand, selves must exist in some (indefinite) way; (The Principle of The 8th PG)

If others do not at all exist, we could not discourse about the others.

Ari: So it is.

Par: But if The Logos is about the others, then the others are indeed other.

Or do you not require that both another and the other be applied to the self?

Ari: I do at least.

Par: Accordingly then, if they are also about to be other, to the others,

then there is something from which they will be other.

Ari: It is necessary.

Par: Certainly then, what will this be? For they will indeed not be other than The One, by non Being.

Ari: They will not.

Par: Accordingly then, they are other from each other; for this still remains for selves;

or else to be other from nothing. (for you are αλλοι μηδενος.)

Ari: Rightly so.

Par: Accordingly then, each is other from the others, according to multitude.

For they cannot be so according to One, and by the non Being of One. But each mass of selves, γαρ αν ουκ ειη οια κατα εν τε ενος ιηντος αλλ’ εκαστος ο σωκος αυτων ως.
§164D

as it appears, is infinite multitude; and even if anyone should take that which appears to be
eoikev este apeiropo pl theor, kai ti lambh dokouv
the smallest piece, just as a dream in sleep, it then suddenly appears to be opposite to that
to simkrataton osper onar en usn eexafyns faivetai antt
which appeared to be one, and instead of that which appeared to be the smallest, it would now
doxantos enos, kai antt simkratatoi eina
be many; that is, an immensely great mass, in relation to the minute fragments of self.
einai polla, pammegthes proz ta keramatizomena ex autou.
Ari: Most rightly. (orhotaata.)
Par: Surely then, among such masses, the others will be other from one another,
[18–09] de toinoutwn ogkon talla an eis alla allhlon,
if One has no Being and others exist.
ei enos mi otnos alla estin.
Ari: Perfectly so. (men komidh ouv.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that there will be many masses/heaps,
[PB-10] oukouv eisonta polloi ogko
each of which, will appear to be one, but which is not so, if indeed One will not be at all?
kekastos phainomenos eis, de oan ou, eiperi en estai mi;
Ari: It will be so. (outo.)

§164E

Par: Thus, there will also appear to be a number of selves,
[PB-11] de kai doxei einai arithmos auton,
if indeed each of these heaps, being many, also appear to be one.
eiperi ekeasto v, otnov pollov, kai en
Ari: Entirely so. (pavno ye.)
Par: And certainly, some which are among the selves will appear to be even
[PB-12] de kai de doxei einai arithmos auton,
de ta perita ouk allhvs, eiperi en estai mi.
Ari: They will not be so. (gar ou ouv.)
Par: And most certainly, that which is smallest, as we have said,
[PB-13] kai ge men simkrataton, phmen,
will also appear to be in selves, but this will appear to be many and big,
ka doxei einai en autois, de touto faivetai polla kai megala
in relation to each of the many, since they are small.
165A proe ekastov ton pollov wos otnov simkron.
Ari: How could it not? (poxo de ouv.)
Par: And certainly each mass will seem to the eye of opinion to be equal to the many
[PB-14] kai men ekastos ogkos doxeasthai einai isos tois pollois
and small masses. For it will not appear to change from a more into a lesser quantity,
ka simkrois. gar an ou phainomenos metebainev ek meizhnoi eis elattov,
before it appears to arrive at something between; but this will be a phantasm of equality.
proi doxei evthi eis to metaxi; de touto an eina phantasma isostitos.
Ari: It is likely. (eikos.)
Par: Is it not the case, that although it appears to have a limit, in relation to
[PB-15] oukouv kai eivon peras proz
another mass, and self in relation to self, it neither has a
άλλον στόχον, τε εαυτός προς αυτόν ουτε εχον
Beginning nor End nor Middle?
ορισθείν απερας ουτε μεσον;
Ari: In what way then? (πη δη.)
Par: For when anyone grasps something of These through the empirical mind, as if
§165B
it were existing, then another “beginning” will always appear to be prior to “the beginning”,
ον, αλλη αρχη τε αει φαινεται προ της αρχης, and after the end, another “end” will always still remain; and in “the middle” there will
tε μετα την τελευτην τε ετερα τελευτη υπολοιπομενη, τε εν τω μεσω τε always be, others more inward than “the middle”; but smaller, because each of the selves
αλλα μεθανετα του μεσου, δε σμικροτερα, δια εκαστου αυτων is not Capable of receiving The One, and inasmuch as by The One not Being.
μη δυνασθαι λαμβανεσθαι το ενος, ατε του ενος ουκ οντος.
Ari: This is most true.
αληθεστατα.
Par: Surely then, all The Being, which anyone may grasp through the empirical mind, I think, must necessarily be broken-up into minute pieces. For the masses will, in some way οιμαι, αναγκη θρυπτησθαι κερματιζομενον, γαρ ογκος αν που always be apprehended without One/Unity.
αει λαμβανοντα ανευ ενος.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανι μεν ουν.)
Par: Is it not indeed the case then, that such a mass, on the one hand, to those who
§165C
behold it from afar and with a dull eye, it will necessarily appear to be one; whereas on the
οροντι πορροθεν και αμβλυν, αναγκη φαινεσθαι εν, other hand, to those who See it with an Intellectual Eye, closely and acutely, then in that case
δε νοοντι εγχυθεν και οξυ, will not each “one” be revealed to be infinite in multitude, if indeed each “one” is deprived of
εκαστον εν φανηκαι απειρον πληθει, ειπερ στερεται The One, by not Being?
tου ενος μη οντος);
Ari: Most necessarily so. (μεν αναγκαιοτατον ουν.)
Par: Surely then, in this way each of the others must appear to be Unlimited and
§19-18 δη ουτο εκαστα ταλλα δει φαινεσθαι απειρα τε και Limited, and One and many, if One is not at all, but those other than The One exist.
περας και εν και πολλα, ει εν μη, δε ταλλα του ενος εστιν.
Ari: It must be so. (γαρ δει.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that they will appear to be both like and unlike?
§19-20 ουκουν δοξει ειναι και ομοια τε και ανομοια;
Ari: In what way, then? (πη δη;)
Par: On the one hand, in such a way as, to those who behold others from afar,

everything appears to be one, as in a shadow painting, by appearing to have experienced

The Same and by appearing to be like.

The Same

Par: But on the other hand, as they approach closely, they will appear to be many and other, and diverse from and unlike themselves, through the phantom appearance of the other.

Par: Certainly then, the massive selves will necessarily appear to be both like and unlike themselves, and to each other.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε .)

§165D
Par: But on the other hand, as they approach closely, they will appear to be many and other, and diverse from and unlike themselves, through the phantom appearance of the other.

Ari: It is so. (ουτω .)

Par: Certainly then, the massive selves will necessarily appear to be both like and unlike themselves, and to each other.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν .)

Par: Is it not so then, that these are both selves and others from each other, and have contact and are separate from themselves, and are moved with every possible motion, and are stationary in every way, and are generated and dissolved, and are neither of these, and all such things possible, which we can at this time easily go through in detail, that is and panta ta toisautha pou, α ημην ηδη ευπετες διελθειν,

§165E

of course, if One has no Being and many exist?

Ari: Most true then.

αληθεστατα μεν ουν.
The Ninth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 27 Surely then, let us return again to The Beginning one more time, and relate what must then be, for those other than The One, if One Is not.

Aristotle: Let us so relate. (γαρ εἰπόμενον οὖν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, the others will not be one.

Ari: How could they? (πῶς γαρ;) Par: Yes indeed will they be many; for one would also be present in many.

Ari: True. (ἀλήθη;) Par: Then, by One not being present in the others, neither are others many nor one.

Ari: They are not. (γαρ οὖν.)

§166A

Par: Nor will they indeed appear to be one nor many.

Ari: Why then? (τι δῆ;) Par: Since the others cannot in any way ever have any Communion with The Real Beings, if none of them are one, then all of them are nothing; so that neither can many exist. For if one is not, then It can not be opined to be any one particular aspect of the others, nor yet of many; for it is Impossible to form an opinion of many without One.

Ari: It cannot. (ἀλήθη;) Par: Accordingly then, if One Is not, then It cannot be opined to be any one particular aspect of the others, nor yet of many; for it is Impossible to form an opinion of many without One.

Ari: It is impossible. (γαρ αὐδανατὸν.)
Par: Accordingly then, If One Is not, then neither will the others exist.

nor can one, nor many, be opined.

Ari: It is not likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, neither do like nor unlike exist.

Ari: They do not. (γάρ οὐ.)

Par: Most certainly then, nor the same nor the other, nor those who grasp, nor those that are separate, nor others such as those we have before described in detail as having an appearance of existing; for no particular of these will exist, nor will the others appear to be if One Is not.

Ari: True. (αληθετατα.)

§166C

Par: Is it not the case then, if we must summarily say, that if One is not, and nothing exists; then will our assertion be Correctly stated?

Ari: Altogether so.

Par: Now then, let this then be affirmed by you and me; and we may add this also:

That if One Is, or Is not, then as it is likely/reasonable, both in relation to Self and in relation to the others, and also in relation to them-selves and to each other, and appear to be, and also, do not appear to be.

Ari: Most true. (αληθετατα.)